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ABSTRACT 
This is a dual study of British intervention in the 
Saint Domingue Revolution. It treats the military occupation 
of 1793-98 both as an aspect of Britain's imperial and military 
policy, and, more particularly, as a window on a West Indian 
society in the process of disintegration. Political and 
military events provide the framework for a narrative. whose main 
theme is the shifting balance of power within Dominguan society 
between the black white and coloured communities. Certain areas 
receive special attention - the respective roles of a creole, 
autonomist mentality and of the Counter-Revolution in bringing 
about British intervention; and defensive thinking in 
Government policy-making; disease and mortality among the British 
troops; the interaction of colonial social groups with one 
another and with the occupying forces; the econpmy of the 
occupied zone; black responses to the Revolution, and the 
progressive destruction of the plantation regime. A wide range 
of sources is employed, many of them previously unexploited. 
INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of the French Revolution, Saint Domingue was one of 
the wealthiest colonies in the world and a keystone of the Atlantic 
economy. From the middle years of the 18th century, while its 
planters and fertile soil produced ever increasing quantities of 
sugar, coffee and other high-grade, valuable staples, its tropical 
patchwork of plantations and hamlets and handful of ports had been 
fusing into a self-consciously creole society through the processes 
of parish life and local inter-marriage. 
1 
After 130 years of French 
metropolitan rule, Saint Domingue had developed into a community of 
insular individuality, still bound economically to the mother country 
by the Exclusif and governed by an administrative system long under 
fire in the colony and the metropolis. Less than a decade before, 
British colonists in North America had shown that a colonial 
rebellion could be feasible, respectable and profitable. 
If colonial self confidence was the reward of Saint Domingue's 
remarkable productivity, human misery was its cost. In these last 
years of the Ancien Regime, manacled negroes, shipped from Africa, 
were being imported at a rate of nearly 40,000 per annum to be broken 
into the rhythm of plantation slavery. 
2 
Their cause had already 
found champions across the sea in the urban, bureaucratic world which 
was emerging and was eventually to eradicate the institution of 
slavery everywhere. To Raynal, however, it seemed the slaves needed 
only a leader to gain their freedom. The whites of Saint Domingue 
numbered merely 7% of the population. 
3 
They slept, in Mirabeau's 
words, au pied du Vesuve. 
4 
The prophets of doom were of course proved right. At the end 
of August, 1791, after three years of agitation and violence at all 
levels of colonial society, the slaves of the Plaine du Nord rose 
against their masters, followed shortly by the free coloureds of the 
West Province. Massacre and destruction engulfed great tracts of 
the colony. By late 1793, planters were fighting French soldiers 
alongside British troops they had called to their aid. 
Events evolved this far, however, only through the complex 
interaction of indigenous and external forces. This classic struggle 
in the Caribbean was worked out against a background of the French 
Revolution. Sharing elements of common causation, the two revolutions 
(vi) 
were complexly intertwined and also largely co-eval, finding their 
conclusions respectively in the success and failure of First Consul 
Bonaparte. To what extent, though, were the 'sparks' of the French 
Revolution required to detonate the colonial 'powder keg', as the 
metaphor usually runs? Conversely, just how combustible was Saint 
Domingue in the 1780's? The question is important, relating not 
only to the human cost of West Indian slave society at its most 
materially successful, but also, in a wider context, to the theory 
of an autonomous Atlantic Revolution transcending simple reaction to 
the great revolution in France. More specifically, it is crucial to 
understanding why there was a British occupation of Saint Domingue. 
It is with this problem that the first three chapters are con- 
cerned. Dominguan society in the late 1780's is analysed and placed 
in its colonial context with comparative reference to other societies 
in the New World (Chapter I). The impact of the Revolution is then 
examined (Chapter II). In the main, stress is laid on the role of 
external factors, though it is hoped that the analysis provides a 
fairly complete picture of the forces determining local action. The 
slave revolution receives special attention. A singular and neglected 
paradox of the Haitian revolution is the fact that the world's 
sole successful slave revolt took place in a colony where slave 
resistance had been comparatively slight. Hence, any explanation 
of the slave revolution must also explain its lack of significant 
precedents. The gradualism of its development, and the balance 
between conflict and accommodation in plantation society, are major 
themes of this thesis. 
In Chapter III, the difficult question of colonial separatism 
is given extended treatment. Much new documentary evidence is 
combined with a close consideration of developments on both sides 
of the Atlantic in elucidating the respective roles of l'autonomisme 
creole and the Counter-Revolution in bringing the British into Saint 
Domingue. New light is thrown on the actions of Malouet and other 
less well-known figures, and there emerges a far more complex picture 
than historians have hitherto presented. The British response to 
these events, in England and Jamaica, is dealt with in Chapter IV. Modern 
historians have inherited contemporaries' conflicting ideas as to 
the reasons behind British intervention, the extent to which it was 
justifiable and the value of sugar colonies in general. Its relation 
(vii) 
to the Abolition question is controversial. By examining in detail 
the importance of the West Indies in Government thinking, and the 
part played by Saint Domingue within its West India policy, the issue 
of ministerial motives is considerably clarified and existing 
judgments are revised. The reaction of Jamaica, slave and free, to 
the Saint Domingue slave revolt is also explored. 
The impact of British intervention, particularly on the shifting 
balance of power between black, white and brown, is the underlying 
concern of Chapter V. It emphasises that Saint Domingue had by no 
means disintegrated by early 1793 and suggests that, though foreign 
intervention had a deleterious effect on the situation, speedier 
and more determined action by the British might have produced 
radically different results. The narrative, which corrects various 
errors perpetuated in the secondary sources and provides fresh 
information on the activities of Toussaint Louverture, pays special 
attention to the crucial and misunderstood area of white - mulatto 
relations. 
In Chapter VI, some new light is cast on the genesis of the 
institutions that governed occupied Saint Domingue, notably on French 
and British attitudes towards this novel situation in imperial 
history. For the first time, the functioning of these institutions 
is examined. The problems they had to deal with, both administra- 
tive and political, are further explored in Chapter VII, which also 
continues the military narrative into 1796 and so provides a composite 
picture of the governorship of Sir Adam Williamson, perhaps the key 
figure of the British occupation. A wide range of sources is employed 
in piecing together military and political developments and in relating 
them to the changes taking place in Dominguan society as a whole. 
These concerns also underlie Chapter VIII, which traces the story of 
the ill-starred Abercrombie expedition from its controversial con- 
ception in Whitehall to its destruction in the Caribbean. Chapter IX 
returns to examine reactions in Great Britain to the Saint Domingue 
venture. The fluctuations in British and emigre policy that led to 
the appointment of John Simcoe as Governor are investigated and the 
events of his governorship are then analysed with reference to the 
changing power structure in the colony. 
Chapters X and XI deal with different aspects of life under the 
occupation. In the towns and in the countryside, the impact of 
Revolution is assessed as regards society, the environment and the 
economy. Relations between the colonists, the British and the emigres; 
(viii) 
the British soldier's response to life in the tropics; attitudes to 
race and slavery; the predicament of the free coloureds, and the 
black slave as soldier, bon negre and 'brigand', and the growth of a 
peasantry are subjects of especial interest. It is hoped that, by 
observing the institution of slavery when attacked from without and 
within, in the process of disintegration, we can learn something of 
the forces of stress and stability in plantation society. 
Chapter XII is a special study of the administration of absentee 
property in the British zone. Dealing with a major aspect of British 
policy and a permanent problem in West Indian society, it provides 
some interesting insights into colonial mores and the difficulties of 
government in the Caribbean. In Chapter XIII, some unexamined aspects 
of the history of yellow fever are brought to light and an attempt 
is made to explain the very great losses suffered by the British 
troops in Saint Domingue. They are examined both in detail and from 
a comparative viewpoint using a large quantity of statistical data. 
Existing estimates are considerably revised. Chapter XIV deals with 
the final campaign and the evacuation. By way of conclusion Chapter 
XV seeks to re-evaluate the impact of the Saint Domingue venture on 
British fortunes in the 1790's, and also to assess its role in the 
destruction of Saint Domingue and the creation of Haiti. 
Although it attracted a good deal of contemporary attention, 
the British occupation of Saint Domingue has never been studied in 
its totality and only a small proportion of the archival material 
relating to it has hitherto been exploited. Certain aspects, such 
as government society and the economy under the occupation have never 
been previously investigated at all. Sir John Fortescue's History 
of the British Army first drew attention to the subject in 1906. 
Thirty years later C. L. Lokke broached a number of related issues 
in several short articles and more recently, research by D. Sanderson, 
C; Frostin and R. H. Griffiths has examined subsidiary aspects of the 
occupation - naval strategy, 'Pappel aux Anglais' in 1793 and the 
role of the French colonial community in London. C. L. R. James, 
H. Cole, and T. Ott have also dealt with the subject in the course 
of more general works. This study, based on archival material in 
five countries a critical analysis of the printed sources, and 21 
months' fieldwork in Haiti, questions to varying degrees the findings 
(ix) 
of all these scholars and presents the subject in a new detail and 
depth. By bringing together with a thorough examination of the 
secondary works and standard sources a lot of largely or entirely 
unknown material, British, Spanish and French, some fresh light is 
also cast en passant on other aspects of the Haitian revolution, such 
as the Spanish invasion, the slave revolt and the actions of Toussaint 
Louverture. 
As Thomas Ott has remarked5 the historiography of the Haitian 
revolution has been bedevilled by overt partisanship and superficia- 
lity. His own attempt, however, to redress the balance, albeit 
successful in many ways, exemplifies another main feature of writing 
on the Revolution -a low level of factual accuracy. 
6 
This is perhaps 
particularly evident in writings in English and dates back to Bryan 
Edwards's Historical Survey, the principal contemporary source on the 
British occupation. However, even the very best works in French 
display the same failings. Cabon's masterful Histoire d'Haiti is 
weakest when dealing with the period 1789-98, while Pauleus-Sannon's 
Histoire de Toussaint Louverture, the best of numerous biographies, 
is notably unreliable in the quotation of documents and dates. Though 
perhaps perpetuating many old errors and even creating new ones - the 
documents themselves can be extremely contradictory - it is nonethe- 
less hoped that this investigation of a little-studied subject will 
contribute towards a more accurate history of the Haitian revolution 
in general and provide new insights into that unique and profound 
event. 
(X) 
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CHAPTER I. SAINT DOMINGUE ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION. 
(i) White Saint Domingue. 'Nos Seigneurs de Saint Domingue, 
Messieurs de la Martinique, bourgeois de Guadeloupe': 
(1) 
if a little 
misleading as to the nature of French West Indian white society, this 
old colonial saying is nonetheless suggestive of the social pre-eminence 
enjoyed by the planters of la perle des Antilles. Investment in the 
colony had attracted some Court nobility. Military service, the 
career of plantation manager and the prospect of better things also 
brought many of their provincial cousins to seek aux Isles the fortune 
that eluded them in France. 
(2) 
However, money always counted more 
than birth in Saint Domingue. Its society in the main was dominated 
by a plutocracy of grands blancs, graced with the occasional title, 
usually of recent origin, the prize of a creole heiress or the creation 
of an inventive parvenu who had left the obscurity of his origins on 
the other side of the Atlantic. 
(3) 
Yet, Brands seigneurs is how they thought of themselves. Masters 
of the largest and most prosperous plantations in the Caribbean, 
surrounded sometimes from birth by crowds of obedient slaves, the 
Dominguan grand blanc developed an imperiousness that was reinforced 
by the knowledge of his economic importance to France. 
(4) 
By 1789 
the coastal plains of this colony scarcely bigger than Belgium were 
producing 40% of the world's sugar while from the mountains of the 
interior came 60% of the world's coffee. Its total production was 
probably double that of the entire British West Indies. Several 
million Frenchmen depended directly on commerce with Saint Domingue, 
which accounted for about 40% of France's foreign trade. No other 
colony, Rotberg observes, contributed so much to its mother country. 
(5) 
Because little of this wealth remained in the colony, Saint 
Domingue's cultural achievements remained meagre by European or 
mainland American standards. The capital, Port au Prince, according 
to one visitor, had the air of a 'Tartar camp'. Spread out over a 
vast terrain, most of its 900 buildings were low wooden structures, 
single-storied and roofed with shingles. Baron Wimpffen mocked 
the 'wretched opulence' of an elite whose fine, imported carriages 
were pulled by mules and whose black postillions, bedecked with braid, 
went barefoot. 
(6) 
However, one should not generalise too readily, 
for Saint Domingue was a large colony and few commentators were 
well-acquainted with all three of its provinces. 
(7) Though not an 
-1- 
impressive sight, Port au Prince was a busy seaport, administrative 
centre and garrison town; it possessed, along with innumerable bars, 
cafes and billard halls, two or three bookshops (rare in the West Indies), 
a botanic garden, a bath-house, a small waxworks and a shop that sold 
musical instruments. 
(8) 
Life in the frontier districts was rough. 
But in the long-settled coastal region, where well laid out plantations 
chequered the plains and rose in orderly terraces into the mountains, 
society was more developed. At Jdrdmie a ball that brought in 200 
people from the countryside was an historic occasion, long remembered, 
but at Port au Prince the playhouse seated 750, and at le Cap, 1500. 
(9) 
Even so, Cap Franjais, with its Paris fashions and predominantly 
slave population, public baths and piles of rotting rubbish, casinos 
and livestock wandering the streets, at best, rivalled Charleston. 
The other towns were merely small collections of houses, mainly 
wooden, though at the end of the Ancien Regime the construction of 
public fountains and highways, quaysides and bridges, lent them a 
prosperous air. 
(10) 
Schools were nearly non-existent and creole 
women were notoriously ignorant. While stone plantation houses were 
becoming more common, as in Jamaica, the grand'case generally was a 
flimsy construction and always sparsely furnished. 
(11) 
This was largely because few colonists regarded their stay there 
as permanent. All commentators noticed an atmosphere of hurry and 
obsession with return to France, that was also a persistent theme in 
colonists' correspondence. 
(12) 
The extent of absentee proprietorship 
is unknown and controversial, but in the plains it was probably as 
great as in the British islands, and was responsible for draining 
away profits better spent in the colony. 
(13) 
Insofar as it facilitated 
through trusteeship the induction of merchants and lawyers into the 
plantocracy, it was along with intermarriage an integrative influence. 
Though prejudice against its members still existed in 1789, 
(14) 
the 
urban, mercantile/professional elite were usually planters too. 
(15) 
Yet, absenteeism sapped the fibre of colonial society, increasing 
the damage done by difficult communications, a paucity of women and 
a materialistic outlook. 'I1 se forme ä Saint Domingue', wrote 
Moreau de Saint-M6ry, 'tres peu de ces liaisons agr4ables qu'on 
nomme la societe'. 
(16) 
To a Swiss visitor, the colonists' passion 
for gambling symbolised a materialistic society, a lack of white 
women and an absence of conversation. 
(17 
Charles Frostin, working from government records, has recently 
-2- 
protested against the plantation-centric view of Dominguan society 
that emerges from Gabriel Debien's work, based largely on plantation 
documents. 
(18) 
He proposes that Saint Domingue was rather more than 
a collection of quasi-independent estates to be viewed in isolation, 
and points to a complex urban life in le Cap and Port au Prince, to 
the importance of white vagabondage in the countryside and to the 
growth of closely inter-connected clan groups in the coastal plains. 
(19) 
Though these aspects are hardly absent from Debien's voluminous work, 
this is a useful correction of emphasis. Nevertheless, against the 
gradual consolidation of family ties and diversity of activity around 
the ports, the spread of freemasonry and the foundation of a 
philosophical society, periodical concerts and balls and an increasingly 
active press, one must weigh the perpetual emigration of successful men, 
the decline of the traditional hospitality, 
(20) 
the prevalence of 
bachelorhood, (21) and the isolation and monotony of plantation life, 
in which a game of cards on Sunday was a major social event. 
(22) 
If bonds between the grands blancs were fairly weak, relations 
between the classes of white society were weaker still. In the 
highlands, the coffee boom of the previous 30 years had created a 
new class of self-made middling planters, who lacked the capital and 
established position of a grand blanc but whose lower overheads enabled 
them to outbid the large sugar planters in the slave market. 
(23) 
A 
class struggle was the more fully joined in that the new men, living 
close to the soil of their parishes in constant supervision of their 
unstable crop, resented the lands granted to absentees but left 
uncultivated. 
(24) 
Regarding themselves as the colony's true 
inhabitants, the resident planters perhaps regarded the mother country 
with less attachment than did a prospective absentee. They thus 
reinforced a 'creole-ness' of attitude long present. In 1761 the 
Governor had complained that, 'Ces blancs ainsi r4pandus ne sont 
point retenus par le lien de la patrie et du sang... Ces hommes arm6s... 
habitent c5a et lä et (without military rule) vivroient dans une 
esp6ce d'ind4pendance funeste ä la socidt6 et ä 1'Etat meme'. 
(25) 
Many of the whites born in the colony denied they were French, 
insisting instead: 'Je suis cr4ole'. 
(26) 
The rise of the coffee planters also entailed the displacement 
from the highlands of woodcutters and hunters, squatters and small- 
holders, who often returned to swell the body of malcontents in the 
ports. In the Revolution such men were to be prominent among 
-3- 
petits blancs militants. 
(27) 
The petits blancs formed a broad social 
group that embraced both the industrious apprenti-colon and the dregs 
of waterfront life. Largely recruited among the classes dangereuses 
then troubling Europe, 
(28) 
they commanded high wages in the colony but 
could not escape the increasing competition for the necessities of life 
then endemic throughout the Western World. Social'mobility was greater 
than in Europe but opportunities were getting more scarce. 
(29) 
The 
growth of the urban population had caused in 1780 a Me'moire sur la 
police du Cap to lament, 'Les vols... les mutineries, Von dit presque 
les seditions, menacent de plus en plus cette ville de quelque accident 
funeste, et que le gouvernement ne pourra arreter que par les moyens 
les plus violens. '(30) 'I1 est peu de contrdes', remarked one grand 
blanc, 'aussi immoralement peupl4es que Saint Domingue'. 
'31) 
The growing numbers of small whites arriving with every ship from 
France, seeking employment in artisan trades or as overseers, met with 
strong competition, not only from one another but from the large free 
coloured community. 
(32) 
This did not occur in the Iberian colonies 
where no white wanted to be a small white, nor in the British colonies 
where this sector had already been driven out or had risen in society 
and where the free coloured position was not so strong. 
(33) 
Furthermore, 
neither experienced the burst of immigration which had doubled the white 
population of Saint Domingue since the Peace of Paris. Lowly in status 
and economically insecure, the petits blancs were the most racist 
element in colonial society. Yet, their situation was ambiguous, 
for the overseer on the plantation, the artisan in his workshop, the 
pedlar and vagabond on the country roads, the cabaretier and the 
caboteur, spent their days and nights in close proximity to the slaves 
and the poorer mulattoes. Some even married a slave woman or a 
mulatress. In October 1789 two whites who had been displaced from 
the mountains were shot at Saint Marc for conspiring with mulattoes 
and slave foremen. 
(34) 
A year later some whites were to join the 
mulatto rebellion led by Ogg. 
(35) 
Under the Ancien Regime, deserting 
troops were known to collaborate with runaway slaves. 
(36) 
Such 
examples, if exceptional, show the limits of small white racism and 
the acuteness of class conflict in Saint Domingue. 
Plantation managers(37)and attornies occupied an intermediate 
position in white society. The grands blancs, Carteaux tells us, 
(38) 
increasingly spurned them, so that they joined with the small whites 
in resenting the pretensions and titles their superiors tended to adopt 
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after 1763. Dubuisson's observation, therefore, that 'toutes les 
classes d'hommes blancs sont confondues ä Saint Domingue', 
(39)must 
be seen as strictly relative to the social order of Ancien Regime 
Europe. The usual solidarity of West Indian whites was weakened 
in Saint Domingue by class tensions which resulted from the unusual 
diversification of its economy, the extent of small white immigration 
and the position of its free coloured population. 
Nevertheless, in the mid 1780's, Debien observes, social problems 
were not the most prominent. 
(40) 
Although a remarkably fertile soil 
combined with an advanced use of irrigation produced a yield of two- 
thirds more per acre than in Jamaica; 
(41) 
although production boomed 
and prices rose; 
(42) 
although 'riche comme un creole' was a Parisian 
proverb; Saint Domingue's most serious problem to contemporaries was 
economic. 'Messieurs les Americains', were in the words of one 
Bordeaux merchant, 'des riches malais4s'. 
(43) 
While it is difficult to see the profitability of West India 
planting in perspective, 
(44) 
it seems that Saint Domingue's wealth 
was gained only at the price of heavy indebtedness to France's maritime 
bourgeoisie. Credit, accompanied by aristocratic values, bred 
wastefulness, and applied to an extremely unstable type of agriculture, 
placed most planters in a debtor relationship that they resented. 
Though it is debatable exactly who exploited whom, the merchants 
naturally hoped to supply their clients dearly while securing their 
crops cheaply. The fact that three-fifths of Saint Domingue's 
exports to France were subsequently re-exported(45)represented a 
further colonial loss benefiting the metropolitan merchants. By 
far the gravest implications are contained in a study of a Bordeaux 
merchant firm trading to Saint Marc, which suggests that from late 
1788 through 1790 colonial products fetched higher prices in the 
colony than in France, and moreover, that freight and merchandising 
swallowed up 25%-45% of the wholesale price. 
(46) 
Apparently, 
illicit trade with the Americans, who were now virtually excluded 
from the British islands, was a much more profitable outlet. Perhaps 
these circumstances were exceptional. The planter Dubuc Saint Olympe 
reckoned metropolitan prices as 15% above those in the colony, allowing 
for transport costs. 
(47) 
Anyway, the Jamaican planter had long received 
barely half of the wholesale 
(48) 
y price of his sugar. It would seem 
that Saint Domingue's greatest complaint against the Exclusif concerned 
imports. 
(49) 
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Here the French government had improved matters but, like the 
British, shrewdly little. The free ports opened in 1784 produced 
a boom in trade with the United States, though import duties were 
heavy and were increased in 1787-88. 
(50) 
American flour continued 
to be excluded. Foreign slaveships were admitted under extremely 
restricted conditions, so that demand was not satisfied and the price 
of slaves continued to rise. 
(51) 
Moreover, this breach in the monopoly 
of French merchants caused a retaliatory increase in freight charges, 
and probably whetted the colonists' appetite for bigger markets. 
The vicious circle of exploitation and mounting debt was of course 
not confined to the French Empire. The Exclusif, even without the 
attenuation brought by contraband trade, 
(52) 
probably bore less severely 
than the strait-jacket still confining the Iberian colonies. 
(53) 
Saint Domingue also enjoyed lighter and more enlightened duties than 
the British planters and a freer attitude to colonial refining. 
(54) 
It is well to remember that in the aftermath of American independence 
costs rose most steeply in the British West Indies which suffered 
all the more for being in incipient decline. Above all, the French 
colonists enjoyed a singularly privileged position as regards their 
debts, on which interest was often not charged by merchant creditors. 
(55) 
However, Dominguan planters, uniquely in no need of preferential 
markets, knew that more and cheaper slaves, a wider range of imports, 
larger and better markets, cheaper freight and insurance, cheaper and 
fresher food, and perhaps longer credit, would be theirs but for the 
Exclusif. But for French rule, some 300/500 millions of debts 
(56) 
would not be theirs either. Though the grievance had always existed, 
economic subordination was ceasing to be accepted as a fact of 
colonial life. In the words of Stanislas Foache: 'On voudrait etre 
de la nation ou le sucre se vend le plus cher et qui a le moins 
craindre en temps de guerre'. 
(57) 
If French commerce slackened, a 
colonial pamphlet predicted in 1785, 'les colonies s'4teindront... 
ou elles feront une empire ä part, ou elles s'attacheront a une 
autre empire'. 
(58) 
Significantly, this warning came from the South 
Province, the one most hampered by the Exclusif and, according to 
Debien, 'anim6 d'un esprit plus jeune, plus hardi, plus am6ricain'. 
(59) 
Such attitudes had been greatly stimulated by Saint Domingue's wartime 
experience, for France's inability in the face of British seapower to 
supply and protect the colonies she taxed, let alone market their 
produce, hit the planters very hard. In the Seven Years' War, they 
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had envied their counterparts in Guadeloupe, who by surrendering to the 
British, benefited instead of suffering from Britain's superiority at 
(60) 
sea. 
Although the French colonies were the most lightly taxed of all, 
and of these, Saint Doiningue politically the freest, her inhabitants 
had never borne imperial rule lightly. The hollowness of this freedom 
perhaps excited rather than satisfied colonial aspirations. Extra- 
ordinary taxation required some colonial consent, that of the militia 
chiefs and some magistrates, but was often continued beyond the agreed 
period. 
(61) 
The right of the two Conseils Superieurs to discuss and 
register laws was likewise ineffective and far-removed from the internal 
legislative competence of the British colonists' representative 
assemblies. In 1769 the magistrates of the Port au Prince Conseil 
were sent to the Bastille for encouraging rebellion, and thereafter 
the Government tried to ensure that only its supporters became 
magistrates. 
(62) 
A critical attitude to government combined with 
political impotence also found institutional expression in the Chambers 
of Agriculture and Commerce, the former being permitted to draw up 
reports on retiring Governors and Intendants. These bodies together 
with the parish assemblies and planter participation in minor 
administrative offices fostered a sense of political competence 
that was rankled by heavy-handed rule from France. 
Historians have seen Saint Domingue's Administration in radically 
different lights. Most depict a scene of military despotism and 
administrative corruption, 
(63) 
yet it should be noted that Bryan 
Edwards was impressed with its 'liberality and mildness' and that 
such instances of tyranny or corruption that he records were vehemently 
denied by so unlikely a figure as Venault de Charmilly. 
(64) 
However, 
the colonists' complaints about inexperience in office and discontinuity 
in policy seem well proven. In the 1780's the colony had 11 different 
Governors and 5 Intendants. 
(65) 
The maxim that a colonial government 
was a no more arbitrary reflection of the mother country's perhaps 
flatters Saint Domingue unduly. Rivalry between the Governor and 
Intendant, although not as dead in France as once thought, was a major 
and crippling factor in colonial life. Moreover, the prevalence of 
military administration and jurisdiction made for a harshness in public 
procedure probably rarely encountered by wealthy proprietors in France. 
In addition to the standard West Indian grievances of bribery, vexatious 
militia service and requisitioning, one finds complaints against illegal 
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arrest, arbitrary imprisonment and the overriding of judicial 
decisions. 
(66) 
Favouritism in land concessions and the capricious 
revocation of grants were additional causes of rancour that were to 
be voiced in the colony's cahiers. 
(67) 
This state of affairs had long been attacked by the colonists. 
In the 1720's and 60's many had taken up arms and demanded the financial 
and administrative autonomy possessed de jure by the pays d'etat and 
de facto by the British colonies. 
(68) 
The crisis after the Seven 
Years' War saw the two Conseils assume the role of popular champions, 
like the parlements in France, defending anciens privileges in the face 
of government reform. In the West and South a serious rebellion broke 
out. The South Province had always had close links with Jamaica - 
some British even settled there - and in 1769 certain habitants of the 
Cayes region apparently called on the Governor to send troops to liberate 
Saint Domingue from la domination franSaise. The brutal suppression 
of this revolt left bitter memories, and we find the same families 
playing active parts in the early years of the Revolution. 
(69) 
Nonetheless, these flare-ups resulted from exceptional provocation. 
Debien doubts that they represented a permanent state of mind. 
(70) 
Later increases in the octroi created no problem. The Administration 
could always find friends. 
(71) 
Furthermore, if, as Frostin claims, Saint Domingue was the 
Caribbean's most turbulent colony, the competition was close. 
Dominguans had tried to overthrow their Governor in 1769, but the 
colonists of Martinique had actually driven theirs out in 1717, and 
seven years before the Governor of the Leeward Isles had been murdered 
by rioting colonists. 
(72) 
While in the early 80's the two Conseils 
were being openly critical of government procedure, a series of revolts 
spread through Peru and New Granada, set off by increasing taxation. 
St. Kitts, with its 'Gallo-American' Assembly, had just surrendered 
to the French and was shortly to riot against its customs officers. 
For over ten years it refused to re-constitute its militia. Anti- 
militarism and non-combattancy were the rule in the Caribbean rather 
than the exception. In Demerara and Essequibo, a 'fierce struggle' 
over taxation lasted throughout the 1780's. In Grenada, intransigent 
settlers persistently thwarted government policy. Republican plots 
were discovered in Chile in 1780, at Goa in 1787 and at Minas Gerais 
in 1789. In the early 90's, planters throughout the Spanish 
Caribbean forced the withdrawal of a new slave code. Even Jamaica 
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may have possessed a pro-independence party. 
(73) 
Eighteenth century 
colonies in general can be characterised as 'though fundamentally loyal... 
habitually disobedient'. 
(74) 
This makes Saint Domingue's refractoriness less unique, but the 
fact that British colonists already possessed the institutions that 
French planters envied, might suggest that Saint Domingue had the more 
reason to revolt. Possibly an important factor here was the Government's 
belated attempts, beginning in 1784, to intervene between the planter, 
his employees and his slaves. Decrees which demanded stricter 
standards of book-keeping and a more humane treatment of slaves enraged 
attornies and managers and were resented by planters as despotic 
interference. The Conseil of le Cap refused to register them. The 
acceptance of slave evidence against whites, some said, would undermine 
the very foundations of colonial society. 
(75) 
This unwelcome trend 
in imperial policy may well have been of immense significance in 
alienating colonial opinion. On the other hand, its apparent 
ineffectiveness(76)might have left the planters well satisfied with 
their ability to remain absolute monarchs on their own estates. 
Such flouting of the law was no novelty, and if it bred a potentially 
subversive disrespect, it also made imperial rule much more acceptable 
to the colonist than would appear in theory. This sort of safety- 
valve does much to explain the longevity of the first colonial empires. 
In these years, however, attitudes were changing throughout the 
Western world, and for the first colonial empires the bell was tolling. 
Frostin has suggestively depicted the discontent in Saint Domingue as 
forming part of an occidental Pre-Revolution as outlined by Palmer 
and Godechot. The parallels are many both as regards cause and 
effect. 
(77) 
Yet, the central problem remains that of the Democratic 
Revolution in general - how significant were such events in their own 
time and place? That is, before the French Revolution sent shock 
waves across the world and forced future generations to read preceding 
history by its own volcanic light. This must remain a matter for 
interpretation but there is no doubt that in the 1780's both philosophe 
precept and American example were spreading belief in the justice and 
inevitability of colonial secession. 
Turgot, Raynal and Mirabeau all predicted and apparently favoured 
the separation of Saint Domingue from France. 
(78) 
If the colonists 
themselves were not notably receptive to liberal ideas, the 
Enlightenment certainly served to reinforce existing notions of an 
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original and revocable contract made between the French Crown and 
their freebooting forefathers. 
(79) 
The Considerations of Hilliard 
d'Auberteuil, published in 1776, warned of une separation prochaine 
if le joug militaire and exploitation by French merchants did not 
cease. 
(80) 
Though banned, it seems to have circulated widely in the 
colony. However, according to de Charmilly, it was the experience 
of free trade with neutrals during the years 1780-83 that created in 
certain influential colonists the desire for independence. 
(81-1 
Commercial links with the United States, moreover, multiplied after 
1783 and colonial pamphleteers and petitioners of the Revolutionary 
period were to enjoy reminding Versailles of Britain's past mistakes. 
(82) 
Yet, for Saint Domingue, unlike the Spanish Empire, the American 
precedent was not entirely relevant. Island colonies, based on slavery 
and cash crops, were extremely vulnerable, both strategically and 
economically. 
(83) 
Saint Domingue, it is true, with its relatively 
large free population and low production costs was less vulnerable 
than most and some planters, undoubtedly, were able to envisage 
absolute independence for the colony. Nevertheless, they were 
probably few in number, and for most, the essential insecurity of a 
slave colony was a fundamental factor limiting any such desires. 
(84) 
To seek British sovereignty, however, was a possible alternative. 
In the turbulent 1760's, it was apparently fashionable in Saint Domingue 
to denigrate French rule while extolling that of England. 
(85) 
Even 
after the loss of North America, England's international prestige 
remained extremely high. h. 
(86) 
The conditions yg granted to Guadeloupe 
in 1759, to Grenada in 1768 and to Quebec in 1774, 
(87) 
suggested such 
a change of domination could be profitable without entailing loss of 
cultural identity. 
(88) 
However, one wonders if the French planters' 
enthusiasm for 'English liberties', that Frostin emphasises, 
(89) 
was 
actually encouraged by Britain's treatment of her conquered colonies. 
In none of them had equal rights been extended to their French 
inhabitants. 
(90) 
Quebec had no assembly at all until 1791, and the 
one then established could scarcely be compared to Jamaica's or those 
Revolutionary France was then granting to her colonies. In Grenada, 
limited rights of representation had belatedly been accorded to the 
French colonists but these were nullified by the hostility of the 
English residents, which amounted to persecution. In 1790 it was 
decided to withdraw them. 
(91) 
Thus, however much French planters may 
or may not have admired English institutions, they were not likely to 
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obtain them through direct British rule. 
It is significant that when English criminal law was introduced 
into Grenada most of the French inhabitants left the colony. 
(92) 
In 
all the Ceded Islands, it seems, British rule was borne with reluctance. 
In the American War, they welcomed (albeit discreetly) their French 
invaders, and emigration from them continued into the 1780's. 
(93) 
While few Quebecquois had felt the need to emigrate, one could hardly 
talk of Anglophilia amongst its stolidly pro-French population, even 
after 30 years of prosperous British rule. Few doubted that a French 
invasion of Canada would receive massive local support(94)and in Grenada, 
Dominica and St. Vincent many French colonists actually did rebel during 
the Revolutionary War. 
(95) 
The seigneurs of New France, to be sure, 
had closely identified themselves with their new rulers as conquered 
elites tend to do, 
(96)but 
this bore no relation to their previous 
attitudes; half of the notables in 1763 had felt obliged to emigrate. 
(97) 
Hence, if it was true that '1'4sprit de famille et de patrie nest pas 
g4n4ralement celui des colonies', 
(98) 
one should not underestimate the 
ties of sentiment that, even in this most cosmopolitan of ages, bound 
the French colonist to France. 
The colombiers and clochers that adorned, quite absurdly, so many 
plantations in Saint Domingue, 
(99) 
the great imports of Bordeaux wines, 
and the obsession with return to France, 
(100) 
suggest there were limits 
to the 'American-ness' of these men. Admittedly, Saint Domingue was 
considerably less Catholic than Quebec, and to this extent was bound 
less closely to France, but it was also much less creole. Only a 
quarter of Saint Domingue's white population were native to the colony 
and most of these were women. 
(101) 
Although a new type of man was 
appearing, who spoke creole before he spoke French, and who perhaps 
resented interference from a mother country he had never seen, such 
men can have numbered at most 4/5,000, probably rather less. 
Moreover, insofar as they conformed to the easy-going, inefficient 
stereotype of the creole planter, 
(102) 
their response to the economic 
rationale of secession was probably not strong. The growth of a 
materialist outlook in Saint Domingue and of a ruthlessly businesslike 
approach to planting was associated with ambitious new arrivals from 
France. 
(103) 
It was surely they who most resented imperial regulations 
that trimmed their profit margins. Hence, to the extent that they 
were not mutually reinforcing, cultural alienation and economic 
frustration were less potent forces for separation than first appears. 
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In addition, the growing ranks of absentees, of young creoles 
being educated in France and of colonists marrying into the French 
nobility, 
(104) 
can hardly be credited with separatist designs; indeed, 
they gave the colony a more European outlook. 
(105) 
It is true, 
absenteeism aggravated the resident planters, and was accompanied by 
a contrary movement of small whites who were to a great extent foreign 
and, like the mobs of waterfront America in the 1760's, lost little 
love on the mother country. But where were Saint Domingue's 'Sons 
of Liberty', her town meetings, her non-importation agreements, her 
colonial assemblies and universities? Le Brasseur's words of 1781 
are noteworthy: 'Il n'y a pas de patrie ä Saint Domingue, point 
d'4sprit publique, par consequent rien qui puisse 6l4ver l'äme et 
la porter aux grandes actions'. 
(106) 
Admittedly, this sounds a 
little reminiscent of mis-placed British optimism of twenty years 
before about the rifts between the 13 North American colonies, but 
it would be wrong to underrate the uniqueness of British America's 
tradition of self-government and the part it played in fostering a 
revolutionary mentality. In Spanish America, independence was very 
much an 'event after the fact', 
(107) 
and no matter how elaborately its 
origins are traced, it remains indissolubly linked with the Napoleonic 
invasion of Spain. Until the French Revolution, Saint Domingue lacked 
both the necessary crisis and with it the institutional bases for a 
revolt against France, and when revolt did come, it was riven by the 
factionalism of a highly fractured society. Saintoyant asserts that 
the colony would no longer be satisfied, after the American Revolution, 
with any concessions short of actual independence under French 
suzerainty. 
(108) 
But we may ask: how many colonists? and, more 
importantly: what were they prepared to do about it? Though there 
can have been few whites who would not have welcomed legislative 
autonomy and economic freedom, separatist talk was probably a matter 
of hot-headed extremists or academic discussion scarcely less so than 
in the British islands, and as such, would probably have remained talk 
without the blow to established authority and the threat to slavery 
and white supremacy brought by the French Revolution. 
(ii) The Free Coloureds. Although the Code Noire of 1685 had 
granted the free coloureds equal rights with whites, it had never 
represented a colonial reality, 
(1O9)and during the 18th century a 
body of racist legislation was built up from both local and metropolitan 
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enactments that was perhaps unequalled in the West Indies. At a 
personal level, however, in the areas of manumission, miscegenation, 
marriage and plantation employment, the French seem to have displayed 
a paradoxical lack of prejudice that tended to distinguish them from 
the 'Anglo-Saxons' and from which the gens de couleur profited. The 
result was that Saint Domingue's free coloured community in the decade 
before the Revolution was remarkable both for its size and wealth and 
for the severity of the laws that governed it. 
While all population estimates are hazardous, Debien thinks that 
by the late 1780's the free coloureds outnumbered the whites. 
(110) 
The size of the free coloured sector, at least three times as big as 
Jamaica's, naturally reflected the great number of slaves but essentially 
it resulted from a high degree of miscegenation and from a high frequency 
of manumission, partly also from marriage between free men and female 
slaves, which was a sort of manumission. 
(111) 
De Charmilly suggested 
as an important factor the amount of prostitution and concubinism, 
resulting from the high wages paid in Saint Domingue and its relatively 
large urban area. 
(112) 
However, in the opinion of Moreau de Saint Mery, 
women in this category bore few children, for reasons both physical 
and professional. The coloured population itself, he claimed, was 
not self-reproducing. 
(113) 
As in all American slave societies outside the United States, 
the free coloureds helped supply the need for a middle stratum between 
the slaves and the white proprietary/professional class. In Saint 
Domingue, however, several factors, though none were exclusive to the 
colony, aided sections of this group to achieve an unusual prosperity 
and independence. Firstly, there were no restrictions on the number 
of slaves or the amount of property a free coloured could own or 
inherit. 
(114) 
In 1790, the mulattoes of one- 
third 
professed ownership 
third of the colony's productive land and one-quarter of its slaves. 
(115) 
The growth of a coloured planter class was further facilitated by the 
expansion of secondary cultures in Saint Domingue especially of coffee 
and cotton which required little capital outlay. While free-coloured 
proprietors of varying wealth predominated in the mountains, mulattoes 
were often found on the coastal plains, serving as managers or overseers 
in the sugar estates. This is because the French were markedly less 
successful in enforcing their 'deficiency' laws than were the English 
and, as absenteeism increased, were more inclined to entrust their 
properties to their illegitimate offspring. 
(116) Lastly, as the 
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ratio of creole slaves to free coloureds was much smaller in Saint 
Domingue than elsewhere, it is probable that coloured craftsmen 
suffered correspondingly less competition from the 'jobbing' of 
slave artisans. 
The free coloured sector thus covered a broad economic range 
as well as being divided by colour into eleven recognised types, 
from free black to mmsallie white, excluding Indian admixtures. 
In the 'Anglo-Saxon' colonies, free coloured status was often derided 
by economically more secure slaves; 
(117) in the Iberian and other 
French colonies the mulatto rarely rose above the position of prosperous 
artisan, but in Saint Domingue he might be a wealthy planter or trader, 
who educated his children in France, lent money to white men and bid 
for the best property in the colony. Although Moreau de Saint-M'ry 
noted that they generally enjoyed good relations with slaves who were 
not their own, they were usually considered the cruellest of masters - 
at least by the whites. Jean Casimir has claimed, on the other hand, 
that as the coloured planters invariably resided on their small-scale 
properties, they enjoyed a closer, more paternal, relationship with 
(118) 
their slaves. As members of the mar4chauss4e, however, the 
mulattoes were certainly hated by the blacks, being responsible for 
catching runaways. 
(119) 
For the most part, the free coloureds tended 
to despise the darker side of their origins and to strive towards 
'whiteness' in manners and choice of partner. While such an attitude 
made for social cohesion, the white response increasingly condemned 
the mulattoes to remain, in sociological terms, marginal men, ever 
denied membership by their reference group - like the d'Antons and 
de Robespierres of Ancien Regime France. 
The period 1730-80 brought a new severity to the legal 
restrictions that burdened those neither white nor slave. They 
were excluded from the priesthood, medicine and the law; forbidden 
to wear European dress and to play European games; compelled to sit 
separately in church and at the theatre; denied entry to France, 
and prevented from gathering 'entre eux, sous pretexte de noces, de 
festins ou de danses'. 
(120) 
In practice, things were sometimes 
better. Despite prohibitions, mulattoes still hunted freely and 
the future revolutionary, Andre Rigaud, was allowed to practise as 
a goldsmith. No mulatto ever had his hand cut off for striking a 
white, 
(121) 
though this was the prescribed penalty. But often, things 
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were worse. Taxation, mar6chauss4e and militia service fell heavily 
on the free coloureds. 
(122) 
Although, unlike in the British islands, 
they could testify against whites in court, justice was difficult to 
obtain against a white man unless the mulatto himself had white 
protectors. 
(123) 
Whether mixed marriages had by 1789 become rare 
and disdained, or had never been so common, it is hard to say, 
(124) 
but in 1778 they were banned in France. 
The reasons behind this rising tide of racism are various. 
Prejudice and policy both played a part, most obviously in direct 
response to the increasing strength of the free coloureds. This 
aroused both the jealousy of the colonists and fear on the part of 
the Administration that, if discontented whites allied themselves 
with the mulattoes, secession would follow. 
(125) 
The policy of 
depressing the status of the free coloured also represented an attempt 
to erect a bulwark against the alarming growth in the number of 
slaves. By stressing la täche ineffaSable de l'esclayage, the whites 
hoped to convince the slaves (and no doubt themselves) of an onto- 
logical, racial element in the free/slave division, the only one 
recognised by the Code Noire 
(126) 
The free coloureds suffered, 
therefore, for the hypothetical sins of both whites and blacks. 
The French response here contrasts with British policy in Jamaica 
and Antigua, which had two of the highest black: white ratios in 
the British Caribbean, and where limited political concessions were 
used to ally free coloureds to the regime. 
(127) 
Nonetheless, during the middle years of the century it was 
the white population that increased at the fastest rate, and in the 
towns it continued to do so until the Revolution. This meant both 
an influx of white women and an advance towards the possibility of 
an endogamous white society. These are the two factors suggested 
by W. D. Jordan as the main stimulants of racism in the New World. 
(128) 
Perhaps more importantly, this movement further possessed a class 
dimension producing the conflict between small whites and free 
coloureds already mentioned. It is doubtful, however, that Saint 
Domingue provides evidence for a fuller 'class' interpretation of 
racial tension. Genovese's distinction between 'bourgeois' and 
'seigneurial' attitudes finds some support in what Debien writes 
about the tolerance of the older white families, 
(129) but it 
necessitates identifying the new coffee planters with a 'bourgeois' 
ethos when they just as easily qualify for the 'seigneurial' tag. 
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Whatever the reasons, a uniquely dangerous situation was being 
created. While liberalism gained ground in Europe, in Saint Domingue 
there had been mounting repression of a social group whose size and 
wealth and self-consciousness were growing rapidly, and which supplied, 
moreoever, most of the colony's militia men and its entire rural police 
force. The white colonists were to regret this military education 
given to such naturally gifted soliders. Mulattoes had played a 
turbulent if subservient role in the struggles of the '60's. 
(130) 
In 1783, a coloured regiment returned from fighting alongside the 
American colonists. The consequent situation morale nouvelle 
(131) 
produced from the free coloureds a memoir attacking the caste system. 
During 1785-B6, Julien Raimond contacted leading mulattoes throughout 
the South and West before going to plead their cause in France. 
As there were administrators in both Port au Prince and 
Versailles who were alive to the colour problem, the memoir was 
sympathetically received. By the outbreak of the Revolution, it 
was still awaiting a reply. Perhaps Saintoyant was too harsh in 
suggesting that the government was still encouraging racial antagonism 
in the 1780's. 
(132) Certainly manners were beginning to change, as 
was the outlook of the law courts. 
(133) 
If the great majority of 
the planters solidly opposed any concessions to the free coloureds, 
the attitude of the merchants, lawyers and military suggested that 
better relations might have evolved, given time. Time, however, 
was not on Saint Domingue's side. 
(iii) The Slaves. Despite the great influx of white 
immigrants, the growing body of free-coloureds and a century of 
creolization, Saint Domingue in the 1780's was becoming rapidly 
more African. While the whites and free-coloureds each numbered 
under 40,000, the slave population, swelling with imported blacks, 
totalled something like half a million. 
(134) Though undeniably 
stark, this fact may have tended to distort descriptions of Saint 
Domingue. Debbasch calls it three colonies in one, 
(135)and 
as 
regards the slaves it acted as such during the Revolution. The 
actual black: white ratio was lower than in Grenada and Antigua, 
and the slave population was probably more balanced between male 
and female, African and creole, than Moreau de Saint-MSry believed. 
(136) 
Besides, the implications of this last factor are not entirely clear. 
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Recently-arrived slaves, feeling their loss of freedom, strangers 
with no attachment to their new situation, were potentially a more 
volatile force but they were also disoriented, linguistically isolated 
and to some extent broken in spirit by their brutal transplantation. 
While the creole was naturally the most adjusted to slavery, being born 
into it, the imported bossale may also have been a bondsman in Africa. 
The Trade, moreover, was in some degree a process of selection, since 
the most rebellious captives cannot have lived to see the New World. 
Newly-imported blacks, it is true, provided most of the colony's 
runaways, yet most observers agreed that the most loyal slaves were 
Africans(137)and one can see that the creolized African who had 
painfully put down roots for the second time in his life might value 
stability highly. 
(138) 
Conversely, the growing creole elite of urban 
slaves and domestics were often referred to as dangerous, possessing 
more 'pretensions', as the whites saw it. 
(139) 
They were doubtless 
more receptive to the news soon to arrive from France, and when 
insurrection threatened in 1790, on one plantation at least, it was 
the creole slaves that the manager mistrusted. 
(140) 
The never-satisfied demand for n6gres de traite speaks grimly 
of the demography of slave life. Debien estimates an annual general 
mortality of 5%/6% minimum, excluding years of epidemic, and these 
were frequent. 
(141) 
Even so, the birth rate was the most significant 
factor. Slavery did not so much like Saturn devour its children, but 
was, rather, a barren mother. The shock of becoming a slave in an 
alien world was said to impair the fertility of African women, who 
were anyway much less healthy than creoles and, on the coffee 
plantations, were well outnumbered by men. Although the sugar 
plantations, owing to their greater degree of creolization, possessed 
not only more, but apparently more fertile, females this advantage was 
entirely cancelled out by their more demanding work and less healthy 
location. 
(142) 
Abortion and infanticide were apparently not uncommon. 
Some masters, though a decreasing number, probably approved of such 
practices, finding pregnancy and child-rearing uneconomic, while the 
majority clearly preferred to work their slaves into premature 
decrepitude rather than minimise depreciation in this sector of 
their capital investment. If there can be little doubt that a 
commercial, exploitative attitude was the norm in Saint Domingue, 
it may be disputed on the one hand how far it was qualified by a 
paternalistic element, and on the other, how far it was tinged with 
outright sadism. 
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Contemporary writers severely criticised the treatment accorded 
the slaves. Though often limited in experience and evincing a 
fashionable sentimentality, their evidence, at least as regards food, 
clothing, shelter and work-load, is not radically contradicted by that 
of surviving plantation accounts and correspondence. Wimpffen's 
observation that no article of the Code Noire was enforced 
(143) 
seems 
well attested. Only slightly more exaggerated was the baron de Saint 
Victor's assertion that, 'les trois quarts des maitres ne nourissent 
pas leurs esclaves et leur d4robent presque tout le temps de repos 
que les lois leur attribuent'. 
(144) 
Even so, what the slaves lost 
in the way of rest and nourishment through having to work their own 
allotments, they gained, in contrast to their relatively well-fed 
American counterparts, in a sense of personal possession and independence, 
that was encouraged by intelligent masters. They were also far more 
likely to gain their freedom than the slaves of British planters and 
were perhaps better clothed, if worse fed, than blacks in Jamaica. 
Unlike slaves in Brazil, they were not locked up at night. 
(145) 
Reliable critics of the slave regime pointed less to any generalised 
hardship or mistreatment - they knew the conditions of the European 
peasantry - than to a deprivation of enjoyment and to the slave's 
defencelessness in face of the master's occasional caprice. 
(146) 
Conditions clearly varied from plantation to plantation but 
were probably worst on those of absentees. Those colonists who 
dreamed of turning their estates into patriarchal congeries of 
Christian family groups seem often to have been absentees, distant 
from the harsh, sometimes terrible, reality of their managers' 
regimes. 
(147) 
Tales of gory punishments abound in the literature 
and two writers specifically state that the good master was regarded 
as an eccentric who could not interfere outside his own estate. 
(148) 
If this is hard to believe, perhaps Girod-Chantrans provides an 
answer: 'Apres un certain temps dans le nouveau Monde, 1'Europ4en 
devient un autre homme', or the down-to-earth Pere Labat: 'On sly 
fait bientot'. 
ý149) 
Even for the planter himself, the claims of 
humanity and self-interest did not necessarily coincide, and the 
colonial mind knew irrational regions where fear and caprice proved 
stronger than a strict regard for book-keeping. The loyalty shown 
by many slaves to their masters, stressed by M. Richard, 
(150) is not 
in itself proof of good treatment. A bad master, noted Malenfant, 
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'est sür de se faire aimer par la persuasion ou sont les Noirs que 
leurs maitres peuvent les battre et les tuer', 
(151)This 
perhaps 
gives some idea how slave society hung together and provides a necessary 
antidote to the tendency to polarise opposites. Symbiosis, after all, 
was achieved. 
Although compelled to observe a perpetual double standard in its 
work, the most reliable witness is probably the Administration. 
(152) 
In the interests of stability, it enjoined close white surveillance 
of blacks and supported a system of terror against the slave both 
legal and illegal. It also propagated ideas of the natural inferiority 
of non-whites, and helped maintain them in a state of secular and 
spiritual ignorance. The master had to be shown to be above contra- 
diction. Yet, in the interest of both humanity and stability, it was 
additionally obliged to limit the masters' excesses. The flow of 
official reports of unpunished atrocities testify to its complete 
failure here -a failure crowned by the notorious Lejeune case of 
1788, its supreme effort, 'cette occasion unique d'arreter le cours 
de tant d'atrocites... Depuis cent ans', the Intendant and Governor 
declaimed, 'ces cruaut4s s'exercent impunement'. 
(153) 
However, 
although there were 'des quartiers entiers ou l'ancienne barbarie 
subsiste dans toute sa force', they added that 'un r4gime moder6' 
was now becoming more generalised. 
(154) 
This opinion was widely held. Debien has observed the spasmodic 
development after 1770 of a more humane attitude towards the sick, 
the pregnant and the newly-arrived. 
(155) 
Humanitarian thinking 
and the rising cost of slaves also attenuated brutality in discipline, 
if only to avoid feeding abolitionist propaganda, and sometimes brought 
improvements in food and shelter. This trend, moreover, was given 
legislative expression in the decrees of 1784-5. However, they were 
highly unpopular and seem to have remained defunct. 
(156) 
Debien 
concludes that in 1789 there remained 'un monde ä emouvoir'. 
(157) 
In the 1780's some 60% of slave imports were absorbed by the 
coffee plantations. Here the regime was much milder than on the 
sucreries, though new estates had to be cut out of the scrub and 
their seclusion, some said, abetted cruelty. 
(158) Cold nights in 
the mountains also meant death to many new arrivals. Possibly less 
affected by the current of humanitarian thought in Europe 
(159) 
and 
more so (surprisingly) by the baneful influence of incipient soil 
exhaustion, 
(160) 
they nonetheless benefited from a healthier location 
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and from owners who were usually resident. At this time, Moreau 
noted; manumission had also become more frequent, 
(161) 
though not to 
the extent that made it an instrument of pacification under the 
Spanish. If pressure on the food supply was mounting rapidly, the 
American trade and the jardins negres apparently accommodated it. 
Thus, there seems little justification for Gaston-Martin's picture 
of actually worsening conditions. 
(162) 
Only in the comparative context may this have been true. In 
the British Caribbean in the previous 20 years economic decline and 
humanitarian pressure had made slave lives less easily expendable than 
in the boom world of Saint Domingue. In the United States and Brazil 
economic and other trends were probably working to the slaves' 
advantage, albeit temporarily, while in Cuba commercialization was 
only beginning. 
(163) 
Generally speaking, then, Humboldt's later 
observation that 'French slavery' was the worst, could conceivably 
be extended to cover Saint Domingue on the eve of the New World's 
sole successful slave revolt. 
Paradoxically, until the Revolution, Saint Domingue's slaves 
appear to have been remarkably unrebellious. 
(164) 
Although most 
of the factors that Patterson suggests lay behind Jamaica's numerous 
revolts(165)were equally or even more prominent in Saint Domingue, 
there is scarcely a single rebellion recorded. Conspiracies were 
occasionally discovered, but they seem to have been getting rarer. 
(166) 
Also, while the colony's terrain favoured runaways, they were never 
so disruptive as in Jamaica and Surinam, and the most famous maroon 
band numbered in 1784 a mere 137. 
(167) 
Rather like the wolf's, the 
maroon's aggression has been somewhat exaggerated. Desertions, 
Debbasch and Debien believe, were rarely the product of a specific 
desire for liberty, nor pace M. Fouchard were they notably 
increasing. 
(168) 
It is true, in 1784 the Governor was forced to 
negotiate with the disruptive Dokos band, but, as in Jamaica, this 
made for stability not subversion. 
(169) 
Slave protest was often 
expressed with poison, but not so frequently as guilty white minds 
imagined. Apart from suicide, self-mutilation and the occasional 
strike, the slaves' resentment was generally sunk in an acceptance 
of the status quo, sometimes sullen, sometimes stoic, often alleviated 
through satire. The majority, it seems, succeeded in constructing out 
of plantation relationships and a plot of vegetables a bearable existence. 
In any slave society, the psychological and physical barriers 
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against rebellion were immense. One may cite three main reasons. 
The master class monopolised the use of armed force; slave classes 
were peculiarly lacking in cohesion and, inevitably if to varying 
degrees, the slaves internalised the masters' view of them as inferior. 
(170) 
In the New World, the slave-owning class was further buttressed by being 
(for the most part) racially distinct from its slaves and by possessing 
a far more advanced material culture, which lent it both additional 
sanction and ability to repress. At the same time, the slaves were 
not a homogeneous group bound by kinship and custom, but a random 
agglomeration of individuals from diverse cultures, speaking different 
languages and at different stages of assimilation into colonial society. 
As amongst free men, divisions of class, colour, ethnic origin 
and locality were strong, while family ties were weak. Creoles mocked 
the newly-arrived bossales and sometimes exploited them; creolized 
Africans denied their origins, and domestics and artisans had privileges 
and pretensions of their own which set them further apart from the 
nýgres de jardin. The endurance of 'tribal' cultures among the 
Africans could likewise be divisive, old hostilities persisting. 
(171) 
Subversive religious sects were often denounced, a contemporary said, 
because 'ils n'adorent point le meme dieu, ils se haissent et s'epient 
reciproquement'. 
(172) 
Conspiracies were also frequently betrayed by 
creole women favoured by whites. They were said to spurn the African 
men; competition for women adding a particular edge to rivalries 
amongst the slaves. Of course, the slave experience itself forged 
new social bonds, between batiments who had undergone the Middle 
Passage together, 
(173) 
between baptised slaves sharing the same 
godparents, between adepts of syncretic religious cults, while gang 
labour in the fields imposed its own solidarity, symbolised in songs 
of call and response. Yet, equally, it was not unknown for a 
plantation workforce to identify with its master, so far as to 
indulge in rivalry with those of other estates and to ally with 
ateliers whose master was related to their own, 
(174) thus 
strengthening the system. 
The system was also strengthened by its shortcomings, not to 
mention what human features it possessed. Precisely because the 
plantation did not resemble the concentration camp to which some 
have compared it, slaves were able to disappear periodically for 
weekends with a distant lover, to pilfer from the stores, to make life 
hell for an unpopular overseer and even to get him dismissed by 
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refusing to work. With time they might achieve modest prosperity, 
and occasionally gain their freedom. Hence, tension could be released. 
Perhaps the growing preponderance of 'Congo' slaves, reputedly 
the most docile, was conducive to stability, though they were prone 
to marronage. Considering the mass of conflicting evidence to be 
assimilated, any generalisation about the 'slave personality' is 
vulnerable. The Haitian Revolution, as will be seen, is a classic 
case in point. Debbasch is on difficult ground when he asserts that 
the desire for freedom was not strong among the slaves. 
(175) 
One 
can point to persistent or successful runaways, or those few bold 
spirits mentioned by Moreau de Saint-M&y 
(176) 
who took on the whites 
at their own game and told them that ne roes were the superior race. 
Undoubtedly dangerous was the vodun cult, whose potential Moreau 
vaguely felt, though unaware of the meaning of the ritual chant that 
he printed. 
(177) 
Even so, until 1791, nocturnal meetings served 
simply as a safety-valve; at worst, mere 'rituals of rebellion'. 
(178) 
Their organisation was doubtless overrated by Saintoyant and 
Vaissi4re. 
(179) 
Fostering a revolutionary mentality at the same 
time as defusing latent tensions, the vodun cult reflects the 
immanent contradictions at the heart of the slave system, which 
drove the slave to rebel but remorselessly held him in check. Yet, 
according to Rousseau, slavery destroyed the desire to be free. 
(180) 
Whites were generally agreed that the slaves accepted their condition 
as inevitable, if not legitimate. 
(181) 
In the words of Toussaint 
Louverture himself, 'Ils ont support4 leurs fers tant qu'ils ne 
connurent pas d'etat plus heureux que celui de l'esclavage'. 
(182) 
Black Saint Domingue was indeed une mine ä poudre but the powder 
was damp, and was to need a lot of revolutionary heat to dry it 
out. 
The growth of anti-slavery opinion in France offered, in 
itself, an even less likely path to freedom than did direct action 
by the blacks. In the 18th century, the divorce between the theory 
and practice of slavery was clearly demonstrated. While philosophers 
attacked the theory, publicists exposed the facts and playwrights and 
poets dramatised them. The economics of slavery, too, were being 
questioned, and the Government took a discreet interest in means of 
replacing it. 
(183) 
Most planters, however, confident in their 
importance to the French economy, were not over-concerned for the 
time being. As Gaston-Martin observed, people had shed tears over 
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Inkle and Yarico for 100 years, yet continued to sip their well- 
sugared cups of coffee. 
(184) 
Nonetheless, early in 1788, planters 
were beginning to worry about the effects the abolitionist campaign 
would have on their workforces. Such concerns probably played only 
a small part in stimulating the colonists' first political moves at 
this time but once revolution was sweeping France, they undoubtedly 
strengthened desires for autonomy. 
(185) 
Reform, as de Tocqueville observed, has the paradoxical effect 
of defusing discontent while simultaneously encouraging it, by 
demonstrating the possibility of change where none previously existed. 
When, in 1784-85, the Government tried to impose on the planters 
certain improvements in the treatment of their slaves, the result 
was a wave of murders, strikes and marronage on the part of the 
blacks. 
(186) 
A number of New World slave revolts were associated 
with a belief that reform by distant rulers was being blocked by the 
master class in the locality. 
(187) 
The Haitian Revolution was to 
be no exception. 
(iv) Conclusion. In a sense there was no dominguois society. 
Its administrators treated their time there as a temporary exile. 
Its largest proprietors, if they lived there at all, were conducting 
a commercial smash and grab raid, and below them laboured lesser 
figures, likewise anxious to get rich and return to Europe, as soon 
as possible. While only a quarter of the whites were creoles, over 
one half of the colony's entire population had been born in Africa 
and arrived in the hold of a slave ship. 
Social cohesion was not only sapped by materialism, a lack of 
roots and an atmosphere of impermanence, but also by an increasing 
degree of stratification. Creoles were ridiculed by Europeans, 
the coffee planter disdained the cotton grower, the sugar planter 
looked down on both, and all of them despised the wage earner. 
(188) 
New and vicious barriers had arisen between white and coloured, while 
free blacks and m4salli4 whites served to further diversify the scale 
of scorn and degradation. Even amongst the slaves, elites of creoles 
and domestics were growing. This high degree of segmentation was to 
express itself in the ruthlessly shifting alliances of the Revolution. 
Certainly, the whites' internal differences were of a lesser 
order than the racial division. Yet, in a comparative context, 
Saint Domingue perhaps exhibited more class tension than other New 
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World colonies, while the caste line was not so clear cut as in the 
United States or (in a qualified sense) in the British West Indies. 
The result was that Saint Domingue had neither the neat lines of 
stratification, and therefore stability, of the British colonies, 
where the class and colour hierarchies were identical, nor the 
greater integration of the Iberian colonies. Its main distinguishing 
characteristics, therefore, apart from its huge number of slaves, 
were its prominent petit blanc and free coloured sectors, and their 
hostile conjunction. 
On the other hand, it could be said that the underlying similarities 
of the New World slave societies outweighed their differences and that 
Saint Domingue's problems were simply those of others writ large. 
Possessing a large, diversified population, it merely contained the 
commonly repressed, thus potentially explosive, elements, (slaves, 
free coloureds, small whites), in greater numbers, and in most cases, 
greater proportion. In the older colonies, such as the British 
Leewards, 
(189 
the struggle between the small whites and free coloureds 
had already resolved itself peacefully. 
it is with some reason that in the mid-1780's social problems 
were not a major issue to most Dominguan planters. The colony might 
have had the world's fastest-growing slave population, but the colonists 
could feel secure in its equally unique record of tranquillity. The 
free coloureds' increase in numbers and wealth had clashed head on 
with mounting racism but they were still quiet. The ablest of them 
continued to leave Saint Domingue to pursue careers in France and there 
were at this time signs of improving race relations. Similarly, 
though the number of petits blanca was growing, they remained no more 
than a police problem, and the Intendant was strengthening the police. 
As for the grands blancs, their long-standing political and 
economic grievances had served to shape a sense of separate identity 
and of interests divergent from those of the mother country that is 
the root of colonial nationalism. Yet, this is easily exaggerated. 
Vulnerability, national sentiment and inertia were less dramatic but 
powerful factors reinforcing the imperial tie. It must also be 
admitted that the frailty of Saint Domingue's social fabric was a 
hindrance to political action, for the individualism that weakened 
ties with the home country also sapped the common spirit created by 
common grievances. Furthermore, contemporary correspondence shows 
the colonists pre-occupied not with imminent cataclysm but with the 
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mundanities of day to day life, which for many, in the short term, 
was proving pleasantly profitable. 
(190) 
The whites' attitude to independence, the free coloureds' 
desires for equality, the slaves' ideas about freedom, were all 
conditioned by their perception of what was possible or probable. 
For all three groups the 1780's was a period of rising expectations 
and broadening horizons, but few indeed can have felt independence, 
equality or emancipation lay sufficiently close to the realms of 
reality to warrant a strong degree of commitment. Potential violent 
conflict was clearly very close to the surface of life in Saint 
Domingue, but it was latent in all slave-based colonies of the time. 
Men, moreover, whether slave or free, rarely find life unbearable 
and are apt to prefer a familiar present to an unknown future. The 
example of the English and Spanish mainland colonies suggests that 
revolution was not caused by the colonial systems themselves, but 
by changes in them. 
(191) 
UNI FRAY 
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CHAPTER II. THE REVOLUTION. 
In Saint Domingue, as in France, the Ancien Regime's last, ill- 
fated flourish of reforming activity encountered heavy opposition from 
the law courts and brought about a situation fairly termed 'pre- 
revolutionary'. The vigorous efficiency of Barbe-Marbois' Intendancy 
(1786-1789) made more enemies than friends. Alarming proposals were 
made to change the laws of debt, and the abolition of the Conseil du 
Cap, especially, like that of the Parlement of Paris, wounded powerful 
vested interests and outraged public pride at all levels of white 
society. Anger at the dismissal of these patriarchs de la famille 
coloniale(1)was exacerbated when representative assemblies were 
granted to Martinique and Guadeloupe but not to Saint Domingue. 
(2) 
In June 1788, certain prominent colonists arrived in Paris to 
present the King with a list of grievances. Revolutionary events 
in France now started to impinge on the colonies. Inspired by the 
noblesse of Brittany and Dauphin4, absentee proprietors initiated a 
campaign for colonial representation in the States-General, 
(3) 
and 
thereby complicated the colonists' demands with a dispute about the 
means for achieving them. 
Early in 1789, the Chambre d'Agriculture of le Cap and three 
secret committees organised illegally among the grands blancs the 
election of deputies, who were sent to France. Fears of a 
'd4spotisme minist4riel qui ne respecte rien' 
(4) 
proved groundless, 
since the colonial authorities, left uninformed by Versailles and 
divided amongst themselves, declined into impotence. The elections 
apparently involved very few colonists; 
(5) 
perhaps because of difficult 
communications, or apathy, or loyalty, or rigging; or perhaps because 
of a desire to keep the affairs of a prosperous colony away from the 
revolutionary assembly of a bankrupt metropole, particularly in view 
of the growing threat of the Amis des Noirs. Absentee opinion had 
divided on the representation issue in September 1788. 
(6) 
Slowly 
finding themselves out of harmony with opinion in Paris, many colonists 
perceived the need for a defensive stance. Around July 1789, the 
Club Massiac took shape, devoted to opposing colonial representation 
in National Assembly. 
(7) 
Both groups in France, however, were overtaken by events in 
Saint Domingue. Already agitated by the grain crisis in France, 
the colony reacted violently to the news of the Paris revolution. 
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Petits blancs celebrated the fall of the Bastille with pillaging and 
burning; patriotic societies were formed and a municipal revolution 
overturned military government in many parts of the colony. 'Multitudes 
of vagabonds... deluged the towns. Gangs of rioters appeared... as if 
from underground'. 
(8) 
In the North, certain grands blancs, using the 
mob of le Cap, took advantage of the Governor's recall to drive out 
the Intendant and elect a provincial assembly. The pattern would be 
repeated throughout the Revolution - 'quelques intrigants perdus de 
dettes', backed up by 'les hommes A bras... n'ayant rien ä perdre et 
beaucoup ä gagner'. 
(9) 
In little time, the Assembly of the North 
raised its own troops, entirely reformed the administration, condemned 
the colonial cahier and ordered all colonists under threat of ex- 
propriation to return and 'partager le p4ril commun'. 
(10) 
A General 
Assembly, meeting at Saint Marc, declared itself sovereign and boldly 
produced a set of Bases Constitutionellesýll) Denouncing this move 
towards independence, the Assembly of the North temporarily rallied 
to the Governor and, with the military, drove out these Patriotes in 
August 1790. 
Against a rapidly changing background, colonial politics had 
developed a bewildering complexity. Extremely atomised, it was an 
affair of factions rather than parties. Nevertheless, certain social 
realities lay behind the groupings mentioned. Half of the colonial 
deputies in Paris were wealthy absentees, mostly nobles, connected 
with both liberal and reactionary elements in the aristocracy. 
(12) 
They initially demanded to sit with the Second Estate. The cahier 
of the North Province, that they took with them to Paris, was designed 
to strengthen grand blanc privileges, and requested transmissible 
nobility for the colonial magistrates. 
(13) 
The cahier of the West 
was remarkably democratic in tone, but 
(14) 
y possibly disingenuous. 
Occasionally mentioning droits imprescriptibles or loi naturelle, 
these men generally based their arguments on the colonists', i. e. 
the grands blancs', great wealth and specialised local knowledge, 
thereby falling unsuspecting prey to Mirabeau and Condorcet. 
(15) 
Their social ideas were rigidly hierarchical. 
(16) 
They thus form 
an aristocratic reaction in R. R. Palmer's broad sense. 
(17) 
When 
the folly of imperial representation stood revealed, the Club Massiac 
absorbed most of the metropolitan members of this group, yet was 
distinguished by leaders of moderate fortune, often Creoles, who 
had recently arrived from Saint Domingue. 
(18) 
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Although Rotberg and Ott confuse 'Patriote' with petit blanc, 
(19) 
most of the deputies at Saint Marc were middling planters, hostile to 
absenteeism and distant rule. 
(20) 
According to Garran-Coulon, they 
despised the 'petits blancs', increasingly more confident and unruly 
behind their red cockades. 
(21) 
They were certainly not averse to 
adopting fantasy titles of marquis or chevalier. The Assembly of the 
North was dominated by lawyers and big merchants, whose professional 
interests explain much of their opposition to the Patriots. 
(22) 
More 
truly allies of the Old Regime were army officers and administrators, 
who, with some rich planters and establishment lawyers, led the 
Pompons blancs. Vaissiere's pattern of bourgeoisie against military 
nobility is therefore fallacious. 
(23) 
With the exception of the government party, it is not inaccurate 
to say that these groups sought basically the same ends: - to gain as 
much autonomy as possible; to liberalize colonial commerce; to main- 
tain a rigid hierarchy of colour and to preserve the institution of 
slavery and the trade vital to its preservation. The differences 
arose over means and the degree of militancy adopted. While the 
colonial deputies were committed to working with the National Assembly, 
the Club Massiac preferred to operate in close contact with the ministry 
and the ports, and pursue a more cautious policy. The Assembly of the 
North was determined on direct action but was not so ready to flout the 
metropole as were the deputies at Saint Marc, even though after driving 
them out they, too, tended to ignore the Governor. 
(24) 
Political demands were at first mild. The Lettre au Roi, dated 
31 mai 1788, 
(25)had 
merely requested an advisory type of assembly such 
as Martinique had gained. However, by 1789, presumably encouraged by 
the approach of the States-General and the re-appearance of several 
Provincial Estates, the three colonial cahiers and various plans for 
colonial assemblies of, both colons and coloniaux all call for complete 
internal legislative autonomy save for a royal veto. 
(26) 
Some of the 
latter plans even envisaged colonial control of commercial affairs - 
a position more extreme than that of the American Declaration of Rights 
of 1774, though couched in much milder language. The Bases 
Constitutionelles of the Saint Marc Assembly allowed the metropole 
little say in matters of trade, and none at all where foodstuffs were 
concerned. 
(27) 
Even the Assembly of the North requested that no 
commercial law be passed without consulting the Colonial Assembly. 
(28) 
On the other hand, in the cahiers of the Chambre d'Agriculture and 
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the North Province economic demands had been neither extreme nor 
prominent. 
(29) 
The Club Massiac, moreover, valuing its alliance 
with the French mercantile community to advance its political claims 
and protect the social status quo, never even discussed such matters. 
(30) 
By 1791, even the extremists seem to have accepted France's claim to 
determine the commercial relations of her colonies. 
(31) 
Like the 
American revolutionaries, many French colonists may have given liberty 
of trade a fairly low priority. In the Revolution, the commercial 
question certainly became overshadowed by political and social 
issues. 
(32) 
As regards an absolute independence that would enable metropolitan 
debts to be forgotten, it is hard to guess how much support there was 
for it. It was discussed by the deputies at Saint Marc(33)but the 
assembly was still prepared, ostensibly, to accept a royal veto, and 
by July, when it entered its extreme phase, it consisted of barely 
100 increasingly unpopular men who were soon overthrown. 
(34) 
Equally, 
the militaristic backlash that brought about its downfall alienated 
many moderates, 
(35) 
and the 85 l4opardins, (the deputies who had to 
flee to France), left behind many friends in the South and West. 
In March 1791, this Cote ouest party(36)made an important advance 
when troops mutinied in Port au Prince, enabling their sympathisers 
to establish a Municipality. 
(37) 
Many leopardins returned to take 
part in the Second Colonial Assembly in August 1791, and when the 
slave revolt broke out they were among the first to look to England 
for help. 
It is disputed how far these events followed naturally from 
Saint Domingue's past history and how far they were reactions to 
events in France. 
(38) 
Clearly discontent was widespread and 
considerable in 1787, though until the calling of the States-General 
it had produced little more than a list of grievances drawn up by 
some leading colonists to be sent to the king. Without the prospect 
of sweeping reforms and the paralysis of authority bought by the 
Revolution, one may doubt if the colony would have gone much further 
in attempting to shape its own destiny. Saintoyant did not accept 
this, but even he thought that, had times been quieter, the National 
Assembly's policy of internal legislative autonomy subject to a 
metropolitan veto, maintenance of the Governor's status and only 
minor modifications in the Exclusif, would have been enough to 
establish satisfactory relations. 
(39) The great stumbling block, 
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it may be argued, was less a deep-seated desire for independence than 
the Revolution's threat to white supremacy, and therefore to slavery, 
in Saint Domingue. 
In the colour question, few commentators have failed to find a 
root cause of the colony's collapse. Whether condemning the free 
coloureds for seeking equality with the whites, or blaming the whites 
for rejecting these demands, contemporaries often attributed the 
destruction of Saint Domingue not to the slaves who accomplished its 
destruction, nor to the political and social divisions that weakened 
white resistance, but to the bitter struggle between white and brown, 
which not only gave an example and an opportunity to the enslaved 
masses but also directly embroiled them. 
(40) 
Though colour prejudice always had the upper hand, the current 
of colonial opinion favourable to the free coloureds was not entirely 
extinguished in the Revolution. In 1789, the Committee of the West 
referred to free coloureds as equals. 
(41) 
In the Club Massiac, some 
southerners favoured concessions, as did many metropolitan merchants. 
(42) 
In parts of the South, mulattoes voted in the first Revolutionary 
elections and even sat on committees with whites. 
(43) 
Nevertheless, 
while the Revolution aided the free coloured position by convincing 
some whites, through fear if not reason, that reform was necessary, 
its main effect was to harden colonial attitudes against even the 
slightest concessions in case worse followed. Connections with the 
Amis des Noirs not only encouraged the mulattoes to extend their 
demands, perhaps unwisely, but also enabled rumour and propaganda to 
link their cause damagingly with that of the slaves. 
To the free coloureds themselves, the Rights of Man offered a 
return to the letter and spirit of the Code Noire. In the autumn 
of 1789, they assembled like the whites to make their wishes known 
but met with a wave of persecution. 
(44) 
Helping the Administration 
to overcome the Patriots in 1790 brought them no concessions. However - 
an important development - they acquired leaders from among the wealthy 
coloureds now returning from France, Pierre Pinchinat, J. B. Villatte, 
J. B. Lapointe, men who had been accustomed to equal treatment. Some 
mulattoes fortified their plantations to protect themselves, but an 
attempt by the Parisian lawyer, Vincent Oge, to raise a rebellion in 
October 1790 failed utterly. 
(45) While having the free coloureds 
well in check, the whites were additionally fortunate in that the 
National Assembly maintained an embarrassed ambiguity on the colour 
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question until May 1791. Nonetheless, they suspected the metropole's 
intentions and the ambivalence on this issue of the March 1790 decrees 
may have helped to push the Patriots to extremes. Certainly, when the 
National Assembly was forced to break its silence and grant political 
rights to the few non-whites born of free parents, the effect was fatal. 
Colonists heaped scorn on a mother country that suggested that non- 
whites could be their equals. 
(46) 
Coinciding with the petit blanc 
revolution in Port au Prince, 
(47) 
this compromise decree, though not 
even sent out, simply drove whites and coloureds further apart. 
Because of emigration during the Revolution, the mulattoes must have 
now well outnumbered the whites in the colony. 
(48) 
Their resistance 
stiffened. Towards the end of July, the free coloureds of the West, 
their patience exhausted, began to gather in armed bands. 
However, just when the free coloureds were poised to strike, 
and the Second Colonial Assembly was gathering at le Cap, a whirl- 
wind of violence swept through the plantations of the northern plain. 
The slaves rebelled, and with cane-knives and fire-brands took a 
terrible vengeance on their masters. Airborne ash from the blazing 
canefields rained down on le Cap as on a second Pompeii. Mirabeau's 
'Vesuvius' had erupted. 
(49) 
As early as September 1789, the Intendant had written, 'Tout 
ce qui se fait et s'ecrit particulierement de l'affranchissement des 
negres perce dans la colonie... ces negres s'accordent tous... que les 
blancs esclaves ont tu4 leurs maitres, et qu'aujourd'hui libres, ils 
se gouvernent eux-memes et rentrent en possession des biens de la 
terre'. 
(50) 
Careless table talk in the grand'cases and conversation 
with sailors on the wharves kept the slaves informed of events in 
France. 
(51) 
Assuredly, they began to see themselves and their masters 
in a new light. At bottom, however, slave revolts were not determined 
by the ideas circulating in the slave quarters, but by their prospects 
of success, and that meant by the strength and unity of the master 
class. The experience of Jamaica at this time makes this clear. 
(52) 
For two years, the slaves of Saint Domingue had watched their masters, 
white and coloured, violently assail established authority. Twice 
as numerous as the slaves of Jamaica, they faced approximately the 
same number of troops in a colony nearly three times as large. 
(53) 
Considering the reckless complacence of most whites and the excessive 
suspicion of others, not to mention the outright provocation of some 
troops arriving from France, 
(54) 
perhaps the most surprising feature 
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of the slave revolt was its slowness in coming. Only a few small 
outbreaks occurred before August 1791. Equally surprising perhaps 
is the spasmodic and limited way it developed. 
(55) 
Despite what 
has been written about the 'revolution of half a million slaves', 
(56) 
Saint Domingue was never to experience anything like a general 
insurrection. 
It seems quite possible that not only was the white demonstration 
of the efficacy of violence a vital factor in stimulating ferment 
among the slaves but also a measure of white or coloured leadership. 
According to Robert Michels, all major class movements in history 
have been instigated, aided and led by men from the classes against 
which those movements were directed. 
(57) 
In the West and South 
Provinces, it was with few exceptions " at the command of their 
masters that the slaves first took to arms to fight in the civil war 
between whites and coloureds. 
(58) 
In the North, the major break- 
throughs in the revolt seem to have come when mulattoes joined the 
slaves, helping them to take over the mountains adjoining the great 
plain and then break out to the eastward. 
(59) 
If the story is true, 
that the August rebellion was a counter-revolutionary manoeuvre that 
misfired, 
(60) 
then the autonomy of the slave insurrection is considerably 
diminished. Garran-Coulon blamed white prejudice for what he called 
the obsession for finding external causes of the slave revolt. 
(61) 
He may have been right, - certainly the reasoning, and honesty, of 
someone like Carteaux leaves much to be desired 
(62)_ but so also may 
this unique event have been the product of extraordinary circumstances. 
Whatever interests were bound up with the August rebellion, its 
immediate organisation was apparently the result of nocturnal gatherings 
associated with the vodun cult. 
(63) 
The proscription of the cult by 
the colonial authorities, and later by Sonthonax, Toussaint, Dessalines 
and Christophe, 
(64) 
gives some idea of its subversive potential. It 
seems to have provided through its meetings a network of inter- 
plantation contacts, some leadership through its priests, a unity 
of feeling and a sense of invulnerability through its precepts. 
(65) 
Even so, the localised nature of the August rebellion surely dis- 
proves fantastic theories of a religious organisation on a colony- 
wide scale, notwithstanding the rapidity with which news travelled 
among the slaves. The fact that so many slaves rebelled at the 
same time(66)can doubtless be explained by the size, and density 
of population of the northern plain; the hesitant, defensive tactics 
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of the whites; 
(67) 
their numerical weakness(68)and indiscriminate 
cruelty, 
(69) 
and the terrorism of the insurgents, 
(70) 
that all con- 
tributed to the snowball effect of the first few weeks. 
It is interesting that Boukman, apparently the organiser of the 
revolt, was not only a houngan but also of British West Indian origins. 
(71) 
The same seems to have been true of the famous maroon leaders, Macandal 
and Plymouth. 
(721 
Slaves rejected by British planters were more likely 
to be dissidents. 
(73) 
Most of the rebels were presumably Africans, 
since they formed the majority of the adult population, though creole 
males, even specialists and house slaves, appear to have been little 
less prone to revolt. 
(74) 
Indeed, they supplied the bulk of the 
leadership and were almost certainly responsible for the rebellion. 
(75) 
Boukman was a coachman, but it was usually the slave-drivers, it seems, 
who decided if an atelier rebelled. 
(76) 
When one reflects that the 
Plaine du Nord was probably the most creolized part of the colony, 
and that the most Africanised areas were the slowest to revolt, 
(77) 
there seems good reason to re-examine suppositions about the links 
between African slaves and armed rebellion. 
The insurrection produced acts of great savagery from the slaves, 
as from the whites and coloureds, but also numerous instances of 
loyalty or kindness both individual and collective. 
(78) 
According 
to tradition, Toussaint Louverture maintained calm on his master's 
plantation for a month before conveying the manager's wife to safety 
and then joining the rebels. His apparent dilemma was not simply 
that of the 'privileged' slave. Of the 317 other slaves on the 
Breda estates, where marronage, moreover, had been endemic, only 21 
left for the rebel camp, while the remainder attempted to preserve 
the plantations. 
(79) 
Slavery was a more durable institution than 
some would believe. 
The conflict between loyalties to class and colour is also 
noteworthy. Some whites had taken part in Og4's rebellion in 
1790, 
(80)and 
several cases are recorded of petits blancs leading 
or involved with bands of slave rebels. 
(81) 
Conversely, free black 
and mulatto slaveowners also joined with revolted slaves, though most 
at first sought solidarity with the whites. 
(82) Some bands of 
maroons were indifferent to the rebellion; others (apparently) 
were active participants. 
(83) 
The completely segmented nature of 
Saint Domingue society is evident from the absence of any permanent 
alignments between groups. In the plain of Cul de Sac, in the 
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autumn of 1791, the whites were initially confronted by the free 
coloureds joined by some slaves. Whites and mulattoes then combined 
and returned the slaves to their plantations but within weeks white 
and coloured planters were using their slaves to fight the white 
Patriots of Port au Prince, who also armed local slaves. In March 
1792, the slaves themselves rose apparently in support of the mulattoes, 
but the following January they massacred them, sparing the whites. 
(84) 
In la Grand'Anse, the whites were able to rely on their slaves to hold 
down the free coloureds, but on the south coast it was usually the 
mulattoes who led the slaves against the whites. 
(85) 
All the hatred, the fear and the aspirations latent in colonial 
society were now given free rein. However, the initiative in colonial 
affairs still lay in Europe and external factors were perhaps the most 
important, if negative, influence on the course of events. Firstly, 
France became increasingly unable to spare sufficient troops either 
to hunt down the insurgents or to overawe unruly whites. 
(86) 
A few 
more regiments more promptly sent and the revolution might have been 
over. 
(87) 
Secondly, the indecision of the French legislators on the 
colour question created havoc in the colony, and it was this issue 
that for over a year determined whether the slave revolt would spread 
beyond the North Province. 
Fear of such a development had, by late September 1791, brought 
the whites in all three provinces to accept either the May 15 decree 
or ealit for all free coloureds. 
(88) 
qu Y This alliance, however, 
was broken when the National Assembly withdrew the May decree. 
(89) 
A savage race war thereupon spread through the colony and continued 
until the early summer of 1792, when it became known that the new 
Legislative Assembly in Paris(90)had decreed on 4th April full 
equality between white and coloured freemen - and was sending a 
Civil Commission with 6,000 troops to enforce it. White and 
mulatto property-owners consequently joined in an uneasy common 
front and the slaves generally returned to work, having negotiated 
improved conditions. 
(91) 
The revolt was now largely confined to 
parts of the North and the Platons region in the South, which was 
captured by whites and loyal blacks in January 1793. 
(92) 
While very little is known about this period in Saint Domingue's 
history, there seems, as regards the South and West, little 
exaggeration in Mahe de CormerPs claim that, 'il n'eut reellement 
daps le principe, d'esclaves insurges ... que ceux qui avoient 
dt4 
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arm4s par les deux partis'. 
(93) 
In general, especially in the West, 
the largest province, slave resistance usually took the form in 1792 
of flouting plantation discipline or ceasing to work, 
(94) 
which became 
increasingly easier as whites moved into the towns or emigrated. 
Autonomous aggression was, at least until 1793, rare, short-lived 
and isolated. The March 1792 uprising in the plain of Cul de Sac 
was instigated by the mulattoes and by August work had been resumed. 
(95) 
The brief and simultaneous insurrection in the plain of Arcahaye was 
likewise a mulatto manoeuvre - their plantations were spared. It 
caused very little destruction, and barely interrupted production at 
all, it seems. 
(96) 
The same appears true of the disturbances in 
the north-west and the Saint Marc-Artibonite region, though in the 
latter area damage may have been more extensive. 
(97) 
The mountains 
were apparently the least affected of all areas. 
(98) 
Neither la 
Grand'Anse nor the rest of the West experienced an autonomous slave 
rebellion of any significance. 
(99) 
There were minor outbreaks, and 
the slaves, once raised, were not easily bought off. In parts of the 
South, they broke away from their masters to fight on their own account, 
but only in the Cayes-Torbeck region was damage considerable, and here 
work was resumed in January 1793. 
(100) 
Most importantly, where slaves actually were in rebellion, their 
demands were surprisingly mild. Generally they called for the extra 
free day per week they apparently thought the king had granted them, 
for some improvements in the treatment of slaves, and for emancipation 
only for their leaders. Sometimes they demanded the return of absentee 
masters. 
(101) 
One cannot expect them, Garran-Coulon observed, to 
have loved liberty as an ideal. 
(102) 
The question of the rebels' 
intentions is a difficult one. In the North it would seem that 
early ambitions to exterminate the whites(103)became rapidly scaled 
down with the experience of defeat. Roume claimed they never 
demanded general emancipation until the 4th April decree became 
known, and that only at the instigation of the Abbe Delahaye. 
(104) 
Certainly the rebels were by mid-November anxious to surrender before 
troops arrived from France. The planters foolishly refused to hear 
of it, and the war continued. 
(105) 
Yet, in June 1792 the soldier/ 
planter de Rouvray wrote that most of the rebels he was fighting in 
the North wished to return to work. 
(106) 
Separated from the race 
war, the slave insurrection assumed manageable proportions. Faced 
by fresh troops, it generally slackened throughout the year. 
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Historians disagree as to how sincere was white Saint Domingue's 
acceptance of la loi de 4 avril. 
(107) 
The Revolution had certainly 
convinced some whites of the justice of the mulattoes' demands, or of 
the prudence of according them. 
(108) 
At the same time the bitterness 
of the race war made rapprochement all the more difficult, especially 
in la Grand'Anse, where the whites would never forgive the atrocities 
committed by the coloured planters of the Cayemittes region. By 1792, 
many colonists were indeed urging co-operation with the free coloureds, 
but often from the saner vantage point of France, where nonetheless 
the colonial deputies left the Legislative Assembly in protest against 
the April decree and the Club Massiac pressed its members to return to 
Saint Domingue to resist its application. 
(109) 
Mahd de Cormer4 
supported the Concordat policy, but privately he derided the mulattoes' 
ambition ridicule, orgueilleuse et d4m4sur4e. He described the 4th 
April decree as 'accept4e, pent-etre avec r4pugnance... d4sastreuse 
mais n4c4ssaire'. 
(110) 
Even some of the leading advocates of racial 
equality seem to have been playing the free coloureds false. 
(111) 
The alliance that had grown up since 1790 between the Government 
party and the mulattoes had some basis in the military man's 
appreciation of the free coloured's martial qualities and the 
European's freedom from colonial prejudice, but was to a large extent 
simply political manoeuvring, determined by the petits blancs' com- 
bination of radicalism and racism, and the slave revolt's threat to 
property. 
On the whole, acceptance of the decree depended on the mulattoes' 
numerical strength in the different parishes. In most of the South 
and West they were henceforth, if not already, dominant. In the 
North and the three provincial capitals, where gens de couleur were 
least numerous, prejudice remained active, while in la Grand'Anse, 
which had the lowest mulatto: white ratio of any rural parish outside 
the North, 
(112) 
the decree was completely ignored. 
When Civil Commissioners Sonthonax and Polverel arrived in 
September 1792, therefore, the situation had stabilised considerably 
but remained tense. Any official sent to root out racial dis- 
crimination would inevitably have met some resistance, but it appears 
that Sonthonax and Polverel made their task more difficult by a 
singular harshness towards the white population. Even Garran-Coulon, 
fellow Brissotin and apologist, pointed to certain excesses on their 
part and reported that some mulattoes, now in positions of power, 
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persecuted their former persecutors. 
(113)_ 
Purges, deportations, heavy taxation, interference with shipping, 
the dissolution of the Colonial Assembly and all municipalities, if 
not unjustified, did little to win the Commissioners support in a 
colony where opinion became increasingly polarized after it was known 
that the monarchy had been overthrown and a republic established. 
(114) 
In October the Commissioners struck to the Right, deporting numerous 
officers and officials, suspected of plotting. In December, after 
an anti-mulatto riot in le Cap, they similarly purged the local 
separatist (or simply anarchic) faction. 
(115) 
The year ended with 
the Commissioners secure in the North Province, poised to forcibly 
extend their rule to the rest of the colony. However, just as in 
Europe the triumphant Republican armies were being propelled by 
Girondin ambition into fighting a world war, so too the policy of 
the Commissioners in Saint Domingue was alienating all shades of 
white opinion, even causing them to combine. 
(116) 
This left as 
their only allies the increasingly self-assertive free coloureds 
and a fast dwindling number of French troops. 
Such was the situation when on 2nd February 1793 the French 
Republic declared war on Great Britain. 
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CHAPTER III. AUTONOMISM, ROYALISM AND 'L'APPEL AUX ANGLAIS'. 
(i) The Problem. It is impossible to know what proportion of 
colonists favoured English intervention in 1793. Their motives, 
moreover, in either actively soliciting or merely accepting a British 
occupation are almost as debatable, and not surprisingly so, since the 
calling in of the English was an act of self-preservation, secession 
and counter-revolution all at the same time. Primarily, however, was 
it a response to immediate and dangerous circumstances? Or was it, 
as Frostin holds, 
(1) 
the natural expression of a virulent creole 
autonomism that had been maturing for fifty years? Conversely, what 
truth is there in Garran-Coulon's diatribes against colonial royalism, 
the planters' need for a king, whether English or French? 
(2) 
And what 
were the implications of these views for Great Britain? 
If mere self-preservation were the prime-mover, one presumes that 
those colonists favouring a British occupation saw it as an act of 
police-keeping, partly humane, partly self-interested. Either a 
necessary evil or a convenient opportunity to profit from British 
commerce, the redcoats' presence would probably be intended to be 
temporary, though the colonists could not be unaware that England might 
try to retain the colony after the war. 
If the autonomist aspect were paramount, then it is likely that 
British troops were intended to free Saint Domingue from French rule 
and French debts, and to enable it to become either British or independent, 
although some might have simply hoped to use the foreign presence as 
leverage at future peace negotiations to gain from France the political 
and commercial concessions the colony had sought in 1789-90. 
Alternatively, if attachment to certain aspects of the Ancien 
Regime was the mainspring of the approach to Britain and the acceptance 
of its soldiers, then it is likely that the invaders were regarded as 
allies, who would help defeat the Revolution and hand the colony back 
to a France returned, if not specifically to the Bourbons, then at least 
to its senses. On the other hand, if the Republic remained triumphant 
in Europe, probably the conservative or compromised colonist would prefer 
to stay under monarchical British rule, free from socidtds populaires 
and enfranchised mulattoes, though dynastic loyalty might persuade others 
to prefer the rule of the Princes in exile. 
These three categories are neither exhaustive, well-defined, nor 
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mutually exclusive. Nor are their implications for Britain clear cut. 
In addition, while all evidence of separatism in the Revolutionary period 
is subject to the difficulties of interpretation already outlined, no 
evidence can be called conclusive regarding the existence of attitudes 
often imprecise and not strongly felt in a population of thousands, 
especially when they concern hypothetical situations. The problem is 
partly one of evidence and partly conceptual. It will be suggested 
that proof of actual secessionist desires in Saint Domingue is not quite 
as extensive as contemporaries and historians have implied. On the 
other hand, to find any evidence at all of overtures from a colony to 
a foreign power, particularly in peacetime, is perhaps sufficiently 
impressive in itself. To insist on extensive proof of such a phenomenon, 
some would say, is to confuse an idea with its expression. 
(3) 
However, 
since this can hardly be avoided by the historian, it appears preferable 
to assuming the existence of things that might not have existed. At 
the same time, one must also remember with what reluctance and disunity 
the North American colonies themselves had nonetheless achieved 
independence and nationhood. A subject so elusive perhaps deserves 
more space than is here available. Yet, as it concerns fundamental 
attitudes towards the occupation, some investigation is thought necessary. 
The most detailed and comprehensive work on the subject is by 
Charles Frostin. 
(4) 
His thesis is that the Revolution did not create 
in the colony an upsurge of royalism as colonial disaffection might 
suggest, but that it accelerated the growth of 'un permanent sentiment 
autonomiste' and desire to ditch metropolitan debts, 'qui depuis la 
seconde moitid du 18me siecle entrainaient les cr6oles vers la Grande 
Bretagne'. 
(5) 
Although the upsurge of royalism is something of a 
straw man, this interpretation undoubtedly does much to explain Saint 
Domingue's reaction to the French Revolution, but it would also seem 
overstated, tending to confuse opposition to the Revolution with pre- 
existing alienation from France. Such a distinction is vital to make 
when considering attitudes to the British occupation and the question 
of eventual sovereignty it raised. Anger with a fickle mother-country 
by 1793 must have permanently alienated some hitherto contented colonists, 
as well as giving others the opportunity to realise latent aspirations, 
but it is surely equally likely that basically loyal colonists, who 
flew into a rage when Parisian assemblies shook the pillars of their 
social order would have happily returned under French rule once the 
'excesses' of the Revolution had passed. Hence, Frostin's case for 
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'la permanence de 1'esprit autonomiste et anglophile chez la plupart 
des colons' is considerably undermined by his own suggestion that 'le 
mobile essentiel de Pappel des colons aux Anglais' was, in fact, 
Revolutionary legislation on the colour question. 
(6) 
(ii) The Evidence. It has already been argued that, while a 
desire for more political and economic freedom had long been present 
in Saint Domingue, actual secessionist aspirations were of little account 
at least until the summer of 1791. 
(7) 
In a slave colony, to demand self- 
government was one thing: to seek independence was another. 
Prominent among the evidence for the existence of an esprit 
autonomiste under the Ancien Regime, is a letter by the Comte de la 
Barre, in which he reflects how little the colony would suffer if occupied 
by the English. 
(8) 
However, it is highly unlikely it demonstrates much 
more than the concern of an ageing nobleman, recently arrived in the 
turbulent colony, to reassure an anxious and distant wife of the security 
of himself and of their property. 
(9) 
Significantly, he noted that when 
Grenada was conquered its inhabitants had been able to sell their land 
and emigrate. Not surprisingly, in 1790 we find the Count opposing the 
extremists in Saint Domingue. 
(10) 
Talk of secession was certainly in the air from the start of, even 
before, the Revolution. The pamphlets and public statements of the 
colonists testify to this both by their veiled threats and their pro- 
testations of loyalty. 
(11) 
Nevertheless, generous allowance has to be 
made both for the blackmail of colonial politicians and the slander of 
the Amis des Noirs. Few planters can have doubted that they needed 
the protection of European arms and that this had to be paid for with 
commercial concessions. If the National Assembly's refusal to modify 
the Exclusif hardly strengthened the imperial tie, it is nonetheless 
true that the colonial cahiers and the behaviour of the Club Massiac 
reveal a willingness to tread carefully in this area. 
(12) 
When the 
rump of the Saint Marc Assembly opened the colony's ports in July 1790, 
the moderate majority was shocked and the backlash was swift. 
(13) 
Garran-Coulon asserted as something beyond doubt that from early 
April 1790 the Saint Marc Assembly had secret relations with the English 
of Jamaica. 
(14) 
Yeti he could mention in evidence only one letter of 
denunciation'and another reporting the rumour of a proposed Caribbean 
Confederation directed from Jamaica and Havana. The rumour soon proved 
spurious and anyway aroused no enthusiasm in Saint Domingue., 
(15) 
No 
sign of any such relations exist in the official papers of the Governor, 
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Council, Committee of Correspondence or Agent of Jamaica, 
(16) 
while 
Bryan Edwards summarily dismissed such talk as slander. He in fact 
found inconceivable the idea that some of the l6opardins should have 
sought independence. 
(17) 
This is obviously going too far. According to Venault de 
Charmilly, 
(18) 
certain influential colonists had, since their experience 
during the American War of free trade with the United States, desired 
independence for Saint Domingue under the general protection of the 
European Powers. They were, however, un petit nombre d'Habitants... 
quelques caracteres ardens. 
(19) 
Moreover, though he himself preached 
the virtues of British rule des le commencement des troubles, it is 
evident his Anglophilia was not shared by many other separatists. 
Thus, the idea of a British takeover - merely another despotism, as 
one colonist put it 
(20)_ 
had even fewer supporters than did hare-brained 
schemes for what he called une ind4pendance absurde. 
(21) 
Some were 
aware, it seems, that, even if the British conquered the colony in 
wartime, the European balance of power would probably prevent them 
from keeping it. 
(22) 
Yet, pace M. Frostin, one gets the impression 
that most whites simply did not want to become British. 
(23) 
The merchant, Grasset, claimed that the deputies at Saint Marc 
discussed independence nem. con. with a view to casting adrift from 
their French creditors. 
(24) 
If true, this would tell us primarily 
how far the moderate deputies were intimidated by the extremists, 
since we know that over 50 of the 212 deputies actively rejected the 
autonomist spirit that evolved in the Assembly. 
(25) 
Probably it is 
not true. The correspondence of the attorney Joseph Sartre mentions 
that the proposal, shocking to colonial opinion, met with stiff 
resistance. 
(26) 
Nevertheless, many planters must have found the attraction of 
instant solvency a seductive argument in favour of secession. As the 
Revolution, from the summer of 1791 onwards, seemed. an increasingly 
bigger threat to the colony, it might have served as a powerful adjunct 
in eroding residual loyalty to the mother country. However, it is 
important to remember that in plantation society debts were often treated 
with aristocratic nonchalance, even when crops were contracted in advance 
to a creditor. Planters regarded credit more as a necessary investment 
by the mercantile bourgeoisie than as something to be repaid. 
(27) 
Moreover, the nature of French colonial law, the bias of the Conseils 
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Sup4rieurs, and the lassitude of the Administration when faced with 
proud and recalcitrant planters made debts exceptionally hard to 
collect. 
(28) 
Unlike in the British West Indies, the seizure of slaves 
was illegal; that of real estate almost impossible, and bodily constraint 
was permitted in only a few circumstances. Attempts to change the law 
at the end of the Ancien Regime had to be dropped. The Revolution, 
furthermore, left intact the planters' privileged position. 
(29) 
The 
result was that some creditors dared not pressure their pampered clients, 
who could view unperturbed the prospect of interminable litigation. 
(30) 
Indebtedness, therefore, while embittering transatlantic relations, was 
not such a strong motive for secession as first appears. The Second 
Colonial Assembly, one notes, made a point of guaranteeing the colony's 
obligations to French commerce. 
(31) 
Colonial apologia are not lacking in lies and specious arguments, 
(32) 
being usually written to rehabilitate the colonists' reputation in 
Napoleonic or Restoration France. Nevertheless, one might accept Felix 
Carteaux's point that free-trading in the Revolution did not necessarily 
imply a desire for absolute independence, still less for English rule - 
the least justified, he claimed, of anti-colonial jibes. 
(33) 
Britain 
could supply cheaper slaves and manufactured goods, but would still 
restrict the vital American trade without offering a significantly 
better market. The Revolution, it should not be forgotten, had brought 
the colonists a large measure of the political liberties for which they 
had envied their British neighbours and to this extent strengthened the 
imperial bond. Even the colonist who in 1791 published at le Cap an 
edition of the U. S. constitution seems to have looked towards la France, 
notre patrie ch&rie with new hope and enthusiasm. 
(34) 
Perhaps Cormier, 
president of the Club Massiac, writing in January 1792, expressed the 
average colonist's wishes - internal self-government and a commercial 
policy agreed to by the colony, the king and the Legislative Assembly 
! 35) 
Despite their debts, their demands for self-government and their threats 
of bolder action, not all commentators took seriously the pretensions of 
what were probably a handful of extremists. 
(36) 
Debien's estimate, 
therefore, that prior to the summer of 1791 less than ten colonists 
wanted absolute independence, seems very likely. 
(37) 
However, the threat of the May 15 decree to white supremacy pro- 
duced a violent response in Saint Domingue. it was no longer a matter 
of blackmail, Debien thinks; 
(38) 
though one must note that much of the 
evidence for this intense backlash against France consists of alarmist 
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letters specifically written for publication in Europe. 
(39) 
Addresses 
to the National Assembly were likewise designed to frighten it into 
backing down. 
(40) 
Nonetheless, the anger and the sense of betrayal 
were only too real. Creoles in Paris, despairing of the colony's 
future, not only made extravagant scenesIn public but also approached 
the English ambassador, who referred a 'certain gentleman' to Foreign 
Secretary Grenville. 
(41) 
The Club Massiac, though, appears mainly to 
have looked to the King and the 4migr4 Princes to sponsor opposition to 
the National Assembly. 
(42) 
At Port au Prince, an assemble g4n4rale 
f4d4rative discussed how to resist militarily any attempt to impose on 
the colony the loi de sang, d'anarchie et d'indignation. 
(43) 
The parish 
of Gros Morne declared its connection with France at an end, and some 
colonists expressed desires for a coalition with Jamaica, believing all 
slave societies to have a vested interest in thwarting such a decree. 
(44) 
Three Port au Prince whites even went to Kingston to inform the military 
commander that Saint Domingue was determined on resistance. 
(45) 
However, 
they were not acting in any official capacity and the Port au Prince 
assembly that probably sent them had no official standing either, as it 
admitted. No actual overtures were made. Genuine fear existed that 
concessions to the free-coloureds would pave the way towards the abolition 
of slavery, and even the moderates in the colonial assembly were determined 
to resist the decree if necessary. One member even proposed that the 
Union Jack be raised. 
(46) 
Even so, the early sessions of the assembly, 
despite such violent language, showed much conciliation towards France. 
(47) 
only when the holocaust started in the region of le Cap do we find 
the first firm evidence of separatist activity in Saint Domingue. Only 
when half of the northern plain had been ravaged, and an immense amount 
of property destroyed, when hundreds of whites and numberless blacks 
had been slaughtered in a matter of weeks, only then did the proximity 
of Jamaica, the power of Britain and the prospect of easy credit for 
future repairs combine to provoke a request for British intervention. 
The figure most implicated is Paul Cadusch. 
(48) 
As president 
of the Assembly, he was responsible for refusing to ask France for help 
and apparently delaying an appeal to Martinique until his overtures to 
Jamaica produced a response. 
(49) 
He sent the same requests for troops, 
arms and supplies to Cuba, Santo Domingo and the United States, but 
Lebeugnet, the envoy sent to Governor Effingham, is alleged to have 
(51) 
made secret proposals. 
(50) 
This, however, appears to be untrue. 
Cadusch's colleagues, Raboteau and B4rault Saint Maurice, 
(52) 
are like- 
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wise accused of making clandestine overtures when sent to Jamaica to 
raise a loan. 
(53) 
Again, no evidence of this has been found. Until 
late September, Cadusch indeed stopped ships leaving for France, 
Martinique and elsewhere, but he had good strategic reasons for doing 
so, and the approval of Governor Blanchelande. The arrival of the 
British warships, and several victories over the rebels in the last 
two weeks of September, brought a degree of security that then per- 
mitted the departure of the merchantmen's crews. 
(S4) 
Much has also 
been made of the black cockade that Cadusch and others in le Cap wore 
in ostentatious disrespect to la cocarde nationale. Garran-Coulon 
calls it an änglophile symbol, but Bryan Edwards, when he visited le 
Cap, thought it a sign of mourning. Moreover, the cockades most in 
evidence in this month of crisis were green or yellow - counter- 
revolutionary colours. 
(55) 
Nevertheless, when Captain Affleck, 
accompanied by Edwards, arrived in le Cap with supplies on September 
22nd, 
(56) 
they were rapturously received, in fact with tears and out- 
stretched arms, and numerous people assured them that a British take- 
over would be welcomed. 
(57) 
A week later, Cadusch sent a letter to 
Pitt, accompanied by a memoir, asking that England occupy Saint Domingue. 
(58) 
The two documents embody the essence of l'autonomisme cr4ole. One is a 
request for self-government under British suzerainty and free trade with 
the United States. The other presents a justification of slavery and 
a theoretical defence of the white colonists' rights vis ä vis both 
the-mother country and the free coloureds. Crudely based on contract 
theory, it reveals a debased but coherent world picture. 
(59) 
The 
display of separatist feeling, then, is quite impressive. However, 
some points need to be noted. A distinction should be drawn, it seems, 
between the secret dealings of Cadusch and the public anger that was 
general in le Cap. The very fact that disaffection was so widespread 
and involved the 'principal Gentlemen of the colony, military and civil'(60) 
suggests that it was something rather exceptional, both broader and 
shallower than l'autonomisme creole. Le Cap, after all, was the city 
of the big merchants, until that summer one of the centres of colonial 
loyalism. In September 1791, suddenly finding itself besieged by 
thousands of vengeful slaves, it seethed with panic, rumour and bewilder- 
ment. Since the slave revolt was invariably blamed on agents of the 
Administration or the Amis des Noirs, alienation from France reached a 
peak. One can extrapolate very little of general validity from such 
a unique situation. 
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As for Cadusch's letter, it does not so much promise support for 
an English occupation, as suggest that the sight of 14 warships and 
12,000 troops would overawe the colony into accepting one. Moreover, 
it was not an official appeal on behalf of the Assembly but a personal 
approach in the name of la volont4 gdn4rale. 
(61) 
Lastly, Cadusch's 
behaviour at this time was to destroy his standing in the colony; by 
the end of the year he was in hiding, a persecuted man. 
(62) 
This moment of crisis produced perhaps three other proposals to 
throw off French rule. Boyer and Marie, the envoys sent from Port au 
Prince, returned to Kingston on 10th September to seek aid. In con- 
fidence, Marie informed Major-General Williamson that 'nothing would 
make them happier than to be independent of France and under the pro- 
tection of Great Britain'. 
(63) 
In response a warship was sent to 
Port au Prince to keep the slaves in obedience. Its arrival seems to 
have prompted Caradeux aing, commandant of Port au Prince National Guard 
and prominent racist, to approach his alarmed mulatto opponents about 
uniting to establish an independent Saint Domingue. 
(64) 
We have, 
however, only their word for it. 
Far more remarkable are the visionary proposals that Venault de 
Charmilly presented in London to 'un ministre qui gouverne avec tant 
d'dclat la nation la plus 4clair4e... de l'Europe'. 
(65) 
Now the French 
army and navy were disrupted, he claimed, England alone could avert the 
disaster then facing all the sugar colonies. It should either make 
Saint Domingue a British colony, or, to avoid alarming the European 
powers, simply garrison its forts while opening up its trade to all 
comers. Then, using it as a springboard, Pitt's England, at the height 
of its powers, was to liberate South America from 'cette indolente et 
ignorante nation', the Spaniards. Otherwise, the United States, soon 
to be Britain's biggest rival, would carry southwards 'le flambeau de 
libertg que les cr4oles de ces climats attendent'. 
There is no real evidence for at least another year of secessionist 
activity in Saint Domingue. This could be attributed to the knowledge 
that the English had refused to intervene, and that the slave revolt 
had made independence impracticable; also to the de facto independence 
that parts of the colony enjoyed in this period. However, other 
stabilising factors were the 24th September law, which granted colonial 
control over the colour question, until cancelled by the loi du 4 avril; 
the dispatch of troops with the first and second Civil Commissioners, 
and the rising prices that colonial products fetched in France after 
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the revolt in the North. It is significant that the outright abolition 
of racial discrimination in April 1792, far from strengthening the 
extreme Cöte Ouest party, already in decline, led to its eclipse in the 
Colonial Assembly, which rallied round the Governor. 
(66) 
The extremists 
lacked energy and direction, said Garran-Coulon, 
(67) 
and very likely 
supporters as well. Their attempt to adopt the title Assemble Generale 
was rejected by 4/5 of the colony's parishes, while the Assembly itself, 
deserted by gens de bien, cannot have been really representative of 
colonial opinion. 
(68) 
On the other hand, British assistance in the 
crisis had earned the colonists' gratitude, and merchants and refugees 
were now busily forging new links between Jamaica and Saint Domingue - 
or, indeed, strengthening old ones. 
(69) 
It was principally in Europe that secessionist activity was to be 
found in 1792, though it was not towards the British Government that it 
was directed. As in the previous year, leading members of the Club 
Massiac appealed to both Louis XVI and his exiled brothers to use the 
French Antilles as a focus for the Counter-Revolution, and a futile 
attempt was made in July to get Spain to render aid under the Pacte 
de Famille. 
(70) 
Various schemes were elaborated both to persuade the 
colonial governors to cease recognition of the National Assembly and to 
ship out to the Caribbean an army of 4migr4s in a foreign, probably 
Russian, fleet. Spain, it was hoped, would occupy and hold Saint 
Domingue in the Regent's name, or at least prevent the disembarkation 
of Sonthonax's squadron. The figures involved were chiefly absentee 
coloniaux. Aristocratic military men, or former royal officials like 
Malouet and Cormier, the Club's president, they were mostly connected 
with the colony by marriage, though some had been born there. Although 
they liaised with the deputies sent to France by the Colonial Assembly 
and agreed with them that the loi du 4 avril should be resisted, only 
one of the deputies eventually accepted their pro-Spanish plans. He 
was the leopardin Cougniac-Mion, 
(71) 
who in April joined the growing 
4migre community in London. An open letter was drawn up in his name 
denouncing the law on racial equality and calling on all colonists to 
return to Saint Domingue to resist the Civil Commissioners. London 
was a convenient rendezvous for agents passing between Paris, the 
Rhineland and Madrid. Contrary to Garran-Coulon's assumption, 
(72) 
the royalist cabals that took place there did not at this time imply 
Anglophile plotting. No approaches seem to have been made to British 
ministers. 
(73) 
In September, when the Prussian army was advancing on 
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Paris, Cougniac-Mion was sent out to the islands as a secret represent- 
ative of the Princes. 
(74) 
These clandestine links with Coblentz and the Tuileries raise the 
question of colonial royalism and the part it played in alienating Saint 
Domingue from Revolutionary France. Frostin argues that dynastic 
a 
loyalty was a significant factor only as regards those few colonial 
officers, usually European-born, who once war broke out were to follow 
the Princes' policy of looking to Spain for assistance, while the 
majority of colonists, Anglophile, often creole, looked to England. 
(75) 
Several criticisms can be made of this distinction. Initially, let us 
note that lack of support for Spanish intervention cannot really be 
taken as a measure of indifference to the monarchy, given the hatred 
felt for the Spaniards in Saint Domingue and the greater benefits offered 
by a British occupation. Always the traditional enemy, the Spaniards 
had become especially odious to the colonists since the slave revolt 
began, by refusing to send aid and by apparently assisting or trading 
with the rebels. Their illiberal attitude towards commerce, agri- 
culture and government, combined with a liberal attitude towards the 
free coloureds, and the treachery and violence they were to display 
after war was declared, made them feared as conquerors. 
(76) 
Between the loose usage of royaliste, meaning anyone opposed to 
the Revolutionary orthodoxy of the moment, and Frostin's unnecessarily 
narrow category of supporters of la solution espagnole there surely 
existed a large body of colonists for whom the French Crown was an 
object of some sentiment, not a focal point in their lives, but part 
of their inherited conception of how things were and should be. Few 
British Americans had wanted a republic in 1776, even though George III 
had been regarded as a tyrant in a way Louis XVI never was. Moreover, 
among Frenchmen the monarchy was a rather more meaningful institution 
than it was for the English, and most colonists as far as we know came 
from the deeply royalist West of France. 
This is not to suggest that the 'average colonist' would have made 
great sacrifices for the Bourbons or the monarchical system, but rather 
that both counted for at least something in his life and would influence 
his actions. Thus, the alignment of the Club Massiac's policy with that 
of the Crown after 1791(77)was primarily a strategy to defend colonial 
interests but it doubtless also accorded with the political ideals of 
its members, who had always looked to the king's ministers rather than 
to the Assembly, who had closer relations with the Emigres than was once 
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realised, and some of whom were implicated in the Favras plot to free 
the king in January 1791. 
(78) 
In Saint Domingue, of course, local needs 
were all the more dominant and the king's presence less felt. 
(79) 
However, his overthrow on August 10th 1792 and execution six months 
later must surely have shocked many more colonists than just those gens 
du roi that Sonthonax felt obliged to deport in October. 
(80) 
Even in 
Port au Prince, one of the few places, according to Garran-Coulon, where 
republicanism was enthusiastically embraced, the Municipality were 
noticeably unhappy at the turn events were taking in Europe. 
(81) 
When only a small proportion of Frenchmen could be called republicans 
and far fewer regicides, 
(82)man 
in Saint Domingue, y although americains, 
must have regarded the abolition of the monarchy as dissolving what 
allegiance they owed to the French Government - or at least thought it 
a necessary legitimation of conspiracy with a foreign power. One says 
'must have' as it is difficult to separate this from other colonial 
grievances against the Revolution, since any direct reaction specifically 
against le 10 aoüt was stultified by the arrival of the Commissioners 
and National Guards shortly before it became known as a fait accompli, 
(83) 
and their ascendancy was strengthened by news of the Republican victories 
in Europe. 
(84) 
However, Quebec provides a useful point of reference. 
There the literate classes, who had initially enthused about the French 
Revolution, began to change their minds by 1791, and by 1793 they 
generally abhorred it. 
(85) 
If democratically-minded, often anti- 
clerical, American-born Frenchmen, untouched by the slavery and colour 
questions, were thus affected by the king's execution, so too, surely, 
would have been many colonists in Saint Domingue. It was not necessary to 
be ultra-royalist or to have ulterior motives to oppose a regicide 
government. As it was, the greffier of les Cayes continued to sign 
documents in the king's name until deported, against the town's will, 
in January 1793; the Jacmel National Guards were still carrying a 
royalist banner in May, while in the same month a colonist declared 
to the Governor that he recognised only the orders of the king. 
(86) 
Just when this new wedge was driven between the colonists and the 
Revolutionary Government, war broke out with England and Spain. A 
European coalition massed its forces against the French Republic. 
Immediately, secession became both more feasible and more desirable. 
Towards the end of 1792, secessionist currents had been quickening in 
both autonomist and counter-revolutionary camps. In Jamaica, we are 
told, refugees from Sonthonax's rule, who had been revolutionaries in 
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1789-90, 'first conceived' the plan of recovering their property 'by 
subjecting the Colony itself to the Government of Great Britain'. 
(87) 
In London, Malouet was deputed to negotiate on behalf of the Saint 
Domingue Omi re community. Despite pressure from de Charmilly, 'he 
deplored saying anything on the subject... until he thought he saw a 
proper opportunity'. 
(88) 
Meanwhile, the Spaniards of Santo Domingo 
were approached by Hanus de Jum6court, a leading planter of the Cul 
de Sac region, who proposed to declare the colony temporarily independent 
until the monarchy was restored. 
(89) 
On the advice of Louis XVI, the 
baron de Montalembert, a leading counter-revolutionary with property 
in Saint Domingue, set out in January to observe conditions there, 
sailing for Jamaica with a recommendation from the Home Secretary. 
(90) 
At the end of the month, Cougniac-Mion himself arrived in Jamaica and 
contacted royalist elements. He hoped to see counter-revolutionary 
forces, perhaps under the marquis de Bouille, shipped out by an English 
or Anglo-Spanish fleet. 
(91) 
On February 25th , some sixty planters in London, 'ne pouvant 
recourir ä leur souverain legitime, pour les delivrer de la tyrannie 
qui les opprime', authorised Malouet to treat with the British Govern- 
ment, ' adoptant d'avence les moyens qu'il prendra'. A set of Pro- 
positions were drawn up and underwent various changes before being 
ratified by both parties in April. 
(92) 
The colonists agreed to 
transfer their allegiance to George III until the future of Saint Domingue 
should be decided at a general peace. In return, they would receive 
British protection; a ten year suspension of their debts to French 
commerce; access to the British market, and slightly freer trading 
rights with the United States than were allowed under the Ancien Regime. 
ý93) 
Frostin interprets the document as a mise sous sequestre in 
appearance but more of a une livraison in fact. 
(94) 
Certainly, eventual 
annexation by Britain is seen as a possibility, but this is not surprising 
on the part of 4migrýs who could expect only proscription and seques- 
tration if the Republic remained undefeated. Ridding them of their 
dependence on, and, temporarily, of their debts to, French commerce, 
the Propositions also went far in satisfying the demands of the colonial 
extremists. But were these men extremists? Emigres first and colonists 
second, they were surely trying above all to derive an income from their 
estates while in exile. War, it was widely and shrewdly believed, would 
bring an end to the slave regime, still much intact. This brooding 
presentiment, and the poverty of most Emigres, put them in a desperate 
position. 
(95) 
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Yet, Malouet, their spokesman, only agreed to approach the 
Government, informally, once the king had been put on trial, and war 
seemed inevitable. 
(96) 
He wished England to intervene at the request 
of the planters' English creditors, not the planters themselves. Were 
this impossible, however, he suggested independence or American pro- 
tection for Saint Domingue - dramatic proposals, though not entirely 
out of keeping with the policy of the 4migrd Princes, which included 
free trade for the colonies and schemes to bring the United States into 
the war against France. 
(97) 
Malouet's attitudes, often a mixture of 
conservatism and radicalism, 
(98) 
are thus difficult to assess. Like 
Louis de Curt, a Guadeloupe creole and principal negotiator for the 
Windward Islands colonists, he had been closely connected with the 
Counter-Revolution. His first contact with the British Government 
early in December, (a time when de Curt was already seeking British 
intervention and British citizenship), was simply to urge Pitt's 
Ministry to save Louis XVI from execution. 
(99) 
Not until war was 
declared and the dmigrLes from the Windward Islands had concluded an 
agreement with the British Government, did he, too, make official 
overtures to the Ministry. 
These original Propositions, however, as opposed to the later 
versions, were avowedly separatist and Anglophile in colouring 
(Appendix C (i) ). Unlike the Windward Isles Propositions, they 
did not stipulate return to France should the Bourbons be restored. 
(100) 
Strangely, they have been ignored by both Frostin and by R. H. Griffiths. 
Two points need to be made. Firstly, the original Propositions might 
well reflect the influence of de Charmilly and Berault Saint Maurice 
more than of Malouet and the destitute aristocrats he represented. 
Secondly, at the time of the king's execution, with the emigre army 
breaking up, the royalist cause was temporarily at rock bottom. The 
Royalists could expect the British to capture the French West Indies 
but not necessarily to overthrow the Republic or restore the monarchy. 
In the circumstances, England, 'oü l'on trouve un Roi respecte et des 
hommes vraiment libres', offered a respectable alternative for men 
whose focus of loyalty was not France but its king. 
(101) 
The Vicomte 
de Fontanges, Malouet took pains to be assured, was willing to do anything 
at this time to save Saint Domingue. 
(102) 
However, in March the situation 
changed. Dumouriez' retreat, the revolt in the Vendee 
Cl03)and 
Spain's 
entry into the war brought the Royalists fresh hope. Their ideological 
predilections could once again with some reason nuance their material 
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interests. This is surely what explains Malouet's increasingly 
th distant relations with the British. By March 29, he was explaining 
to Lord Grenville that while desiring to remain British the planters 
must act in accord with their duty to the French Monarchy. 
(104) 
It is true Malouet initially opposed the Princes' Spanish plans, 
but as he explained, Spain's conduct had been si affreuse that not one 
colonist wanted to submit to her. 
(105) 
He even told the Government 
that the planters approached the British specifically to be protected 
against a Spanish invasion. 
(106) 
Furthermore, he insisted that if de 
Charmilly were to act as agent for the British in Saint Domingue, he 
should do so in subordination to the Princes' representatives, Coustard 
and Fontanges. 
(107) 
Indeed, Frostin eventually has to conclude that 
Malouet, unlike de Charmilly, really did regard the occupation as a 
mise sous sequestre 
108) 
As for the other known signatories, we cannot be sure. Said to 
be 'largely responsible for the Propositions', was Cadusch's colleague, 
(109) 
Berault Saint Maurice. As one of the colony's deputies in Paris, 
he had been informed by Malouet what was afoot and slipped across the 
Channel in February, narrowly escaping arrest. Like Malouet, he 
insisted that all Dominguan planters, in the colony or abroad, even 
some of the troops there, would welcome British intervention. 
(110) 
There were a few other leopardins among the signatories but most would 
appear men of an entirely different stamp. The great majority were 
sugar planters, probably absentees. 
(111) 
A large proportion, including 
many of the smaller planters, were officers in the colonial regiments 
or in elite corps like the Vivarais Regiment, Bourbon Infantry and the 
Carabiniers de Monsieur. Some were 'colonists' only by marriage or 
inheritance; a good many, one might guess, had never set foot in Saint 
Domingue. Comtes, vicomtes, chevaliers; the Prince de Broglie-Revel, 
the Comte de Noailles, the Marquis de Jaille: they do not look like 
extremists. They insisted that a colonial assembly should not meet 
until peacetime; extremists in the colony had demanded a new one immediate- 
lyý112) Above all, one must remember that in these months, without allies 
and opposed by almost all Europe, the French Republic seemed increasingly 
close to collapse. Better to capitulate than to suffer a conquest that 
looked inevitable. A short war followed by a Bourbon restoration would 
be the least likely to involve territorial losses. 
In Saint Domingue, the so-called separatist and royalist factions 
were temporarily united against the Commissioners in all three provincial 
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capitals: a significant point. 
(113) 
As in Europe, many of their 
members, especially those forced to flee the colony, now sought or at 
least hoped for British intervention. The royalist faction, led by 
Coustard, Fontanges and de Jumecourt, sent two deputies to London who 
seem to have arrived shortly after the Propositions were drawn up. 
(114) 
Simultaneously, they sought Spanish protection but told the authorities 
in Santo Domingo that the British would be accepted only as second 
best. 
(115) 
In February, a refugee in Kingston, the son of a tete- 
chaude of 1769, wrote to de Charmilly telling him his father now realised 
he had been right - France would destroy Saint Domingue. 
(116) 
Opinions, 
therefore, were changing. News of Louis XVI's execution was received 
'aver horreur generalement par tous les blancs'. 
(117) 
The French in 
Jamaica went into mourning. Indeed, the very hour the king was 
guillotined they had burnt the tricolour and national cockade as well 
as effigies of Marat, Paine and the Duc d'Orleans. Royalists like de 
Beaunay passionately desired revenge and looked to England just as did 
democratic extremists such as Raboteau and Borel. 
(118) 
An armed troop 
was raised among the expanding refugee community(119)which awaited the 
arrival of a British fleet. 
From March onwards, reports reaching Jamaica told the same story - 
weariness of disorder; fear of the mulattoes and of Sonthonax, as he 
moved closer to the blacks; hatred of Spain, and a general willingness 
of 'all orders', or just 'people of property', to welcome the British 
as saviours. 
(120) 
In London, one Count Rici informed the Government 
he had 'concerted measures' with various corps commanders in the 
colony. 
(121) 
As to the relative strength of these two factions, it 
is instructive to note that Borel, stormy petrel of Saint Domingue 
politics, was swiftly ostracised when he fled to Jamaica where most 
refugees supported the Ancien Regime. 
(122) 
Even so, by no means all opponents of the Commissioners aimed at 
secession. Sometimes they claimed to be trying to 'conserver ä la 
m4tropole les restes de la colonie', and even accused Sonthonax of 
being influenced by royalistes and independens. 
(123) Perhaps a verbal 
smokescreen, this possibly suggests that much of what Garran-Coulon 
thought plotting for independence is better termed personality struggles 
between republicans. 
(124) 
Here one might tentatively include the 
conspiracies of Thomas Millet(125)and the fighting that destroyed le 
Cap on 21st June 1793, in which French troops and free coloureds defended 
Sonthonax against sailors led by Governor Galbaud. Usually depicted as 
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part of the colonial counter-revolution, it seems scarcely colonial or 
counter-revolutionary, considering that most of le Cap remained neutral 
and both sides considered themselves Republicans. 
(126). 
De Charmilly arrived in Jamaica a month later. He was at first 
coolly received by the refugee community in Kingston but had little 
difficulty in having the Propositions accepted by them, or at least 
the 15 called to hear them read on 26th July. Thereafter, his rival, 
Cougniac-Mion, could find little support for co-operation with the 
Spaniards, who had invaded Saint Domingue after the burning of le Cap 
and called on the French planters to join them. 
(127) 
Frostin makes 
much of this; he treats the choice between the two powers not as one 
of opportunity but as one of profound ideological significance that 
demonstrates the planters' anglophilia, secessionism and lack of loyalty 
to the Bourbons. 
(128) 
This is questionable. Firstly, we find such 
prominent counter-revolutionaries as Montalembert and La Rochejacquelein, 
even Loppinot de Beauport, 
(129) 
who had been designated Governor of Saint 
Domingue by the Princes, equally ready to serve under Spain or England. 
(130) 
Secondly, despite the colonists' dislike of the Spaniards, support for 
la solution espagnole was more widespread than Frostin thought. 
(131) 
De Charmilly's instructions were to get the Propositions accepted by 
the majority of colonists, yet for over 48 hours he refused to reveal 
their contents. Evidently he was doubtful of their reception or feared 
being outbid by the Hispanophiles. Then, on 25th July an urgent plea 
for British aid arrived from the town of Jeremie. The situation suddenly 
changed. Here was an immediate chance to overturn the Civil Commissioners. 
The Propositions were revealed and all agreed the British should move into 
Jeremie. Only the parvenu Cougniac-Mion chose to be plus royaliste que 
les royalistes. 
(132) 
The choice between the two powers was to some 
extent between duty and interest, but Frostin is surely wrong to rigidly 
represent it as a choice for or against the French connection. While 
England left the eventual sovereignty of Saint Domingue an open question, 
Spain, despite her recognition (in Europe) of Louis XVII, was undoubtedly 
aiming to keep her conquests. 
(133) 
The honorable et Chretienne et 
heroique solution the Governor of Santo Domingo offered to the rebel 
chief Jean-Francois(134)actually meant Spain's reconquest of all Hispaniola. 
A Bourbon restoration was not mentioned; nor was it in any of the pro- 
(135) 
Both Frostin clamatfons issued by the Spaniards in Santo Domingo. 
and Malouet were mistaken in thinking Governor Garcia announced recognition 
of Louis XVII. 
(136) 
His proclamations, in fact, call on the colonists 
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to become Spanish subjects. 
Hence, one cannot treat royalism as being synonymous with support 
for Spanish intervention. Curiously, Cadusch actually claimed that 
the Spaniards were initially preferred to the English, irrespective 
of religious or dynastic considerations, because of their proximity, 
their large army and their influence over the rebels: '... dans le 
moment oü le frayeur et la inquietude ne laissent aucun acces au projets 
fantastiques, je dirai meme aux factions-partout oü le colon voit un 
protecteur qui l'arrache au fer des assassins il voit un Dieu, quelque 
soit sa Religion, ses richesses et son commerce'. Especially, he added, 
since the fate of a colony was decided by treaties not self-determination. 
(137) 
Scarcely a sign of Hispanophilia, this might suggest that the colonists 
sought foreign intervention for reasons no more positive than fear, 
poverty and aversion to Republican rule. 
In May, Commandant Desombrages of Jeremie had told the Governor 
of Cuba that Saint Domingue would welcome the first armed power to 
appear. The planters would prefer the English, but had originally 
looked to Spain and would accept either or both together. Only their 
desperate plight made them amenable to foreign domination. The great 
majority of whites simply wanted security and the status quo of 1784 
plus prudent concessions to the free coloureds. Only a small faction 
sought total independence. 
(138) 
The planters detested the local 
Spaniards and doubtless suspected the good faith of Madrid, but above 
all they wanted their properties preserved. Of course, they appreciated 
the benefits of British commerce, especially in wartime, when it was a 
matter of survival, and Revolution or not, they might have been reluctant 
to resist a British occupation. However, such neutralste provisoire is 
not proof of either long-standing Anglophilia or a desire for annexation. 
Before examining the reception Saint Domingue gave to the British 
forces, it is necessary to appreciate the immediate context in which it 
took place. Between the Commissioners and the planters, le fait 
revolutionnaire et le fait colonial, 
(139)there 
could be no compromise. 
Their mutual hatred was profound. Hundreds of whites were imprisoned 
(140) 
or deported. Public office became almost a mulatto monopoly. Mail was 
intercepted; heavy fines and taxation were imposed, and the Commissioners 
were at least believed to be extremely corrupt. The outbreak of war 
practically ended what commercial activity still survived, which, as 
regards France, was anyway rendered worthless by the decline of the 
assignats and the law of maximum prices. Above all, the colonists had 
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feared throughout the Revolution that France would abolish slavery, 
and in 1793 Sonthonax was steadily forced into realising these fears. 
In May, he began forming Legions de 1'Egalite from those slaves who 
had been armed by the whites or mulattoes. At the same time, he 
relaxed discipline on the plantations, allowed slaves to denounce 
their masters and had the 1784-86 protective laws read out every 
Sunday. 
(141) 
The slave trade had been abolished in February. To 
fight Galbaud in June, Sonthonax turned to the local rebel bands, 
which he had to declare free. As a consequence, Cap FranSais went 
up in flames. General Emancipation followed on 29th August. However, 
the slave revolt, far from abating, escalated dramatically. 
(142) 
By 
the autumn, the Commissioners were disarming planters and handing their 
weapons to their erstwhile slaves. 
(143) 
For the colonist of average prejudices, it was the end of the world. 
In such circumstances, what West India colony would not have welcomed 
foreign intervention? 
(144) 
Looked at from another angle, when three- 
quarters of France was in revolt against the Paris-run Revolution, why 
should her colonies have behaved any differently? The British were 
invited into Toulon a few weeks before they landed in Saint Domingue, 
yet there is no need to look for anglophile autonomists there. It was 
surely no accident that Saint Domingue was occupied when France was at 
its lowest ebb. Indeed, it must be emphasised that once war with 
England became inevitable, it was widely believed that the Republic 
was doomed, particularly after Neerwinden and the Federalist revolt. 
More especially, the French Antilles were thought easy prey for English 
sea-power. The colonists, therefore, had great incentive to abandon a 
sinking ship and get on the winning side. Hence, Sonthonax's desperate 
measures. No one could foresee that the mass mobilisation called for 
in August 1793 by Carnot, and by Sonthonax, would keep France republican 
and Saint Domingue French. 
The first part of Saint Domingue to capitulate to the English was 
the isolated, coffee-growing region of la Grand'Anse, at the tip of the 
southern peninsula, the sole area that had not submitted to the 
Commissioners. The white planters of its four parishes, 
(145) 
many of 
them Basques, had been self-governing for nearly two years, united under 
a Conseil de Sürete. They were intensely proud of their success in 
keeping their slaves loyal and using them to keep down or drive out the 
local free coloureds. 
(146) 
However, they were now under pressure from 
the forces of the mulatto Andre Rigaud. Although they resoundingly 
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defeated him in mid-June, when he tried to breach their north-eastern 
defences at Camp Desrivaux, their unity was beginning to crack. Early 
in June, the habitants of the Cap Dame Marie district stopped con- 
tributing to regional funds and at the beginning of August they surrend- 
ered to the mulattoes. Rigaud's army of slaves and free coloureds then 
advanced to within 30 miles of Jeremie, the main town. Particularly 
alarmed by the destruction of le Cap, the whites had already sent an 
envoy to Jamaica authorised to treat on any terms. 
(147) 
He arrived 
on 25th July, two days after de Charmilly. Merceron and Berault Saint 
Maurice were sent back as agents to get the Propositions accepted as a 
capitulation. This was soon done, possibly with some help from 
Cadusch. 
(148) 
Troops from Jamaica landed at Jeremie on 19th September 
amid public rejoicing, and an oath was administered to the population, 
binding it as long as George III should possess the colony. 
The Mole Saint Nicholas, the great naval stronghold commanding the 
Windward Passage, capitulated three days later, again amid 21 gun 
salutes and cries of Vive les Anglais! The agents of surrender this 
time were the commandant, Colonel Deneux, the ex-commandant, Baron de 
Valtiere, and the naval administrator, Carles. In early July, they 
had decided to seek Spanish intervention but were taken by a privateer 
on their way to Montecristi. They offered instead, after a complicated 
journey, to introduce British forces into the 'Gibraltar of the Antilles'. 
Unsuccessfully, they tried to ensure that the British troops serve with 
them under the Bourbon flag. 
(149) 
The Union Jack was next raised in the port of Saint Marc, but not 
until the 12th December. Like the Grand'Anse, the Artibonite parishes 
had united against the Commissioners under a Council (of Peace and 
Union), but unlike the Grand'Anse, they were dominated by free coloureds. 
(150) 
On 30th November, a meeting of the Saint Marc commune voted by une tres 
grande majorite to send deputies to capitulate to the English, on con- 
dition that racial equality be maintained. They were to preserve until 
a general peace, when Saint Domingue might possibly become British, 
their customs and status of Frenchmen. 
(151) 
Curiously, another meeting 
the next day declared the inhabitants to be irrevocablement attache ä la 
France leur mare patrie and decided to raise the Bourbon-flag and send 
deputies simultaneously to both the English and Spanish. 
(152) 
Verettes, 
Gonaives and Petite Riviere soon copied their example. 
(153) 
At the 
Mole, the deputies failed to get Major Grant to accept the white flag. 
Nonetheless, they signed the Capitulation excepting article 4. 
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However, it was the Spaniards who responded most quickly. Only 
Saint Marc was able to welcome the British envoys sent to take formal 
possession. This, moreover, they declined to do, when on 9th December 
the coloured mayor, Savary, organised a parish meeting, dominated by 
some 150 of the poorer mulattoes, which refused to accept British 
rule. 
(154) 
Its president and secretary thereupon informed the British 
that owing to 'the manifested desire to remain French subjects and to 
continue under the ancient standard of that nation' - and to the 
ambivalent status accorded the free-coloureds - the Capitulation had 
been rejected. 'No prejudice', they observed, 'exists under the 
Spaniards'. 
(155) 
The deadlock was broken only when Captain Affleck 
sailed into the harbour on the 11th . Seeing no sign of the Union Jack, 
he seized a ship laden with £20,000 worth of produce - for many colonists 
the last remnants of their fortune. Savary fled, and the next day the 
'respectable inhabitants' raised the British flag. 
(156) 
Within a week, the town of L4ogane had followed suit. There the 
whites worked in co-operation with 500 of the 'better sort of 
Mulattoes'. 
(157) 
L4ogane also contained some 150 refugees, apparently 
planters, from the south-west region, 
(158) 
who declared they would return 
and hoist the British flag, even without the support of troops. Saint 
Louis du Sud had already sent envoys to the English. 
(159) 
In fact, 
the whole south coast with the exception of les Cayes was expected to 
surrender if British forces appeared. 
Among those who had capitulated at the Mole in September were the 
white planters of the adjacent parish of Jean-Rabel, which was commanded 
by the mulatto, Jean Delair. 
(160) 
On 20th December, three days before 
the Spaniards arrived there in force, he allowed British troops to take 
possession of the region. 
(161) 
Four days later the immensely wealthy 
quartier of Arcahaye capitulated. It was dominated by the griffe 
Jean-Baptiste Lapointe. 
(162) 
Only a month before, he had saved 
Sonthonax from a dangerous situation at Saint Marc. However, he later 
adhered to the Artibonite Coalition and on 19th December he approached 
the British commander in that town. On 24th December, he harangued a 
public meeting in his presence on the benefits of British as opposed to 
Spanish protection. The response was a unanimous, and probably well- 
rehearsed, 'Vive Sa Majeste Britannique!.. Vive Louis XVII! Vivffýous 
les rois de la Terre! ' First to sign the Capitulation were 18 officers 
of the National Guard. Only two were white. 
(163) 
Just as refugees 
from the northern parishes had crowded into the Mole, colonists now 
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fled Port au Prince for the newly-occupied areas. 
(164) 
Tortuga and 
Mirebalais, two highly strategic positions, would also have capitulated, 
had there been enough troops to occupy them. 
(165) 
(iii) Analysis. To say, as James does, that 'all propertied 
San Drushed to welcome the British', 
(166) 
Domingo is therefore an 
exaggeration, though the colonists' caution is understandable in view 
of the feeble numbers of troops sent for their protection. In spite 
of this, the welcome they received was, on the whole, impressive, even 
sycophantic, and the English were confident that with more soldiers the 
(167) 
At the same time, whole of the South and West would capitulate. 
the colonists' surrender can be entirely explained in terms of their 
desperate situation. Destitute or unemployed, shut up in the towns or 
camps, facing a total shortage of everything, 
(168) 
while their plant- 
ations disintegrated and their ex-slaves plotted their destruction; 
blockaded by the British and cruelly robbed by their privateers if they 
tried to escape, 
(169) 
the colonists had little choice but to surrender. 
(170) 
France could do nothing and the English refused to send supplies before 
a capitulation was signed. Moreover, the hated Spaniards and their 
black Auxiliaries were advancing with threats of punishment(171)and it 
was probably they who precipitated the overtures from the south-west, 
(172) 
the Artibonite, Mirebalais and perhaps Arcahaye. According to Debien, 
Lapointe only surrendered Arcahaye to avoid arrest by Republican 
rivals. 
(173) 
The capitulation of Jean Rabel was almost accidental 
as Delair had already called in the Spaniards. 
(174) 
Under the English, 
however, both commanders might hope for the preferment they failed to 
find under the Republic, just as ruined planters hoped for pensions and 
penniless wage-earners hoped for free rations. In la Grand'Anse and 
Arcahaye substantial bribes had been paid. 
(175) 
'Pitt's gold' was to 
flow freely in Saint Domingue. 
Despite the multiple attractions of an English occupation, it was 
not welcomed by all. According to de Charmilly, 
(176) 
all the planters 
wanted to belong to the English but all non-proprietaires were their 
enemies and favoured Sonthonax. At Jeremie, Berault Saint Maurice 
described une masse de Canaille attache ä la Republique. They were 
white and needed constant surveillance. The same situation prevailed 
at the mole, he said. 
(177) 
There, Edwards claimed, the town was 'in,, 
the highest degree hostile' and that most able-bodied men left to join 
the Republican forces; de Charmilly did not deny it. 
(178) 
Moreover, 
at least 70 men of Dillon's Irish Regiment were deported for refusing 
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the oath of allegiance. 
(179) 
At Saint Marc, the pattern was re- 
versed. 
(180) 
The garrison at first refused either to lay down their 
arms or serve anyone but the French king. But, while their officers 
remained adamantly Republican, most of the rank and file eventually 
accepted British pay. As already seen, the poorer mulattoes at Saint 
Marc, some planters, and perhaps a few whites, opted decisively for the 
Spaniards. So did the non-proprietaires of Petite-Riviere, probably 
also mulattoes. Though accounted 'of no consequence or Property', 
this 'small number of desperadoes' clearly carried considerable weight. 
After all, most of Saint Marc's population was coloured. But for 
Affleck's gunboat diplomacy, Grant thought, Saint Marc would never have 
hoisted the Union Jack. 
(181) 
At Leogane, as soon as the British had brought security to the 
town, the inhabitants' common front began to crack, and hostile voices 
were raised against them. 
(182) 
At Arcahaye, Anglophiles remained a 
minority; most planters, like Lapointe himself, had favoured forming 
a fourth party opposed both to Sonthonax and to the invaders. 
(183) 
In 
la Grand'Anse, most of those known as garcons ou petits proprietaires 
were said to be bons patriotes who resented the English presence. It 
was a region of small planters, and Billard even claimed that most of 
its population would soon have surrendered to Rigaud. 
(184) 
Berault 
and Merceron made cryptic references to the opposition they encountered 
there. 
(185) 
The pro-English faction at Bombarde apparently consisted 
of les chefs, which implies at least indifference among the lower 
classes. 
(186) 
Few merchants were prominent among those who welcomed 
the invaders, and those that were generally owned plantations. Planters 
from Jean Rabel and Bombarde moved to the Mole just as most planters of 
Petite Riviere came to Saint Marc. 
This broadly tends to confirm James's judgement on 'propertied 
San Domingo' and justify Williamson's expectations of the 'people of 
property'. 
(187) 
The planters looked to British arms to restore what 
they called 'order'; to British capital to revivify their estates, 
and to British ships to carry their produce. 
(188) 
Petits blancs 
stood to lose the power they had enjoyed through revolutionary direct 
democracy. Merchants faced rupture with Metropolitan partners and a 
ten year freeze on debts owing to them. 
However, it should also be apparent that such a formula does not 
exactly fit the facts. While the planters clearly were not always 
enthusiastic about a British occupation, non-propertied Saint Domingue 
was not always averse to one. Of those who signified their support 
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for foreign intervention, at Saint Marc, one-quarter, at Gonaives, two- 
thirds, were technically illiterate. 
(189) 
Debien has printed a list 
of about 80 anglo-4migres denounced by a Republican petit blanc for 
having surrendered Saint Domingue to the British. 
(190) 
Surprisingly, 
about one-fifth were small whites apparently without landed property. 
Many were exempts in the mar4chaussee, who may have simply been hanging 
on to their jobs, but some are mulatto artisans -a group with little to 
gain from the British presence. When one considers that at Jer&mie 
'all ranks' welcomed the British troops, and that at Jacmel 'the 
Tradespeople' were especially said to want English intervention, 
191) 
support for an occupation would seem to have come from a wide spectrum 
of the population. Indeed, the crowds that ubiquitously cheered the 
redcoats can hardly have consisted solely of planters. Military and 
civil officiers serving in the colony account for over a quarter of the 
names on the list. The proportion would be over a third if one included 
the several ex-officers and men with European commissions found among 
the planters. According to Debien, most of the officiers were also 
planters, but, judging from the personal data he provides, under one 
half appear to have owned plantations. Of those actually serving in 
the colony, only a third seem to have been planters. Overall, scarcely 
more than a half of those denounced are known to have owned estates, 
while at least four of the five bons patriotes also named were in fact 
coffee planters, not to mention the denunciator himself. A socio- 
economic explanation of pro-British behaviour is thus not entirely 
satisfactory. 
Nor, by any stretch of the imagination is a 'racial' explanation. 
Frostin's assertion that the colour question was the mobile essentiel 
de Pappel des colons aux Anglais 
(192) 
is perhaps valid as regards la 
Grand'Anse but it scarcely explains either the February Propositions, 
originally favourable to free coloureds, or the capitulation of the 
other parishes, considering that nearly the whole of Saint Domingue 
was surrendered by the mulattoes themselves. 
(193) 
The fact that 
mulattoes also commanded most of the areas that stayed loyal to France 
merely shows how complex the situation was. 
At Leogane, Arcahaye and Jean Rabel, they were almost entirely 
responsible for bringing in the British; at Saint Marc, partially'so. 
In Saint Louis du Sud, it was the 'whites and richest mulattoes' who 
requested British intervention. 
(194) 
Free coloureds were probably 
also behind the unsuccessful overtures that issued from districts like 
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Petit Goäve, Anse ä Veau and Mirebalais, while from Jacmel they deserted 
to the British lines. 
(195) 
Later in 1794, the British were to be wel- 
comed into the plain of Cul de Sac by the local free blacks, and some 
even thought the fall of Port au Prince due to mulatto treachery. 
(196) 
As for the whites of these areas: they were among the least prejudiced 
in the colony. Saint Marc, Arcahaye, Leogane and Jean-Rabel were all 
exceptional for the degree of racial harmony they had enjoyed. They 
accepted British rule solely on the understanding that full equality 
would be preserved. Similarly, the Mole had known no racial troubles 
and the council formed there by the British was quick to advise against 
a policy of discrimination. 
(197) 
Conversely, the areas where Republican 
rule was strongest - Port de Paix, le Cap, Port au Prince, Les Cayes - 
had all been scenes of the most violent racism. 
(198) 
The exception to this pattern is obviously the Grand'Anse. One 
could say, however, that there the British were called in not simply to 
preserve white supremacy but more to save the whites from being massacred 
when Rigaud broke through from the south. One might also presume that 
the divided state of opinion there implied some willingness to accept 
racial equality under the Republic. Yet, this would be to obscure the 
deep-seated prejudice that had galvanised les paroisses unies and enabled 
them to sustain two years of quasi-independence. Berault observed that 
on his mission to Jeremie his well-known opposition to la Caste inter- 
mediaire had stood him in good stead. Indeed, he imparted to the 
undertaking a remarkable spirit of crusading zeal: - 'Je suis ä ma place 
et j'y resterai. Jeremie veut vaincre ou mourir, et c'est mon avis. 
Je veux donner sur les Mulätres et je veux concourir ä les vaincre'. 
(199) 
As Merceron remarked of this region where coloured prisoners were 
suffocated with sulphur, innoculated with smallpox and drowned at sea 
in batches, 
(20O)'La 
couleur blanche a ici toute sa dignite'. 
(201) 
Such men saw their struggle as heroic. Like the Confederate 
planters of 70 years later, they were fighting for a way of life. This 
mentality was shared by de Charmilly and Cadusch, the principal pro- 
tagonists of Pappel aux Anglais. Yet, it contrasts markedly with 
that of other whites important in surrendering the colony - like the 
three Desmarattes brothers at Li6ogane, or Montalembert or de Jum6court, 
architects of the Concordat policy. Though one viewpoint was to prove 
stronger than-the other, neither can be excluded from an explanation of 
Pappel aux Angläis. 
We find a similar pattern when seeking the role of l'esprit 
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autonomiste, but also a more complex reality that transcends simple 
categorisation. Firstly, we find the same lack of continuity regarding 
people and place. Although the areas first to surrender to the British, 
la Grand'Anse and the Mole, were precisely those that had suffered from 
government neglect under the Ancien Regime, there is an almost complete 
lack of correlation between the occupied areas and those parishes which 
emerged as 'revolutionary' in 1790. La Grand'Anse had withdrawn its 
deputies from the Saint Marc Assembly and was the only area of the South 
not to join the anti-government Confederation du Sud. 
(202) 
Leogane 
and Saint Marc itself were strongholds of the Pompons blancs. The 
areas where the Saint Marc Assembly had found most support - Port de 
Paix, the upper Artibonite, Port au Prince and most of the South - 
were those that offered most resistance to the British, just as the 
social group least attached to the occupation, the petits blancs, were 
the most politically volatile and racist element in colonial society. 
At the Mole, the only civilian who refused to take the oath of allegiance, 
(the mayor, Genton, ) had been a staunch partisan of the Cöte ouest, 
while most of its citizens had stayed loyal to the National Assembly. 
(203) 
On the other hand, leading opponents of the Saint Marc Assembly, such 
as Campan and de Jumecourt, played leading roles in the colony's 
capitulation. 
In 1793, we have seen, both Saint Marc and the Mole had declared 
for the Counter-Revolution before approaching the English. Like the 
inhabitants of the Artibonite parishes, they wished to preserve . 
leurs titres et qualites de Francais and asked that British troops 
I 
serve with them under the Bourbon flag. The officers at the Mole had 
in fact tried to surrender to the Spanish, 
(204)(and 
in this they were 
said to be supported not only by the garrison but by the town and the 
inhabitants of Bombarde). 
(205) 
Only an accident prevented them. 
Jean Rabel, Gonaives and the three Artibonite parishes had all been 
willing to receive Spanish protection. It is true that the British 
were the preferred party and that the overtures to the Spanish were 
mainly in deference to the proximity of their forces and the wishes of 
the free coloureds. As already-noted, however, this preference is 
easily explicable in terms of the colonists' very real fear of Spain, 
(206) 
and the reasonable desire to profit rather than suffer from a foreign 
occupation that was unavoidable. 
We have already noted how such prominent counter-revolutionaries 
as Loppinot de Beauport, the marquis de La Rochejacquelein and the 
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baron de Montalembert, were ready to serve either England or Spain. 
Finding Jamaica unable to lend assistance, some 29 of these 'principal 
gentlemen' left Kingston on 30th July to join the Spanish forces, but 
became so disillusioned by their reception that they soon returned to 
fill important positions under the British occupation. 
(207) 
Frostin 
represents such behaviour as a betrayal of the Princes' plans but it 
was, in fact, in keeping with them. 
(208) 
Montalembert, de Montagnac 
and apparently even de Charmilly gained before September the Regent's 
approbation of their conduct. 
(209) 
Many colonists during the occupation 
maintained links with counter-revolutionary circles in Europe - not 
least Loppinot de Beauport who served with the English intending to 
assume the Governorship the Princes had bestowed on him. 
(210) 
Need one doubt the sincerity of these men's sentiments? The 
English invariably referred to their allies as 'royalists', as did 
their enemies. Colonel Deneux impressed Major Grant as a 'Royalist 
officer most strongly attached to his king'. 
(211) 
De Chadirac, a 
creole officer who helped surrender Saint Marc, died before a Repub- 
lican firing squad with a shout of Vive le roii(212) When Montalembert 
later raised the Union Jack over a captured town, he supposedly remarked 
to the Vicomte de Bruges, 'Quel plaisir si, au lieu d'etre celui-ci, 
nous avons hisse celui que vows et moi cherissons! '(213) 
It is entwined with this thread of counter-revolutionary activity 
that we find the separatist strand that similarly ran through the 
Revolution's history and led to the British occupation. The number 
of 1eopardins involved is impressive. Apart from de Charmilly and 
Cadusch, Berault and Merceron, who played active roles in the colony's 
surrender, we find at Jeremie in the Conseils de Surete and Executif 
Favaranges, Maignie, Huguon, Lacombe and Chaumette. 
(214) 
Other members 
of the Cote ouest faction, like the de Leaumont brothers, Jouette and 
Valentin de Cullion, 
(215) 
followed events from Jamaica and were soon to 
surface under the occupation in prominent positions. Though they did 
not always like or agree with one another, these men had long been 
working together in the vanguard of the Revolution, and had been closely 
connected with other leading incendiaries such as Bacon de Chevalerie 
and Thomas Millet. One notes, however, that these and other leading 
extremists like Larchevesque-Thibaud, Brulley and Caradeux al-ne had 
nothing to do with the occupation and were often hostile to it. 
L'es rit autonomiste thus provided the spearhead of the movement 
towards Britain but in by no means all cases did it imply a pro-British 
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stance. Extremists who had genuine leanings towards republicanism 
or democracy seem to have found la France r6g neree a preferable option 
to George III's England. Moreover, if the Cote ouest faction played 
the dominant role in the calling in of the English, one may doubt that 
it was an essential role. Malouet was already negotiating with Grenville 
when Berault Saint Maurice arrived in England. Montalembert and de 
Beaunay left for Jamaica six months before de Charmilly, and the Grand' 
Anse had already, before Befrault and Merceron's mission, offered to 
capitulate via the wealthy Legras. 
As for the long-term intentions of these men: they are hard to 
judge. When la Grand'Anse offered to surrender, it made no conditions, 
but trusted that England would make only honourable demands. 
(216) 
Faveranges, who masterminded affairs in the region, was at first dis- 
tinctly sceptical of the British proposals. 
(217) 
One recalls that de 
Charmilly said that most separatists wanted absolute independence not 
British rule. The address of thanks the Conseil de Sürete sent to 
George III was sycophantic enough but studiously avoided any reference 
to the future. 
(218) 
On October 14th we find the British Government 
receiving from a M. Lacombe a petition from inhabitants of Saint Domingue 
asking that it take the colony au nom de Louis XVII et de la constitution 
de 1789. 
(219) 
The February Propositions and the discussions that preceded the 
surrender of Saint Marc show that many colonists were prepared to accept 
becoming British subjects as a possible outcome of their actions. A 
petition from 80 planters of Petite Riviere suggests more definitely a 
desire for British annexation. 
(220) 
Dated 10th December 1793, it 
observed that France's neglect of both the slave trade and projects to 
irrigate the Artibonite plain had retarded their plans for changing over 
from cotton and indigo cultivation to sugar. With British capital, 
however, the planters could look forward to making Petite Riviere the 
biggest sugar-growing parish in Saint Domingue. Although the petition 
was the result of rather special circumstances, 
(221)the link between 
economic frustration and secessionism could not be clearer. Even so, 
explicit statements in favour of British annexation are rare indeed. 
Apart from the overtures of Cadusch and de Charmilly, 
(222) 
they come 
from the most unexpected quarters. 
Deneux, commandant of the Mole, who had much to say about 'mon 
amour pour le soutien d'ordre et de la monarchie', wrote to Governor 
Williamson five weeks after capitulating as follows. 'Vrais franqais', 
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he said, such as he and his fellow officers, had hoped to preserve 
the Mole for the French Crown. They also hoped that Louis XVII would 
avenge his father. Nevertheless, he went on, 'l'amour de leur patrie... 
ne leur fera jamais perdre de vue tout ce qu'ils doivent ä la nation 
anglaise. Ce sera une consolation pour eux, si, ä la paix generale, 
ils changent de maitre, d'etre sous les loix dune Constitution qui 
fait notre admiration et notre etude'. 
(223) 
Here we have anglophile 
separatism not on the part of indebted creole planters but royalist 
gentilshommes militaires, who had first turned to Spain for assistance, 
who had requested to remain under the Bourbon flag and who apparently 
possessed not a single plantation between them. ' 
(224) 
Only one was a 
creole and the two principal protagonists had been in the colony but 
nine and three years respectively. 
Such behaviour is extremely difficult to categorise. Yet, we 
find the same blend of counter-revolution and desire for British 
annexation in a memoir by the ultraroyalist, Mahe de Cormere, whose 
connections with the colony were similarly tenuous. 
(225) 
However, 
whereas Deneux wrote of admiration for the British Constitution, Mahe 
de Cormere's plans for colonial reform show no interest whatever in 
British institutions. Apart from the original, rather ambiguous, 
Propositions, (signed, one will remember, by scores of royalists, ) 
only in the recommendation by Dubuc Saint Olympe 
(226) 
that the British 
law of debt be adopted do we find any desire amongst the colonists to 
emulate British ways. Yet, he was no extremist; in fact, he had first 
made this suggestion to the 4migre Princes in November 1792. On this 
crucial subject of debt, it is worth observing that the indebted, auto- 
nomist, resident planter, Dubuc Saint Olympe, made the mildest, almost 
self-sacrificing, proposals, while the absentee authors of the February 
Propositions took a rather more self-interested line, and it was the 
reactionary non-planter, de Cormere who suggested that debts to French 
commerce could be written off sans injustice. Both memorialists favoured 
an authoritarian government for Saint Domingue and a return to the 
institutions of the Ancien Regime. Even in the writings of Cadusch, 
who wanted a self-governing Saint Domingue, there is little that can 
be called anglophile. 
(227) 
Both parties doubtless looked on the British 
predominantly as a source of soldiers, credit and ships. However, on 
the ideological plane, it was perhaps the royalists who in 1793 had the 
closest affinities with monarchical England. 
(228) 
These examples suggest that Frostin's analysis has definite 
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limitations. They give, however, no certain idea of what the 
majority of colonists wanted, those who did not compose memoirs, or 
sign petitions. Their thoughts remain most difficult to assess. 
Cadusch acknowledged that by no means all the colonists in the 
occupied zone had wanted the British called in. 
(229) 
More spec- 
ifically, Edwards stated that the English 'came on the invitation 
of a few obscure Frenchmen' and that the 'chief planters throughout 
the colony were altogether unacquainted with the English and enter- 
tain no very favourable opinion of their laws, government or manners'. 
When they landed, he claimed, many went into exile, while others 
'remained in silent obscurity... waiting patiently... for better times... 
The French planters', he concluded, 'acted as any other body of men 
attached to their country and faithful to their allegiance would 
probably have acted'. 
(230) 
Written to dissuade the English from 
keeping Saint Domingue, Edwards' book is not entirely trustworthy, 
(though the manuscript was read before publication by ex- Governor 
Williamson). By 1800, moreover, when these words were written, 
Edwards was doubtless additionally concerned to help French planter 
friends make their peace with the French Government. On the other 
hand, Venault de Charmilly's reply to Edwards' criticism is extremely 
evasive, and he freely admitted that self-preservation, not anglo- 
philia, was the colonists' main motive in looking to England. An 
attachement was to result only from services rendered. 
(231) 
Garran-Coulon varied through the four volumes of his Rapport 
in his judgement of the colonists. On balance, though, he considered 
the majority as basically loyal or neutral, the victims of a few 
factieux. 
(232) 
Similarly, the Precis Historique contains blanket 
condemnations of colonial society but depicts most colonists as wishing 
to stay French, though fearing the Revolutionary government. 
(233) 
Baron Wimpffen, one should remember, lived in the South from spring 
1788 to early summer 1790 without recording any secessionist desires 
on the planters' part. 
(234) 
In the six months before the outbreak 
of war, letters sent from Saint Domingue reveal much discontent with 
the commissioners but no actual aspirations for independence. 
(235) 
It seems reasonable, therefore, to postulate a passive majority 
of whites whose political fate was decided by groups of activists. 
Thus, in la Grand'Anse in August 1793, we find that 'M. Favaranges 
est 1'homme qui fait tout. I1 a beaucoup d'ennemis'. 
(236) 
Even 
then, on the eve of the Occupation, the colonists were far from united 
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on a course of action. Sonthonax describes them as, 'divises en 
cents partis differents, toujours en guerre, opprimant ou opprim4s', 
adding 'et une partie d'entre eux servirait, peut-etre, les uns, les 
independants, les autres, les royalistes, d'autres, les Espagnols ou 
les Anglais... '(237) 
(iv) Conclusion. It would appear, therefore, that the capit- 
ulation of Saint Domingue was rather more and rather less than la 
manifestation ultime et aboutissement de 1'autonomisme colon. 
(238) 
Not until Revolutionary legislation threatened the colonial status 
quo in 1791 was there any attempt to put Saint Domingue into British 
hands. Not until 1793, when both the colony and the regicide French 
Republic seemed destined for ruin, can one speak of general support 
for throwing off French rule. A general desire for autonomy and certain 
individuals' aspirations for independence clearly played an important 
part in this development, far more so than Cabon, W. A. Roberts and 
possibly Debien have realised. However, while the 'creoleness' of 
l'esprit autonomiste is yet to be demonstrated(239)its anglophile 
orientation has certainly been overrated. Conversely, the royalist 
aspect of Pappel aux Anglais would seem more significant than Frostin 
allows, 
(240) 
and the rich diversity of individual action on the colonists' 
part points towards a situation rather more complex than the one he 
presents. Overall, the paucity of evidence for a deep-rooted separatist 
movement and the broad spectrum of support for British intervention both 
in 1791 and 1793 suggest that the appel aux Anglais is most realistically 
viewed as an act of self-preservation rather than long-meditated 
secession. 
(241) 
It is true that in July 1794, after the fall of Port au Prince, 
de Charmilly managed to work up a number of petitions in the colony, 
some of which called for closer links with Britain, but, suspiciously, 
their signatories were rather few or not listed. 
(242) 
Perhaps more 
significant was the observation Dundas made to Williamson the previous 
month: 'Frenchmen of every description', he said, tend to prefer English 
protection to living under the French Republic, 'but, on the other hand, 
they generally feel a predilection for the Antient Government of France, 
if Monarchy is restored'. 
(243) 
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CHAPTER IV. THE BRITISH RESPONSE. 
The British reaction to these developments in Saint Domingue was 
no less complex than the colonial response to British intervention. 
The occupation of the colony was both a defensive and an offensive act, 
with various economic and strategic implications. Pitt's decision to 
intervene, as the most recent historian of the Haitian Revolution has 
said, defies any simple explanation. 
(1) 
It also raises a great number 
of questions. Did the decline of the British West Indies, which was 
rapid in the 1780's, make the Government more, or less, interested in 
acquiring other sugar colonies? How did the loss of America and Pitt's 
penchant for free trade affect the issue? Did the Government intend to 
annexe Saint Domingue, even if the Bourbons were restored to the French 
throne, or merely to use it as a bargaining counter? How could Pitt 
reconcile a policy of aggrandisement with his efforts to abolish the 
slave trade, that had reached an eloquent climax only ten months before 
the Propositions were signed? Was intervention in Saint Domingue the 
best means of protecting the British West Indies from its dangerous 
example and the possibility of invasion? What did the planters think? 
If the 'pacification' of Saint Domingue was vital for the safety of the 
British islands, would not its restoration shatter their recently renewed 
prosperity and accelerate their ruin? Did the Government, therefore, 
consider the elimination of a rival? 
Although in official communications of the British and colonists 
'the Protection and Assistance so liberally granted by H. M. Government' 
was a common phrase, some suspected Great Britain as well as Spain of 
trying not to conquer Saint Domingue but to destroy it and so enhance 
the value of its own colonies. 
(2) 
This view has also been confidently 
asserted by the historian Lepkowski as well as attributed (incorrectly) 
to Eric Williams. 
(3) 
However, while arguing that Pitt's attempts to 
abolish the slave trade were mainly aimed at ruining the French West 
Indies, Williams like C. L. R. James depicts the occupation of Saint 
Domingue as an act of territorial aggrandisement, an alternative strategy 
for capturing the European market in tropical produce, lost to France 
50 years before. 
(4) 
H. T. Manning, on the other hand, thought that the 
British Government in 1793 was not interested in acquiring another sugar 
colony and seized Saint Domingue as a means of forcing France to make 
peace. 
(5) Sir James Barskett, writing in 1818, assumed that, while the 
- 68 - 
Government's 'avowed' purpose was to take possession of Saint Domingue, 
its 'real' intention was the protection of the British West Indies from 
the spirit of revolution. 
(6) 
Yet, it was precisely defensive and 
humanitarian aims that Dundas stressed in his public pronouncements. 
It was not 'a war for riches', he said in 1796 but 'a war for security'. 
If Saint Domingue were not occupied, Jamaica would have been worth 
nothing. 
(7) 
Whether he thought this in 1793, however, is another 
matter. The changing situation in the Caribbean is one reason for 
these diverse interpretations of Government motives. Another is the 
difference of opinion within the Cabinet. It is also surprisingly 
difficult to find direct evidence of Pitt's intentions in the early 
part of the war. While claiming to know 'Pitt's sentiments exactly' 
or 'the real reason' for his actions, James and Williams, for example, 
rely almost entirely on a single memoir not written by him but to him. 
Lastly, this was a multi-faceted situation and the responses it elicited 
are not easily categorised. According to R. H. Griffiths, 'mystery 
Estill] shrouds the whole of [Britain's3 Saint Domingue policy'. 
(8) 
There thus remains considerable scope for clarifying the points at 
issue. 
(i) The Revolution. Though the English had tried to conquer 
Hispaniola in Cromwell's time, no attempt was ever made in the wars 
of the next century to capture what had become la perle des Antilles. 
The smaller colonies in the Caribbean were often occupied in wartime 
but even they were usually regarded as bargaining counters whose 
temporary possession weakened the enemy and brought freedom from attack. 
Very few West India islands definitively changed hands in the 18th 
century. The larger and longer-established a colony, the more its 
transfer would upset the balance of power. Unlike the Neutral Islands 
that became British in 1763, settled colonies were not attractive pro- 
positions for annexation. 
(9) 
In Great Britain, furthermore, the West 
India planters were an influential force opposed to the acquisition of 
new colonies whose produce would compete with their own on the domestic 
market. In 1763 they proved sufficiently powerful to ensure that 
Guadeloupe was restored to France, though mercantile and refining interests 
campaigned for its retention. 
Thereafter, however, their political influence gradually waned 
along with their prosperity, sapped by soil exhaustion and increasing 
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taxation, and their privileged position was slowly eroded. 
(10) 
After 
the breach with America, some commentators began to regard the imperial 
compact between Britain and her colonies as a hindrance to the profitable 
workings of free trade -a view Pitt had considerable sympathy with. The 
majority still considered the West Indies the 'hub of the Empire' but 
British horizons were broadening and the sugar islands' monopoly of the 
domestic market came to seem increasingly unreasonable. In 1787, the 
import of French West Indian cotton and dyestuffs was permitted via a 
system of free ports; partly to meet the needs of the Manchester mill- 
owners, partly to provide new markets for British manufacturers and 
merchants. The inefficiency of British West India sugar production 
relative to that of the French islands was highlighted by the Privy 
Council and parliamentary enquiries into the slave trade which began 
in 1788 and which revealed that French sugar was about 30% cheaper than 
British. The enormous output of Saint Domingue seems to have made a 
great impression on British ministers; its trade figures for the years 
1787-88 frequently crop up amongst their papers. Lord Hawkesbury, the 
minister with responsibility for foreign trade, was himself a West India 
planter but under his and Pitt's direction the Government was now turning 
its ear to other 'interests' - shipowners, sugar refiners, manufacturers 
and also the consumer. 
(11) 
In 1789 it was decided to allow the import 
of sugar from British India and two years later the production of sugar 
in Sierra Leone was permitted. When the price of colonial produce sky- 
rocketed after the slave revolt in Saint Domingue, bounties on the re- 
export of sugar were withdrawn and for the first time foreign sugar and 
coffee were admitted on to the British market. 
(12) 
Hence, when Saint 
Domingue was first offered to the British Government towards the end of 
1791, 
(13)its 
British West Indian rivals had already ceased to be a 
dominant force in British politics and a new imperial policy was 
developing, less monopolistic, with an emphasis on trade and which was 
already drawing Britain and the French West Indies closer together. 
Even so, despite many assertions to the contrary, there is no 
evidence to suggest the Government intended in any way to intervene in 
Saint Domingue until the situation in Europe made war between England 
and France almost inevitable. Like the emancipation of the slaves, 
British intervention was widely anticipated long before it in fact 
became likely. As early as December 1789, we find colonists assuming 
that the visit of a British warship to a Dominguan port was an attempt 
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to stir up discord, even a prelude to conquest. 
(14) 
As the Revolution 
moved further to the left in 1791, colonial politicians, seeking to 
scare the National Assembly and the free coloureds, several times 
publicly referred to British intervention as probable or imminent. 
(15) 
Such expectations were often genuine. The Spaniards of Santo Domingo 
actually believed Governor Effingham of Jamaica to have offered the 
colonists 18 warships with troops to help them resist the May 15th 
law; and the naval assistance he sent to le Cap and Port au Prince 
after the slave revolt broke out was universally interpreted as a 
devious manoeuvre. 
(16) 
The truth, however, was somewhat different. 
Prior to the slave insurrection, Governor Effingham paid little attention 
to the revolution in Saint Domingue, while Admiral Affleck specifically 
avoided communicating with the colony. They were principally concerned 
by the threat of war with Spain (over the Nootka Sound dispute) and, 
ironically, kept watch on Saint Domingue chiefly because France was 
still Spain's ally. 
(17) 
Ships and guns were sent to the colony in 
September only in response to numerous and desperate requests. Several 
of the vessels were anyway on their way back to England. Bryan Edwards, 
who accompanied them, was certainly not a Government agent, though the 
colonists convinced themselves that he was. 
Some public servants nevertheless clearly did wish to profit from 
the situation in Saint Domingue. Major-General Williamson, it was 
later said, was an early enthusiast for British involvement, prompted 
by his 'humanity' and the 'anticipated great political and commercial 
consequences that must result to Great Britain, and security to the 
Island of Jamaica'. All that can be said for certain, however, is 
that he forwarded to Dundas without comment brief accounts of his 
conversations, with the Port au Prince revolutionaries. 
(18) 
Lord Gower, 
British Ambassador in Paris, was also in touch with secessionist ele- 
ments, even as early as May 1791. He seems to have thought the occasion 
ripe for taking revenge on France for having aided Britain's American 
colonies to secede. However, on 31st August he was curtly informed 
by Lord Grenville, the Foreign Secretary, that such retaliation was out 
of the question. 'We are fully persuaded', wrote Grenville, 'that the 
islands in the West Indies are not worth to us one year of that in- 
valuable tranquillity which we are now enjoying'. 
(19) 
Another figure 
palpably excited by the disaffection displayed by the Dominguan colonists 
at this time was Gilbert Francklyn, a wealthy absentee planter and friend 
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of Lord Hawkesbury. Possessing contacts in Paris, he relayed to the 
minister news arriving from Saint Domingue and, when Venault de Charmilly 
came to London in November seeking British assistance, 
(20) 
he introduced 
the two men. Hawkesbury, a ponderous man in his mid-sixties, received 
the articulate, animated Frenchman with caution and reserve. He wrote 
to Paris to get information on him and the reply was not encouraging. 
Francklyn himself thought the memoir he presented was written with the 
Vivacity of Imagination which may be expected from a French Creole in 
the present position of affairs'. 
(21) 
De Charmilly received two inter- 
views with Pitt but was told there was nothing Britain could do. 
With her armed forces run down to a low level, the country was 
enjoying a period of peaceful prosperity which no minister would wish 
to jeopardise. Pitt was immersed in projects of financial reform. 
(22) 
France, moreover, was sending troops to Saint Domingue and no-one could 
predict how events would turn out. Nevertheless, de Charmilly's over- 
tures, arriving shortly after those of Cadusch, brought by the British 
frigates from le Cap, seem to have been of considerable interest to the 
ministry. Hawkesbury mused on the great gains British commerce would 
make, if the whites of Saint Domingue made themselves independent or 
sought a foreign protectorate. Even if the blacks were to win, he 
thought, Britain would still be the main beneficiary of the Revolution, 
although in that case her own colonies would be endangered. The gains 
would not only be commercial. The traditional enemy would be hit hard. 
Her manufactures, merchant marine and navy would suffer and her balance 
of trade would be massively deranged. Saint Domingue's future, therefore, 
was very important to Great Britain. For the time being, however, the 
Government's only option was to be prepared to profit from any contingency, 
'so far as Considerations of Interest combined with a due sense of Honour 
may hereafter suggest'. At least, this was his initial response. From 
de Charmilly, he learned that about one-seventh of Saint Domingue's sugar 
exports were currently being smuggled out of the colony on foreign ships. 
Growing more convinced that France, without any effort on Britain's part 
was bound to lose some part of its West India possessions, he urged that 
foreign sugar be allowed into British Caribbean ports. It should cross 
the Atlantic in British ships, be refined in Great Britain and then be 
re-exported. By a few simple regulations, of which the French could 
not complain, Britain could reduce prices at home and recapture her 
former dominance of the European sugar trade. 
(23) 
A bill amending the 
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Navigation Laws was consequently passed in the spring of 1792. 
Encouraging the French to break their own laws of trade, this was as 
far as the ministry was prepared to go, it seems, in interfering in 
Saint Domingue. 
During these months, Francklyn remained in close contact with the 
French planters who came and went between London and the continent. As 
already seen, he kept Lord Hawkesbury informed of their movements and 
may have introduced him to La Rochejacquelein in the summer. 
(24) 
When 
Cougniac-Mion drew up in London his incendiary open letter to the 
colonists of Saint Domingue on July 21st, Garran-Coulon assumed that 
the British Government was behind it. 
(25) 
This is extremely unlikely. 
(The 4migr4s all looked to Spain at this period. ) Even so, it is hard 
to believe that Hawkesbury, at least, did not have prior knowledge of 
the letter. There seems, nonetheless, no justification for C. L. R. 
James's assertion that the British 'busied themselves with schemes 
and plans of conquest'. 
(26) 
So much for the opportunities created by the revolution. As for 
the dangers, it is not easy to gauge how seriously the Government at 
first took the spectre of a race war in the Caribbean. As the gory 
drama in the Plaine du Nord became the talk of the London coffee houses, 
the Assembly of Jamaica and the West India Committee clamoured for more 
troops. Yet, to their chagrin, Dundas replied that in the interests 
of economy the colonial garrisons were actually going to be reduced. 
Any troops over and above their peacetime quotas would have to be paid 
and fed by the colonists themselves. 
(27) 
However, this did not exactly 
imply indifference, or complacency. After 1783 the island garrisons 
had remained at wartime strength and they had been further reinforced 
during the international crises over Holland and Nootka Sound. The 
number of troops in the West Indies was thus at a record level. So, 
too, of course was the number of slaves. Governor Williamson's reports 
from Jamaica were nonetheless on the whole reassuring. 
(28) 
Above all, 
the Government was on safe ground for once demanding cash from a colonial 
assembly. It knew the Jamaicans would pay up to protect their crops, 
now greatly inflated in value, thanks to the rebel blacks of Saint 
Domingue. Even so, it does seem the Government saw the situation 
primarily from a European angle. France was weakened by the slave 
revolt. Britain and her empire were consequently the more secure. 
In his Budget speech of February 1792, Pitt looked forward to 15 years 
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of unbroken peace. Two months later, the campaign for the abolition 
of the slave trade reached a climax and, despite the anarchy then 
spreading throughout Saint Domingue and dire warnings from the 
Jamaican planters, the House of Commons voted to abolish the trade 
within four years. 
Pitt and Grenville had long supported the measure but Hawkesbury 
opposed it. Dundas was not enthusiastic but in the event it was he 
who introduced the motion for gradual abolition, perhaps disingenuously. 
Many must have known the bill would not pass the House of Lords. Dundas 
was probably most interested in bringing to a swift conclusion a debate 
profoundly unsettling for the British West Indies. Pitt, however, seems 
to have sincerely thought he could carry the measure. 
(29) 
It is 
interesting to note how the foreign sugar bill would have complemented 
Abolition, by compensating for the loss of trade that would result, and 
possibly for any loss of production. It thus helped to underwrite this 
essay in idealism, reluctant and perhaps bogus though it was, D. B. Davis 
suggests, on the part of many M. P. s. 
(30) 
Eric Williams' scepticism 
takes a different form. He claims that Pitt's Abolitionism was not 
idealistic but was specifically aimed at destroying France's dominance 
of the sugar trade. Having failed to persuade the French to abolish 
their own trade in slaves, Williams argues, Pitt still hoped, by 
ending the re-export of slaves from the British colonies, to hamstring 
the economy of the French West Indies. 
(31) 
This seems implausible, 
if only because it overrates the French planters' dependence on the 
British slave trade and because it does not allow for the French and 
others filling whatever gap would have been left by British withdrawal. 
(32) 
While Dundas's bill was delayed in the House of Lords, it lost much 
of its support both in and out of Parliament. By the end of the year, 
the changing political climate had made it a dead horse. 
(33) 
Radicalism, 
damagingly linked to Abolitionism, spread rapidly in Britain; the French 
Monarchy was overthrown; the slave revolution in Saint Domingue remained 
unquelled. Suddenly, war with France became likely. Henceforth, 
Dundas opposed all efforts to abolish the slave trade and Pitt, though 
he continued to speak for the cause in Parliament, grew lukewarm in its 
support. The occupation of Saint Domingue, Williams argues, logically 
meant the end of Pitt's interest in Abolition and proved the materialist 
nature of his motivation. 
(34) 
This does not, of course, necessarily 
follow. Pitt could indeed 'have had Saint Domingue and Abolition as well'. 
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The two might actually have complemented each other, both compensating 
amply for the decline in British production and ensuring that fewer 
Africans were enslaved. More particularly, Williams quotes from 
Wilberforce's diary in a misleading way. When in 1792 the Abolitionist 
wrote that 'Pitt threw out against slave motion on St. Domingo account', 
he was clearly referring to the dangerous results Abolition might have 
and not to any plans of conquest. 
(35) 
(ii) The War. However, in November this situation was trans- 
formed. The new French Republic. repelled its invaders and revealed 
expansionist tendencies that threatened vital British interests in the 
Netherlands. Pitt's hopes for continued peace slowly vanished. As 
war became steadily more likely, steps were taken to protect the British 
West Indies and a cautious dialogue was opened between the Government 
and certain 4migrd planters among the royalists now fleeing to England 
in great numbers. Yet, throughout December, Pitt was still hoping to 
avoid hostilities and, when France declared war on February 1st, Britain's 
military preparations had scarcely begun and no war policy had been 
formulated. 
(36) 
As late as April 3rd, the Duke of Richmond, Master- 
General of the Ordnance, complained to Pitt that the Government had yet 
to decide what course of action it was to pursue. 
(37) 
Basically, the 
Government had three options. It could send forces to join with the 
Austrians in Flanders hoping to march on Paris; it could use its fleet 
to raid the French coast, perhaps in combination with foreign troops or 
insurgent French royalists, or it could seize France's colonies. In 
the event, it attempted all three. 
It is not certain just when direct contact began between the British 
ministers and the growing French planter community in London. Towards 
the end of November, the baron de Montalembert put forward a scheme via 
Gilbert Francklyn similar to the one proposed to Spain in the summer. 
Britain would forbid France to send any more troops to Saint Domingue 
and would enforce the ban with a naval squadron paid for by the colonists. 
It would also transport to the West Indies 2,000 planters then serving 
with the Princes who together with loyal slaves would defeat 
both the 
Republican forces and the black rebels. If granted a free passage to 
Jamaica, Montalembert himself would prepare the ground. 
(38) 
By this 
time, Malouet, the most prestigious figure among the planters, had 
arrived in London and had been empowered to negotiate with the 
Government 
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by and on behalf of his fellow colonists. He had probably already 
met Lord Grenville, (having befriended his brother in Paris), but as 
yet he refused to become involved. 
(39) 
It was therefore the Guadeloupe 
creole, Louis de Curt, who opened negotiations with the Government. On 
December 5th, after already meeting Lord Chatham, First Lord of the 
Admiralty, he had what was apparently his second interview with Lord 
Hawkesbury. He hoped, if war broke out, that the Windward Isles would 
be declared either independent or sujettes de la Grande Bretagne, and 
in the meantime he intended to advise their inhabitants to resist any 
Republican forces sent to occupy them. Hawkesbury, for his part, 
would make no promises. He admitted there was a 'great probability' 
of war but said the 'moment had not yet arrived'. Everything depended 
on France's conduct towards Holland. 
(40) 
Meanwhile, strict neutrality 
was to be observed. 
On December 8th, the Home Secretary, Dundas, warned the Governors 
in the West Indies there was a possibility of war and that the Republicans 
might attempt to raise the slaves. 
(41) 
The latter warning had come from 
Malouet and de Charmilly, who otherwise still kept in the background. 
At the end of the month, two regiments were ordered to the Caribbean 
from Gibraltar and Canada and in early February two more would be sent. 
De Curt met Hawkesbury again on December 18th, this time with the exciting 
news that the Windwards were in rebellion against the Republic. He 
wished to sign a treaty arranging for a British occupation. Hawkesbury 
suggested to Pitt, (who already possessed a number of papers by de Curt), 
that he be examined by the Cabinet. Nothing could be ventured, however, 
while hope of peace still existed. Although tension mounted towards 
the end of the month, when it was realised that the Republic was going 
to attack the Windwards, the Government still refused, to the colonists' 
great frustration, either to send arms or to promise it would intervene 
once war was declared. 
(42) 
Finally, on January 1st, Malouet overcame 
his scruples and in private conversation with (it appears) Lord Grenville 
declared that British intervention was urgently needed in Saint Domingue - 
that or independence. Grenville replied that war was 'highly probable' 
and that 'our attention would naturally on every account be turned to 
the West Indies'. Ideas of independence, he thought 'chimerical and 
dangerous'. He would therefore see about placing the French islands 
under British sovereignty, he said, without engaging individuals in 
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schemes that would endanger them if war were not declared. 
(43) 
The case for occupying Saint Domingue had been stated in a memoir 
sent to Pitt a few days before by one James Chalmers, Lieutenant-Colonel 
of the late Maryland Loyalists. 
(44) 
Britain, he said, should commence 
hostilities by invading Normandy, but in the autumn (after the end of 
the 'hurricane' and 'sickly' seasons), or sooner if necessary, it should 
attack the French West Indies. The Convention, he thought, was going 
to free the slaves of the French islands so as to punish their 'aristo- 
cratic' masters; Jamaica, he observed, could easily be reached by 
canoe. Stressing the 'vast vast importance of French St. Domingo', 
Chalmers noted firstly the strategic importance of the Mole Saint 
Nicholas, 'the true key of the New World', as Raynal had called it. 
Possession of the colony, he went on, would give Britain a monopoly of 
the European trade in sugar, indigo, cotton and coffee. Its produce 
and the market it offered for British manufactures would boost industry 
throughout the empire and so halt emigration from the British Isles to 
America. One might add that British manufacturers at this time were 
searching for new sources of good quality raw cotton(45)and that the 
high-grade cotton of Saint Domingue had already attracted their 
attention. 
(46) 
Moreover, by monopolising the supply of colonial 
produce to the markets of northern Europe, Britain would be able to 
buy naval stores at the lowest prices, while the French, deprived of 
trade goods, would have to pay for theirs with specie. The merchants 
of Bordeaux and Nantes, Amsterdam and Hamburg, would be supplanted by 
those of London and Liverpool, Bristol and Glasgow. The commerce of 
France would be ruined and, with this enormous accession to her carrying 
trade, Britain's merchant marine would grow ever stronger. 
(47) 
Colonies 
were necessary in the West Indies, Chalmers argued, taking issue with 
Lord Shelburne, as under conditions of free trade the islands' commerce 
would be dominated by the Americans. Saint Domingue should be retained 
after the war, he said, but if other powers objected, the north coast 
at least ought to be kept, so as to render Jamaica secure. 'Gloomy 
and perilous as the present state of Europe is, ' the lieutenant-colonel 
summed up, 'yet from these evils the greatest and most lasting benefits 
may arise'. 
In mid-January, Montalembert and de Beaunay took ship for Jamaica 
with a letter of introduction to Governor Williamson. Dundas informed 
him that war was likely and that Britain intended to offer 'protection' 
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to the French West Indies and the 'advantage of becoming British 
subjects ... to preserve by that means as well those Islands as the 
present British colonies-from, the contagion-which must lead to 
their utter subversion'. The French colonists, it was expected, 
would co-operate in these views. Nevertheless, until war was actually 
declared, Williamson was strictly enjoined to do nothing that would 
prejudice Britain's neutral status. 
(48) 
This remained Pitt's resolve for another month. Hawkesbury had 
urged him on January 3rd that a decision should soon be made about the 
Windwards, where a golden opportunity was in the process of being lost. 
(49) 
De Curt continued throughout January to push for immediate assistance and 
was now joined by two deputies sent from the Windwards. They, too, 
stressed the urgency of the situation. However, more politically 
scrupulous than de Curt, they were reluctant to become British subjects 
while there was a possibility of the Bourbons regaining the French throne. 
Hawkesbury replied that their islands could not benefit from the British 
laws of trade unless placed under British sovereignty. He added that 
military and naval protection would cost money. It was therefore agreed 
that the Windward Isles, if occupied, might swear allegiance to the 
British Crown but be returned to France and pay the costs of occupation, 
if the Bourbons were restored. The deputies would not assent to 
Hawkesbury's proposal that Saint Domingue be retained unless the French 
King made peace on terms ä la satisfaction de la Grande Bretagne. On 
31st January, the day before the Republic declared war, they presented 
their Propositions. During the next two weeks, they grew increasingly 
impatient waiting for a reply. Although Hawkesbury was extremely busy, 
it seems Pitt was the cause of the delay. Procrastination, as 
Wilberforce observed, was his great vice. 
(50) 
Overworked ministers 
angry at being badgered for interviews, agitated colonists frustrated 
with ministerial dilatoriness and hauteur: the pattern was set for 
future relations between the Government and colonial 4migr4s. Tired of 
this 'unpleasant situation', Hawkesbury asked Pitt on 14th February for 
a final decision. As a result, the Propositions were formally received 
on the 15th and four days later were approved by the King. 
It was widely expected that Britain would attack the French West 
Indies. Public opinion in England favoured a maritime war, one that 
would re-live the days of Chatham and exact vengeance for the loss of 
America. 
(51) 
As soon as the declaration of war was known in the United 
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States, we find a Charleston newspaper proclaiming, '... it is almost 
self evident that the first offensive operations of Great Britain will 
necessarily be against the French West Indies, not only that they are 
the most vulnerable and disaffected, but also as they promise more 
national advantages than conquests which must be purchased at much 
greater expenditure of blood and treasure'. 
(52) 
Such predictions, 
however, did not allow for the fact that Britain was then almost without 
an army and that the French navy actually had a numerical superiority in 
the Caribbean. 
(53) 
If France was to be beaten, moreover, it would have 
to be defeated in Europe. Pitt had been drawn into a war he did not 
want and now had to start improvising. 
On February 28th, orders were sent to the British commander at 
Barbados to occupy, not Martinique and Guadeloupe, but the smallest, 
least-protected of the Windwards, Sainte-Lucie and Marie-Galante, and 
then only if the inhabitants proved favourable. As the number of 
British troops in the Caribbean was not sufficient to mount a proper 
offensive, and Britain's naval presence there was extremely weak, the 
attack was not to be pressed if strong resistance was encountered. 
Orders had already gone out on the 10th for the capture of Tobago, which 
had formerly been British and was almost undefended. 
(54) 
This, then, 
was the character of Britain's opening moves in the Caribbean. It was 
to be a cut-price campaign, aimed at collecting windfalls; its chances 
of success were not rated highly, but it was undoubtedly worth trying. 
(55) 
So it was. Had the policy been implemented a little more vigorously, 
it might have succeeded. Yet, it was impossible to synchronise actions 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Early in January, while de Curt was 
negotiating in London, the rebellious planters of Martinique, having 
learned of Republican successes in Europe, had surrendered to a French 
naval force. They revolted again, however, following the outbreak of 
war, in anticipation of British help, but not till June 15th, after a 
great deal of dithering, did a small force of Anglo-colonials 
ä+g`ýº. 1po. rk 
in the island, by which time Royalist resistance had almost been stamped 
out. 
(56) 
The venture was abandoned amid mutual recriminations. As in 
the Windwards, British intervention in Saint Domingue was also to prove, 
in the final analysis, too half-hearted and belated. 
Following slowly in the wake of the Windward Isles planters, those 
of Saint Domingue drew up their Propositions on February 25th and they 
were presented by Malouet three days later. The fate of America, de 
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Charmilly 
(57) 
Curiously, it was exclaimed, was in Britain's hands. 
to be over a month before they were ratified by the Government and more 
than three months before it was finally decided to act on them. The 
causes of this delay are difficult to determine. As already seen, the 
Propositions underwent a number of changes before their content was 
finally settled, but it is not clear that the changes made had anything 
to do with the delay, nor can one say exactly when the different drafts 
were drawn up. 
(58) 
In the course of March, it seems that Malouet may 
have regretted the overtly Anglophile document he initially presented. 
He was evidently relieved when, in early April, he and Grenville agreed 
on a joint statement which stressed the planters' desperate circumstances 
and their past loyalty to Louis XVI. 
(59) 
However, there is no evidence 
that Malouet sought to change the Propositions and, far from delaying the 
Government, he repeatedly pressed for the dispatch of forces. 
Certain changes made by the British deserve note. Firstly, there 
were struck out from the original document the words en sequestre and 
provisoirement, which suggested British rule would necessarily be 
temporary. To the same end, the future sovereignty of Saint Domingue 
was to be decided not only by Britain and France but also by les puissances 
alliges. This would give Britain additional leverage when peace was 
negotiated. The grant of 'English' institutions was also refused, as 
they would prevent the Government making any alterations in the colony's 
constitution at a later date; it had already had enough problems with 
the Assemblies of Grenada and Dominica. Parliament's right to make such 
changes was explicitly stated. The statement signed on April 5th 
announced that the King had accepted the Propositions and would send 
troops to Saint Domingue as soon as possible. That same day, de 
Charmilly was on the point of setting out to get the Propositions 
accepted in the colony, when suddenly the Government decided to delay 
his departure. No explanation was given. For over a month, Dundas 
refused to see Malouet and ignored his letters. 
(60) 
Changing military calculations might account for this behaviour. 
It is possible that, until then, the Government was thinking, not of 
just using the troops in Jamaica and 4migr4 recruits before mounting 
a major expedition in the autumn, but of withdrawing its forces from 
Flanders at the first opportunity and sending them out forthwith to 
Saint Domingue. As it was still in Republican hands, it may have been 
thought that, unlike the Windwards, it could not be attempted by local 
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troops alone. 
(61) 
Hence, the realisation reached in the first half 
of April that the troops could not be withdrawn from Flanders(62) might 
have scotched the Government's plans for the West Indies. This, however, 
is pure conjecture and it does not accord well with the evidence of 
Richmond's letters cited above (p. 75). Pitt indeed hoped to withdraw 
the Guards from Flanders but was then clearly intending to use them off 
the French coast. 
(63) 
Dundas, therefore, may have decided he needed 
more information on Saint Domingue before becoming involved, and that, 
as serious operations in the West Indies were being left until the 
autumn, he had time to procure it. 
There is no doubt that the policy Britain should adopt towards 
the free coloureds occasioned much debate. Various proposals were put 
forward until it was decided simply to extend to the colony the race 
laws of the British islands. The Government, for its part, desired 
to win over this increasingly powerful, indeed dominant, sector of 
Dominguan society but it also feared the effect that the recognition 
of racial equality might have on the mulattoes of the British colonies, 
as well as on the whites of Saint Domingue. The planters themselves 
were divided on the subject, and attitudes were probably changing as 
news arrived that the moderate mulattoes in both Saint Domingue and 
Martinique had abandoned their Royalist allies for the Republicans. 
(64) 
On May 15th, Rundas received an urgent call from Bryan Edwards concerning 
'a question of greater magnitude than the Slave Trade'. He apparently 
meant the free coloured question, for the mulattoes of Jamaica had 
lately been showing signs of discontent. He probably argued, therefore, 
that it would be dangerous if Britain granted civil equality to the 
Dominguan free coloureds. With a view to framing its Saint Domingue 
policy, the Government at this time was enquiring among the merchants 
and planters in London as to the exact status of mulattoes in the British 
and French colonies. Two memoirs on the subject, one by Edwards, were 
sent to Governor Williamson as soon as the decision to intervene was taken. 
The terms of the Propositions could be altered, Dundas told him, but not 
if it would upset the British planters. 
(65) 
Whatever was the cause of delay, Dundas was doubtless encouraged 
by the favourable reports he received from Williamson during the spring 
concerning the situation in Saint Domingue. On June 4th, de Charmilly 
was finally authorised to set out for Jamaica with the Propositions. 
A misunderstanding must have taken place, for he left believing that 
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forces were already on their way to the colony. Dundas, however, 
informed Williamson he should undertake 'such measures that will lead 
to an amiable surrender' and that he could choose whether or not to 
employ his own small forces. If serious resistance were anticipated, 
he should wait till the autumn, as an expedition would be sent to the 
Leewards and Jamaica 'as shall be necessary*. 
(66) 
A few days before, 
Dundas had told Grenville that expeditions would be sent to Mauritius 
and the West Indies in September. He and Pitt had discussed the matter 
generally on several occasions and he was now intermittently working on 
the details, distracted by his many other responsibilities. 
(67) 
It was only in July, however, that the Cabinet approved the plan 
for a West India expedition. Hawkesbury, of course, strongly favoured 
an aggressive colonial policy, but the Admiralty was loath to increase 
its work-load in the Caribbean and apparently preferred a defensive West 
Indian strategy. The Duke of Richmond, for his part, continued to push 
for an expedition to the coast of Brittany. Dundas, however, argued 
with enthusiasm that such schemes should not be allowed to divert re- 
sources from operations against the French colonies. The Flanders 
campaign, he considered vital to British interests, as it ensured the 
co-operation of Austria, but the restoration of order in France, he 
observed, was not a British war aim and was anyway not likely to be 
accomplished by an expedition to Brittany. Apart from in Flanders, 
therefore, Britain's forces would be best deployed in occupying enemy 
colonies, so as to make secure her own, to weaken France and to enlarge 
the British Empire. The West Indies was 'the first point to make 
perfectly certain'. 
(68) 
Pitt apparently agreed. 
The position of Grenville, an austere, aloof man, is less clear. 
Different scholars have stated both that he was inclined to 'non- 
intervention on the Continent' and also that he objected to colonial 
ventures, favouring instead a direct attack on France. 
(69) 
However, 
it does not appear that in 1793 he was opposed to a West Indian offensive - 
far from it. As Foreign Secretary, though, he was concerned about the 
reaction of Spain, with whom he was trying to form an alliance and who, 
it was rightly suspected, was also interested in annexing Saint Domingue. 
'Nice questions', were involved, 'very serious questions', he stressed. 
Could he broach the subject in Madrid, he asked, while both the outcome 
and Spain's intentions were in doubt? Or would it be better 'to stave 
off all explanations and to make the best of our own game? ' 
(70) 
This, 
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in the event, is what happened. Numerous historians have assumed, 
as did such contemporaries as Malouet, that Britain and Spain agreed 
to partition Saint Domingue, but no such agreement was ever reached 
and Spain's resentment of British policy, in fact, was later to be a 
major factor in causing her to abandon the First Coalition. 
Throughout August, British prospects looked bright. Civil war 
spread through France; the allies in Flanders made slow but steady 
progress, and Dundas prepared to dispatch to the Caribbean 10,000 men 
under Sir Charles Grey. However, the Government's resolve to concen- 
trate on the West Indies did not last long. Towards the middle of 
September, news arrived both of an allied retreat in Flanders and of 
the surrender of Toulon to a British squadron. Eight regiments from 
Grey's expedition were rushed to Ostend and Pitt began contemplating 
intervention in the South of France. Toulon's surrender, he thought, 
was the most important blow yet struck towards the ending of the war. 
The King warned him about having 'too many objects to attend to' and 
suggested the West Indies expedition would be best diverted to the 
Low Countries. 
(71) 
He and Dundas, nevertheless, were determined the 
expedition should not be delayed, but in mid-October the Republicans 
gained another major victory in Flanders and Grey himself had to dash 
across to Ostend to assess the danger. Meanwhile, the Royalist rebels 
in Brittany broke through to the Channel coast. These new opportunities 
and dangers in Europe made Caribbean operations seem increasingly irrele- 
vant to the defeat of France. 
If diverted by 'the pursuit of conquests', argued Lord Auckland, 
the former William Eden and most influential of British ambassadors, 
'we risk the fate of the whole war and of the existing race of mankind'. 
He would regret, therefore, the dispatch of troops to the West Indies 
but, it must be noted, 'not on account of the mortality to which they 
are exposed: such mortality may be justified as the inevitable result 
of an inevitable war; and we are to place in the opposite scale the 
immense importance of St. Domingo, Guadeloupe and Martinique, or of 
any one of them'. Even so, he considered the West Indian expedition 
unnecessary, since only by defeating the Republicans in Europe could 
France be forced to make such 'sacrifices as may be thought necessary 
for our future safety'. 
(72) 
As Windham and the Whigs said, Dundas 
was hunting sheep before he had killed the dog. As for the King, he 
thought it 'quite impossible' to send troops to both Toulon and the 
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Caribbean and therefore wanted the expedition - already held up by 
winds and commissariat problems - to be delayed six months to see how 
the Mediterranean fared. The Duke of Richmond, predictably, renewed 
his demand for intervention in Brittany. 
(73) 
Grenville, however, said 
it would be a sign of weakness to abandon the expedition and Hawkesbury 
argued forcefully that all the troops in Britain could have no effect 
in Brittany, while it would be exhausting to try and defend Toulon. 
Moreover, the campaign season in northern Europe was nearly over; 
that in the Caribbean was just beginning. Dundas, nevertheless, 
compromised. Troops at Gibraltar, destined for the West Indies, were 
sent to Toulon, and 4,000 of Grey's soldiers were withdrawn and diverted 
to the Breton coast. 'You are abandoning objects truly British', 
Hawkesbury told him, 'in favour of others more difficult and less 
important] '. 
(74) 
As a result, when the West Indies expedition. 
finally sailed on November 25th, it carried little more than 6,000 
troops, not its original complement of over 10,000. 
This, then, was not exactly the 'reckless', single-minded pursuit 
of Caribbean spoils depicted by C. L. R. James. 
(75) 
Furthermore, these 
preparations, far from proving 'what San Domingo meant in those days', 
had practically nothing to do with the colony. Grey had been instructed 
first to conquer Martinique, Guadeloupe and Sainte-Lucie, and then, if 
possible, detach forces for Saint Domingue. 
(76) 
So little, it seems, 
had Dundas expected de Charmilly's mission to bear fruit that as late 
as October 2nd he was ordering Williamson to send troops to Barbados! 
(77) 
This neglect of Saint Domingue is surprising. The failure at Martinique 
in June may have convinced the ministers that no French colonists could 
be relied on and that the Saint Domingue mission, therefore, had also 
come to nothing. Perhaps the Windwards were then preferred as the 
initial target for an expedition because of their upwind position, 
i. e. for logistic reasons. Perhaps they were thought to be militarily 
easier options, or perhaps more valuable than Saint Domingue, having 
suffered less destruction. Undoubtedly, the harbour of Fort Royal 
was considered an important objective. However, once the eight 
battalions had been withdrawn from Grey's forces, Dundas gave up hope 
of taking Martinique and expected Grey to occupy only the smaller 
Windwards. 
(78) 
By this time, moreover, (November 11th), he knew that 
an expedition was being sent to JErr¬mie and that the slaves of Saint 
Domingue had been emancipated. Yet, only when the news of Whitelocke's 
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success arrived - and the surrender of the Mole created quite a stir - 
was Grey given the option of attacking Saint Domingue first. It was 
then mid-December and Grey was in mid-Atlantic. Two regiments already 
embarked at Cork were also ordered immediately to Jamaica, but they 
proved unable to leave port. 
(79) 
Far from being obsessed with Saint 
Domingue, Dundas had evidently not taken seriously enough his commitment 
to its planters. The Brittany and Toulon expeditions had already failed. 
The Flanders campaign had achieved nothing. It remained to be seen if 
Dundas's opportunism was to be entirely undone by this excess of oppor- 
tunity. 
Sir John Fortescue, historian of the British Army, sharply criti- 
cised Pitt's ministry, (as did most of the Opposition in Parliament and, 
more reservedly, the King), both for frittering away its resources and 
giving priority to the West Indies in its strategy. 
(80) 
Pitt's bio- 
grapher, J. Holland Rose, however, retorted that the ministry did not in 
fact go out of its way to attack the French West Indies and that 'British 
action was in reality defensive'. 
(81) 
Three points, therefore, are at 
issue: - the foolishness or otherwise of Pitt's West India strategy; 
the motivation that lay behind it, and its place in overall British war 
policy. One of the difficulties in delineating the role of the West 
Indies in Government strategy results from the instability of the military 
situation on the continent. Originally, it would seem, the ministers 
did not want to send troops to the Low Countries. Although forced to 
in February by the French invasion of Holland, they still intended to 
withdraw them once Austrian reinforcements arrived. 
(82) 
on the other 
hand, there appears to have been no question either of immediately 
dispatching troops to the Caribbean. Coastal operations were apparently 
the Government's first preference. With the French on the offensive, 
and a peacetime army of only 18,000 men, no soldiers could be spared for 
the West Indies until new regiments had been raised. Even though France 
was forced on to the defensive in March, it was anyway wiser to wait until 
the 'sickly' and 'hurricane' seasons ended in September before an exped- 
ition was sent, 
(83)by 
which time the war could have been over. By mid- 
April, Pitt, Grenville and even the colonially-minded Dundas had decided 
that a permanent military presence was essential in Flanders, despite its 
hindrance to other projects, its unpopularity with public opinion and 
opposition within the Cabinet from the Duke of Richmond, who wanted to 
see concentration on attacking the French ports. 
(84) 
The defence of 
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Holland was Britain's casus belli and its security remained Britain's 
major war aim. Although from the very outset the West Indies were 
in the forefront of Government planning, it should be apparent that 
they never really took precedence over the European theatre of war. 
One may, therefore, dispute Fortescue's description of the West 
Indian campaigns as 'the most essential feature' of Pitt's military 
strategy. At the same time, however, Holland-Rose's estimate of 
them as 'in reality defensive' is equally biased and his claim that 
'the French attacked first'(ß5)is patently wrong. He was principally 
referring to the first dispatch of naval forces on March 24th. These 
were indeed rushed out to the Caribbean in response to the sailing of 
a French squadron from Brest, 
(86) 
(itself intended to protect Saint 
Domingue from the British). As seen above, however, a West Indian 
offensive was already being planned in Whitehall and, with what means 
were available, was being put into effect. Undeniably, defensive and 
aggressive thinking are not easy to separate in this context, but quite 
plainly the Saint Domingue Propositions envisaged the colony's possible 
annexation. Addressing Parliament on April 25th, Pitt declared that 
the ministry's aim was to obtain 'indemnity for the past and security 
for the future'. 
(87) 
This could have meant the acquisition of Dunkirk 
but most obviously implied were the French West Indies. 'Success in 
that quarter', Dundas told Richmond in July, 'I consider of infinite 
moment both in humbling the power of France and with the view of en- 
larging our national wealth and security'. 
(88) 
Grenville's papers, 
too, show that in June and July the Government was looking to the West 
Indies for a war indemnity, and clearly had Saint Domingue in mind. 
(89) 
A note of qualification needs to be entered here, for it is generally 
forgotten that Britain's West India strategy centred not on Saint Domingue 
but on the Windward Islands. As the Propositions of Martinique and 
Guadeloupe stipulated restitution to France should the Bourbons regain 
the throne, it follows that Britain's opening moves in the Caribbean 
could not have been directed with any certitude towards territorial 
aggrandisement. Nevertheless, the Government specifically avoided 
any commitment to the exiled Bourbons and encouraged Spain to do 
likewise, and once the initial attack on Martinique failed in June 
the clause regarding restitution was dropped from the Propositions. 
When Sir Charles Grey eventually set sail in November, he was instructed 
that the reduction of some of the French islands would not only render 
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secure and enhance the value of the British West Indies but would also 
provide 'a just indemnification' of Britain's war costs. 
(90) 
This is not to say that Dundas was lying, when in later years he 
insisted it was 'a war for security' not 'a war for riches'. The 
defensive element, always present in Government thinking, became ever 
more important during the course of the war, especially once Emancipation 
became part of Republican policy. At the same time, hopes of profitable 
gains faded. In 1793, occupying enemy colonies for defensive reasons 
meant primarily reducing the possibility of a conventional naval attack. 
By 1794, however, it seemed much more a matter of preventing the French 
from freeing all their slaves and turning them against the British 
islands. Since such a threat would still exist were peace concluded 
with the Republic, annexation itself assumed a defensive aspect. In 
April 1794, Pitt informed the Society of West India Planters and Merchants 
that he intended to take and 'at any price' to retain after the war all 
the French West Indies, so as to prevent the spread of Republican 'anarchy' 
in the Caribbean. 
(91) 
In December, he used as an argument for continuing 
the war the fact that peace would entail the surrender of the French 
colonies to a 'government of anarchy, the horrors of which are even 
more dreadful than those of slavery'. 
(92Y 
Such reasoning, however, 
did not play a significant role in ministerial thinking at the outset 
of the war. Otherwise, the Government would have concentrated, not on 
the relatively undisturbed Windward Isles, but on strife-torn Saint 
Domingue. 
Similarly, considerations of economic warfare probably became 
more important as it became clear that the war would be a long one. 
At its outbreak, however, when French trade was already dislocated, 
it could not seriously be maintained that an aggressive West India 
strategy was designed mainly to weaken France's war effort. In 
April 1794, in fact, Dundas had to acknowledge that campaigns in 
Europe were more likely to bring about the Republic's downfall. 
(93) 
But was this a matter that Britain could much influence? 
Any justification of the Government's West India policy can only 
be 'counter-factual' and hence speculative. It seems reasonable, 
however, to suppose that Grey's 7,000 troops could not have made much 
difference to the war in Flanders, where the Duke of York already 
commanded over 34,000 men and the allies numbered 110,000. It is 
also questionable if they would have had much impact in the South of 
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France, where, one notes, the Austrians did not think it worthwhile 
to intervene. 
(94) 
Less certainly, one might further agree with 
Hawkesbury that they would have accomplished little in la Vend4e, 
particularly after the ley4e en masse. War policy, therefore, was 
a matter of means rather than ends, of choosing where British resources 
could be deployed to their greatest effect. Without doubt, the 
ministry's West Indian projects helped to ruin its ventures in Brittany 
and Toulon. It remains to be considered, however, if the demands of 
European strategy did not have an even more deleterious effect on the 
war in the Caribbean. 
(iii) Jamaica and Saint Domingue. It should be clear from the 
foregoing that British policy towards Saint Domingue, albeit half- 
hearted, was essentially aggressive and not inspired by fear for 
Jamaica's safety. That was largely a later development. Of the 
four regiments ordered to the Caribbean between December 1792 and 
February 1793, none was sent to Jamaica. The Government was not 
indifferent to the colony's security, but had already, before war was 
declared, taken what it thought adequate measures for its defence. 
Even before the slave revolt in Saint Domingue, Jamaica's garrison 
had been bolstered because of tense relations with Spain, and its 
crumbling fortifications were being repaired. Then, in response to 
the colonists' fears of the worsening situation across the windward 
Passage, and their agreement to pay for extra troops, another three 
regiments and a cavalry corps were moved to the island in the course 
of 1792. When war was declared, there were 3,000 soldiers in Jamaica. 
In five years, its garrison had almost doubled. 
(95) 
The matter is worth stressing, for the failure of Jamaica's slaves 
to follow the example of the 'Mingo nigra' they sang songs about is not 
easy to explain, especially in view of their rebellious past. Slave 
society in Jamaica, it is true, had become more creolized and therefore 
more stable, than in rapidly-growing Saint Domingue. However, historians 
have not hitherto appreciated that at this time Jamaica also experienced 
an unprecedentedly great influx of Africans, difficult to assimilate, 
even difficult to feed, which substantially changed the character of 
its society. In the decade following 1788, the process of creolization 
was interrupted by a wave of panic importing, sparked off by the campaign 
to abolish the slave trade. Demand for slaves was further increased by 
the revolution in Saint Domingue, which led to an expansion of the Jamaican 
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economy and also reduced the re-export trade. While retained slave 
imports averaged 5,662 p. a. in 1784-87, they rose to 10,596 p. a. in 
1789-91 and throughout the 1790's they averaged close to 12,000 p. a. 
In 1787,5,703 slaves were imported; in 1793,25,960. 
(96) 
It was 
doubtless important, therefore, and perhaps not accidental, that most 
of the new arrivals were Ibo and 'Congo', reputedly tractable peoples, 
many of them women and children. Imports of the more rebellious Gold 
Coast and Slave Coast negroes declined sharply in this period. 
(97) 
In Jamaica, of course, white society had not been shattered by 
the French Revolution as it had in Saint Domingue. Nevertheless, it 
was undermined vis a vis the slaves by the Abolitionist campaign in 
England, which was universally discussed in the colony, to many 
Jamaicans' alarm. Moreover, as in the French islands, it seems, 
Abolitionist tracts were communicated to the slaves by free coloureds. 
Early in 1791, a revolt flared up in the island of Dominica; British 
planters warned of a 'new Temper and Ideas' among their slaves. 
(98) 
There was no sign of rebellion in Jamaica, Williamson reported in July, 
but he would not like to predict, he said, what would happen if Parlia- 
ment passed an Abolition bill. 
(99) 
Hence, white Jamaica was fortunate 
that when the Plaine du Nord went up in flames in August it possessed 
a garrison of 2,000 soldiers. In Saint Domingue, the same number of 
troops faced twice as many slaves in a colony almost three times as 
large. 
The garish images of rebellion that filtered through from Cap 
Franjais in the autumn of 1791 must have seemed to the Jamaican 
planters like an enactment of their very worst nightmares - white 
captives hung from trees with hooks through their chins; men sawn in 
half; children impaled; women raped on the corpses of their husbands 
and fathers; hundreds of plantations ablaze. For the first time in 
nine years, the militia was called out. With ramshackle pomp, it 
drilled, paraded and patrolled throughout the winter and autumn. As 
it became clear the revolt could not quickly be put down, committees 
of security were established in every parish to examine evidence of 
sedition - one thinks of Revolutionary France and America - and the 
Assembly called for more troops, particularly cavalry. The purchase 
of gunpowder was made more difficult. Isolated cannon lying around 
the island were collected up. In the ports, new arrivals, at least 
in theory, were strictly vetted, and Spanish vagrants and French free 
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coloureds already in the colony were deported, if they could not find 
referees. On December 10th, martial law was declared for the duration 
of the Christmas holidays. 
(100) 
As a second line of defence, the slave laws received some minor 
ameliorations, following up the reforms of 1788. Grenville, when Home 
Secretary, had already urged that the slaves' lot be improved, and Dundas, 
his successor, could not resist pointing out that propaganda was by no 
means the most obvious explanation of the revolt in Saint Domingue. 
(101) 
As soon as the Assembly met in October, we find Effingham suggesting 
with both tact and discretion that something might be done for those 
'who do not wilfully reject the happiness you offer them'. The Council 
concurred, no less discreetly, and the Assembly replied with magnanimity 
it would continue to make 'more secure and easy' the life of 'the most 
defenceless part of the community'. 
(102) 
However, it was not till 
March 1792, when tension had considerably lessened, one notes, that 
the necessary amendments were made. 
Another sensitive area in imperial relations that was spotlighted 
by the crisis was the question of the payment for troops. In Britain, 
where the rising price of sugar made the British planters increasingly 
unpopular, the Jamaican demand for additional forces was attacked in 
the press. 
(103) 
The Government's refusal to pay for reinforcing the 
garrison, along with its decision to restrict sugar re-exports and permit 
foreign competition, was bitterly resented by West Indians. Both the 
Society of Merchants and Planters in London and the Assembly in Jamaica 
insisted that they were entitled to protection free of charge like other 
British subjects. 
(104) 
The Assembly at first tried to have the troops 
and avoid pledging payment. The Governor refused. Then, under 
pressure from taxpayers for retrenchment, it decided to take only a 
corps of dragoons. In May, however, having heard that the whites of 
Saint Marc had been murdered in their beds, it agreed to take three 
regiments and pay for them if forced to. 
(105) 
Not only between colony and metropole was friction increased by 
the Saint Domingue crisis, but also within Jamaican society itself. 
As at le Cap, those with no stake in the plantation system showed 
little enthusiasm for defending it. Poor whites complained they could 
not afford uniforms and arms to serve in the militia. When a rumour 
circulated that the Assembly was going to introduce corporal punishment 
into the militia, the Kingston company rioted. 
(106) 
The Assembly became 
considerably more unpopular when it increased taxation to pay for extra 
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troops. In several parishes, perhaps the majority, smallholders met 
to decry its 'extravagance' and petitioned for its dissolution. 
(107) 
They had less property to protect and less money to spend than the 
sugar planters of the legislature, and may have lived in upland areas 
where cavalry were of little use. 
The reaction of the slaves is more difficult to assess. While 
individual planters were known to cover up or lie about plots that 
involved their own slaves, it was of general concern to the plantocracy 
to present a picture of peace and internal security to its metropolitan 
creditors, on whom it relied so much. The Island Agent in London was 
instructed by the Assembly not to allow any expression of danger to get 
into the British newspapers. On the other hand, many of the alarming 
stories that circulated were found by the committees of security to be 
exaggerated or baseless. 
(108) 
One thing is certain. As soon as news 
from Saint Domingue reached Jamaica, it spread immediately among the 
slave population. As early as 18th September, Williamson was writing; 
'Many slaves here are very inquisitive and intelligent, and 
are immediately informed of every kind of news that arrives. 
I do not hear of their having shewn any signs of revolt, though 
they have composed songs of the negroes having made a rebellion 
at Hispaniola with their usual chorus to it; and I have not a 
doubt but there are numbers who are ripe for any mischief and 
whenever any insurrection begins it will be... on the North side 
of the islandt. 
(109) 
By early November, Williamson thought perhaps the slaves were now 
tending to be 'insolent' but felt sure all was well. In Clarendon 
parish, 'head negroes' had been overheard talking of destroying the 
whites and dividing up their land. 'Negroes in the French country', 
they said, 'were men', and they hoped the Jamaican slaves, too, would 
rebel. Interestingly, they were arrested but then discharged, as it 
was thought best not to make a fuss. Clearly this was talking rather 
than plotting. In Westmoreland, it was said, 3,000 blacks, provided 
with alcohol, gathered to celebrate Wilberforce's birthday, but were 
peaceably persuaded to disperse. 
(110) 
It was. in the course of November that alarm began to spread among 
the whites. The slaves were now, someone wrote from Kingston, 'so 
different a people from what they were... I am convinced the Ideas of 
Liberty have sunk so deep in the Minds of all Negroes, that whenever 
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the greatest precautions are not taken they will rise'. The fate of 
Saint Domingue, he thought, would probably decide their conduct. 
(111) 
Much significance was attached to the fact that the wealthier, more 
industrious slaves, those who took greatest care of their gardens, 
suddenly neglected them. More specifically alarming, blacksmiths 
were said to have made cutlasses in the dinner break, and on the 
Fairfield plantation lead shot was cast in the forge, when the whites 
were on militia duty. Elsewhere, hidden cartridges were found. Large 
quantities of powder, it seems, were purchased by black or Spanish 
pedlars. Several whites were warned by slaves that a rebellion was 
planned. Various slaves reported hearing talk about weapons and 
rebellion, often among the Coromantees. One 'daring and desperate 
spirit', a Coromantee ten years in Jamaica, 'acute' and 'sensible', 
confessed that a revolt was planned for Christmas but that if prevented 
it would take place after crop time, when the ships had left. He had 
intended to join in, he said, because they were his people. He was 
astonished, however, to see the Maroons join the whites when the militia 
was mustered. 
(112) 
At least one band of runaways, nonetheless, decided at this time 
to begin attacking the whites. Led by Brutus, an escapee from the 
work house, it was 18 strong and had been living in symbiosis with the 
slaves of the Brampton Brian estate in Trelawny, trading with them, 
attending their dances and possessing wives on the plantation. The 
slaves on the estate, moreover, now threatened to join Brutus if their 
master did not return and replace their cruel overseer. However, before 
there was any violence, Brutus was captured by the militia in January. 
(113) 
There would seem small doubt that Jamaica came far closer to a slave 
revolt in 1791 than anyone has previously realised. Yet, nothing 
happened. It must be said there is little evidence of panic amongst 
the whites. Some scoffed at talk of rebellion. In Trelawny, the 
planters suspended their committee of security, (foolishly, thought the 
committee in Saint James). Williamson always remained sanguine, at 
least in his correspondence, confident that the measures taken would 
cure any thought of revolt. This, it seems, is what happened. The 
Christmas holiday was the crucial test, since the slaves, as the Governor 
put it, 'may be said to be at full liberty and many of them the whole 
time in a state of intoxication'. 
(114) 
It was precisely then, however, 
that the militia turned out, over 8,000 strong with 1,000 cavalry. 
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Together with the garrison, and the Maroons, and slaves willing to 
give evidence of conspiracies, they surely made the potential rebels 
think twice. Their moment passed. Another regiment arrived in 
February and three more in the autumn. Having survived into the 
New Year, white Jamaica heaved a sigh of relief. In January 1792, 
Williamson was writing with satisfaction that the slaves were peaceful 
and wondering why the whites were so busy. 
(115) 
Although the situation 
in Saint Domingue was to worsen, serious doubts were no longer enter- 
tained as to the safety of Jamaica. The success of the Abolition bill 
in April caused no more than some swaggering on the part of the blacks 
in Kingston. A growing influx of slaves from Saint Domingue, brought 
in mainly by refugees, certainly disturbed 'people who remembered the 
years 1760 and 1765' but, speaking no English, they had no communication 
with the Jamaican slaves. Some, in fact, did speak English but this 
proved of no significance. 
Terrifying or simply disturbing for the whites of Jamaica, the 
revolution in Saint Domingue was in any case the subject of mixed 
feelings. With regard to the anti-slavery lobby in England, it 
essentially strengthened the plantocracy, which was able to argue both 
that the 'wild and enthusiastic doctrines' of the Abolitionists led to 
revolution and that slavery in Jamaica was a beneficent institution. 
The revolt, therefore, and its failure to spread to Jamaica gave cause 
for some self-congratulation, which is evinced in the Addresses of the 
Assembly. 
(116) 
Rather more tangibly, the destruction of its rival 
meant high prices for Jamaican produce and overnight its ailing economy 
became once more prosperous. The disruption of French trade had already, 
in fact, brought beneficial results, for at the beginning of the year 
merchants all over Europe had placed large orders for British sugar, 
shrewdly anticipating misfortune in the French islands. Governor 
Effingham had then remarked that 'as a man' he lamented the situation 
in Saint Domingue, but as an Englishman' he rejoiced. 
(117) 
How did the Jamaicans now react to the Dominguan planters' appeals 
for aid? Not surprisingly, Effingham refused to part with any troops. 
The quantity of guns and ammunition he sent, some writers have thought 
deliberately meagre but this seems unjustified. The Governor did what 
he could. Like Admiral Affleck, who commanded the ships he sent to 
le Cap and Port au Prince, he seems to have considered the French planters' 
predicament 'a Common cause and very alarming to us their neighbours'. 
(118) 
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The Assembly apparently agreed. 'Sympathising most feelingly with 
(its unfortunate neighbours', it thanked the Governor for sending arms. 
Although commercially they had gained a 'temporary advantage', the 
planters complained that, 'the tenure both of our properties and lives 
is precarious while our slaves have such a precedent of the triumph of 
savage anarchy '. 
(119) 
Some, nevertheless, sympathised more feelingly than others. 
Effingham suggested, in private, that the Assembly ought to give 
financial assistance to the Dominguans, as the House of Commons had 
done to the victims of the Lisbon earthquake. 
(120) 
A committee chaired 
by Bryan Edwards recommended that a loan of £100,000 be granted to the 
colonial assembly at le Cap out of public funds. This, however, was 
decisively rejected. So, too, was a subsequent proposal, by 18 votes 
to 9, to lend £10,000. The chances of repayment were slim. However, 
in February the Assembly voted 20 to 5 to allow £10,000 worth of supplies 
to be exchanged for bills drawn by the Intendant of Saint Domingue on 
the French Treasury and made payable in London. Even though the trans- 
action made good business sense, it aroused considerable opposition 
both at the grass roots and from the Governor's Council. At the parish 
meetings mentioned above, smallholders protested that their taxes were 
being 'wantonly' increased for the benefit of foreigners. Jamaica's 
coffee planters were the main beneficiaries of Saint Domingue's collapse 
but there is little to suggest that they were behind this movement, 
which was probably less machiavellian and xenophobic than simply anti- 
government. Edwards denounced its protagonists as 'characters... 
having neither property nor reputation to lose', trying to act as a 
Fourth Estate, 'never so happy as in times of public confusion'. The 
voice of the plantocracy, he spoke of 'sound policy', 'true humanity' 
and 'our sister colony'. The whole Assembly, he said, believed that 
Jamaica's fate was bound up with that of Saint Domingue. Even if the 
bills proved worthless, it would be £10,000 well spent. 
The Council, however, influenced by Williamson, now become Governor, 
disallowed the measure, as it 'deeply implicated national with colonial 
policy', was not justified by 'State expediency' and lay outside the 
scope of the Assembly's powers. This created uproar among the Assemblymen, 
always sensitive on such issues. Unanimously, they declared the Council's 
intervention 'officious, indecent, assuming and irregular, derogatory to 
the honour and injurious to the privileges of this House'. Somewhat 
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unfairly, they attributed it to 'that odious and secret exaltation 
at the misfortune of a colony whose disastrous situation may [yetj 
be our own'. 
(122) 
Williamson prorogued the Assembly but it would 
not back down and, as the Council had acted unconstitutionally, he 
finally had to give way. Ironically, the Dominguans then decided 
that they did not need a loan. 
When the Assembly met for the new session in October 1792, it 
was able to congratulate itself on the peaceful and prosperous state 
of the island. Within a month, however, it again had cause for alarm. 
A number of Kingston free coloureds petitioned that certain of their 
legal disabilities be removed. Occurring just when the mulattoes 
were beginning to dominate affairs in Saint Domingue, the movement 
had a sinister appearance. George Hibbert, the merchant, called the 
petition a 'germ of evil'. Its demands, however, were mild and its 
protagonists, elders of the Methodist church, had requested Assemblyman 
Henry Shirley(123)to put forward their case. He refused. Leading 
white Jamaicans seem to have agreed that the mulattoes' complaints 
were just and needed redress but that any concessions at that moment 
might encourage them to try and exact full political equality by 
leading the slaves to revolt. The richest of the free coloureds, 
they were pleased to note, opposed the petition. The episode had 
no sequel but left the whites the more uneasy about developments in 
Saint Domingue. 
(124) 
The slave revolution, as we have seen, evoked from the Jamaican 
planters a show of class solidarity with their commercial rivals in 
Saint Domingue, which cut across the political divide and somewhat 
increased class tensions in white Jamaica. The two colonies also 
grew closer together in other ways in this period. Refugees from 
Saint Domingue began to arrive in Kingston in September 1791. A 
great deal of money was also transferred there. By April 1792, 
after a sudden influx from the West Province, there were as many 
French in the capital as British. 
(125) 
Most returned during the 
next 12 months, but the onset of war brought an even greater flood - 
refugees, P. O. W. 's, envoys from Europe and hundreds of luckless 
individuals who tried to flee to the U. S. but were captured by Jamaican 
privateers. Plantation society was hospitable. Some of the French 
found jobs; a great many were supported by individual acts of charity 
by a public subscription. Henry Shirley entertained numerous Dominguans 
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of all political persuasions, just as de Charmilly in London was 
introduced to the Society of Merchants and Planters. As a result, 
many new friendships were formed. 
(126) 
Commercial links between the two colonies also grew stronger, as 
the French trade laws were increasingly ignored during the Revolution. 
Jamaican merchants had long supplied southern Saint Domingue with slaves 
and manufactured goods; according to some, they were responsible for its 
development. 
(127) 
Dominguan cotton, mainly from the Artibonite, was 
much sought after and since 1787 could be legally imported into Jamaica. 
In September 1792,200,000 lbs. were sold in one day. 
(128) 
Among the 
main figures involved in the intercolonial trade was Alexandre Lindo, 
a Jewish merchant with partnerships in Kingston and London. Active 
in the slave trade, particularly the slave re-export trade, and a friend 
of de Charmilly, he was accustomed to discounting French commercial paper 
and had supplied ammunition and food to the Assembly of the West. 
(129) 
Equally prominent, was Alexander Donaldson, who held the contract to 
supply provisions to the island garrison and also traded with Cuba. He 
and fellow Scot Alexander Forbes were members of a British company actually 
established in Port au Prince, which was concerned largely with cotton. 
Its principal partner, James Grant Forbes, was imprisoned there in 
November 1793. In Kingston, Alexander Forbes was closely connected 
with the refugee community and, along with Shirley, helped set up and 
administer the public fund for its support. 
(130) 
With the outbreak of war, Jamaica had again to face the question 
of direct aid to Saint Domingue, although this time the implications 
were more heavy than in 1791. Any attempt to restore order might now 
lead to the incorporation of Saint Domingue into the British Empire, and 
as a direct competitor the French colony would ruin Jamaica. In addition, 
the removal of troops would increase the island's vulnerability to attack 
at a time when French P. O. W. 's were crowding into the capital. The 
pontoons were overflowing and in May there was a partially successful 
break-out from Bath prison. Republican prisoners on parole in Kingston 
donned swords and cockades and proved disturbingly fond of singing Ca 
Ira. 
ý131) Furthermore, though the slaves remained quiet, imports from 
Africa continued to rise. In the 12 months before July, more than 
23,000 were imported. In Clarendon parish, there were over twice as 
many new Africans as in any previous year. As a result of this great 
influx of whites and blacks, the early summer brought an acute shortage 
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of foodstuffs, and when the maize crop failed, famine and possible 
revolt were feared. 
(132) 
At the same time, however, defensive arguments for pre-emptive 
intervention were stronger than ever. Williamson reported in April 
that rumours of a general emancipation in Saint Domingue made it very 
much in the Jamaican planters' interest to do all they could to halt 
the revolution. 
(133) 
In June, we find Henry Shirley and other wealthy 
colonists providing and fitting out a ship to carry a group of refugees 
to join the Spanish forces then invading Saint Domingue. They wanted 
to see order restored as soon as possible - before, perhaps, Britain 
could get involved. Whatever their motives, Governor Williamson sent 
along a naval escort, and he, awaiting instructions from Whitehall, was 
eager to see Britain intervene. Many West Indians clearly regarded 
helping the Dominguans as helping themselves. One of the subscribers 
to the refugees' relief fund signed himself 'An enemy to Anarchy' . 
(134) 
The pernicious 'doctrine of Equality' must be stamped out, wrote a 
Scots merchant from Dominica, and 'the brave and generous French 
royalists' saved. 
(135) 
Having lived in Guadeloupe, however, before 
the Revolution, he went on to plead for 'the lives and properties of 
the British subjects' in the French colonies. For merchants in the 
intercolonial trade, defence was not the only issue. British connections 
with the Windward Islands were doubtless more extensive than with Saint 
Domingue but the Jamaican merchants certainly had good reason for wanting 
peace restored among their French neighbours. The slave revolt had 
ruined the slave re-export trade, not only because the Dominguans 
stopped buying slaves but also because the Spaniards, instead of coming 
to Kingston, could now purchase them 'dog cheap' from the French. 
(136) 
Saint Domingue continued to buy dry goods from Jamaica but otherwise 
its planters insisted on dollars in return for their cotton. Since 
the Spaniards ceased trading in Jamaica, dollars became extremely 
scarce. Moreover, once war was declared, all trade with Saint Domingue 
was disrupted by the Royal Navy, and merchants like Lindo and Donaldson 
found their cargoes seized even if carried by neutral vessels. 
(137) 
On the other hand, if stability returned to the colony, Jamaica's 
merchants could expect to drive a thriving trade restocking and re- 
furbishing its plantations. 
Another interest group happy to see Britain move into Saint Domingue, 
were the civilian officials. Often merchants themselves, it was they 
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who would staff the Customs and administration of an occupied colony. 
The Island Secretary and Agent-General, George Atkinson, was to decline 
the post of Agent-General for the Saint Domingue expedition, as he 
thought Martinique would be a richer plum. Nonetheless, he left hot- 
foot for London and offered his services in financing the occupation. 
(138) 
More generally, any Jamaicans who wanted to remove from their midst the 
rapidly-growing body of refugees, becoming both a financial burden and 
a health hazard, may also have favoured intervention in Saint Domingue. 
When de Charmilly arrived on July 21st, therefore, Williamson faced 
a difficult problem - refugees clamouring for intervention, Jamaicans 
distinctly ambivalent; the chance of an imperial coup de main of 
gigantic importance but scant means to carry it out. His troops 
lacked ammunition and provisions and possessed neither tents nor trench- 
tools. Even worse, there were only two frigates on the Jamaica Station. 
At Saint Domingue, there were four and a ship of the line. Williamson 
proposed an expedition but the Station Commodore vetoed the idea as 
unsafe. De Charmilly was furious and felt he had been misled. 
(139) 
The contemporary picture of Britain as a maritime colossus whose fleets 
and armies would storm through the Caribbean 
(140) 
was ironically un- 
realistic. Only more ironic was the unseaworthiness of the French 
man of war that the Commodore feared and which scarcely dared leave 
port in case it met a British ship. Similarly, the Spaniards in 
Santo Domingo, whose supposedly huge land forces caused great alarm 
to the British and Republicans, were paralysed by fear of overextending 
themselves. 
(141) 
Only because the French squadron dispersed in the 
course of July and August, did the Saint Domingue expedition become 
possible. 
At the same time, pressure for intervention mounted. After the 
burning of le Cap, Sonthonax moved swiftly towards freeing all Saint 
Domingue's slaves. He had 'diabolical' designs on Jamaica, it seemed. 
The spectre of black revolt, allied to a hostile European power with 
its resources of guns and ships, now achieved a new dimension. Dominguan 
privateers, furthermore, began attacking Jamaican shipping. A force of 500/ 
600 troops was put together and on September 9th they set sail for 
J4rdmie. Many prominent Jamaicans were unhappy to see them go. The 
Assembly approved but was uneasy about the strength of the garrison. 
Within one or two months, however, having reflected, as Williamson said, 
that it probably meant the salvation of Jamaica, the planters were 
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'perfectly content'. 
(142) 
Reconciled, he meant, to one horn of their 
dilemma rather than the other. The colony's future and that of Saint 
Domingue seemed to hang in the balance. 'It was', as James has re- 
marked, 'a crucial moment in world history'. 
(143) 
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CHAPTER V. THE IMPACT OF BRITISH INTERVENTION: WAR AND POLITICS IN 
THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION. 
(i) Saint Domingue in 1793. According to Sir John Fortescue, 
the decision to intervene in the French West Indies was a rash one. 
British forces, he said, would have to fight not only the French but 
also the climate and 'the entire negro population, which the Revolution 
had summoned to its aid'. 
(1) 
In his dislike of all things West 
Indian, 
(2) 
however, Fortescue failed to appreciate either the immense 
value of Saint Domingue or its extreme vulnerability at this time. 
Few governments could have resisted the temptation presented to Pitt 
and Dundas in February 1793. 
The high mortality of European troops in the West Indies was not 
unknown to the British ministers, 
(3)but 
as their initial plans centred 
on the use of French colonists and of soldiers already stationed in 
the Caribbean, and as they were not intending to send out forces from 
Europe till the end of the sickly season, the issue was not immediately 
relevant. There is also reason to believe that later British losses 
in the colony were not entirely forseeable. Moreover, the stakes were 
high, and in a less sensitive age of low life expectancy, when government 
was not responsible to the masses from whom troops were drawn, statesmen 
were less likely to quibble at the cost of a successful campaign. 
(4) 
Hopes for success, indeed, - were not without foundation. Fortescue 
was quite wrong to claim the Republicans could muster in mid-1793 
6,000 regular troops, and 14,000 white militia as well as 5,000 
'desperate ruffians' of all colours. He had misread Bryan Edwards' 
calculations, which were themselves erroneous. Saint Domingue's 
white militia scarcely ever totalled half the amount stated and, by 
mid-1793, three-quarters of the whites had emigrated. 
(5) 
If at most 
3,500 of the troops and National Guards sent from France were still 
alive, half were sick and many ready to desert to the Counter-Revo- 
lution. 
(6) 
Most of them, moreover, were concentrated in the North. 
French soldiers in the South, even as early as January had been reduced 
to 700 fit, 
(7)while 
at Port au Prince the Artois batallion numbered only 
320,100 of whom were hospitalized. 
(8) 
By early 1793, the Civil 
Commissioners had not yet extended their rule outside the North Province 
but had already alienated most white colonists, so that very few were 
willing to oppose foreign intervention and large numbers, as already 
seen, actively favoured it. 
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Fortescue likewise overestimated the likelihood of black resis- 
tance. In the opening months of 1793, the slave rebellion in Saint 
Domingue came very close to being extinguished. La Tannerie and les 
Platons, the central strongholds of slave resistance in the North and 
South, both fell with surprising ease. In November 1792, the northern 
rebels were routed in the plain, while in January, Laveaux, after losing 
a good campaigning month through political strife, drove them from almost 
all their camps in the mountains. 
(9) 
Abandoned by their mulatto allies, 
split by factional quarrels, starving and shut up behind the double 
mountains of Valliýre, their situation was desperate. Thousands 
surrendered. Others fled to Santo Domingo only to be handed back to 
their masters or kept as slaves by the Spaniards. 
(10) 
Throughout the West and South Provinces, the north-west and perhaps 
the north-east, too, the majority of the slaves had remained on their 
plantations, while thousands more were now returning to the devastated 
estates around le Cap and les Cayes. 
(11) 
Some had gained an extra 
free day per week. Leading agitators had been freed. Significantly, 
though, these then became gendarmes who helped police the regime. All 
in all, they were far more likely to fight for their masters than against 
them. In the Artibonite region, for example, we find at this time that 
most planters had returned to supervise their properties, if indeed they 
had ever left them, and were looking forward to better days. 
(12) 
The 
plantation regime had been shaken and undoubtedly weakened but Saint 
Domingue was still very much a slave colony. Hence, when the British 
government decided to intervene, circumstances were unusually pro- 
pitious. All would depend on the speed and effectiveness of British 
action. 
However, in the eight months before British troops set foot in 
the colony, the situation was to develop dramatically. Two funda- 
mental social changes took place, largely, though not entirely, under 
the impetus of the threat of foreign intervention. Firstly, as the 
Republican Commissioners strove to stamp out the counter-revolution 
and extend their rule towards the tip of the southern peninsula, they 
effectively destroyed the remains of white power in Saint Domingue, 
transferring it to their mulatto allies. Simultaneously, the enormous 
latent power of the blacks, as potential rivals to the mulattoes and 
successors to the whites, was felt for the first time. British inter- 
vention in la Grand'Anse was to check the first of these developments 
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at the eleventh hour, and the occupation can be viewed as an extended 
attempt to reverse its progress. Paradoxically, however, Britain's 
efforts to save the slave regime in Saint Domingue may have been a 
major factor in bringing about its destruction. 
Nonetheless, to depict this deterioration of British prospects 
as being determined entirely by the threat of intervention itself, 
i. e. dialectically, would be as inaccurate as to claim that the failure 
of intervention was implicit in the situation existing before war was 
declared. 
Obviously, the elimination of anti-Republican elements and the 
transfer of public office from whites to coloureds was well under way 
by the end of 1792 and was likely to continue, war or no war. On the 
other hand, it was doubtless the prospect of foreign assistance that 
inspired the colonists to attempt the ill-fated 'coups' that led to 
the mass exodus from le Cap in June and the massacre of whites at les 
Cayes in July, just as the fear of a fifth column made the Commissioners 
completely intolerant of any white in a position of power. 
Similarly, even if the slave revolt had finally been extinguished 
in the North, the smouldering discontent in the mountains of the West 
and the insurrection that broke out in the Cul de Sac region in 
January, 
(13) 
showed that slave unrest was not at an end. At the same 
time, though, this insurrection was not really aimed at destroying 
slavery but was another instance of the blacks being embroiled (not 
unwillingly, of course) in the mulatto/white conflict and taking 
advantage of it. They returned to work in May, after gaining certain 
concessions. It is significant, however, that the previous month 
a plantation manager had observed that, '1'insurrection actuelle est 
bien diff4rente que Gelles que nous avons essuy4es. Its ne connaissent 
plus personne et on ne peut les faire rentrer dans fordre qu'ä coups 
(14) 
de canons. 
Above all, one cannot be sure, despite a floridly embellished 
piece of dialectic in The Black Jacobins, 
(15) 
that it was the outbreak 
of war that saved the revolt in the North. C. L. R. James claims that 
Laveaux's campaign against the rebels was cut short by his being re- 
called to defend the coast against the threat of invasion. This is 
yet to be proven. More probably, illness forced Laveaux to return 
to le Cap (on February 12th )(16)and local political problems and a 
subsequent order from Sonthonax (on March 10th )(17)kept him there. 
As he was also said to be losing over 20 men per day through disease, 
(18) 
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it may be his campaign, like so many in the West Indies, was defeated 
by the climate, - an ominous portent for those about to intervene. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the onset of war transformed 
the situation of not only the veteran warriors in the North but also 
that of all the blacks in Saint Domingue. It is striking that, as 
soon as war was declared, all parties immediately looked to the slaves 
for assistance. In February, the French and Spanish governments both 
instructed their representatives to enlist the support of the black 
rebels. 
(19) 
Simultaneously, Sonthonax requested permission from Paris 
to institute un nouveau regime on the plantations and by March had 
called off Laveaux and was making overtures to the insurgents -a fact 
Garran-Coulon did not realise or tried to cover up. 
(20) 
Royalist 
planters fleeing Saint Domingue urged the Spaniards to forestall 
Republican offers by winning over the rebels, while colonists in 
London assured the government their slaves were eager to serve the 
Counter-Revolution and kill mulattoes. 
(21) 
One notes straightaway 
the broader frame of reference of Sonthonax's proposals. He was 
clearly not unhappy in being forced into helping the slaves. Certainly, 
once he had lost the competition with Spain to win over the principal 
black chiefs, he was compelled to turn increasingly to the black masses 
in general to prop up Republican rule - liberalizing the plantation 
regime; freeing and forming into Legions slaves who had fought in 
the civil wars; offering rebel bands the sack of le Cap and, ultimately, 
when an English invasion was imminent, declaring General Emancipation 
on August 29 . Meanwhile, the starving rebels of Valliere had been 
transformed into uniformed troops of the king of Spain and free men. 
These events inevitably gave the blacks a new sense of their 
power and of their rights. Liberty, hitherto a distant ideal for 
all but a militant minority, was suddenly theirs. The Spaniards 
and the Republicans soon found they had bitten off more than they 
could chew. Their new black troops were quick to see the weakness 
of their white allies and proved dangerously unruly. 
(22) 
Plantation 
work seems often to have ceased. Rebellions multiplied. 
(23) 
Thus, between January and September 1793 British prospects of 
successful intervention in Saint Domingue were considerably reduced. 
The counter-revolutionary forces with whom the invaders hoped to link 
up were scattered. Coustard and de Jumecourt were imprisoned; 
Fontanges fled to Santo Domingo; de Coigne was murdered. Innumerable 
potential allies took flight or were deported; many thousands left 
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le Cap alone. Most would never return. Command of the North and 
West Provinces and much of the northern littoral passed into the hands 
of mulattoes, devoted to the Republic but even more so to establishing 
the supremacy of their caste. The plantation regime had been criti- 
cally undermined and slavery actually abolished. Great tracts of the 
countryside were abandoned to the blacks and much of the plain of Cul 
de Sac and the surrounding mountains had been desolated. 
(24) 
In the 
mornes dominating Port au Prince, Pompe and Dieudonn4 rose to pro- 
minence, leaders later to give the British much trouble, while in the 
North the black troops of Toussaint Louverture were exchanging their 
machetes and lances for rifles. 
(25) 
As the Spaniards prepared to conquer the colony with an army of 
ex-slaves and the Republicans swallowed up such potential bridgeheads 
for British troops as Jacmel, Dame Marie and de Charmilly's parish, 
Cavaillon, one can well understand the frantic tone of colonists' pleas 
to the British government in these months. On 31st July, in anger 
and frustration, de Charmilly declared to Home Secretary Dundas, 
'England has lost one of those happy moments that rarely offer'. 
(26) 
Not all was lost, however. Malouet's secretary, Duban, argued 
that British prospects had even improved. 
(27) 
France's alienation 
of the whites, he said, now ruled out any resistance from them, while 
the-powerful French naval squadron that arrived off Saint Domingue in 
May had finally dispersed - and this was the sine qua non of any exped- 
ition leaving Jamaica. The blacks in the South and West, Duban and 
others claimed, were still loyal to their masters and sworn enemies 
of the Commissioners and free coloureds. Certainly, almost all the 
rebel chiefs, from Grand Amiral Jean Franjois to Jean Pineau of les 
Crochus, proved hostile to the Republicans and curiously favourable 
to the Royalists. Conversely, the fact that Polverel was able to 
imprison Hyacinthe and Guiambois, leaders of the Cul de Sac and 
Artibonite slaves, 
(28) 
shows that the ascendancy of the whites did not 
vanish overnight. Edwards' much-quoted statement that some 100,000 
blacks took to the hills at this time and formed 'a sort of savage 
republick' is clearly fanciful and was rightly ridiculed by de 
Charmilly. 
(29) 
Plantation society, in fact, was to prove surprisingly 
durable both where the Emancipation decree was carried out and where 
the planter class managed to resist it. Workforces held together 
as social units even when work was abandoned, while in many areas 
(30) 
production was continued or resumed. 
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Fortunately for the English, the mulatto ruling group was split 
on the subject of Emancipation. A wedge was thus driven between the 
Commissioners and many of their coloured supporters. It was a fatal 
dilemma for this classically unstable class. The Republic had 
guaranteed their civil rights but now took away their property and 
offended their prejudices. It was less than nine months since the 
conservative mulattoes of Saint Marc and Arcahaye had deserted their 
Royalist allies and swung over to the Republicans. 
(31) 
Even the more 
radical coloureds had been noticeably opposed to Sonthonax's increasing 
reliance on the blacks. 
(32) 
From the earliest days of the slave revolt, 
military men had insisted the whites could not win without the help of 
coloured troops inured to the terrain and climate. 
(33) 
Given the 
disastrous susceptibility the French and Spanish soldiers had shown 
to local fevers, 
(34) 
there was clearly much truth in this. Here, then, 
was a vital opportunity for the British invaders. 
(ii) Early successes. Amid 21 gun salutes and shouts of Vivent' 'cQ, M 
les Anglais, Colonel Whitelocke's 600 redcoats d, barked in the tiny 
port of J4r4mie on September 20 .A banquet was given, black cockades 
were worn, and even a song was specially composed, in their honour. 
(35) 
The British occupation got off to a good start. Anticipating White- 
locke's arrival, the commander of the army of la Grand'Anse, Morin 
Duval, had retaken the strategic Irois/Dame Marie region that had 
surrendered to Rigaud shortly before. He was just in time to avert 
a rebellion among its 12,000 slaves. A few days later, the commander 
at Tiburon, the Chevalier de Sevr6, a local creole, deserted the 
Republicans and took the oath to George 111. 
(36) 
Hundreds of 
colonists now flocked into the paroisses unies from Jamaica, Port au 
Prince and from the mulatto-dominated south coast. The population 
doubled in a month and soon quadrupled. 
(37) 
By mid-November, when 
colonists began returning from the U. S., Morin Duval had 800 men at 
Irois, while another 1,600 were divided between four camps guarding 
the southern and eastern approaches to the jumble of hills and valleys 
that make up la Grand'Anse. Not all were colonists. Many were 
servants, since the planters liked to live well, or poor 6migr6s 
arrived from Europe, or the survivors of French regiments, whom 
Montalembert began to organise into a Legion. 
(38) 
Some 280 were 
ex-slaves led by the much feared and very able Jean Kina. The. 
British, however, to the colonists' dismay, remained in garrison in 
salubrious Jer4mie. 
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, they attempted a landing at Tiburon but were On October 4th 
driven off from the beach by unexpectedly heavy musket fire, losing 
two men. Though they had been misled as to the enemy's strength, 
the British quite unfairly blamed Duval's colonial troops for failing 
to coordinate with their movements. 
(39) 
The seeds of mutual dis- 
illusion were sown early. Indeed, the Navy's high-handed (if legal) 
seizure of shipping anchored near Irois on September 23rd had created 
uproar at Whitelocke's first meeting of the Conseil de Süret4. 
Nevertheless, he managed to dispel the appearance of treachery 
(40) 
and, with the prospect of reinforcements arriving in November, re- 
lations remained harmonious. 
In his opening proclamation, Whitelocke assured the colonists 
that the small size of his army was deliberately designed to test their 
goodwill before he proceeded with greater force to conquer the colony. 
He stressed the need for unity, as did publicists of all parties 
throughout this most factionalised of revolutions, and emphasised that 
a colony must be subordinate to its mother country. On the other hand, 
the colonists could make local laws and supervise financial matters. 
They were promised protection, faveurs et avantages and help in re- 
covering property in foreign hands. Their enemies were to be punished. 
(41) 
The Grand'Anse was a valuable gain but, in British eyes, the great 
military success of 1793 was the surrender of the Mole Saint Nicholas 
to a nominal force on September 22nd It was announced to the British 
public by the cannon of the Tower of London. One of the strongest 
naval stations in the New World, its fall brought into British hands 
a huge quantity of stores and artillery and a fine natural harbour; 
also 149 men of Dillon's Irish Regiment. Surrounded by arid semi- 
desert, it relied for foodstuffs on the hamlet of Bombarde ten miles 
away, whose inhabitants, mainly German settlers, signed the Capitulation 
. Like the populace of 
the Mole, however, their loyalty on the 26th 
remained uncertain, especially as no troops were available to garrison 
the place. 'The State of the People's minds', warned the local British 
commander, 'requires that no difficulties should appear among us'. He 
feared an attempt to blow up the powder magazine and said a garrison of 
500 British soldiers was needed. To his embarrassment, refugees began 
to pour into the tiny bourg expecting assistance or employment. 
(42) 
The occupation of the Mole infuriated Britain's allies, the 
Spaniards, whose plans to conquer Saint Domingue were similarly being 
hampered by lack of troops. Their renewal of activity towards December 
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probably accounts for the second spate of overtures to the British, 
though news of the fall of Toulon and Sonthonax's increasing reliance 
on the blacks had anyway powerfully abetted British propaganda. Despite 
the arrival in October of 200 more soldiers from Jamaica, 
(43) 
the 
shortage of troops became critical and more embarrassing than ever. 
None could be spared for the areas now clamouring for protection. At 
Gonaives, the three officers who had gone alone to administer the oath 
of allegiance to the inhabitants found the Spanish flag flying and 'a 
Negroe, who they called the Spanish general, commanding the place'. 
Known as 'Tusan', he offered to withdraw his forces, but the three men 
felt obliged to decline... 
(44) 
All three of the Artibonite parishes, 
although they had sent deputies who had signed the Capitulation at the 
Mole, thus slipped out of British hands. Were it not for Toussaint's 
hesitation, Saint Marc also would have become Spanish. 
However, once Savary's faction was overthrown, 
(45) 
the commander 
of the Mole scraped together 50 men to send to Saint Marc under Brevet 
Major Brisbane along with the remnants of Dillon's Regiment, now de- 
pleted through desertion. Arriving on the 18 
th December, they had a 
tense moment when the 130 French troops in the town, drawn up opposite 
them on the main square, refused to surrender their arms. At gun- 
point, they were forced on board a ship and at least 80 eventually took 
the oath of allegiance. 
(46) 
The principal factieux were arrested and 
some of them, according to an unofficial source, 'mis a mort'. 
(47) 
In the town and neighbouring districts 1,138 civilians were under 
arms. 
(48) The British and Spanish agreed to respect each other's de 
facto positions and co-operated in policing the left bank of the Arti- 
bonite. In parts of this vast flood plain the slaves had not worked 
in the previous two years and in November some had briefly attempted 
to rebel. However, both plantations and workforces remained relatively 
intact. Planters returned to their estates. The situation was 
(49) 
promising. 
Far more so was the case of Arcahaye, where the ruthlessness of 
local dictator, Jean-Baptiste Lapointe, had preserved 50 of the finest 
sugar estates in Saint Domingue. Just as la Grand'Anse was insulated 
by the Massif de la Hotte, the narrow coastal plain of Arcahaye had been 
protected by the triple chain of the Matheux, which additionally con- 
tained over 130 coffee and indigo plantations. Before the Revolution, 
this one parish had produced about one eighth as much sugar and over 
(50) 
three times as much coffee as the whole of Jamaica. Its population 
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now numbered 800 mulattoes and whites and 18,000 slaves. Two camps 
containing 156 men guarded the roads to Port au Prince, and the bourg 
of Arcahaye was fortified with a ditch, breastwork and four redoubts. 
(51) 
The British neither could nor needed to spare any men for its defence, 
when it was placed under their 'protection' on December 24th 
Shortly before, the parish of Jean Rabel, commanded by the mulatto, 
Delair, had accepted a small garrison of British soldiers. It produced 
some of the best coffee in the West Indies and proved a valuable source 
of foodstuffs for the Mole. Many of its white planters had been living 
at the Mole since September. 
Twenty miles west of Port au Prince, the port of L4ogane called 
in troops from J4r4mie on December 17th. In the broad plain surround- 
ing the town were 62 sugar estates very little affected by the Revolution. 
The district was expected to make an important contribution to the costs 
of occupation. However, scarcely had the detachment of anglo-dmigrds 
arrived, when the whole plain went up in flames. Raiders from Port au 
Prince and the South were apparently responsible, and once they had with- 
drawn, many complete gangs of slaves returned to Leogane. This suggests 
that the planters' faith in the loyalty of their slaves was not entirely 
misplaced. Yet, for the want of 300 British troops thousands of pounds 
worth of property had been destroyed, and the green and orderly land- 
scape was now charred black. 
(52) 
A month later, the planters of Petite Riviere almost suffered the 
same fate, though there external agents were more certainly abetted by 
the slaves, resisting the restoration of plantation discipline. A 
planter tells the story: - 'je rentrai chez moi 9 janvier. Le con- 
fiance renaissait de toutes parts lorsque le 20 le feu eclata sur plus 
de 20 hops. en meine terns. Ses progres 6taient effrayants... Il n'y 
avait nulle force armee, point de chefs, point d'ordre, tout annoncait 
une culbute g, 
lle,. The next day, 50 men were sent from Saint Marc 
and 50 Spaniards from Petite Riviere. Patrols were formed among the 
planters. The insurgents had few rifles but fought off the Spaniards 
with determination. Nonetheless, 'les chefs furent connus, arretds et 
on instruit leur proces'. Some 3/400 were killed and eighty were 
gaoled. The plain was still being raided in mid-February but small 
patrols sufficed to keep order. 'C'est un dernier effort des 
Commissaires', the planter thought. 
(53) 
Shortcomings in the Militia accounted for part of the problem. 
According to Brisbane, it did 'tolerably well' when acting with regular 
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troops but without them did 'more harm than good'. At the Mole, 
the Militia was described as 'bred up in ease and luxury and since 
worn down by anxiety and dismay'. At L6ogane, the inhabitants 
fought well near the town and were able to bear with fatigue but 
they had neither enough discipline nor mutual confidence to operate 
at a distance and save what remained of the plain. 
(54) 
It is not clear if L6ogane with its large coloured community 
refused like Saint Marc to accept article 4 of the Capitulation, 
which discriminated against the mulattoes. Certainly, the local 
British commander felt obliged to issue a proclamation maintaining 
the free coloureds in their rights. 
(55) 
The mayor, Labuissoniere, 
he found 'very respectable and much looked up to by all', but he 
lamented 'it will require great nicety to manage affairs under a 
power that has not the means of enforcing an Order should any be 
refractory and there are a number here of that description'. 
(56) 
Like the other occupied districts, L4ogane contained many re- 
fugees from surrounding parishes, particularly the south-west. Before 
the end of the year, they were intending to re-cross the Montagnes de 
la Selle with a detachment of emigres to raise the Union Jack in the 
hamlet of Saltrou. 
(57) 
Though such an expedition was eagerly awaited 
there, it never seems to have taken place. The 800 British troops 
then in the colony had been spread out as thinly as possible. No new 
districts could be occupied. Consequently, overtures from the highly 
strategic areas of Tortuga, Jacmel and Mirebalais, as well as from 
Fort Dauphin, Saint Louis and other parts of the South, could not be 
followed up. This was exceptionally unfortunate. Tortuga was the 
main source of supply for the Republican army at Port de Paix and a 
useful base for blockading the north coast; Mirebalais commanded 
north-south communications, and if taken, would threaten Port au Prince 
from the rear, while possession of Jacmel would cordon off the southern 
peninsula. Another crucial opportunity was thus missed. 
The reinforcements promised by de Charmilly and expected by 
Williamson and the colonists, though only half-promised by Dundas, 
(58) 
had failed to materialise. Just as the Saint Domingue expedition was 
launched, Dundas's attention had suddenly been snatched away from the 
West Indies by the promise of success at Toulon and the prospect of 
defeat in Flanders. As already seen, this caused him to delay the 
departure of General Grey's expedition and to reduce its strength. 
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Owing to further problems with the commissariat and the weather, it 
did not sail till November 25th. Furthermore, the Windward Islands 
remained very much Britain's priority in the Caribbean. News of 
Whitelocke's success led to Grey being given the option of attacking 
Saint Domingue first, but it was then far too late. Only in mid- 
December did Dundas announce that two regiments would leave Ireland 
immediately for Saint Domingue. These, however, were kept in port 
by disease and contrary winds until March 22nd! 
(59) 
Dundas had clearly 
been the victim of unforeseen events but it is equally plain he had not 
taken seriously enough his commitment to the planters of Saint Domingue. 
Nevertheless, the British could be pleased with what had been 
accomplished. As de Charmilly pertinently asked, was ever in the 
French Wars so much territory gained with so little effort? 
(60) 
Before 1793 had ended, Williamson was looking forward to promotion 
and 'most fervently' hoped that when peace came at least the west and 
South Provinces would be annexed by Britain. 
(61) 
The colonists, too, 
seem to have remained optimistic though regarding their 'protectors' 
with a certain irony and impatient for the fall of Port au Prince and 
les Cayes. 
(62) 
For the time being the British could only resort to bluff and 
bribery. Twice, in early January and early March, Commodore Ford 
and his squadron appeared before Port au Prince and called on Sonthonax 
to surrender. The Navy was determined to seize the shipping in the 
roadstead and from the beginning Ford excluded the harbour area from 
the terms he offered, rationalising that the citizens had failed to 
accept the Capitulation. On the second occasion, he threatened to 
bombard the town, but nonetheless withdrew without risking a clash 
with the powerful coastal batteries. 
(63) 
Without the means to support 
an aggressive strategy, Ford had undermined the goodwill on which the 
British had till then depended, and gained nothing. Each time, he had 
received from the Commissaire a proud and defiant response. The British 
and Royalists, however, simply assumed he was under the thumb of the 
mulattoes and continued to regard him as an adventurer who would be glad 
to be bought off, 
(64) 
Dundas had authorised bribes of up to £5000, to be 
paid to the commanders of important posts, and in February Whitelocke 
offered such a sum to Laveaux for the surrender of Port de Paix. To 
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avenge the insult, the French general challenged him to a duel. 
(65) 
A campaign without soldiers was not going to succeed. 
Cynicism and greed, impotence and empty'threats: this was the 
shabby side of the British occupation. There was also courage and 
ability and decisive action. When a few hundred troops arrived from 
Jamaica at the end of January, they were sent immediately against the 
key stronghold of Tiburon, which was held by over 850 men of all colours. 
Covered by broadsides from a frigate, the flank companies of the 13th 
Foot landed from small boats amid a hail of musket fire and cleared the 
beach with bayonets fixed. Through the night of February 2nd/3rd they 
held out in a house near the palisaded village and, when more troops 
debarked next morning, the enemy fled from the fort and batteries that 
overlooked the bay on the hill above. Though on this occasion the 
colonists camped at Irois did fail to advance and cut off the Republicans' 
retreat, 150 prisoners were nonetheless taken. 
(66) 
Two and a half weeks 
later, the same troops stormed Fort l'Acul, six miles from Leogane, which 
guarded the road south to Jacmel. Another combined operation, this time 
the naval side went awry, owing to winds, said Williamson, owing to the 
drunkenness of a transport captain, said de Charmilly. However, a 
bayonet charge, up a slope covered with fallen trees and straked with 
grape-shot, sufficed to put the enemy to flight. The British forces' 
reputation now rode high and nearby Grand Goäve raised the Union Jack 
and took the oath of allegiance. 
(67) 
The Republicans had been shaken and yielded a lot of ground; the 
road to les Cayes lay open. The British, however, could do little 
more by land. They tried to use their seapower to induce the surrender 
of Port au Prince and suggested to the Spaniards a joint attack on le 
Cap - in vain. Within two months the Republicans counter-attacked in 
strength. On April 16th Rigaud threw 2000 men at Tiburon fort and, 
as had happened at Fort l'Acul, a suicide agent blew up the powder 
magazine. Of the 60 British in the garrison, 28 were killed, along 
with 30 colonists. The Chevalier de Sevr4, however, saved the day with 
a bold sortie, Jean Kina's corps conspicuously taking the greatest risks. 
In six hours, the defenders expended 40,000 balls and killed nearly 400 
of the enemy. A frigate, arriving the next day, replenished their 
ammunition and sent seamen to stand guard while naval carpenters re- 
mounted the guns blown out of the fort. Naval support was clearly 
(68) 
essential to the survival of such outposts. 
Fort 1'Acul, now rebuilt, was attacked on May 3rd by over 1200 
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blacks, probably part of Pompde's band, which lived in the mountains 
of Riviere Froide and operated independently despite receiving ammunition 
and orders from the mulattoes of Port au Prince. They had crept up to 
the ramparts during the night and rushed the embrasures at the sound of 
the morning gun. Once again they tried to blow up the powder magazine. 
Once more they were routed by a bayonet charge. Their daring and 
discipline, in the event, were matched by that of Montalembert's Legion 
and the L4ogane militia, who, though outnumbered three to one, killed 
well over 50 of them, losing only one man themselves. 
(69) 
These were desperate if heroic affairs. Although according to 
de Charmilly 4,500 colonists had by now returned to the occupied zone 
(including women and children), dissatisfaction was growing with British 
protection. Luckily on May 19th the long-awaited reinforcements arrived, 
1860 men(70)under the ebullient General Whyte. Losing little time, a 
full-scale land-sea attack was mounted against Port au Prince. Fort 
Bizoton, commanding the littoral three miles south of the capital, was 
bombarded and stormed in a tropical downpour on June 1st, possibly with 
help from within. As British and colonial troops advanced from the 
north, the black levies guarding the earthworks surrendered, so their 
fleeing officers later claimed, with shouts of 'Vive le Roi! Vive 
Jumdcourt! Venez nos pauvres maitres! Nous voulons encore vous 
servir! '(71) The perimeter forts capitulated one by one and, to the 
inhabitants' relief, the Civil Commissioners fled into the mountains 
on the 3rd. The next day, the British forces and their French allies 
were able to celebrate in the capital of la perle des Antilles the 
birthday of George III. 
In eight months of minimal activity, the British Army had occupied 
a third of France's richest colony and lost in combat barely 50 men. 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Lucia, Tobago and Pondicherry had already 
fallen. In England the churchbells were ringing in honour of the 
'Glorious First Of June'. British fortunes had reached their apogee. 
(iii) Failure. In retrospect, however, we can see that Britain's 
position had been undermined for several months. Apart from the early 
failure to take Tiburon, the British forces' first major setback had 
come at the end of March, when Delair surrendered Jean-Rabel to the 
Republicans. On the 16th April, the German settlers of the neighbouring 
Bombarde/Plateforme district also defected, and two weeks later repulsed 
an attack by British marines. Partly, these losses were due to the 
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discrimination the local free coloureds suffered. 
(72) 
Delair, part- 
icularly, was piqued at not being made commandant of his parish. 
Partly, the fault lay with the paucity of British troops. The colonists 
expected to be protected, not to bear the brunt of active service in 
continued insecurity. Similarly, the Republicans now realised how small 
the British forces really were and with new found confidence went on the 
offensive. 
(73) 
Colonel Whitelocke, however, blamed his colonial allies. In a 
remarkable letter to Laveaux, 
(74) 
whom he candidly addressed in 18th 
century fashion as a brother officer and gentleman, he complained he 
would never again expose British troops alongside colonials. They had 
already tricked him, he said, at Tiburon and Fort l'Acul. 'Je ne 
m'attends ä aucun changement dans leurs sentiments militaires'. As 
for deserters from Dillon's Regiment, Laveaux was welcome to them, and 
to Jean-Rabel, too, which he was going to leave in the colonists' hands 
anyway as he was intending to regroup the scattered British detachments. 
Hence, not only the military situation but also Anglo-colonial relations 
reached a very low point. Left seven months without being reinforced 
from Europe, the British soldiers were dejected and the colonists severely 
disillusioned. They had been promised troops for the winter campaign 
season, which was now over. De Charmilly desperately toured the 
occupied area trying to quieten discontent. 
(75) 
On April 28th William- 
son lamented that the shortage of troops had brought his operations to 
a standstill and that there was a danger of the colonists rebelling. 
(76) 
The next day, there came about at Gonaives, 25 miles up the coast 
from Saint Marc, 'a most strange circumstance', as it seemed to Colonel 
Brisbane, 'so complicated, so extraordinary, so mysterious, as to baffle 
all conjecture'. 
(77) 
The black auxiliary troops drove out the Spanish 
garrison 'in the name of the King of the French' and then massacred some 
150 white inhabitants. One of the most famous yet obscure events in 
Saint Domingue's history, it is generally taken to mark the volte-face 
of the black general, Toussaint-Louverture, whose rallying to the 
Republic was without doubt one of the major factors in the defeat of 
the British. Just when their forces were doubled by the arrival of 
Whyte's 1800 redcoats, 4000 seasoned black fighters and a leader of 
genius were thrown into the balance against them. 
It has not been realised, 
(78) 
however, that Toussaint's volte-face 
was itself part of a broader rebellion north of the Artibonite that 
since the beginning of the year had brought thousands of blacks and 
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coloureds to oppose the invaders and resist the restoration of slavery. 
The tide was thus already turning against the scanty Anglo-Spanish forces 
when Toussaint joined the Republicans. This he did, moreover, long 
before news arrived that the French Convention had endorsed Sonthonax's 
policy and abolished slavery in all France's colonies. On the other 
hand, until he received a copy of the emancipation decree, in early 
July, Toussaint astonishingly kept up a double game with the Spaniards, 
staying mainly on the defensive and assuring them of his continued 
loyalty. Whatever his motives were, the first two months of his Re- 
publican career were fairly limited in effect. At great cost, the 
Spaniards were dislodged from Petite Riviere on May 23rd by the mulatto 
Blancazenave, who had long been harrying them. Toussaint's men moved 
up to the Ester but on June 11th , the Anglo-Royalists forced them back 
to Gonaives, with heavy losses after a bombardment lasting ten hours. 
(79) 
In early June, therefore, the British were still in a strong position. 
Recently reinforced, they had some 3500 armed men in Port au Prince, about 
1800, mostly mounted, in la Grand'Anse, garrisons at Saint Marc, Arcahaye 
and the Mole and a strong naval squadron. 
(80) 
The psychological ad- 
vantage was theirs. 
(81) 
Port au Prince had fallen almost without a 
shot and amid mutual recriminations. The Republicans were in disarray 
and everywhere short of food and ammunition. 
(82) 
Yet, the British 
commanders, by continuing their cautious, defensive policy, wasted this 
crucial opportunity and so lost the initiative in Saint Domingue. 
Firstly, they failed to take Gonaives, Toussaint's link with the 
outside world, at a time when he was hard pressed on all sides and low 
on ammunition. Driven back from the Ester, he suffered major losses 
in the east to Jean-Francois and Biassou. 
(83) 
A major British offensive 
could have been decisive. On June 15th a single warship created havoc 
at Gonaives. It bombarded the town and a party of 50 seamen spiked its 
guns. They received no help, however, from Saint Marc and were forced 
to retire when Toussaint burnt the town in desperation. Five days later 
his main camp at Marchand was apparently destroyed by the Saint Marc 
royalists but no troops arrived from Port au Prince. 
(84) 
No more was 
done and within a month, having survived this supreme test, Toussaint 
had driven off Biassou, defeated the Spaniards to the north (with 
Villatte's help) and devastated the army of Jean-Francois. It had 
also become known that the French Convention had declared slavery 
ahnlichpri by the decree of 16 pluviose (February 4th). The black/ 
Republican alliance was sealed. The independent blacks of Gros Morne 
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immediately joined Laveaux while those already fighting for the Republic 
in the South became noticeably more enthusiastic. 
(85) 
Moreover, the 
loyalty of Toussaint, perhaps still doubtful, was now assured. Insurr- 
ection spread throughout the Artibonite region. Meanwhile, vital 
supplies had started to filter through to Republican ports accompanied 
by news of resounding French victories in Europe and of the recapture of 
Guadeloupe. 
(86) 
Evidently inspired, Laveaux and Villatte captured 
several Spanish camps on the north coast, while Toussaint advanced to 
the Artibonite and even crossed the river to occupy Verrettes. 'I1 n'y 
eut pas une journde dans cet heureux mois', Laveaux later wrote, 'qui 
ne fut pas marqu6e par des victoires'. 
(87) 
If the British failure in the Artibonite can be attributed to a 
shortage of troops in the area, 
(88)the 
same is not true of their poor 
performance further south. Both Edwards and de Charmilly agreed that, 
by not taking or blockading Jacmel before the attack on Port au Prince, 
they committed the gravest blunder of the whole occupation. 
(89) 
In 
view of the threat posed by its military forces and privateers, the 
favourable attitude of its planters and the preservation of many of its 
parishes, its proximity to Jamaica and contiguity with the Grand'Anse, 
it may well be that the south coast should have been Britain's main 
priority. Alternatively, perhaps Whyte should have sent his army against 
Port de Paix and le Cap, where Republican forces were concentrated. 
However, even without the prospect of prize money, it was not unreason- 
able that the general's first objective should have been the capital. 
What was unjustifiable was his leaving his army inactive in the town 
after it had fallen. 
Instead of clearing and garrisoning the mountains that dominate 
Port au Prince, thereby restoring its fresh water supply, Whyte merely 
sent 300 local militiamen to prevent Dieudonne's blacks descending from 
the mornes into the plain of Cul de Sac, now occupied by Montalembert's 
Legion. The blacks had no artillery and they abandoned several camps 
without much resistance, but on June 22nd the militiamen were suddenly 
hurled back to Port au Prince by a surprise attack. Unsupported by the 
British, they lost one third of their number. The blacks now began to 
raid from the surrounding woods, burning plantations and sniping nightly 
at the scarlet-coated sentries on the palisades around Port au Prince. 
(90) 
Not only should Whyte have secured Morne 1'Hopital and la Char- 
bonniere, but he also ought to have pursued Sonthonax and his supporters 
through the mountains, sending at least a frigate to cut off their re- 
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treat. It was already clear they would flee to Jacmel, as Borel had 
done the previous year. 
(91) 
Such a pursuit would have been arduous 
but might have been entrusted to colonial troops, and deserters from 
the Legion de l'Egalit4. 'Factionalism made the defeated Republicans 
especially vulnerable. During their retreat, fighting all but broke 
out between the black and coloured corps, while once they reached the 
south coast, the mulatto generals divided against one another. 
(92) 
If 
Jacmel, commanded by the alienated Monthrun, had been taken, the south- 
ern peninsula could have been cut off by a cordon extending north to 
L4ogane and providing in the mountainous interior a healthy location for 
the troops. 
(93) 
A general convergence on les Cayes, de Charmilly argued, 
would have been easy. 
(94) 
Although his opinion of non-white troops was 
clearly prejudiced, he may have been correct. Rigaud was a bold, vig- 
orous and obdurate leader, but his Logion du Sud, not yet a year old, 
had still to win an engagement and had suffered numerous severe defeats 
at the hands of the Anglo-Royalists. In the second week of June, his 
men succeeded in ravaging the coast between Tiburon and Irois, but once 
again they were cut to pieces by the planter cavalry of the Grand'Anse 
and the cannon of Tiburon fort (and of a Royal Navy frigate). 
(95) 
Simultaneous attacks on Camp Desrivaux and Camp du Centre failed 
entirely. Moreover, les Cayes at this time was suffering from famine 
and relied on Jacmel for its supplies. 
(96) 
The white planters in the 
South and probably some of their slaves could be counted on for help, 
and possibly many mulatto planters, too, who cannot have welcomed the 
news of the Emancipation decree that arrived on June 8th. De Charmilly 
in fact claimed to have arranged through two coloured landowners the 
surrender of most of the South. 
(97) 
Another chance was thus lost. Rigaud was allowed to go on con- 
solidating his mulatto dictatorship in the South, while the mountains 
overlooking Port au Prince were left in the hands of poorly-armed blacks 
powerful in numbers. This was partly because General Whyte channelled 
his energies into taking possession of the capital and extending its 
fortifications; partly because he continued the divisive policy of 
confining British troops to the ports and using colonials in the 
interior, but also because he was preoccupied with the matter of prize 
money. it was widely believed, indeed, that he had secretly let 
Sonthonax escape on condition that he did not burn the town or the 
(98) 
ships in the harbour. 
This immobility proved doubly fatal, for within two months of its 
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fall, some 650 of the British soldiers in Port au Prince were to the 
without firing a shot. Dundas had been warned that troops should be 
kept outside the town on plantations rather than in the casernes. 
'Bäti sur un terrein brillant sous un ciel homicide', (as the colonists 
saw it), the colonial capital was notoriously unhealthy. 
(99) 
Moreover, 
with singular ill-timing, Whyte's men had arrived at the start of the 
sickly season. After being cooped up for months crossing the Atlantic, 
the pallid recruits emerged from the transports into the midst of a 
tropical summer, without a chance to acclimatise. Set to work digging 
entrenchments in the steaming rain, mounting guard through the compara- 
tively chilly nights, 
(100) 
they could offer no resistance to an epidemic 
of yellow fever that broke out in the crowded capital. By the end of 
June, two-fifths of the troops there were sick and the death rate in 
some regiments reached well over 20% per month. The Navy was apparently 
even worse hit. Military operations ceased. 
(101) 
By mid-November, 
1000 British soldiers had been buried in Port au Prince and only one- 
third of the survivors were fit for duty. 'They dropt', as Bryan 
Edwards observed, 'like the leaves in autumn'. 
(102) 
In view of the disastrous losses already experienced by the French 
and Spanish forces in Saint Domingue, and those later suffered by the 
ill-fated Leclerc expedition, 
(103) 
one might well assume that any attempt 
to conquer the colony was doomed. This is the conclusion of a recent 
study by B. Foubert. 
(104) 
There is, nevertheless, much to be said for 
the colonists' persistent belief that Saint Domingue could be saved if 
only a sufficiently large force was put into action at one time. Once 
the rebels were overwhelmed, as they nearly were early in 1793, the 
task of maintaining order could be performed largely by acclimatised 
colonials, who would return in large numbers to the pacified colony. 
Malouet and de Charmilly were not entirely deluded to claim that 3000 
troops landed in November 1793 would have had an easy job. 
(105) 
West 
Indian campaigns had always been wasteful of human life but they were 
not all failures. It is true, as the Spaniards feared and Leclerc later 
found out, that keeping the colony might prove more difficult than 
conquering it but, then again, Leclerc had to fight an army of 30,000 
free men, an army of veterans: the British did not. The mortality 
problem became insuperable only when slavery ceased to 
be supportable 
in the minds of most of the blacks. 
Furthermore, it is probably erroneous to write off Saint Domingue 
as an unusually lethal death trap that should not have 
been bothered 
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with. Although Edwards stated that yellow fever began to ravage the 
British forces from the start of the occupation, 
(106) 
this is simply not 
true. A degree of sickliness was noted at the Mole in October without 
much alarm, while at Jeremie none appeared until the end of February. 
(107) 
Mortality was negligible until March. On June 11th, Williamson was 
still able to comment how much healthier Saint Domingue was than 
Jamaica. 
(108) 
It was a cruel coincidence that found the bulk of the 
British forces freshly arrived from Europe and at their densest con- 
centration in one of the unhealthiest parts of Saint Domingue at the 
worst time of year. Moreover, whatever was the likelihood of yellow 
fever breaking out when so many non-immunes crowded into the capital, 
it became unavoidable after the ill-fated arrival on June 8th of fever- 
ridden reinforcements from the army in Martinique. What is more, they 
may have been responsible for introducing a particularly virulent strain 
of the disease, then killing thousands from Baltimore to Barbados. 
(109) 
It is also relevant that Port au Prince had become especially insalu- 
brious during the Revolution, because its fresh water supply was re- 
peatedly cut off by insurgents in the surrounding mountains. The 
shortcomings of General Whyte's policy thus become increasingly evident, 
and the destruction of the British army looks a little less rigorously 
inevitable than might be supposed. 
Yet, this was not the only setback to British prospects that 
resulted from the fall of Port au Prince. According to Williamson, 
General Whyte's predatory and domineering behaviour soon created 
'universal discontent' in the capital. 
(110) 
Firstly, he ignored the 
capitulation offered by the inhabitants once the Commissioners had fled 
and left the town at the discretion of the army for five days before 
offering a pardon from which he excluded recognised revolutionaries. 
(111) 
In the meantime, royalist officers of Montalembert's Legion sought out 
and murdered various of Sonthonax's ex-alumni. Though Whyte clamped 
down on these summary executions, the petty tyranny that certain 
intriguants francois continued to exercise created much fear and 
2 (112) 
bitterness in the town. Whyte regarded Port au Prince as British 
by right of conquest, as it had not accepted the Capitulation. It was 
already clear that the ships in the harbour were bound to be forfeited, 
but the general went further and proclaimed, as had Rodney at St. 
Eustatius and Grey and Jervis at Martinique, that all public and private 
property in the town belonged to the conquerors. 
(113) 
He proposed, 
however, that only known enemies of 'order' would suffer full confis- 
- 118 - 
cation, while friends of 'order' would be exempted, and those neither 
one nor the other would pay a fine. To this end, every inhabitant was 
to be examined by a joint Anglo-French committee and to make a declar- 
ation of his property. 
Williamson found the measure 'truly Inquisitorial' and nullified 
all of Whyte's proclamations, threatening to suspend him if he refused 
to take orders from Jamaica. 
(114) 
Whyte did not think himself account- 
able to Williamson, as he had been assigned to Saint Domingue by Grey, 
the commander in chief of British forces in the West Indies. Whitehall, 
however, supported the Governor. 
(115) 
Whyte asked to be relieved and 
was replaced on September 18th by Brigadier-General Horneck. 
The dispute did nothing to improve the image of the occupying 
power. Apart from the anomalous question of seniority involved, there 
may have already existed some personal rancour between the two men, who 
had served together in the past. Basically, though, it was a clash 
between two opposed concepts of how the occupation should be conducted. 
Whyte's approach was military and authoritarian, hostile to-interference 
from the civil power, and indifferent to colonial sensibilities. This 
was also the attitude of the royalists and dmigres in his army like 
Montalembert 
(116) 
and de Jumecourt. Williamson, on the other hand, 
was above all conciliatory, as befitted a Governor of 18th century 
Jamaica. Advised at Spanish Town by members of the old Cöt4 ouest 
faction, he was anxious to restore civil government and to do all he 
could to reconcile the colonists to British rule. These two con- 
trasting themes in Anglo-colonial thinking were to run through the 
entire five years of occupation, each dominant at different times. 
Whyte's policy was probably more efficient, certainly more economical, 
but Williamson, his sights set on more long-term gains, insisted that 
his 'system' was right for Saint Domingue. For the time being, the 
British Government agreed. 
The predatory approach(117)was efficacious but tended to be 
counterproductive. This is well seen in the role of the Royal Navy. 
Naval support was the sine qua non of the British presence in Saint 
Domingue, and prize money, it may be argued, was essential to the 
functioning of the senior service, as it helped to reconcile the 
common seaman, so often in the West Indies the product of the press 
gang, to his brutalized lot. 
(118) 
To penurious colonists, however, 
who expected from the British the protection promised in Whitelocke's 
proclamation, the seizure of their ship-borne goods, in some instances 
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after they had capitulated, was a real grievance that reinforced the 
popular image of British hypocrisy. 
(119) 
One could say the ill-will 
of the people of Port au Prince was a fair price for the £400,000 
worth of property seized in the harbour and on the wharves; also, 
that it may well have been Captain Affleck's cutting out of the 
'Triomphante' that finally brought Saint Marc into British hands. 
Nevertheless, a serious consequence of making the seas unsafe for 
French citizens, even those of pro-British opinions, was to hinder 
the return of refugees from the United States, most of whom had already 
been robbed once by British privateers. It was not the most important 
factor discouraging return to Saint Domingue but must be accounted pre- 
judicial to British interests when acclimatised troops were so des- 
perately needed. 
(120) 
The policy of conciliating colonial opinion had good and bad 
points. In one respect, however, it proved catastrophic. Numerous 
colonists had argued that the black rebels could only be defeated in 
their mountain retreats by coloured troops who had been trained at 
hunting runaways in the mar4chauss4e. Similarly adept at living on 
roots and bananas and running barefoot up and down slopes covered with 
brambles and broken rock, the mulattoes were also excellent horsemen 
and sharpshooters. Even in November, moreover, after thousands of 
refugees had ret 
rned, they still outnumbered the whites 6: 1. 
(121) 
Hence, from the military-point-of-view they merited at least as much 
consideration as the white colonists. The London Propositions, 
however, condemned them to the status of coloureds dans les colonies 
anglaises. 
What the planters probably wanted was the flexibility and 
pragmatism of the Jamaican system. 'Respectable' coloureds of the 
old free families, wealthy, legitimate, married and light-skinned, 
(i. e. those the 15th May law was aimed at), along with any other 
influential figures, would be granted 'white' status to ally them to 
the regime. The majority of affranchis, conversely, would lose all 
the privileges they had gained in 1792 and more besides. 
(122) 
Never- 
theless, some whites had wanted to be more generous. The different 
draughts of the Propositions reveal an original proposal to grant full 
equality, that was then gradually whittled down, doubtless under B4rault 
and de Charmilly's influence, to become the infamous article 4. 
(123) 
For many free coloureds it was not an unacceptable price to pay 
for the preservation of their property. Yet, at Saint Marc and Arcahaye, 
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they and their white allies accepted the Capitulation only on the 
understanding that the King would be asked to revoke article 4, which 
they refused to sign. Meanwhile, they were to receive equal treat- 
ment with whites. 
(124) 
Even then, many had tried to back out of the 
arrangement before the British moved in. At Jean Rabel, the mulattoes 
actually revolted against their second class status and this encouraged 
minor anti-white outbursts at Ldogane and Arcahaye. 
(125) 
In the 
occupied zone, therefore, white-coloured relations rested on a fragile 
basis of uncertainty and local anomaly. This has not hitherto been 
realised. 
Bound by the articles signed in February, the British were in a 
dilemma. When Colonel Whitelocke had landed in Jer4mie, he had con- 
fidently proclaimed to the mulattoes: choose between article 4 'et 
la punition de tous vos crimes'. 
(126) 
This is exactly what the whites 
of la Grand'Anse wanted to hear. At the Mole, however, the Council 
criticised article 4 on several occasions and Major Grant had apparently 
sought permission to revoke it even before the overtures of the Artibonite 
parishes made clear its impracticality. 
(127) 
Man y, perhaps most, British 
officers favoured the free coloureds. Major Brisbane, in the Artibonite, 
paid them 'every attention', assigning to them the principal military 
commands. Even Colonel Whitelocke became converted to their cause, 
finding them more 'brave and faithful' than the petits blancs, wealthier 
and better educated than the Jamaican coloureds and possessing more 
influence over the slaves than did the whites. He doubted the blacks 
could be beaten without their co-operation and said, if civil equality 
was not officially granted, they would rebel. Furthermore, he stressed 
that outside la Grand'Anse the planters who had stayed in the colony 
through the Revolution, often serving under mulattoes, did not object 
to conceding them equal rights. 
(128) 
On January 19th, Williamson 
observed to Dundas that he could take all of the South and West Provinces, 
were he empowered to grant equality of colour. He also sent him a speech 
by Lapointe, 'to shew that those people possess Talents and Influence', 
and accepted the colonelcy of the largely coloured Saint Marc Legion. 
(129) 
However, it was impossible to please everyone. Demographically 
as well as ideologically, the years of revolution had greatly strengthened 
the mulattoes' position, so that many whites feared they would come to 
dominate the government, if granted equality. 
(130) 
De Charmilly was 
willing to countenance only the 'whitening' of coloured families free 
for several generations and a few other 'well-behaved' individuals -a 
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notable advance, nonetheless. He repeatedly warned Dundas and 
Williamson that, by not enforcing article 4, the British were destroy- 
ing the whites' goodwill towards them and inviting the Jamaican free 
coloureds to revolt. Brisbane, he said, had greatly alienated the 
whites of Saint Marc 'par ses liaisons et ses prdf6rences ridicules 
en faveur des Hommes de Couleur; car il vivait dans un intimit6 avec 
les Mulätres, comme jamais aucun Blanc, surtout un officier fran5ais, 
ne l'avait fait et n'aurait os6 le faire' , 
(131) 
Although de Charmilly 
was biased, it seems that even in Saint Marc prejudice died hard and 
that the British presence probably encouraged a regression to old 
norms. 
(132) 
At L4ogane, the free coloureds felt so insecure, thanks 
to the bullying of Bdrault Saint Maurice, that Captain Smith had to 
issue a proclamation assuring them he was not going to stir up the 
past and that he had not been paid to massacre them. 
(133) 
On the other hand, even colonists like La Rochejacquelein, who 
considered the mulattoes to be criminals, came to argue that it was 
essential to grant them civil equality. 
(134) 
Williamson summed up 
the situation at the end of the summer; 'There are a description of 
Whites who are sanguinary in the extreme against the Mulattoes. I 
have kept them within bounds, and great numbers of the Whites have no 
jealousies about them'. 
(135) 
Dundas, no more than Williamson, regarded article 4 as sacred. 
Any improvement, however, in the free coloureds' status, he said, 
should come at the French colonists' suggestion and should not upset 
the British West Indies. 
(136) 
Jamaican whites had been extremely 
alarmed by an innocuous petition drawn up by some Kingston free 
coloureds in late 1792. 
(137) 
Before long, they were bracing them- 
selves for the arrival of Raimond himself, and when Bryan Edwards 
urgently sought an interview with Dundas the following May, it appears 
he wanted to emphasise the dangerous effects British policy towards 
Saint Domingue might have in Jamaica. 
(138) 
Such considerations may 
have delayed the decision to intervene. The Home Secretary was perhaps 
more disturbed by the jealousy that the promotion of mulattoes was 
creating in the occupied zone and he warned Williamson to be cautious. 
On 5th July 1794, he instructed him that, though individual exceptions 
might be made, article 4 'if practicable, must ultimately be complied 
with'. 
(139) Any flexibility British policy had had in this area 
finally vanished in the next two months, when de Charmilly reported 
back to London and the Duke of Portland became Home Secretary. His 
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first orders were that the Capitulation should be adhered to in spirit 
and principle. 
(140) 
Williamson, too, one presumes, was under pressure in Spanish Town 
both from British planters and the Cadusch faction. Before receiving 
these instructions, he had already begun to alienate the coloured pop- 
ulation by his measures to restore civil government. In early July, 
he revoked all decrees and appointments made by the various British 
commanders. All commissions for public office he ordered to be vali- 
dated by the new Conseil Sup&rieur, which was controlled by extremists. 
(141) 
Williamson's chief concern here was administrative streamlining. He 
assured the mulattoes their interests were not prejudiced. Yet, they 
found this hard to believe when their posts in the mardchauss4e were 
taken away and given to newly-arrived whites. 
(142) 
Their hopes of 
seeing the Code Noire enforced proved vain. The 1770 criminal code 
was restored. In the granting of relief to the destitute, the mulattoes 
suffered marked discrimination. 
(143) 
The moment of reckoning came in 
mid-August when the Conseil Supdrieur registered the Act of Capitulation 
with article 4 unchanged. At the same time it also registered an 
indiscreet letter from Williamson to B&rault Saint Maurice revealing 
that suspects deported to Jamaica would not be allowed to return without 
permission and that those designated by Agent Cadusch would be prosecuted. 
For the mulattoes this had a very sinister meaning. They recalled the 
insulting tone of Whitelocke's October 5th proclamation. They heard 
their old enemies discussing their murder or deportation to Botany Bay. 
(144) 
At best, there seemed little place for them under the new regime. At 
worst, they seemed destined for proscription. Hence, as Laveaux rallied 
his forces, as the English and Spanish troops dropped like flies, and as 
news of the great French victory at Fleurus filtered through to the colony, 
the free coloureds of the occupied zone began to feel they were on the 
wrong side. 
Those of Saint Marc seem to have been secretly won over by the 
Republicans via what was apparently an elaborate plot laid by Toussaint 
Louverture. In the middle of August, the black general informed Major 
Brisbane he was willing to surrender. His coloured allies Blancazenave 
and Christophe Mornet handed back Verrettes and Petite Riviere and actually 
joined the British forces. Hostilities ceased and even 10,000 slaves 
returned to the plantations. Ironically, Brisbane's reputation reached 
new heights at the very time Toussaint's fifth column spread disaffection 
in his camp, and while the rebel leader amassed ammunition ready to strike 
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at his duped and unsuspecting foe. 
(145) 
At the beginning of September, 
Brisbane set out to take possession of Gonaives and only narrowly 
escaped an ambush by Toussaint's men. The Anglo-Spanish garrisons 
on the upper Artibonite were overwhelmed by their new allies. Brisbane 
hurried back to Saint Marc to find that his coloured aide-de-camp, 
Morin, had led a rebellion of almost all the mulattoes in the town. 
Most of the plain seems to have risen also. For over two weeks, 
Toussaint repeatedly attacked Saint Marc and twice captured its north 
side, burning down 80 houses. However, the white colonists held on 
and fought bravely, and the blacks became distracted by pillaging. 
The appearance of a frigate which bombarded their positions proved the 
decisive factor. The belated arrival of reinforcements from Arcahaye 
and a Spanish advance down the Artibonite enabled Brisbane to counter- 
attack. Toussaint, injured in the siege of Saint Marc and always short 
of ammunition, had already retired when his men were driven back across 
the river on the 28th. Nevertheless, the mulatto-British alliance was 
ruined and the slave regime in the plain probably finally destroyed. 
Toussaint developed his network of camps, based on Marchand, into a 
strong defensive position. 
(146) 
Even Brisbane's trust in the mulattoes was now shattered. Their 
'natural Perfidy' seemed beyond dispute. Nearly 300 were imprisoned 
along with some whites implicated in the revolt. Several were shot. 
Colonial officers, incited by-the infamous Borel, snatched the remainder 
from prison one night and murdered them on the outskirts of town. 
(147) 
A still greater disaster struck L4ogane, where there was no British 
garrison or warship. At the invitation of the local mulattoes, Rigaud 
appeared before the town with 800 men and took possession on October 
7th, meeting little resistance. A great quantity of stores was thus 
lost. The coloured mayor, Andr4 Labuissoniere, and several whites 
were executed, while 150 others fled to Port au Prince, which was shaken 
into a frenzy of defensive activity. At Arcahaye, it was believed that 
if Saint Marc fell the mulattoes and slaves would rise and march on the 
capital. Lapointe's life was apparently threatened by a plot. With 
or without his complicity, 109 free coloureds and blacks were seized by 
white colonists and murdered. Fearful of upsetting public opinion, 
General Horneck did nothing. 
(148) 
Having lost most of their mulatto allies and over half their own 
troops, the British now had to turn, like the Republicans and Spaniards 
before them, to the blacks. Under the Ancien Regime, slaves had sometimes. 
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served in the militia or had been specially armed in wartime. Those 
who served well had occasionally gained their freedom. 
(149) 
This 
tendency enormously increased during the Revolution, and paved the way 
for General Emancipation. It continued under the occupation. Jean 
Kina had long been a vital prop of the southern plantocracy. Montalem- 
bert and the planters of the plain of Cul de Sac had recruited about 
150 slaves and, in August, Brisbane began to raise a black corps in the 
Artibonite. 
A crucial opportunity had been lost, however, after the fall of 
Port au Prince to win over Dieudonng's Logion de 1'Egalit4, said to be 
5000 strong. Several officers and men of the Legion had refused to 
follow Sonthonax and had stayed on in the town helping to maintain order. 
Montalembert's purge unfortunately laid low or drove out most of these 
potentially valuable allies. 
(150) 
Even so, in the following weeks, 
Dieudonne himself began negotiating with Montalembert and Whyte, offering 
to serve, under white officers if necessary, in exchange for their liberty. 
They would exterminate or force back to work, as desired, the other blacks 
in rebellion. Here was a chance to restore Port au Prince's water supply 
and revive agriculture in the surrounding plain, not least to double 
British forces with acclimatised troops. Yet, again we find military 
and civil considerations in serious conflict. Officially, these fighters 
were slaves and Williamson was not empowered to dispose of the planters' 
property. He offered them British pay and freedom from vexation by their 
masters but said only the King could grant them their liberty. Either 
because of the nature or tardiness of this reply, the negotiations broke 
down. 
(151) 
By September, the situation had stabilised a little after 
Montalembert had killed hundreds of rebels in a series of engagements 
around Croix des Bouquets. The houngan and pro-royalist slave leader 
Hyacinthe, an important friend of the Cul de Sac planters, was sent to 
try and re-open the negotiations. Dieudonn4, however, had him executed. 
(152) 
By this time, colonists so different as Cadusch and La Rochejacque- 
lein were agreed that black troops were indispensable and that they should 
be given their liberty. 
(153) 
Brisbane had already reached the same con- 
clusion and was supported by the Saint Marc planters. During the mulatto 
revolt, the behaviour of the troupes franches of the white creole 
Dessources led him to extol the black soldier's pre-eminence in a war of 
patrols and ambushes, indeed 'on all occasions'. 'The Mulattoes', he 
said, 'dread nothing so much as to fight against Negroes'. 
(154) 
Since 
Jamaica had been able to spare merely 55 troops during the September crisis, 
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Brigadier-General Horneck decided shortly after his arrival to raise 
a regiment among the slaves. In November, the Chasseurs Royaux began 
recruiting in the plain of Cul de Sac. - Following Brisbane's plan, the 
slaves were to serve for five years and then be freed. Jean Kina's 
corps was placed on the same footing. 
In the circumstances, this development was doubtless essential 
but it posed many problems. Besides being expensive and increasing 
the alarm and alienation of the free coloureds, it undermined the slave 
regime, further blurring the distinction between slave and free. 
According to one observer, recruitment often fell on 'chefs de famille 
dont l'exemple et les conseils contribuoient mieux que les actes de 
sevdritd ä retenir les autres dans le devoir'. 
(155) 
The policy was 
also said to be opposed by the majority of planters. The author of 
the Pr4cis Historigue accounted it an evil and claimed its supporters 
were an influential minority blinded by the desire to venge themselves 
on the mulattoes: 'c'etoit en quelque sorte armer la colonie contre 
elle-meine, c'etoit la dechirer de ses propres mains'. 
(156) 
Slaughtered by the 'yellow and putrid fevers', the British by mid- 
November could barely hold on to their positions. 
(157) 
Garrisons were 
everywhere weak and could not be given naval support because of the 
mortality among the ships' crews. With the end of the rains, the 
Artibonite became fordable and an attack was 
martial law was proclaimed on October 25th. 
Republican to British territory was reversed 
to Port de Paix to man the corsairs now doinc 
shipping. 
(158) 
Internal enemies were many. 
soon expected. Hence, 
The flow of refugees from 
and many young sailors fled 
I great damage to British 
'They are much more hostile 
to us now', Williamson observed, 'than when we first took possession'. 
The colony would be British, he further lamented, had he been authorised 
to preserve civil equality between white and coloured. 'The Mulattoes 
are so superior in number to the Whites that the Whites never can extir- 
pate them, but which is the great object of many of them'. 
As no British ships were available for blockade duty, the Repub- 
licans were now freely importing supplies and ammunition in neutral 
vessels. At les Cayes,, commerce and agriculture revived, while socially 
and militarily Rigaud's dictatorship achieved new degrees of stability. 
His black troops, it was noted, fought more boldly since learning of the 
emancipation decree. Some expected the invaders would soon be expelled. 
(159) 
In late September, the Spaniards finally lost their foothold at le Borgne 
and Port Margot and then suffered devastating defeats on their own terri- 
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tory at San Michel and San Raphael. Toussaint Louverture, by these 
victories, brought large quantities of artillery, cash and ammunition 
into Republican hands and established himself as a brilliant commander. 
(160) 
They also definitively marked his breach with Spain, till then still 
unclear. Toussaint now led a victorious and well-supplied army. He 
commanded some 30 camps in a cordon that stretched nearly 90 miles and 
had built up an officer corps of talent and experience, consisting mainly 
of blacks. He and Laveaux now met for the first time, as the white 
Governor toured in admiration the area commanded by this increasingly 
powerful ex-slave. 
In 20 months, the face of Saint Domingue had changed dramatically. 
Areas still well-preserved when the British arrived, such as L4ogane, 
Grand Goäve and the Artibonite, had been ruined by fire and desertion, 
while the abandoned plantations of Cul de Sac were now fast falling into 
decay. In the Spanish zone, too, 1794 saw the destruction of Plaisance 
and le Borgne, the only parts of the colony that had survived intact, 
as well as of Marmelade, Ennery and Gonaives. 
(161) 
By a singular and 
significant irony, after a year in Saint Domingue, the British were now 
attempting to preserve the slave regime by turning to the slaves with 
offers of freedom. 
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CHAPTER VI. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL COVERNMENT: ADMINISTRATION 
AND POLITICS IN THE FIRST YEAR OF OCCUPATION. 
(i) Whitehall Planning. Ironically, just when confidence in 
British intervention was falling away fast, 
(l)Williamson 
was informed 
by the Government it had decided to establish a civil administration in 
Saint Domingue and to make him Governor. This was a novel decision. 
(2) 
In wartime, conquered colonies were usually kept under military rule. 
In this instance, however, Pitt's government was concerned to win the 
goodwill of the colonists, on whom it relied heavily. 
(3) 
The Capitulation (appendix C (ii) ) did not require such a re- 
storation. It allowed for the Crown and its representative in Saint 
Domingue to exercise supreme power, assisted 'dans tous les details 
d'administration et de police' by a Conseil Privd nominated by the 
Governor. There was no question of re-establishing the old Intendancy, 
the lynch-pin of Bourbon government. The British had no tradition of 
a judicial/administrative supremo, while many colonists had thought the 
Intendant's powers too extensive for one man and most recognised that 
friction between Governor and Intendant had obstructed government under 
the old regime. To have a British Governor and a French Intendant 
would simply have compounded previous problems. 
(4) 
Governors of British colonies were accustomed to working with 
Councils of leading colonists, and in occupied Saint Domingue such a 
body was indispensable from an administrative, if not also from a 
political, point of view. British commanders, if they knew any French 
at all, needed the help of men who knew the laws, customs and inhabi- 
tants of the colony, who could help frame legislation and deal with 
the myriad details of everyday administration and government. As all 
parties were agreed that no Assembly should be called before order was 
restored, and as the Governor was to wield supreme power while war 
lasted, an advisory and nominated Privy Council, drawn from the land- 
owners of the three provinces, would give a necessary measure of re- 
presentation to the colonists (who had experienced some three years of 
self-government) and thus assuage to some degree their political ambitions 
in a useful and harmless manner. Unlike the Councils in the old British 
colonies, and even in Quebec, it would have no legislative powers. 
The colonists were to foot the bill for all military and civil 
expenses (bar those of the navy) but were to pay only those taxes in 
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force in 1789 and with exemptions granted to ruined property owners. 
The British Government would make up the deficit and be repaid later. 
The Navigation Acts would be applied but the export of refined sugar 
was to be permitted, as was, until the colony recovered, a limited trade 
with the United States. The colonists had also asked for and been 
granted the free practice of the Roman Catholic religion and the re- 
storation at the end of the war of the pre-Revolutionary civil law. 
The structure of the law courts was not mentioned, not because of 
British pressure but because of the absentee planters' dislike of 
colonial lawyers. The Original Propositions had actually called for 
the adoption of the cheaper fees and simpler procedure of the English 
legal system. However, the demand was dropped from all subsequent drafts 
and among the colonists in Saint Domingue we find no echo of this opinion. 
The great backlog of judicial business in the colony had created by the 
summer of 1794 a general cry for the re-establishment of the law courts - 
a demand endorsed by Colonel Whitelocke and Governor Williamson. Those 
who opposed such a move did so because they thought it premature or for 
more blatantly political reasons. 
(5) 
Premature, it certainly was, but Whitehall had to consider not 
only Saint Domingue but also the far more stable French Windward Islands 
conquered in March, where General Grey had restored the civil law almost 
immediately. Around May 1794, Lord Hawkesbury, the extremely active 
President of the Privy Council Committee for Trade and Foreign Plantations, 
was charged with drafting preliminary proposals for the government of 
these colonies. His main aim was to 'make them desirous of continuing 
under His Majesty's Government'. 
(6) 
Conciliation was the keynote of 
his approach. He wanted the Governor and leading inhabitants of each 
colony to be consulted before making his final recommendations. This 
was rejected as impractical, 
(7 
but most of his other proposals were 
embodied in the Instructions sent to Williamson on October 7th by the 
new Home Secretary, 'the Duke of Portland. 
(8) 
Hawkesbury was impressed that in Grenada British rule and the 
introduction of English criminal law had driven out almost all the 
French inhabitants. He found British policy 'absurd' and 'cruel in 
its consequences' and he criticised the 'idea that the Government and 
Laws of Great Britain... must be equally good and equally agreeable to 
foreigners'. It was he, moreover, who had introduced into the Quebec 
Act of 1774 the special oath that enabled Catholics to hold public office. 
(9 
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He determined, therefore, that until a permanent form of government 
should be decided upon, as much as possible of the Ancien Regime system 
should be retained in the occupied colonies. He also recommended that, 
with the exception of merchants trading in the ports, 'old' British 
subjects should not settle there. The Instructions thus not only 
followed the Capitulation's demands in restoring the free practice of 
the Roman Catholic religion and the civil law and taxation system of 
the Ancien Regime but went even further and revived in toto the laws 
and judicial system as they existed before the Revolution. 
(10) 
On the matter of criminal law, Hawkesbury had in fact hesitated, 
being reluctant to deprive British subjects in conquered colonies of 
trial by jury, yet adamant that the jury system would not work there 
and that two sets of courts could not co-exist. Portland wanted English 
criminal law applied to both nationalities, as it had been in Quebec, 
Saint Vincent and Grenada. However, the issue was decided, doubtless 
to Hawkesbury's satisfaction, by the opinion of the Lord Chancellor. 
He ignored the vague notion that English legal privileges were an 
Englishman's birthright and declared, following the 1774 Campbell v. 
Hall judgment, that an Englishman was subject to the laws of the place 
he was in. 
(11) 
The irony of this determination to preserve French institutions 
is that it was considerably more, or less, than the colonists in London 
had at first asked for. The authors of the Original Propositions 
(appendix C (i) ) had in fact called for British political institutions 
and, though desiring to retain the loix et usages permitted to the French 
of Grenada and Quebec, they had been willing to accept the English law 
of debt (in certain circumstances), English judicial procedure and legal 
fees, and (apparently) the English criminal law. The Propositions of 
the Windward isles planters specifically allowed for the introduction 
of English criminal law after 18 months. 
(12) 
Only in the fourth com- 
plete redrafting of the Saint Domingue Propositions was it stipulated 
that the pre-Revolutionary status quo was to be restored. 
(13) 
These early drafts of the Propositions are ä problem that histor- 
ians have previously ignored. They were probably less Anglophile than 
they seem. Insofar as the criminal law and the law of debt are concerned, 
it appears the colonists were not expressing a preference but offering 
what they deemed unavoidable concessions. English criminal law had been 
introduced into all previously conquered colonies, and the Dominguans 
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feared that English merchants without adequate means of redress in case 
of default would not advance them loans. On the other hand, it was the 
British themselves who baulked at promising the eventual adoption of 
British political institutions. It was feared that, if the old re- 
presentative system were introduced, Parliament might thereafter be un- 
able to alter the regime and that the Government would repeat the 
troublesome experiences it had had with Grenada and Dominica. 
(14) 
However, the redrafting of the Propositions may also reflect a growing 
assertiveness among the royalist planters in London, as the French 
Republic started to totter in March 1793. 
(15) 
It should be realised 
that Hawkesbury expected, when it came to establishing a permanent 
government, that the 'turbulent and factious' would want an assembly 
but that the moderate colonists would side with the 'wise and discreet' 
in desiring the restoration of their 'ancient government'. 
(16) 
Only on two major points would the wartime administration differ 
from that of the Ancien Regime. Firstly, the British laws of trade 
and customs tariff were to be applied, and indeed had been, by Order 
in Council, since December 1793. The Vice-Admiralty Courts were re- 
placed by British customs officers exercising, however, the powers of 
their French predecessors, and colonial merchantmen received the pri- 
vileges of prize ships. This was really the only 'British' feature 
of the regime. The other departure from the French system was the 
strengthened Executive with its advisory council, both novelties imposed 
by the Capitulation. The Governor was to subsume most of the powers 
previously shared between the Governor and Intendant, apart from their 
judicial ones. However, although he was to exercise full executive 
authority, he could not levy new taxes and was to change existing law 
only in an emergency. As long as British interests were not prejudiced, 
he should endeavour to follow the advice of his Privy Council and any 
disagreements were to be reported to Whitehall in detail. Despite these 
restrictions, the Governor's powers were of a new type similar to those 
of the new Governor-Generalship of India, more extensive than those under 
the Quebec system of 1774 and far more so than in the other British 
colonies. 
D. J. Murray has criticised the Instructions for their 'contra- 
dictions and obscurities', claiming that nothing was specified as to 
the legislative functions of the Governor and Conseil Supe'rieur and 
that Hawkesbury 'presumed' the separation of Executive, Legislature and 
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Judiciary would follow from the abolition of the Intendancy. 
(17) 
it 
was clear, nonetheless, from article 6 that legislative power lay 
solely with the Crown and its representative. As well as functioning 
as an appeal court, the Conseil Superieur had in the past helped to 
vote taxes and administer the caisse municipale; it could remonstrate 
against legislation, which it was nevertheless obliged to register, and 
within narrow limits it could issue rulings for the better execution of 
the law, but its power to make 'police laws' had been suppressed in 
1766. 
(18) 
In organising the Conseil Superieur, the Governor was ordered to 
'attend to' the most reasonable of the previous tables of fees. Colon- 
ists' complaints against the exorbitant costs of litigation were thus 
not ignored. 
(19) 
Though he was left free to fill judicial posts with 
former colonial magistrates, Williamson was advised by Portland to choose 
4migrds who had served in the parlements of France. As a great Whig 
noble, Portland was doubtless sympathetic to those robe families who 
had led the revolte nobiliaire against the French Crown, and he had be- 
friended some exiled in England. However, to Williamson he stressed 
that the character and ability of the judges was a vital point in con- 
vincing the colonists of the superior advantages of being British, and 
indeed he laid repeated emphasis in his correspondence on 'an able and 
upright administration of the laws'. 
(20) 
In his desire to strengthen the Executive and conciliate local 
opinion, one might say that Hawkesbury took the cardinal innovations 
of the Quebec Act and extended them even further. However, in so 
doing, he was also following the Capitulations, for both the colonists 
and the British realised the situation demanded a strong hand backed by 
local goodwill. The system, one should remember, was only intended to 
be temporary. All assumed that peace would bring the introduction of 
traditional patterns, British or French, or possibly of the Canadian 
system of 1791. 
(21) 
Even so, in the context of British colonial history, 
the Instructions for Governor Williamson represent a 'clear break with 
traditional forms' and may be considered the prototype of Crown Colony 
(22) 
Government. 
(ii) Early Administration. Like Grey at Martinique, Williamson 
did not wait for instructions from Whitehall and between May and August 
1794 re-established civil government in the occupied zone on a provisional 
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basis. Till then, administration and government were shared between 
Williamson at Spanish Town, a few British officials sent over from 
Jamaica, the local military commanders and the councils they appointed 
to advise them. It was consequently a fragmented affair. 
In charge of all matters of revenue and provisioning was the Agent- 
(or Commissary-) General, George Bogle. One of a family of Jamaican 
merchants, he was relatively young for so responsible a position, though 
he had been long employed in the Agent-General's office in Kingston and 
had served as Commissary on a previous expedition. He was recommended 
for the post by the Jamaican Agent, the very wealthy and influential 
George Atkinson, who was also Bogle's business partner in one of Kingston's 
most prestigious merchant houses. Allowed a guinea per day and 5% com- 
mission on expenditure, he later acquired other lucrative posts under 
General Whyte and a small clerical staff, which gave him some influence. 
(23) 
Bogle arrived with Whitelocke's expedition and began organising 
the Jdrdmie customs. In this he was assisted by another Jamaican mer- 
chant, Edward Corbet, who within two months had combined the post of 
Naval Officer with that of correspondent for a firm of Charleston mer- 
chants, overseeing an absentee plantation and importing French wine 
'much wanted' in the colony. 
(24) 
Comptroller of the Customs at J6rdmie, 
Ldogane and, later, Port au Prince, was Henry Francklyn, nephew of the 
Kingston Collector and son of the absentee planter and pamphleteer Gilbert 
Francklyn. Early in 1794, another Jamaica customs officer, John 
Rousselette, was similarly transferred to Saint Marc and Arcahaye. 
Commodore Ford had already, without consulting Williamson, made his 
purser Collector of Customs and Commissary for the mole, and it was 
soon found expedient to make Rousselette and Francklyn likewise local 
deputies to Bogle, 'as a check to the impositions', Williamson admitted, 
'that I am afraid some of my French friends might be guilty of'. 
(25) 
Rousselette was also named Colonel of Militia and Agent-Paymaster of 
the colonial corps of his district, Comptroller of Port au Prince 
Customs, Agent of Forfeited Estates and Agent for Prize Money. He 
had enjoyed a similar plurality in Jamaica. This was indeed an econ- 
omical use of manpower. Williamson assured Whitehall that his prot4g6 
was paid only for the Collectorship but, as Rousselette himself later 
observed, one could not expect a man to abandon secure employment in 
Jamaica without profiting by it. 
(26) 
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In July 1793, an American sea captain had predicted, 'it would 
cost a kingdom to pay the expenses of getting a tolerable footing on 
St. Domingo with an army'. 
(27) 
From the very beginning, the costs of 
occupation were found to be great. The colony was eventually to foot 
the bill, but even in la Grand'Anse Bogle found he was expected to pay 
in the first instance for the colonial forces, whose lifestyle in the 
camps he considered luxurious. Trade was reviving, however, and he 
hoped the export tax would cover these costs, but at the Mole, whose 
hinterland was barren, there was almost no prospect of trade. 
(28) 
There the garrison cost £7/800 per month and in three weeks 650 refugees 
arrived from the surrounding parishes with an equal number of slaves. 
They expected at least to be fed, and the British could not afford to 
disappoint them. It was to be a persistent problem. Saint Domingue 
swarmed with people of all social groups out of work or with no place 
to live. When nearly 2000 whites fled mulatto-ruled Port au Prince 
in mid-March, an exhausted Captain Smith at L4ogane suddenly found 
himself distributing 5000 rations per day. 
(29) 
The hallmark of Williamson's administration was his desire 'by 
all manner of means to reconcile the inhabitants of St. Domingo to the 
British Government'. 
(30) 
The creation of public offices, therefore, 
could not simply be a matter of administrative efficiency. It also 
involved considerations of charity and, primarily, of politics. Thus, 
at the Mole, Lieutenant-Colonel Dansey and, later, Williamson had to 
promote recalcitrant' and superfluous officers and find jobs for numerous 
unemployed gentlemen of 'weight and influence'. Williamson had instructed 
Whitelocke before he sailed that the important thing, when appointing his 
Privy Council, was to leave out no figure of importance. 
(31) 
The Conseil 
Prive at Jerdmie was formed from the existing Conseil de Sürete with the 
addition of de Charmilly. It was criticised for containing men with no 
property and proved difficult to manage, as did that region in general. 
(32) 
The Mole council consisted of two important refugee planters, both creole, 
Pierre-Joseph Laborie, 
(33) 
who was president, and Pierre Collette; a local 
planter, Jacques-Daniel Jujardy, also named government storekeeper; 
James Esten, Commodore Ford's purser, who spoke good'French; the newly- 
promoted Colonel Deneux and a small boat owner, Benoit Pittalus, both 
of whom had helped surrender the place to the British. L. Cougniac 
fils acted as secretary. Doubtless at the instigation of Laborie, 
the council advised against a policy of racial discrimination and was 
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to be critical of high taxation and legal fees. 
(34) 
Saint Marc and 
LSogane possessed Conseils de Police which included free coloureds. 
Troops, administrators, the destitute; hospitals, gaols, fort- 
ifications, the hire of shipping: all needed money. However, William- 
son and, for the time being, Dundas remained sanguine, impressed with 
the colony's huge potential wealth. Furthermore, by February, trade 
between Saint Domingue and Jamaica was said to be 'prodigious'; some 
months later, Arcahaye and Saint Marc were described as 'flourishing'. 
(35) 
It is true that half of the produce exported in this period, in spite 
of the Capitulation, the Navigation Acts (and the U. S. embargo of March- 
June 1794), went to the Americans and other neutrals, but as they paid 
extra duty this was all for the better from a fiscal point of view. 
Williamson simply had to accept that American shipping was vital to 
the conquered colonies. American imports were cheaper and of better 
quality, while the British merchant marine probably did not have the 
extra capacity to handle the huge volume of coffee involved and, anyway, 
would soon be driven from the seas around Saint Domingue by enemy 
privateers. 
(36) 
The Capitulation was also ignored as regards taxation. The export 
duties the British Collectors placed on American shipping considerably 
exceeded those known under the Ancien Regime. The Council of the Mole 
complained in vain, but the Jer4mie Council had itself already imposed 
extra taxation, though it was not a representative body. It raised the 
poll taxes on plantation slaves from 2 1.5 s. to 10 1.5 s. to bring 
in around £10,000 p. a. 
(37) 
Giving vent to its esprit colon, it slapped 
an extra 14 1.5 s. on absentees' slaves and sequestered outright the 
revenue of mulattoes living under Republican rule. The Council also 
asserted the local pride of the Grand'Anse planters by insisting it 
retain the poll tax revenue for local use. 
(38) 
Instead, therefore, 
of financing current expenditure in the less well-preserved areas, it 
was applied to generously compensating those Jeremie planters who freed 
slaves to serve in the camps. Some districts, however, had a broader 
outlook. Arcahaye gave assistance to embattled Saint Marc, though it, 
too, paid supplementary taxation and was subject to levies to meet local 
needs. Little evidence has survived of this local taxation raised by 
the municipal authorities for their own use. At Port au Prince, Saint 
Marc and L4ogane, items of extraordinary expenditure (such as the fort- 
ification of la Croix des Bouquets) were met by loans raised by these 
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parishes on the strength of future revenues and contracted at parish 
meetings. 
(39) 
The increases in taxation were not unreasonable. Colonial pro- 
duce had risen considerably in price since 1789. In Republican areas, 
the standard impost was 25% of total income, and this was to be continued 
by Toussaint, Dessalines and Christophe. Moreover, despite these 
increases the public revenue of the occupied zone was still completely 
inadequate for its needs. By mid-summer, it is true, the Customs of 
Arcahaye and Saint Marc were bringing in £1000 per week, but this did 
not last and the occupation of Saint Marc had already cost over £7000. 
It is unlikely the J&&ie Customs grossed more than £12,000 before 
the end of June. 
(40) 
From the outset, Bogle and the British commanders 
had to have specie shipped from Jamaica, American merchants being loath 
to take bills on Kingston. However, until Williamson arrived and began 
drawing directly on the Treasury, Bogle's main source of finance was in 
fact bills drawn on the Jamaican Agent-General, Atkinson, who like his 
partner took 5% commission on them. As soon as the British landed in 
Saint Domingue, he had offered his services to the Government. Though 
it was his associate Sir Francis Baring, no less, who presented the bills 
at the Treasury, he had great difficulty at first in getting them honoured, 
so suspiciously large were the sums involved. 
(41) 
Up to June 1794, the 
occupation of Saint Domingue seems to have cost Great Britain around 
£120,000. 
(42) 
Far worse was to follow. 
(iii) The Establishment of Civil Government: May - October 1794. 
The re-establishment of the law courts and the multiplication of civil 
posts following the fall of Port au Prince were to greatly increase the 
costs of occupation. Being questions of power and patronage, they also 
deepened political divisions in the colony. No one could doubt the 
strength of these, when on June 4th 17 whites picked out as revolution- 
aries from among those found in Fort Saint Joseph were summarily beheaded 
by Montalembert's soldiers. 
(43) 
For two months, Brigadier-General Whyte and his royalist supporters 
held sway in the capital, monopolising patronage and ignoring Williamson's 
prior arrangements. The key figure was Hanus de Jum6court, who was made 
Chief of Police of the occupied zone - hardly an English institution, 
remarked Cadusch, who called him a 'Vizir'. 
(44) 
Supposed supporters of 
Sonthonax were deported or sent to the pontoons at Port Royal. All 
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property-in the conquered city was declared liable for confiscation, 
even though most of its inhabitants had abandoned it and joined the 
British before it fell. An Anglo-French committee - Malouet called 
it a Revolutionary Tribunal - was set up to review cases individually. 
(45) 
Montalembert professed amazement that colonists whose goods had been 
seized by Sonthonax should now expect to retrieve them from the govern- 
ment warehouses. Prize money was at stake. Those who complained or 
instituted legal actions were regarded as subversive. 
(46) 
Moreover, 
residents returning to Port au Prince were refused entry to their own 
houses by soldiers now occupying them. 
Such cases were regarded sympathetically by Whyte's new Conseil 
Prive. 
(47) 
It set up an emergency body to deal with them till the 
civil courts were restored and represented the colonists' fears to the 
commander. The Council's time was mainly taken up with these and other 
property cases, the examination of government contractors' accounts, 
requests for secours and for permits to leave the colony. It also 
produced projects for re-establishing the postal service and for re- 
organising hospital administration -a persistent concern. However, 
one of its first duties was to frame an ordonnance de police. Interest- 
ingly, its opening clause recalled the popul to its forgotten religious 
duties and threatened severe punishment of any irreverence towards church 
ceremonies or property. Soldiers, sailors and slaves were barred from 
taverns and drink shops and their opportunities for handling stolen goods 
were restricted. A strict pass-system for slaves was revived and a 
curfew was imposed at 10 p. m. Streets renamed by les anarchistes were 
renamed yet again. 
The lawyer, Francois Ango, one of the Conseil Prive, was made police 
chief of Port au Prince, a somewhat superfluous post, and the city's 
police force (archers and mar4chaussee) was restored with a wage bill 
of 150,000 1. p. a. Rainville, principal administrator under Sonthonax, 
became Inspecteur de police and additionally Commissaire de l'arrieree. 
He was an odd choice, opposed by both the Cöte ouest and certain Royalists. 
Moderates, nevertheless, wished to profit from his long administrative 
experience, though in the event it was he who profited most. 
(48) 
De Charmilly's presence in Whyte's Council is at first sight surprising. 
However, Williamson had made him Colonel en second of Montalembert's Legion 
and he had since broken with his l6, opardin colleagues in power at Kingston, 
and attached himself to the military faction now dominant in Saint Domingue. 
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In August, he set out for England, intending to put pressure on the 
Government and posing as the colonists' deputy on the strength of a 
few petitions he had worked up. Malouet, outmanoeuvred, declined to 
compete: 'je le laisse poursuivre sa brillante carriere'. 
(49) 
On two points, all parties were agreed. Saint Domingue needed 
more troops and a resident governor who was tactful and could speak 
French. By July, few doubted that Williamson was the man for the job. 
One issue, however, was a source of bitter disagreement - the restoration 
of the law courts. Military men claimed that the political and financial 
state of the colony called for military government. The great sums 
needed to pay the lawyers' salaries, Montalembert observed, would be 
best spent on the army. 
(50) 
Lawyers, naturally, thought otherwise. 
One ex-magistrate, however, not re-appointed, claimed that as the best 
lawyers had all left Saint Domingue the lack of suitable candidates to 
become judges was another reason why the return to civil procedure was 
premature. There was, to be sure, a considerable backlog of cases 
waiting to be settled, especially concerning debt and inheritance. On 
the other hand, with a ten year moratorium on commercial debts and so 
many colonists absent, too poor or too busy in the camps to litigate, 
there was, some argued, little judicial business to be done. They were 
probably right. 
(51) 
Yet, moderate opinion seems to have supported the measure in essence. 
Colonel Whitelocke, who had found the inhabitants of the Grand'Anse 
'extremely litigious', thought it necessary to protect property and re- 
store order. There was a danger that prosecutions might revive old 
hatreds, but without the courts of law military rule would certainly seem 
and could well prove to be unduly arbitrary. 
(52) 
The Conseil Prive, for its part, feared in the restoration of the 
Conseil Supe'rieur the appearance of a rival. It knew it would be a 
bastion of Cöte ouest influence. Williamson, however, disliked the 
'strong monarchists', particularly those he called 'Emigrants (I almost 
say Adventurers)' who had served the Princes and possessed no property 
in Saint Domingue. 'I give office to none of them', he wrote with future 
annexation in the forefront of his mind. 
(53) 
He had friends to reward 
who had rendered England notable services and whom he thought men of 
ability. Isolated in Spanish Town, he saw Saint Domingue only through 
the eyes of his adviser, Cadusch. He thus assured Portland that oppos- 
ition to the re-establishment of the law courts came 'entirely (from) 
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persons... guilty of every species of fraud and plunder' who feared 
prosecution. 
(54) 
Like Hawkesbury, he doubtless felt that, as Britain 
held Saint Domingue by the consent of the principal inhabitants and as 
long as they were footing the bill for the occupation, Britain owed them 
a civil administration 'on a respectable footing'. 
(55) 
Certainly, he 
felt free to proclaim to the colonists in mid-July that His Majesty 
expected 'greater conquests from his generosity than from his arms'. 
(56) 
Accordingly, Williamson announced by the same proclamation the 
return of the Conseil Superieur and lower courts. He also nullified 
all decrees and appointments made by the local commanders and dismissed 
with thanks their advisory councils. The administration was to be 
centralised and made uniform. All commissions for public office had 
to be validated by the Conseil Superieur. The ambitions of General Whyte 
were thus curtailed. At J6remie, on May 17th the senechaussee had already 
been reinstated with some pomp and the additional powers of a court of 
Vice-Admiralty. The Conseil Superieur, at first delayed by Whyte and 
Montalembert, finally met at Port au Prince on August 18th. 
(57) 
The 
public outcry, even Williamson admitted, was considerable. 
At the centre of the storm were Chauvin Dumas, named Chef de Justice 
and Premier President of the Superior Council, and Berault Saint Maurice, 
who became Procureur-General. Dumas was generally acknowledged to be a 
talented avocat but was little known before the Revolution. Berault 
Saint Maurice was a totally obscure court official with only 18 months' 
judicial experience. Whitelocke and-Williamson praised his abilities 
but Billard thought him imaginative rather than learned: 'il a servi 
ici la cause Anglaise avec le vif desir de la Place qu'il occupe'. 
Both were about 33 years old and, with de Ronseray, the Deuxieme President, 
were the youngest men in the new tribunal, although the most senior. 
(58) 
Royalists, particularly former magistrates, were furious to see promoted 
men they thought responsible for the colony's ruin. They, the honnetes 
gens, the vrais, franrais, had waited patiently through the years of anarchy 
only to see the highest offices given to 'les Coryphees des Assemblees... 
devenues Royalistes depuis deux jours'. So thought creole ex-conseiller 
Kenscoff de la Pommeraye. 
(59) 
Like the author of the Precis Historique, 
he could not forgive Dumas for attacking the magistracy in the Saint Marc 
Assembly and then, as president of the Assembly of the West, dismissing all 
officiers appointed by the King. Even the much more moderate Billard 
called as a 'Cameleon Revolutionnaire qui dit-on a occupe 52 places 
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dans les Municipalites et Assemblees'. For the vicomte Saint Pont, 
both Berault and de Charmilly were traitors and bastards, 'vile... 
(60) 
obscure beings', 
Similar feelings were aroused by the appointment of the leopardin 
Jean-Baptiste Mongin as senechal of Port au Prince. Dumas' uncle, 
Etienne Vincendon-Dutour, who was made Substitut Procureur General, 
had been even more prominent in the Revolution but his age and experience 
carried some weight. 
(61) 
Of the judges of the Conseil Superieur, Baron 
and Salvau were outstandingly disreputable, while Bocquet, Conigliano and 
de Cullion pere were ex-magistrates and considered good choices. The 
other seven were a mixed group but generally were accounted nonentities 
who would do what Cadusch said. All were thought to have paid William- 
son's secretary ten portugaises each for their commissions. Cadusch 
protested: only a few had. 
(62) 
The other judicial appointments reflect the same blend of extremism, 
ability and incompetence. Even had business been as normal in the 
occupied parishes, the number appointed was far more than was necessary 
and, to make matters worse, their salaries appeared to have been increased. 
(63) 
Those of the Conseil Superieur alone totalled some 460,000 1. p. a. 
Williamson was unlucky in that the worsening military situation put his 
policy in an especially unfavourable light. Even so, well might de 
Jumecourt complain of the injustice of paying judges 20,000 1. p. a. to 
try imaginary cases, when Port au Prince was in a state of siege and 
plantations all round the town were going up in flames. 
(64) 
Two contentious decisions by Williamson further embittered the 
controversy. Firstly, he declared that existing court decisions should 
be reconfirmed before being executed, and that all judgments made by 
magistrates appointed by Sonthonax or Polverel could be appealed. This 
was creating litigation at a stroke. It overthrew the 10 year moratorium 
on commercial debts and promised millions of livres in fees to the 290 
new court officers. 
(65) 
Additionally, Williamson ordered that planters 
making a profit should pay / of their past commercial debts, providing 
this left them with enough to live on and maintain their property. This 
seemed reasonable, particularly in January when first decreed at the 
request of the Grand'Anse merchants. 
(66) 
It shows Williamson's desire 
for equity. Despite many contrary claims, it did not contravene the 
Capitulation, which merely authorised the Governor to grant debtors 
relief. (In fact, Malouet's original intention, until dissuaded by 
- 140 - 
de Charmilly, had been to grant relief only to ruined planters). 
(67) 
However, if creditors deserved justice no less than debtors, Saint 
Domingue was a debtor society. The inhabitants of Port au Prince and 
the Cul de Sac petitioned in the autumn that most planters had no hope 
of meeting even a fraction of their past debts. The intact state of 
Arcahaye and the Grand'Anse was no excuse for a general law, it was 
claimed. Even there, revenues at a third of their former levels, were 
swallowed up by taxes, requisitions and greatly increased running costs. 
Furthermore, English merchants would cease offering credit, if their 
advances were used to pay off other creditors. 
(68) 
The traditional tensions between planters, merchants and lawyers, 
as well as those between royalists and revolutionaries, were thus exacer- 
bated. Berault even sharpened the already fraught question of legal 
fees by actually adding new ones to the tariff, such as the petite chan- 
cellerie of the French parlements. Vincendon-Dutour, moreover, admitted 
that some judges were making illegal exactions. 
(69) 
In England, de 
Charmilly assiduously spread rumours about the new courts. No one 
trusted them, he said; everyone discussed the lawyers' pasts. Indeed, 
Berault and Dumas lived up to expectations, when they declared, to 
Williamson's embarrassment, that they were not subject to the authority 
of the military commander, (Whyte, then Horneck). Only the Governor, 
they claimed, had the right to interfere with the civil administration. 
(70) 
Faced with such pretensions, the Conseil Prive urged the now subdued 
General Whyte to assert what it thought to be his prerogatives. He 
should not, they said, let the Chef de Justice take over the Governor's 
power of censorship. In vain, they advised against allowing the journ- 
alist Gattereau to print his Affiches Americaines at Port au Prince, which 
Berault had recommended. In the case of Paulin Mandel, a renegade priest 
who had collaborated with Rigaud's insurgents in 1791-2, it suggested 
Whyte prevent the Conseil Superieur from prosecuting him lest it arouse 
factional disputes in the camps. He should therefore monopolise the 
haute pouvoir policier in criminal cases, and preferably deport Mandel. 
Whyte replied he did not need advice on the extent of his authority and 
generally ignored his Privy Council, never consulting it and often not 
bothering to sign the letters he sent it. De Jumecourt hardly ever 
attended its meetings. 
(71) 
Similarly, Whyte's successor, Brigadier-General Horneck, only 
(72) 
sought advice on trivial matters but his Privy Council, partly nomi- 
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nated by Cadusch and Dumas, was to prove more self-assertive. One of 
its members, however, Billard, had been retained from the old Council. 
(73) 
Former president of the Club Massiac, he proved the most active of the 
councillors, drawing up numerous reports and writing privately to Malouet, 
who regarded him as an influential opponent of Cadusch, moderate and tres 
instruit. 
(74) 
In the same terms, Malouet described Billard's colleague, Belin de 
Villeneuve, who had likewise been active in the Club Massiac. He, however, 
was a unique figure, perhaps the most generally respected man in Saint 
Domingue. An entirely self-made creole planter and estate attorney, 
he had connections with the Royalists in Europe but was considered to 
be above factional disputes. 
(75) 
This could not be said of the Cote ouest appointments, Vincendon- 
Dutour, de Leaumont pare and the secretary, Jouette. According to 
Billard, Vincendon-Dutour's ideas were now assez saines, except that he 
wanted to destroy the Conseil Prive, as it prevented the Conseil Superieur 
from ruling Saint Domingue. De Leaumont, he thought knowledgeable on 
business matters, though possessing 'de bonnes vues avec un caractere 
trop facille'. 
(76) 
Gueydon was an upright and trusted Cul de Sac planter 
and Legras a wealthy refugee from the North. 
Otherwise an obscure figure, Billard is the man whose opinions we 
know best, thanks to a memoir he wrote to Malouet. 
(77 
The two men's 
principles, he claimed, were the same, adding that Saint Domingue had 
only accepted the British because the Commissioners were freeing the 
slaves and plotting to kill the whites. Billard wanted an assembly to 
be called only after the war. It should be small, based on wealth and 
not allowed to overrule the Governor, who alone could maintain slavery. 
He had favoured the restoration of the law courts but not the main 
appointments made. In the future, he wanted three provincial Conseils 
Superieurs, smaller, cheaper, bringing justice closer to the litigant - 
the usual southerner's demand. The Administration should be French with 
different officials handling receipts and expenditure. 
(78) 
Above all, 
it should be accountable to the Conseil Prive, acting, as Malouet said, 
as a Chambre des Comptes. If not, it was in danger of running up huge 
bills at the colony's expense. To his mind, the Conseil Prive should 
be not only a guide for the British commander but also 'un simulacre... 
de representation Coloniale'. It ought to watch over colonial funds, 
the treatment of colonists and the making of laws. Instead, it was merely 
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an English-type Council, he thought, (and in fact considerably less 
powerful). On November 22nd, the Conseil informed Horneck that its 
duty was not simply to give advice when asked 'mais encore de provoquer 
(79) 
des decisions dans les cas oü elles leur paroissent n6cessaires'. 
Billard was worried that the ten year moratorium on debts would 
make some planters irretrievably indebted, destroying the hopes of 
their old creditors. Yet, he condemned Williamson's 25% law as a 
waste of time benefiting only lawyers. Vincendon-Dutour went further 
and on behalf of the Conseil declared that neither the Governor nor the 
King had the power to thus break the Capitulation. 
( 0) The Council 
also condemned as contrary to the Capitulation, and dangerously vague 
and inflammatory, a letter Williamson had written to Berault Saint 
Maurice subsequently registered by the Conseil Superieur as a law and 
published in Gattereau's newspaper. It authorised Berault to prosecute 
with a view to sequestration as friends of the Civil Commissioners those 
deported to Jamaica and singled out by Cadusch. It greatly alarmed the 
mulattoes at a critical juncture and shows Williamson in a poor light. 
The Conseil Prive wanted the letter withdrawn. Like the previous 
Council, it urged that the censorship of publications be performed not 
by the judiciary but by the commander, which in effect meant themselves. 
It also opposed the creation of unnecessary posts by Dumas and B&rault, 
(81) 
and this advice Williamson heeded in late November. 
Further conflict with the lawyers was avoided by the declaration 
of martial law on October 25th. 
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CHAPTER VII: THE GOVERNMENT OF SIR ADAM WILLIAMSON: OCTOBER 1794 - MARCH 1796 
In late autumn 1794, Williamson learnt he had been made a Knight of the 
Bath and Governor of St. Domingo. He never wanted the post, it seems, 
hoping rather that success in Saint Domingue would lead to the military 
command in Bengal 
(1) 
Sent out in 1790 to command the Jamaica garrison 
when war with Spain was feared, he had only become Governor of Jamaica 
because of the sudden death of the Earl of Effingham. Some expected he would 
be replaced by a more high-born candidate 
(2), but he was confirmed in the 
post, having seen Jamaica through a dangerous crisis and proving extremely 
popular with its inhabitants. Deferential to the Assembly, lax in enforcing 
the Acts of Trade and indulgent in his assistance to French refugees, he was 
much praised for his 'mildness', occasionally so for his ability 
(3). After 
his dispute with Brigadier-General Whyte, all agreed he should be made 
Governor of Saint Domingue. Before Williamson could leave Spanish Town, 
however, he had to wait for a replacement. This took six months. 
(i) The Campaign, October 1794 - July 1795. During this period, 
British fortunes in the Caribbean reached their lowest ebb. The French 
Republic, while consolidating its position in Europe, drove the British from 
Guadeloupe in December and from St. Lucia the following June. More 
alarmingly, in March revolution and race war spread to the British island 
of Grenada, then to St. Vincent, while French agents were active in 
Jamaica and may have helped cause the Maroon War that broke out in July (4). 
For want of men, the British forces in Saint Domingue could do nothing but 
hang on in increasingly difficult circumstances. In late August 1794, 
Dundas had announced the dispatch of 2000 reinforcements. Though embarked 
in September, contrary winds kept them in the Channel, incredibly, until 
February 1795 They could never have saved L4ogane nor the Artibonite 
and were perhaps too few to permit an offensive but, nonetheless, would 
have been of infinitely greater use arriving at the end instead of at the 
start of the sickly season. The British might then have enjoyed the 
luxury of two fresh regiments free from disease for six months. They 
would have prevented morale in the occupied parishes sinking to the depths 
it did, for in the months before Williamson's arrival hundreds of colonists 
left for North America, while unknown numbers of blacks, free coloureds 
and petits blancs fled to the Republican zone. Horneck, it was said, considered 
(6) 
abandoning Port au Prince 
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TABLE 1 
Regional Distribution of British Troops 
Fit, Sick and Convalescent, 26th October 1794 
Fit 
Port au Prince 448 (45%) 
Mole 171 (36%) 
Saint Marc 27 (45%) 
Arcahaye 38(100%) 
Tiburon 64 (47%) 
Jdr6mie 92 (54%) 
Sick and Convalescent 
5 39 
302 
33 
0 
72 
76 
Total 
987 
473 
60 
38 
136 
170 
British troops 840 (45%) 1022 1862 
Colonial troops 427 (67%) 213 640 
Total 1267 (51%) 1235 2502 
Source: WO 17/1986. Only rank and file are given. British officers and 
NCO's numbered 344, while the three colonial corps listed possessed 190. 
The great surface area of the capital required very long lines of 
defence and these were dominated by the surrounding heights. All that took 
place on the parade ground could be seen and heard by the black insurgents 
hiding in the hills overlooking the eastern perimeter or camped on the 
enormous Morne 1'Hopital rising 3000 feet directly to the south. Moreau de 
Saint-Mary had thought the town indefensible. On the other hand, 
de Charmilly ridiculed the idea that it could fall to an enemy without 
artillery or trained troops 
(7). 
The British, nonetheless, took great pains 
in elaborating the capital's fortifications. A ditch and earthworks were 
thrown up round the town and redoubts, small forts and blockhouses added at 
intervals. The 'citadel' of the system, now Fort National, was an extremely 
costly stone fort containing bomb-proof underground chambers and a huge 
blockhouse. It was erected on a hill above the Belair district dominating 
the town and looking out on to the plain of Cul de Sac 
(8), 
where 10 miles 
away Montalembert similarly turned Croix des Bouquets into an impressive 
stronghold. The only communication between the two places was by armed 
convoys of wagons. These were frequently attacked but Montalembert's 
legion, with about 350 local militia, inflicted severe losses on their 
assailants and inspired confidence in the capital. 
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This was shaken by the sudden loss of Ldogane, and though in November 
the blacks pulled back from Port au Prince, they turned in December to 
attacking Fort Bizoton that guarded the coast road two miles to the south. 
On the 5th, Pomps's men crept up unseen to the ramparts as the moon set and 
tried to climb through the embrasures. As at Fort l'Acul, the tiny garrison 
responded instantly. A brig anchored offshore began cannonading the blacks 
swarming down the mountain side. Within 45 minutes, 250 lay dead and the 
rest withdrew. The defenders had lost five men; and yet, the attacks went 
on 
(9) 
Throughout 1795, the 70 men at Bizoton had to be relieved weekly by sea. 
Though the fever epidemic had abated in November, the damage was already 
done and the Port au Prince garrison continued to dwindle under the strain 
of constant guard duty and overdrinking. In late October, it had about 450 
British fit and 540 sick or convalescent; in late December, 366 fit and 462 
sick, plus 550 armed colonials 
(10)" Simply to mount a night guard along its 
far-flung ramparts required 500 men. Hence troops rarely got a full night's 
sleep. At Bizoton, they were always armed before dawn. Lt-Col. Markham, 
town commandant and son of the Archbishop of York, never went to bed before 
the morning gun 
(11)" Of the 4000 soldiers sent to Saint Domingue, under 1800 
lived to see the new year. 'Lord have mercy on, us', Williamson lamented, 
'for we are poor insignificant devils in this Hemisphere'. 
(12). 
The colonists, who complained frequently at this period of poor relations 
between the army and navy and of warships idle in the ports, - did not realize 
how severely the navy had also suffered. In July, August and September, the 
Jamaica Station had lost over 440 seamen and, although mortality and morbidity 
dropped sharply for the next twelve months, the commodore was already 600 
men short by October and achieving little success with his press gangs 
(13) 
Consequently, privateers of all descriptions were able to raid coastal ports 
in Jamaica and Saint Domingue, cut out ships in the small harbours and by 
mid 1795 bring trade between the two colonies to a standstill. 
Hispaniola's 
coastline is exceptionally long and 
indented, and the Jamaica Station lacked 
small, fast vessels. Laveaux's marine flibustiere, 
Rigaud's south coast 
seamen, American, Spanish and British freebooters could generally outstrip 
the British cruisers or lie close in to the shore out of reach of a frigate. 
Even so, the deadliest enemy-was said to be the armed longboats that put out 
from Leogane and Gonaives to board vessels becalmed off the coast. The 
(14) 
fighting at sea was as savage as on land 
146 - 
The Jamaica Station, whose responsibilities included Jamaica, Honduras 
and the Bahamas, clearly could not patrol, reconnoitre, ferry supplies and 
provide permanent support for all the outposts in Saint Domingue as well. 
As a result, in early December the Republicans finally captured the 60 
miles of coast between Fesles and the Spanish frontier, a wild region of 
forests and mountains, said to produce annually six million lbs. of coffee. 
Till then, 100 or so local planters, supplied by the British, had endeavoured 
to keep it independent 
(15) On Christmas Day, Rigaud appeared once 
again before Tiburon, this time with a flotilla. No frigate was there to 
oppose him, only a schooner on which the colonists' wives and children had 
taken refuge. Landing siege artillery, the Republicans sank it with all 
hands and then began bombarding the British positions above the bay. 
Perhaps numbering 3000,800 of them were thought to be troops of the line. 
For four days, shells rained down on the great fort with devastating effect. 
When a bomb exploded in the ditch they were crouching in, Kina's men finally 
panicked, lowered the drawbridge and fled. The British and colonists then 
effected a desperate retreat by mountain tracks through an ambush to les 
Irois, where a frigate halted the Republicans' advance. Of Tiburon's 
garrison of 450,300 had perished 
(16) 
The disaster at Tiburon had serious repercussions. At J4r4mie some 200 
mulattoes rebelled (although it is not clear if this was'a direct response 
or provoked by a decision to round them up). Their leaders were executed 
and 100 were imprisoned at the Mole, where a plot in Contade's legion was 
(17) 
also discovered Harsh conditions and Laveaux's agents similarly 
produced a conspiracy among men of all colours at Saint Marc, and in late 
January Montalembert claimed to have unearthed a plot to overthrow the 
British linking men in his legion with revolutionaries at Port au Prince. 
More executions followed. 'We have nothing to fear from an external foe', 
Williamson opined, 'but everything from within'. 
(18) 
However, one must remember that the Republican zone was no less 
troubled by internal strife. In particular, the northern mulattoes began 
to chafe at Laveaux's reassertion of central control in alliance with the 
blacks. In November, those of le Cap rioted and may have arrested Laveaux; 
some wanted him dead. This in turn created, or provided an excuse for, 
dissension in Toussaint's Artibonite Cordon, which Brisbane then opportunely 
attacked in concert with forces from l'Arcahaye and Mirebalais 
(19). Some of 
the mulattoes who had betrayed Brisbane in September had, it seems, promptly 
betrayed Toussaint. He had decided since then, being short of ammunition, 
that the town had become too strong to be attacked. 'Ses propres ruines', 
lui servent de remparts 
(20) 
he observed, 
Instead, the black leader had 
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turned against the Spaniards and also tried to revive the plantations around 
Petite Rivic)re, which Brisbane was now trying to burn. Deploying a large 
force of cavalry, Toussaint counter-attacked and retrieved a difficult 
situation, as in June, with immense energy and skill. Dissension between 
his subordinates was patched over and at the end of December he was able to 
undertake a whirlwind compaign in the north-east where he mangled the army 
of Jean-Francois 
(21) 
By this time, Saint Marc was defended by some 80 British and about 1250 
colonial troops. Well over a quarter were in hospital. The provision 
grounds in the Artibonite plain had suffered greatly from the fighting and 
from drought, and by February a food shortage had become a famine. Great 
numbers of people, particularly after the plot against Brisbane had failed, 
fled across the river to the Republican zone 
(22). 
However, despite reports 
to the contrary, Toussaint did not dislodge the Anglo-Royalists from their 
posts on the left bank. When the Spanish abandoned Verrettes in December, 
the British took it over at the inhabitants' request 
(23). 
A lack of 
ammunition made Toussaint's subordinate commanders hesitant= it also 
provided at least the occasion for many of the disputes in the Republicans' 
camp. In the second half of January, Brisbane, reinforced from 1'Arcahaye, made 
frequent attacks in the plain. His death on February 4th, shot in the head, 
came as a great blow to British fortunes. Verrettes was immediately abandoned. 
Toussaint, having disposed of his unruly subordinate Blancazenave and 
received new supplies of ammunition, advanced across the plain and occupied 
without a fight the hills above the bourg 
(24) 
The following month, the other outstanding young officer in the British 
forces was also killed in a hail of bullets. Rigaud, turning his attention 
from the South, had established a battery overlooking Fort Bizoton. One 
hundred troops were rushed from the Mole to Port au Prince and on March 26th 
Lieutenant Colonel Markham led a sortie from the capital which led to his 
death and the capture of the battery. In a headlong charge, Montalembert 
went on to kill over 700, he claimed, of Rigaud's men, but Bizoton remained 
under siege and from new positions was subjected to daily bombardment. The 
navy attempted to create a diversion at L6ogane but failed. News then 
arrived that Saint Marc, too, was under bombardment 
(25). If it fell, 
Toussaint's army might drive southwards to join Rigaud. The people of Port 
au Prince were openly disaffected. In the whole colony, there were under 
1000 redcoats fit for service. The British position was never so precarious. 
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Horneck discussed withdrawing. to the Mole, the most secure of Britain's 
footholds in the colony. Even there, however, sentries were sniped at and 
patrols beyond its perimeter defences were often ambushed. Its advanced 
posts had had to be abandoned months before 
(26) 
There was cause for relief, 
therefore, when some 1700 troops arrived from England on April 24th. The 
pressure on Port au Prince eased. Rigaud withdrew his batteries. Twenty- 
eight days of continual cannonading had had no effect on Fort Bizoton 
(27) 
Though Toussaint Louverture apparently concerted measures with him, Rigaud 
seems to have failed to win the co-operation of Dieudonnd and Pomp4. He 
reappeared briefly in May but quickly retreated. If none of them was able 
to take the isolated Fort Bizoton, then Port au Prince, now bristling with 
defence works, might well feel secure. 
At Saint Marc, too, mid-April saw a sudden reversal of fortune. 
Toussaint's plans to attack the town were discovered by some of Dessources's 
Chasseurs who had infiltrated the dances in the Republican camps and then 
destroyed one of them in a daring night raid. Nonetheless, dawn broke on 
the 13th revealing batteries that had been erected during the night and 
that began to bombard the small forts in the hills around the town. The 
attackers greatly outnumbered the defenders and for two days the situation 
was critical. Then, Toussaint's guns were dismounted and Dessources's 200 
Chasseurs, descending from the Hauteurs de Saint Marc, rushed his positions. 
A rout must have followed, for Laveaux tells us the defeat was heavy and 
forced Toussaint on to the defensive. He retired to Gros Morne and apparently 
evacuated for a time the Artibonite and even Gonaives 
(28). 
A stalemate ensued for some months. No sooner was the British contingent 
reinforced, than it began to be whittled away again by disease. In the five 
companies sent to Saint Marc, almost every soldier was hospitalized by early 
July 
(29)" At the same time, most of Toussaint's attention seems to have 
been absorbed by the political, social and racial conflicts that undermined 
the new Republican polity in the North. The Spanish, too, made some 
(30) 
advance against him Consequently, in the thickly-wooded mountains behind 
Saint Marc and Port au Prince a war of posts and ambushes developed, enemy 
patrols sometimes clashing in the forests. It was doubtless the same along 
the Irois river, now the front line of the Grand' Anse. Toussaint's forces, 
meanwhile, increased daily and his spies were at work. In July, he busily 
manoeuvred in the highlands above the Artibonite. While avoiding a 
confrontation in the plain, he was specifically hoping to impress the 
inhabitants of the Mirebalais region to the west. They were mainly free 
- 149 - 
coloureds and many wanted, his agents informed him, to drive out the 
(31) Spanish occupying forces and join the Republicans. 
The basin of Mirebalais was a natural fortress surrounded by 
mountains. 
(32) A bulwark to the plain of Cul de Sac, controlling 
north-south communications and the trade route between Port au Prince 
and Santo Domingo, it was strategically vital. Its ranches, moreoever, 
were an important source of fresh beef and its plantations, of cotton, 
indigo and coffee, were exceptionally well preserved. Hence, when in 
late July its inhabitants rebelled against the Spaniards and called in 
Toussaint's troops, there was panic in the British camp. Simultaneously, 
the Maroon War broke out in Jamaica. With slaves and free coloureds 
already in revolt in six West Indian islands, it seemed that de Charmilly's 
warnings about the subversion of the New World were coming true. 
(ii) Martial Law and the Rise of Montalembert. For much of this 
period, the occupied parishes remained without a judiciary under martial 
law. The military was able to arrest and deport whom it pleased. The 
Governor's decrees could not be registered; criminals went unpunished and 
civil disputes untried; the gaols filled up 'with alarming speed. Despite 
their mistrust of the magistracy, Horneck's Privy Council was calling by 
late November for the return of the law courts. 
(33) 
Although no-one was exempted from the billeting of troops, the army 
had few qualms about evicting the occupants of houses it wished to use. 
The Belair district of Port au Prince was reserved exclusively for soldiers 
and many outlying buildings were demolished to provide material for the 
fortifications. Hoping the government - would' grant compensation, the 
Conseil Priv4 got such properties valued and spoke up for the dispossessed. 
(34) 
It also overruled Mole Saint Nicholas Council when it was tempted to assume 
judicial powers itself. Such affairs were of no interest to the military 
commanders. With Port au Prince facing destruction, one can see why Horneck 
was not over-concerned if judges supplanted notaries in drawing up certain 
types of inventory during martial law. But of course it mattered to notaries 
and judges, especially as business was bad and the cost of living sky high. 
However, pressured by B&rault and Dumas, Williamson was finally induced 
to end martial law on January 12th. The move was opposed by many army 
officers, particularly the increasingly powerful baron de Montalembert. 
The Cadusch faction, he complained, was trying to rule Saint Domingue and 
he would have nothing to do with it. If it tried to prejudice Williamson 
against him, he warned, he would leave the colony 
1351 
The defender of 
Port au Prince, he could afford to make such threats, for he had the confidence 
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of the propertied classes. Yet, he was disliked, notably by the planters 
of Cul de Sac themselves. The requisitions he made on their property, the 
fines he imposed for disobedience and the personal fortune he was starting 
to amass, earned him bitter enemies. Abandoned estates tended to be 
stripped. While some royalists almost idolised him, others like O'Gorman 
and de Jum4court (soldiers but also Cul de Sac planters), were already 
beginning to oppose him 
(36) 
The lawyer who wrote the Precis Historique 
hated him. 
He depicts Montalembert as a lawless mercenary, who in order to maintain 
his position exploited popular fears of the free coloureds and revolutionary 
petits blancs by fabricating 'plots'. Since the rebellions at Saint Marc 
and Ldogane, all mulattoes were regarded with intense suspicion. The 
colonists were especially uneasy that 'democratical assassins' deported 
from Saint Domingue might return to serve in the colonial corps after being 
recruited in Jamaican gaols. Yet, according to the Precis Historique, 
nobody was fooled (except the British) when, on January 29th, Montalembert 
denounced a new conspiracy in the West. Eleven of his legionaries with 
past 'records' were court martialled and those not executed were murdered 
on their way to prison. With the complicity of de Riviere, majeur de la 
place, another 15 (apparently innocent) inhabitants of Port au Prince were 
tried by a council of war and shot. Horneck then informed his Conseil Prive 
it need no longer meet. Desertions from the Legion ensued and a further 
decline in public spirit, everyone fearing to be denounced by the next 
intriguant who would take advantage of British weakness. 
(37)Free 
coloureds 
figured prominently among the executed and even more so among those imprisoned 
or deported as suspects. Yet, though the Precis Historicxue presents 
Montalembert as an oppressor of the mulattoes, Royalists claimed he was 
regarded as their protector against C©td guest extremists who wished to 
exterminate them 
(38) 
Certainly, in Jean-Baptiste Lapointe, the baron 
had a most p werful ally but his relations, too, with the free coloureds, 
were rather ambivalent. Only by executing scores of his fellows had he 
gained the (hesitant) trust of the whites and made Arcahaye the most 
flourishing and secure region in the occupied zone 
(39). 
It at first 
seemed that B6rault and Dumas would win him to their side, but in this 
important preliminary contest the victor proved to be Montalembert. 
The military crisis in April further enhanced'his position. When 
martial law was proclaimed on the 19th, he became commander of all 
colonial troops and was charged with the defence of Port au Prince. 
Ominously, he ordered a census of all people and property. Absentees' 
houses were distributed among army officers and in the plain his men 
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were encouraged to think of absentee property as their future 
reward 
(40). The Coto ouest were no less hungry for spoils but had 
a less direct approach. Their chance for retaliation soon came. 
Civil law was restored on May 21st and five days later Williamson 
arrived at Port au Prince accompanied by Cadusch. 
(iii) The Apogee and Overthrow of the 'Cdt4'ouest'. Although 
the military situation continued to decline, the arrival'of the honnete 
et bienfaisant Governor did something to restore confidence in the British. 
presence and stem the tide of emigration. A crowd of prisoners detained 
without trial was immediately freed from the pontoons. The Capitulation, 
Williamson proclaimed, applied to the whole colony; there would be no right 
of conquest. Taxation. would not be increased. Absentee property would 
be sequestered but none confiscated without judicial process. 
(41). 
Moreover, he got to know the colonists. A bon vivant, speaking fluent 
French and fond of late-night drinking and story-telling, he entertained 
from 14 to 20 guests a day. 
(42) 
At the same time, however, rivalry between the Cadusch and Montalembert 
factions increased. When the Conseil Sup&rieur met on June 1st, speeches 
were made alluding to imaginary plots and illegal courts martial. 
(43) 
Williamson offered Montalembert a seat in the new'Conseil Priv4 but he 
preferred to stay in the field. De Ronseray, the 2me President, was 
added instead and Billard and Gueydon dropped. The two councils thus 
came closer together. A burst of legislative activity ensued. 
The Privy Council first drew up a law sequestrating the property 
of all absentees and making their employees liable to dismissal. It 
offered enormous scope for graft and created"a storm of protest. 
(44) 
Emigration had cut the free population by at least half in the past year 
and was continuing. 
(45) 
So, to complement the absentee decree, tighter 
controls were placed on the issue of passports. Maritime cases were 
taken out of the hands of the ordinary courts and a provisional court 
of Vice-Admiralty established in the capital with one French and two 
English judges. The postal service and police were reformed and the 
billeting of troops became compulsory only in an emergency. Williamson 
thought the British owed their survival in Saint Domingue to the black 
(46) 
levies they had raised. It was decided, therefore, to extend 
what many still regarded as a dangerous experiment and to raise a corps 
of Chasseurs in every parish. Regulations and terms of service were 
now standardised. Planters were to supply i in 15 of their slaves and 
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would be paid 2,000 iivres for each recruit. After five years' 
service the men would be freed. The new law's preamble stressed 
that the maintenance of slavery and the fate of the sugar colonies 
were at stake. 
The existing black corps had fought with loyalty and bravery and 
most whites (unlike in Jamaica) now seemed to have accepted them as a 
necessary evil. 
(47) 
However, it seems that the measure was rather 
less equably received in Arcahaye and Jer4mie, (which were not represented 
in the Conseil Priv4), than in the districts where work-forces were left 
idle. It was feared, furthermore, by the free coloureds, who saw the 
Chasseurs as a counter-poise to their influence and an instrument of 
persecution. 
(48) 
Officers in the corps, like officials of the 
Administration of Absentee Property, were to be whites who had resided 
at least five years in the colony. Designed to exclude Montalembert's 
4migr4s from positions of power, as well as to ensure those officering 
the blacks could speak creole, this clause was-often ignored. However, 
even in the Cul de Sac and Arcahaye, we find enemies of Montalembert and 
Lapointe commanding the new corps. 
The British Government, after lengthy discussions, had accepted 
that black troops were essential in the'West Indies: -almost every officer 
there said so. Dundas and Portland, however, were displeased with 
Williamson's costly terms of service. After at first reluctantly 
accepting the granting of liberty, Dundas had forbidden it in December 
1794, when it was too late, and then instructed that British officers 
were to be used. 
(49) 
Williamson, though, was on strong ground. Since 
the Republic had freed all slaves, the offer of liberty was unavoidable. 
As only men were freed, there would be no long-term addition to the 
free coloured population. Besides, after five years, he said, most 
recruits would re-enlist or be dead. 
(50) 
Faced with the anarchy'of Saint Domingue's profane and selfish. 
society, Malouet and others often stressed that order and subordination 
could be inculcated into all its classes through religion. 
(51) 
Just 
as he recommended emigr4'lawyers, administrators and soldiers to purge 
and renew Dominguan society, he also wished to use'4migr4 priests. 
(52) 
The British agreed. French and Irish priests'were sent out and, despite 
Cadusch's objections, an Apostolic Prefect was appointed, a former 
colonial curs living in England, the Abbe d'Osmond. His deputy In 
Saint Domingue, Guillaume Lecun, was already there. He now produced 
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an interesting proclamation extolling 'le nom ch4ri de Georges III, 
protecteur de la religion'. Because of 'l'orgueil et la filosophie... 
un esprit d'empiet4 et d'independance', it said, Europe's oldest throne 
and America's most prosperous colony had been smitten by the hand of God. 
At every Sunday mass, it decreed, Domine salvum fao regem should be sung 
and a sermon given, specifically mentioning the King of England. 
It was in England, where Malouet and de Charmilly were both active, 
that the first steps were taken to topple the Cotg buest faction now 
supreme. Portland suggested to Williamson, and at length insisted, 
that B4rault and Dumas, though deserving of reward, should be replaced 
by men better qualified for high office, specifically by magistrates of 
the French parlements recommended by Malouet. The Conseil SupXrieur, 
he thought extremely expensive and larger than necessary. 
(53) 
It was 
an embarrassing situation for Williamson. The Conseil Privd, its 
esprit colon offended, protested to Portland at local men being replaced 
by Etrangers ignorant of the colony. 
(54) 
The dilemma was to show 
the Governor at his weakest and most extravagant. Two magistrates, 
Marniere and Jonquiere, were dismissed apparently for being unqualified, 
the latter receiving a 'loan' of £30. This was a perfect occasion to 
reduce the size of the Conseil Su 4rieur. However, Williamson chose 
instead, while raising Laborie and another-lawyer to the magistrature, 
to compensate Berault and Dumas by giving them new posts within the 
Council at their old salaries. This involved displacing without 
indemnity the Council's venerable doyen, creating a new post of sous- 
doyen and riding roughshod over various legal technicalities. In 
addition, B4rault received 25,000 livres; the 2 
me President's salary 
was increased and an utterly superfluous post of Advocate-General (based 
on British and French precedent) was invented to reward Vincendon-Dutour, 
Dumas' uncle, for his part in the deal. The affair was all the more 
scandalous and unnecessary in that Berault was also made a, procureur du 
roi and Dumas 'Deputy' for the colony in England at 36,000 livres per 
(55) 
annum. 
Malouet was also named a 'Deputy'. Willing to work with men of 
all parties, he was a correspondent of Cadusch and was too influential 
a figure to ignore. These new creations of the Conseil Priy9, though 
superficially resembling the British Colonial Agents or French West 
Indian deputies at Versailles were in fact intended to give the Council 
control of the colony. Designated as the sole channel of communication 
between the colonists and the British Government, the Deputies were to 
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present 'tous les plans qui doivent donner lieu aux loix et r4glements 
d4stin6s ä gouverner Saint Domingue'. The Cotg'düest thus hoped to 
screen out their enemies in England as they had in the West Indies and, 
furthermore, gain a dominant say in legislation. To underline its new 
constitutional pretensions, the Conseil Priv6 now adopted the title of 
'les proprigtaires-planteurs composant le Conseil Colonial'. 
(56) 
Malouet had warned Hawkesbury well over a year before: if the Governor 
did not keep control of it, the Conseil Priv4 's'4rigeroit bientöt au-dessus 
du Gouvernement et les troubles recommenceroient'. 
(57) 
Most property-owners, it was said, loathed the Cadusch faction. 
Considered responsible for the colony's ruin, 
(58) 
its unpopularity now 
greatly increased. The Conseil'Priv4 had to close down most printing 
presses for ' upsetting order'. One extreme anti-revolutionary living 
at J4r4mie wrote bitterly to a British'M. P. that the government was 
controlled by the 'same barbarians' as in 1790. The Privy Council, 
he said, was a secret revolutionary body like the Committee of Public 
Safety; it stifled the voice of the majority. 
(59) 
Friction with the 
Montalembert faction became intense. On . J=e 15th the plantars of 
Cul de Sac petitioned against the behaviour of the baron's legion in 
the plain. Montalembert denounced their demands as revolutionary and 
complained that his military operations were being hindered by jealous 
opponents. Royalist officers, others said, were being persecuted by 
Cadusch's men. 
(60) 
Williamson, however, kept a neutral stance. 
Surrounded by ex-l&opardins, he was probably not aware just how unpopular 
they were; colonists were afraid to speak against them. 
(61) 
Then, 
on July 7th, Cadusch was killed in a duel. Montalembert sent a naval 
officer to pick a quarrel with him. The baron meanwhile led his legion 
in the capture of several enemy camps in the mountains behind Port au 
Prince. 
From this position of strength, he asked Williamson to deport 
several of his enemies. Using familiar tactics, he claimed that 
certain escaped prisoners had hatched a plot against the'Governor's 
life. Colonel Murray and Major Spencer supported him, saying they 
had been robbed. Williamson remained unmoved. He even freed more 
prisoners. Montalembert thereupon resigned and withdrew to the Mole, 
pretending to be leaving for London. Immediately, events went his way. 
His officers organised petitions amongst the merchants of Port au Prince 
and the managers and attorneys of the Cul de Sac demanding his recall. 
Threateningly, they noted those who refused to sign, but the public alarm 
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was probably genuine, for, a few days after Montalembert left, the 
mulattoes of Mirebalais hoisted the Republican flag and called on 
those in the occupied zone to join them. At the same time, the all- 
powerful Lapointe added to the general outcry by denouncing the Cöt4 
ouest for planning to use the Black Chasseurs to massacre the free 
coloureds. As the Republicans advanced south to the Cul de Sac, 
some mulattoes rebelled at Croix des Bouquets. 
(62) 
The future of 
the occupation hung in the balance. Williamson was critically short 
of all munitions and especially field artillery. Five hundred of his 
troops were in hospital. 
(63) 
He had no choice but to declare martial 
law, and recall Montalembert. 
Pressured by public opinion, de Ronseray resigned and Dumas, 
Vincendon-Dutour and later Bgrault left the colony. Williamson 
suspended the Conseil Priv4 and sent Belin in haste to pacify Lapointe. 
He and Montalembert thereupon presented a list of demands. Dumas, 
Vincendon, de Ldaumont, Jouette, Mongin, de Montalet and eight others 
were to be deported. The mar4chauss4 and militia should be organised 
as in the past, with mulattoes receiving full opportunity for promotion. 
The Code Noire was to be registered by the Conseil Superieur, making 
whites and coloureds officially equal. Other demands included a new 
Conseil Priv6 (retaining Belin de Villeneuve), the limitation of the 
number of black troops and permission to make overtures to the mulattoes 
of Mirebalais. Williamson's reply was firm. He could not deport men 
without cause, nor undertake government reforms in the present crisis. 
It was premature, he said, to fix a limit to the number of black troops. 
On the other hand, he pointed out, many of the proscribed men had resigned 
their posts. Dumas' deputyship had been withdrawn and the corps of 
Chasseurs raising at Port au Prince was to be dropped. As for equality 
for the mulattoes, Williamson had already speedily drawn up a decree for 
Belin to take with him. He added, rather speciously, that the Code Noire 
was already in force, as the Capitulation had confirmed all existing 
colonial laws. Lapointe was certainly at liberty to approach the 
mulattoes of Mirebalais, as long as he did not upset relations between 
Spain and Britain. This answer, and the supplies of cash and arms that 
accompanied it, satisfied. the coloured leader, though he still wanted the 
Code Noire to be registered. 
(64) 
Lapointe now began to use his influence among the free coloureds 
of Mirebalais. As early as November 1794, as Spanish power was 
collapsing, he had wanted to seize this valuable parish before Toussaint's 
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agents could infiltrate and 'republicanise' it. Its inhabitants, 
he thought, were half pro-British, half pro-French. Billard and, 
surprisingly, Malouet had supported the scheme but the British refused, 
having belatedly decided they needed active Spanish assistance. 
(65) 
In December, Madrid rejected proposals for a formal agreement on 
co-operation, but for the next six months Dundas and Grenville pursued 
instead plans to send Malouet to Santo Domingo to bring about the 
effective joint action he continually stressed was essential. 
(66) 
Mirebalais continued to export its produce via Port au Prince and 
Arcahaye but in May the Spaniards of Santo Domingo cut off the vital 
cattle trade that fed the British forces. Those of Cuba had already 
done so. 
(67) 
Hence, the pastures of Mirebalais assumed an increased 
importance, and the expulsion of the Spaniards in fact saved Britain 
from a diplomatic dilemma. 
(68) 
The plateau of Mirebalais and the adjoining mountains of Grands 
Bois and Trou d'Eau contained some 450 small plantations where between 
5,000 and 12,000 blacks were still working. In Toussaint's words, 
they were 'des habitations magnifiques, dans le meilleur etat possible, 
bien cultiv4es et en grand rapport. Tous les cultivateurs sont chez 
eux et travaillent bien'. He could not have taken the area, he said, 
but for the complicity of its inhabitants. 
(69) 
Most were free 
coloureds. However, nearly 500 were whites who had mainly fled from 
the North. The British, it is important to note, controlled all 
Mirebalais' outlets to the sea and could now offer its coloured planters 
civil equality as well as the preservation of their slave property. 
Many probably had relations in the mountains of Arcahaye and only a 
small clique, it seems, had called in the Republican forces. It is 
hard to say if these troops were guilty of 'excesses', as Williamson 
thought, but Lapointe's overtures were certainly well received, and 
when over 1,000 British reinforcements reached Port au Prince 
Williamson felt confident he could take the region. 
(70) 
on August 15th, the whites guarding Grands Bois and Trou d'Eau 
under the creole Lavergne surrendered to colonial forces without a 
fight. Toussaint, furious, dispatched Christophe Mornet 'afin 
d'exterminer et ruiner toute cette caste de Royalistes'. At the 
end of the month, however, he was obliged to withdraw as five columns 
led by Montalembert and Lapointe converged on Mirebalais and were joined 
by many of the inhabitants. The campaign, fought in pouring rain, was 
well-planned but less well carried out. The colonial troops that came 
through the mountains from Arcahaye disobeyed orders and allowed Christophe 
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Mornet to escape, carrying off booty and prisoners. More seriously, 
Dessources' column, that advanced up the Artibonite and took Verrettes, 
was completely routed when it had to bear the brunt of Toussaint's 
counter-attack. 
(71) 
Nevertheless, the capture of Mirebalais was 
of crucial importance for the British forces and a personal triumph 
for Montalembert and Lapointe. This-was noted in Whitehall. Dundas 
retracted his earlier decision to split up Montalembert's unwieldy 
Legion and awarded the baron the local rank, of Brigadier-General. 
Rather late in the day, he now strongly recommended that the free 
coloureds be granted full civil and political rights. 
(72) 
Williamson, like a man awaking from a dream, was forced to see 
his government demolished and rebuilt around him. Enemies of the 
cotd ouest now freely told him how deceived he had been. When Lambert 
and de Cotte, the new Chef de justice and Procureur General, arrived 
in September, reconstruction began in earnest. The Governor had to 
admit in the preamble of a decree reforming the judiciary, that many 
of his previous rulings had been contrary to traditional usage and not 
justified by circumstances. 
(73) 
Till now, he had defended his past 
appointees as talented Anglophiles calumnied by jealous rivals. 
Henceforth, he called them the best of a"bad lot, telling Portland he 
was indebted to Lambert for dismissing certain mäuvais Sujets 'unavoidably 
placed' in the law courts. 
(74) 
His controversial decree on the 
repayment of debts was deemed contrary to the Capitulation and quashed. 
Retrenchment became the order of the day. All the novel fees, extra 
powers and new posts created for the ' Conseil' Sup&rieur were abolished 
along with the many commissions Williamson had granted for areas not yet 
conquered. 
Montalembert, quick to befriend Lambert and de Cotte, was 
unassailable. Abetted by the hard-liner, Colonel Murray, he had 
little trouble getting his critics arrested. 
(75) 
Murray was made 
Inspector and Commissary of Colonial Corps, replacing Cadusch's father- 
in-law, de Valtiere, now dead. Much concerned with law and order, he 
was responsible for tightening up the laws concerning 'stray' slaves 
and the sale of alcohol, and also for having investigated the finances 
of la Grand' Anse. Here various irregularities were discovered and 
Cadusch's friend Faveranges was called to account. 
(76) 
Failing to 
get Mongin dismissed, the l4opardin seneschal of Port au Prince, 
Murray instead had his police powers reduced and partly transferred 
to Montalembert's henchman de Bussy. A naval officer previously 
stationed two years in Saint Domingue, he became chief of the capital's 
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police and mar4chaussde, and was to exercise a corrupt and petty 
tyranny. 
(77) 
The new Conseil'Priv4, to accord with public opinion, was made 
up of men largely unconnected with past politics. Not noticeably 
less creole than its predecessor, it was certainly` more military, 
more northern and more royalist in character. 
(78) 
Its first duty 
was to redraft the decree sequestrating absentee property. While its 
predecessor had been tougher towards the-absentees than the British 
intended, the new Council actually remonstrated in favour of those 
proprietors unable to leave France. This aside, the Council's 
handling of this difficult issue proved it to be concerned above all 
with what was practical. If, in Arcahaye and the Cul de Sac the 
new decree proved as unworkable as the old, it was not because of its 
'obscurity', as its critics claimed, -but because Lapointe and Montalembert 
(79) 
(tacitly) refused to enforce it. 
Two items of great expense, the colonial corps and mar4chauss4e, 
(80) 
were also overhauled. Like the dmigr4 regiments in Europe, they 
were undermanned and top-heavy with officers. 
(81) 
Unlike their 
European counterparts, however, Williamson had generously placed both 
on the same footing as British regiments. Contades' small corps at 
the Mole had twice the number of general officers needed and for a time 
was actually paid at above the British rate. ' Some companies had no 
troopers at all. 
(82) 
It was decided,, therefore, that no more general 
officers should be appointed. La Rochejaquelein's Logion de la 
Couronne was scrapped. Also called the L44ion du Sud, it had after 
nearly a year's recruiting 31 men and officers all related to one 
another. 
(83) Some of the horse companies that colonels of black 
Chasseurs had been permitted to raise were also suppressed as costly 
anomalies. After much hesitating, it was decided to pay the militia, 
though allowing full pay and rations only for service away from home. 
Disobedience, absence without leave and failure to attend review 
received specific attention. Having been converted into a cavalry 
regiment with Cadusch as Colonel, the mar4chauss4e was now replaced 
approximately on its old footing without its expensive 
4tat-major. 
It was allowed to keep British pay but, like the colonial corps proper, 
it was deprived of bat and forage, baggage and lodging money. 
The Cadusch party was finished. 
(84) 
Although Malouet warned 
that it lived on in strength, attracting all mecontents and revolutionaries, 
(85) 
this is probably attributing to it a breadth it never possessed. It 
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remains difficult to identify it, or the Montalembert clique, 
specifically with an ideology, or a social group. Heirs to the 
autonomist and royalist traditions in colonial life and taking on 
the colouring of these two ethos, they were both, first and foremost, 
factions intent on lining their own pockets. 
(86) 
It is uncertain 
they represented anyone but themselves. The protector/predator role 
of the military as regards private property guaranteed it at best an 
ambiguous response from planters and householders. Conversely, though 
when denouncing Montalembert's behaviour, the Cadusch faction spoke 
with the age-old voice of colonial antimilitarism, 
(87) 
it was popularly 
blamed for the colony's troubles. While even in a conservative area 
like the Cul de Sac the C8t4 ouest had supporters among the plantocracy, 
like the creoles de Montalet and Jur6 Desravines, most of its leaders 
during the occupation were lawyers. Cadusch had been a planter all his 
life, Montalembert for only a few years, but leaders of planter opinion 
like de Jum4court and O'Gorman opposed both factions. 
Moreover, the divisions between the two factions were not entirely 
clear cut. Although Montalembert's party was typically the party of 
the 4migr4s who had no property to preserve in Saint Domingue, one of 
Cadusch's most hated alumni, de Coetlory, was an emigre himself. Cate 
ouest supporters were considered the most violent opponents of the free 
coloureds but, while Montalembert and his associates were said to behave 
extremely cruelly towards the mulattoes, 
(88) 
Dumas and B&rault themselves 
had tried to win over Lapointe. The baron took his royalism seriously 
enough to shoot a French prisoner who refused to shout vive le roi but 
the 'marquis de Cadusch', too, always at least paid lip service to 
Louis XVI. 
(89) 
If England possessed, according to Williamson, no 
more zealous friend than Paul Cadusch, Montalembert, one should note, 
had publicly declared his willingness to remain a British citizen if 
the Bourbons had to renounce Saint Domingue in order to regain their 
(90) 
throne. 
Revolutionaries the Cöt6 ouest had been, but having pinned their 
hopes on the British occupation, and therefore burned their boats where 
France was concerned, they had little connection with the 'revolutionaries' 
Malouet presumably had in mind - citizens of Port au Prince who openly 
declared their support for the Republic, petits blancs who fled to the 
enemy lines, the militia sergeant of Cayemittes who one day in 1795 ran 
up the tricolor... 
Certainly, their plans for the Conseil Priv4 and two Deputies 
bear witness to the old autonomist spirit but were hardly extreme and 
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were as much the product of factional manoeuvring as of a desire for 
immediate constitutional change. All the Privy Councils complained 
of their limited role. The Cdt4'ouest, its enemies said, really wanted 
independence. This may have been true of many colonists by this time, 
disillusioned with both England and France. 
(91) 
However, the only 
scheme for giving Saint Domingue a quasi-autonomous status was in fact 
to come from Malouet and proved very unpopular in the colony. 
(92) 
Indeed, it is not easy to take too seriously the politics of 
Saint Domingue's factieux. Garran-Coulon ridiculed the antics of 
colonial spokesmen like Page and Brulley, who changed with ease from 
royalist to terrorist. 
(93) 
Moving in the opposite direction, we 
have seen Cougniac-Mion and now de Charmilly. Two years before, he 
had scornfully described the 4migr4 Princes as dans la baue. Early 
in 1796, the comte d'Artois awarded him a Croix de Saint Louis. 
(94) 
As for the morose and aging Laborie, whatever his opinions early 
in the Revolution, he was now aýrespected moderate. He was advocating, 
at least by spring 1796, that the old administration of Saint Domingue 
should be fully restored. 
(95) 
Nevertheless, he had little love for 
Montalembert and soon fell foul of the'Chef de'Justice, who rejected 
his proposals to reduce the salaries of the Conseil'Sup&rieur. 
Suddenly, discovering an anti-government pamphlet Laborie had written 
in 1789, Lambert had him sacked from the Conseil Priv4. Williamson 
then allowed Lambert, an extreme royalist, with no previous connection 
with the colony, to return to England, partly to explain government 
policy but also to launcha vendetta against the creole lawyer. 
(96) 
Things had changed since Williamson had spurned the 'strong 
Monarchists' and insisted colonials take precedence over outsiders. 
The change of policy, however, had come too late, for in mid-November 
the Governor learned he was recalled forthwith. 
(iv) Williamson's Recall. From early 1795, when it was clear 
Saint Domingue could by no means pay for-its occupation, Portland and 
Dundas had been growing anxious about costs. The measures Williamson 
passed in-June and July were the last straw. On September 2nd, Portland 
wrote calling him and his heads of department home to account for their 
administration, using as an excuse the dispatch of a new Commander in 
Chief for the West Indies. 
(97)- 
To Major-General Forbes, who was to 
stand in for Williamson, he complained that the Governor had disobeyed 
his instructions about absenteee property and the'black corps, and had 
failed to inform him of his arrangements for the Conseil Sup&rieur. 
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Given the circumstances, he thought the creation of four (actually 
only two) extra magistrates 'highly culpable' and their increases in 
salary 'still more so', while the appointing of two Deputies was 'an 
unwarrantable and extravagant waste of Public Money'. 
(98) 
Williamson was not quite so guilty as seemed, nor Portland 
entirely blameless. Anyone who knew the situation in Saint Domingue 
agreed that slave recruits had to be offered their freedom, that their 
impecunious masters had to be compensated and that 2,000 liyres was a 
fair price. A black Chasseur, in fact, because he lived longer, cost 
less than a soldier sent from Europe. 
(99) 
Portland's careless wording 
of a letter was partly responsible for the excesses of William on's 
absentee property decree. He also accepted the salary proposed for 
Malouet. 
For the Conseil Supdrieur, the Duke had recommended 'competent 
even liberal' salaries but not exceeding those of 1789. 
(100) 
This 
was difficult. Prices had risen considerably since then and unlike 
in 1789 lawyers now depended solely on their salaries. Williamson 
thought Saint Domingue at least twice as dear as Jamaica; Mme. Rouvray 
called it in 1796 the dearest country on earth. Duranton, accounted 
an honest man, thought-15-18,000'livres the minimum necessary for a 
decent standard of living, when basic necessities cost two or three 
times their normal (? European) price. 
(101) 
Moreover, Williamson 
claimed that his Conseil Sup4rieur, compared to the reformed Conseil 
of 1787-89, was smaller and cheaper., It-'omitted some minor officials 
and combined, he said, salaries and fees. 
(102) 
He may have been 
deceived, especially where fees were concerned, or simply stating the 
position subsequent to Lambert's reforms. Whatever, the 1787-89 
Council had been an extremely unpopular innovation and had been 
designed to serve the whole of a flourishing colony. William on's 
conseillers received 20,000 livres, an increase in salary of 60% since 
1766. The Attorney General's earnings had, been quintupled, it seems. 
(103) 
Despite the increased cost of living, Billard claimed that William on's 
salary increases had surprised everyone. Laborie, a conseiller 
himself, wanted salaries cut back to their 1786 levels. In particular, 
he and Malouet thought excessive the 90,000 livres paid to the Chef'de 
Justice, while Billard thought the post itself quite superfluous. 
(104) 
Though Lambert had added to its functions those of the Chef de Police 
(and was thus heir to half the Intendant's powers) Billard was probably 
right. Portland, however, had no quibbles where his protegd was 
involved, even though he was to hold the post for three years and spent 
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only two months in the colony. Furthermore, although Portland's 
initial reaction had been to insist civil government be kept to a minimum 
and that the judges of the Conseil Sup4rieur should tour the 
countryside, thereby making redundant all other paid magistrates, 
he was to agree by early 1796 that, where possible, the courts should 
keep functioning during martial law and that reform of the judiciary 
should wait till after the war. 
(105) 
During Williamson's Governorship, the central administration 
raised revenues amounting to £126,711 - just 7% of the-£1.81 millions 
Bogle paid out up to 29th February 1796, which did not include the pay 
of the British rank and file. 
(106) 
An unknown but much smaller sum 
was raised in cash, kind or loans by the different parishes themselves 
to meet local needs such as fortifications. It would probably have 
been unwise to remove these 'voluntary' taxes from local control, but 
Williamson ought nonetheless to have established regular machinery for 
their administration. Though Ancien Regime practice would have justified 
his diverting them into central government hands, they were left under 
the control of various municipal administrations. Anxious not to 
alienate the colonists, the only taxes Williamson levied were on 
external trade, (bar a tax on. taverns that partly financed the Port 
au Prince police). The poll tax on urban slaves, too, would have 
fallen heavily on those town dwellers who lived by renting out one or 
two domestics or artisans. Williamson might well have exploited the 
house rent tax or been less lenient with la Grand' Anse, which ought 
to have paid for its own police and mar4chauss4e, but clearly he did 
not think it worth the political cost. 
(107) 
Hence, as regards revenue, 
he could have done rather more, though the benefit would not necessarily 
have been great. 
As for expenditure, Williamson undoubtedly was extremely wasteful 
and lax but he also faced insurmountable problems. From the beginning, 
the hiring and arming of vessels was an expense that caused Dundas alarm. 
Curiously, according to Bogle's summary account, it was responsible for 
only 1% of expenditure (E26,473 - Ja. ), while by March 1796 the hire of 
19 ships was costing £12,274 -(? Ja. ) per month. They were vital, 
Williamson said, because the navy was 'totally incapable' of providing 
the assistance he needed. He certainly could have used fewer more 
efficiently and with smaller crews but, as Bogle's successor observed, 
their necessity and the 'enormous' cost of provisions and labour made 
it an expense difficult to reduce substantially. 
(108) 
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Another controversial item of expenditure was the'secours 
Williamson handed out to the destitute, i. e. almost everyone who did 
not receive a soldier's ration. In June 1795, Williamson began adding 
to the free ration (worth 1/-2 gourdes per week) cash payments of 
generally two gourdes per week. 'A man formed by nature to be the 
comforter of misfortune', Williamson earned immense goodwill by his 
generous response to the tragedy of white Saint Domingue. 
(109) 
Yet, 
he responded to excess. Widows and orphans, the homeless, the aged 
and disabled undoubtedly had to be cared for. 
(110) 
However, Balcarres, 
the new Governor of Jamaica, was shocked that while refugees in England 
were paid a flat rate Williamson distributed aid according to social 
rank. 
(111) 
The vicomte Leroi de la Potherie and his wife received 
7 gourdes per week each. Malouet's nephew, arriving to take up a post, 
was accorded 16 gourdes. Destitute 'ladies of quality' were frequently 
given 'loans' of £30. A number of families were also housed at 
government expense until the Conseil. Priv6 had them given lodgings 
money. All claims were vetted'by the Council but abuses occurred. 
(112) 
Nevertheless, though two-thirds of the'ruined proprietors were 
said to receive assistance, Bogle and the Conseil Priv6 insisted that 
the sum involved was not large and was a point of honour and good policy. 
(113) 
Around August 1795, the destitute of the Mole and Port au Prince, it 
(114) 
seems, were only costing £220 Ja. per week. This certainly did 
not include their rations, for at this time Bogle was apparently 
distributing 19,000 per day, 
(115) 
of which only 4,000 could have gone 
to British troops and no more than 8,000 to the militia and colonial 
forces. The figures are difficult to reconcile. 
Whatever the cause, provisions took 25% of the Agent-General's 
expenditure and were the second largest item in his account. All 
foodstuffs had to be imported. Provisions were always very dear 
in the West Indies in wartime and exceptionally so now, when the 
seas were highly unsafe and American ships were' carried into Republican 
ports. Given the exodus of colonists-from the Caribbean, the influx 
of troops may not actually have increased total demand for either meat 
or flour but the specie shipped-out to pay the soldiers certainly 
created a severe monetary inflation. As regards both purchasing and 
appointments, Bogle was said to be efficient and honest, if guilty of 
some partiality. 
(116) 
On the other hand, receiving commission on 
expenditure, he had no incentive to drive hard bargains or to exercise 
control over others. He was responsible, furthermore, only to 
Williamson and the Treasury. 
(117) 
Though the Agent-General in 
Europe was allowed only 1%, Bogle's 5% commission was approved by the 
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Treasury. In 211 years, it brought him an astonishing £86,000. 
(The Governor's salary was £5,000. ) It is likely he also made 
considerable gains by pocketing the profit made when negotiating 
bills above par. It is not clear that regulations against this 
practice then existed. 
In 1793, Bogle had been appalled by the spendthrift commissariat 
of the Grand' Anse militia. Yet, Williamson continued to allow corps 
commanders to do their own contracting, particularly for regimental 
hospitals, which appeared in profusion and became objects of speculation 
and continual complaint. Colonels of colonial corps were also permitted 
to clothe their own men, although uniforms made up in the West Indies 
were extremely expensive. Bogle apparently complained to Williamson 
about waste and disorder but never demurred, it seems, in acquitting 
the demands made on him. 
(118) 
He paid out for whatever a commander 
signed for. If the Agent-General was merely ineffectual, however, his 
assistant Rousselette was patently corrupt. With a contractor at 
Saint Marc, he appears to have colluded, accepting unsigned chits for 
stores never supplied, in £60,000 worth of fraud. 
(119) 
It was this 'nullit4 absolue de toute forme d'administration' 
that was the perpetual complaint of Malouet and the different Privy 
Councils. 
(120) 
Under the Old Regime, financial control had been 
elaborate. It was largely bureaucratic; responsibility for receipts 
and expenditure was kept separate and even the Intendant's signature 
needed counter-signing. The colonists, also, had been allowed 
(through the Conseil Supdrieur) to examine how their taxes were spent. 
None of these checks, administrative or political, existed in British 
Saint Domingue, where all power devolved on the Governor. It was 
never suggested Williamson or Bogle were themselves-corrupt - far 
from it. Yet, their failure to exercise any financial control, it 
was said, allowed corruption to flourish around them and permitted 
Williamson to indulge in misguided if well-meant extravagance. The 
Conseil Prive, therefore, wanted to oversee the use-of public money 
and also to examine in advance all proposed expenditure. Williamson 
promised several times to co-operate, but, to the Council's utter 
frustration, never did. 
Williamson was incapable of saying no to anyone. 
(121) 
This is 
doubtless why officers' pay and clothing account for over a quarter 
of Bogle's expenditure (E676,351 Ja. ). By the summer of 1795, the 
pay bill of the colonial corps came to around £33,000 per month. 
(122) 
Besides creating too many corps with too many officers, Williamson had 
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created officers with no soldiers at all. He had named colonels 
to raise Chasseurs for almost every parish in the North. At Saint 
Marc and Arcahaye, several officers held commissions in three or four 
different corps; one held five, drawing 26 dollars per day plus 
'gratifications and plunder'. 
(123) 
Though the '4migrd corps' 
(made up of refugee planters) were only used for guard duty, they, 
like the rest, had a full complement of officers receiving British pay. 
Much concerned with public relations and his own salary, de Charmilly 
had insisted it was essential to grant full British pay to colonials. 
Laborie, however, claimed it was completely unnecessary, as destitute 
colonists and dmigr4s had been at first only too glad to be given their 
daily bread. 
(124) 
Similarly, the decision to pay the militia was far 
from unavoidable. The reforms forced on Williamson at the end of 1795 
only went a small way towards remedying'these abuses and were not all 
carried out, as Williamson did not publish the decrees. Such officers 
as were dismissed apparently received gratuities of £1,000. 
(125) 
How far the Governor was simply naive or weak-willed, un dupe 
des fripons, it is hard to determine. Laborie suggested he was 
overworked, and was induced in unguarded moments to sign away millions 
to those he ought not to have trusted. One man could not be expected, 
he thought, to cope with both administrative details and running the war. 
(126) 
This being so, Williamson surely should have made more use of his Conseil 
Priv6, at least as auditors. The main justification, nonetheless, for 
the Governor's behaviour was that'it was politically necessary. Faced 
from early on with large numbers of hostile colonists and unable to offer 
adequate protection, let alone conquer the colony, he was obliged to 
spend freely. 
(127) 
After all, Dundas, Portland and Hawkesbury had 
all written to him stressing that 'the great object' was to reconcile 
the colonists to British rule. 
Such considerations, however, did not justify Williamson's laxness 
with the British in Saint Domingue. Despite endless complaints by the 
Privy council, he let army officers lodge in the best houses in Port au 
Prince, leaving the Administration eventually to pay their rent. 
(128) 
The Deputy Quartermaster-General was allowed to spend most of the 
occupation in Jamaica and was later cashiered for corruption. At 
Saint Marc, which was swallowing up £35,000 per month in early 1796, 
the peculation of the British officials was 'proverbial'. Chief among 
them was John Rousselette, Deputy Agent-General and Williamson's own 
protLfg4. One of his assistants apparently engrossed £40,000 in two 
years. After the occupation, Rousselette would boast in an anonymous 
pamphlet, 'Poor Saint Marc, thou hast enriched not a few (now honest) 
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men. " 
(129) 
Particularly damaging for Williamson was the corruption 
of his secretary, William Shaw, who was a relative. He was apparently 
behind the creation of many of the superfluous military and judicial 
commissions, charging ten portugaises for each one he issued. Though 
customary in the British islands, such venality had been unknown in a 
secretary of one of Saint Domingue's governors and consequently shocked 
the colonists. 
(130) 
More seriously, news reached England in the 
summer of 1795 that Shaw had taken bribes from p. o. w. 's in Jamaica and 
secured their release. 
(131) 
Although his failings are explained to a great extent by 
circumstances, Governor Williamson was clearly weak, indulgent and a 
poor judge of men. Despite this, he was respected by intelligent 
critics like Belin and Laborie and remained very popular in Saint 
Domingue. His recall created public consternation. 
(132) 
According 
to the pro-French author of the Pr4cis Historique, his humanity and 
generosity made him 'le Gdn4ral le plus dangereux aux interets de la 
France'. 
(133) 
However, Great Britain could not afford this sort of 
campaign. The Government came to accept that the salaries Williamson 
paid were not excessive and it acknowledged that the weakness of the 
British presence necessitated some 'latitude' in the deployment of 
public funds. Yet, it rightly concluded, Williamson could have 
exercised greater control. He was not 'the proper man to make 
oeconomical arrangements' and had shown himself unequal to his 
difficult task. 
(134) 
'Son nom ne p, 6rira, ' de Charmilly proclaimed with unintended 
(135) 
irony, 'qu'avec la colonie. ' 
(v) Waiting for Abercromby. Though ordered home immediately, 
Williamson did not leave Saint Domingue ti l March, 1796. The autumn' 
months had seen the occupied zone plunged into another crisis. 
Implored by the Privy Council to stay, Williamson resolved to remain 
in the colony until the situation stabilised. He had good reason to 
be optimistic, for it was now certain that Sir Ralph Abercromby, the 
leading British general of the day, was sailing for the West Indies 
with an army of 30,000 men. At last, it seemed a decisive blow would 
be struck at the beginning of the campaign season. Hence, through 
the vicissitudes of these months, there was an underlying mood of 
confident anticipation. In early August, it was hoped large 
reinforcements would arrive in September. Eight thousand fresh 
troops, Belin de Villeneuve thought, would bring victory in a few 
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months. 
(136) 
By September, Williamson was expecting reinforcements 
for mid-November at the latest, and on September 29th Dundas announced 
they should arrive around December 1st. 
(137) 
Hence, by the time 
Williamson received his recall, the mammoth expedition was expected 
imminently. 
The reinforcements that had arrived in August proved of little 
benefit. They were raw recruits who had yet to learn their firing 
drill and, although judged exceptionally healthy, they were almost 
immediately engulfed in a devastating new epidemic, which in September 
and October carried off 1,100 men. 
(136) 
To make matters worse, over 
1,000 troops destined for Saint Domingue had been sent, owing to a 
Whitehall blunder, to Jamaica, where they were detained because of the 
Maroon War. At the same. time, the remains of the three original 
'Jamaican' regiments were now repatriated. By October 18th, the 
British troops at Port au Prince had dwindled to 230 fit for duty 
and merchants had to stand guard on the ramparts. 
(139) 
Three 
weeks later Forbes reported 'most of the British dead at the Mole'. 
Scarcely a ship had half its crew; Admiral Parker needed 1,500 seamen. 
Some regiments were almost completely annhilated. 
(140) 
The upswing in mortality coincided with the alarming news that 
Spain had withdrawn from the war and had surrendered Santo Domingo to 
France. Furthermore, the situation in the countryside had become 
critical, as all slaves now knew of the Emancipation decree. The 
Conseil Privd warned of malintentionn4s in the interior. To prevent 
loyal ateliers being seduced by Republican agents, and also to supply 
urgently-needed manpower, Williamson decided to let Montalembert recruit 
slaves in the Cul de Sac without reference to their masters. Specialists 
were to be exempted, but otherwise any slave who presented himself could 
be enrolled. Plantations where no white was present were to bear the 
brunt of recruitment, as this would encourage residence in the plain. 
The measure met with a good deal of opposition and, in the event, 
recruits proved hard to find. 
(141) 
The colonists' complaints had remained unchanged for over a year - 
the lack of troops, of field artillery and small ships, the ineptitude 
of British physicians and the inactivity of the navy. Desertion and 
Republican privateers had entirely ruined the coastal trade and sent 
food prices higher than ever. 
(142) 
Because of Spanish recalcitrance, 
fresh meat had all but disappeared. The British had always found la 
Grand' Anse 'a continual source of plague and trouble' 
(143) 
and now a 
potentially dangerous affair erupted at les Cayemittes, whose population 
was said to be showing Republican sympathies. At its centre was a 
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TABLE 2 
Regional Distribution of Colonial Forces: 'December 1795 
Port au Prince Croix des Bouquets Mirebalais 
The Company of 
the Governor 
Royal Militia 
Emigr4s 
Mar4chaussde 
Kina's Volunteers 
The Mole 
Royal English 
Gendarmerie 
King's Chasseurs 
Mardchaussge 
Royal Militia 
Grands Bois 
Militia 
Mardchauss6e 
British Legion with 
62 Light Horse and 
644 Auxiliary Chasseurs 
156 Militia 
179 Royal Chasseurs 
119 Marechauss4e 
Saint Marc 
Prince of Wales' 
Chasseurs 415 
1049 Mardchauss4e 20 
307 Militia 960 
677 
Arcahaye 
64 
Prince of Wales' 
225 Regiment 85 
80 Militia 373 
29 Royal Legion 146 
113 Dillon's Regiment 66 
Mardchauss4e 42 
Emigres 114 
Dessources' Volunteers 786 
91 Artibonite Chasseurs 100 
15 
Duke of York's 
Cavalry Regiment 218 
Queen's Chasseurs 819 
Emigr4s 24 
Militia 551 
King's Black 
Regiment 88 
La Grand' Anse 
Chasseurs of les 
Cayemittes 380 
Irois Chasseurs 540 
Militia 1500 
11,037 
Sources: WO 1/64,101 and WO 1/65,73. The Chasseurs and the Volunteers 
consisted almost entirely of slaves officered by whites. The Mar4chauss4e, 
the York Cavalry, the Prince of Wales' Regiment and the Royal Legion were 
mainly free coloureds. 
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captain of affranchis Chasseurs who (apparently) threatened to lead 
his men over to the enemy if their grievances were not settled. His 
suspension caused a dispute between H4lie, the Chasseurs' Colonel, and 
Duperrier, the colonel of militia and local Chef de parti, who overruled 
his fellow officers and refused to take orders except from the Governor. 
Colonel Murray was sent in haste to restore order. After investigation, 
the Conseil Privd decided subversion was not in question, merely personal 
jealousy and indiscipline. However, within a few months, Murray himself 
became involved in factional quarrels and had to be recalled. His arbitrary 
actions and negligence had aroused general resentment, which was further 
aggravated by a backlog in the Chasseurs' pay and a lack of naval protection. 
The Conseil Priv4 now feared that the region's many disaffected inhabitants 
would profit from the disorder and call in the Republicans. To his credit, 
Williamson acted swiftly and restored calm before he left the colony. 
(144) 
In the meantime, British prospects began to show distinct signs of 
improvement, though the stalemate in the Artibonite persisted. Throughout 
the second half of September, the British had attempted to exploit their 
capture of Mirebalais by advancing down the valley against Verrettes and 
Petite Riviere. The fighting was hard and many of Toussaint's troops, 
'nus comme des vers de terre', were killed. Yet, overall the blacks 
lost little ground and took revenge by burning plantations on the upper 
Artibonite and carrying off the slaves. Saint Marc was too strong to 
be attacked but Republican patrols, skirmishing in the woods with 
Dessources' Volunteers, kept its garrison hemmed in, while its 
inhabitants continued to flee to the Republican zone. 
(145) 
Nevertheless, 
Dominguan society was no more unifed there than under the British, and 
news of the Abercromby expedition greatly increased existing tensions 
between black and brown, ex-slaves and ancient libres. In fact, by 
the beginning of 1796, internal divisions had made the French Republic's 
foothold in Saint Domingue extremely vulnerable. 
Although the Artibonite front was defended by staunch Republicans 
like Guy and Christophe, it was essentially Toussaint's presence that 
maintained order. 'Si ce n'4tait pas ses neuf tetes-dans la paroisse 
de Petite Riviere, ' an observer wrote, ' les autres sont des girouettes. ' 
The local National Guard commandant was actually in correspondence with 
Saint Marc. 
(146) 
When the Anglo-colonials launched a major offensive 
shortly before Christmas, most of the inhabitants of Verrettes joined 
them. Verrettes'bourg changed hands several times 'before being destroyed 
by Dessources, who also burnt several of the surrounding plantations. 
Toussaint, however, held his own and rebuilt the'bourg on a more 
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defensible site. By late January, the British had returned to the 
defensive, having breached the Artibonite's banks to flood the plain 
south of Gonaives. 
(147) 
In the North, subversion proved far more serious, although there it 
is not clear how far it was directly favourable to the British. General 
Laveaux had never enjoyed good relations with the mulattoes, who commanded 
most of the North Province. 
(148) 
Their hostility steadily grew as he 
began to exercise centralised control, interfering in what had become 
the independent domains of the parish commanders. Their jealousy and 
fears were also increased as, more and more, Laveaux's authority came 
to depend on the rising power of Toussaint Louverture. The coloureds 
of le Cap wanted Villatte to be made commandant of the North in place 
of Laveaux's man, Pageot, a white creole planter. In December 1794, 
they had rioted when Laveaux had visited the town and the situation 
became inflamed at the end of 1795, when he returned as Governor. 
As in the British zone, the use of absentee property, in particular, 
proved an extremely vexatious issue. In January 1796, Rodrigue, 
the coloured commander of the 1st Regiment declared at a dinner in le 
Cap that Saint Domingue had no need of France. According to Laveaux, 
he then stirred up the black'cultivateurs of le Borgne (led by a 
mulatto in at least one district) against the local whites. Laveaux 
arrested Rodrigue only to see him freed by his fellow officers. 
(149) 
At the same time, Delair, the fractious commandant of Jean-Rabel, 
began to disobey Pageot's orders. 
(150) 
Also in January, agents from le Cap induced 180 of Toussaint's 
troops to desert and join Villatte. 
(151) 
The two generals had in 
the past disputed the territorial limits of each other's commands. 
Their relations had become particularly strained in June 1795, when 
Joseph Flaville, the mulatto commandant of Acul, had led or acquiesced 
in a revolt by disgruntled black troops and plantation workers. 
Supported by Villatte, he had claimed his district was not within 
Toussaint's command. 
(152) 
In February 1796, we find him harbouring the 
pro-Royalist black chief Macaya, who had escaped from prison at 
Gonaives after trying to win over Toussaint's men to Jean-Franjois. 
(153) 
That same month there broke out in the mountains of Port de Paix 
a rebellion of plantation workers which cost the lives of many whites. 
It is not certain if the rebels' leader, Etienne Datty, was a black 
(as all historians assume) or in fact the mulatto Danty, commandant 
of Gros Morne, whom de Charmilly had described in August 1795 as 
(154) 
'd4voug aux Anglais'. Laveaux later claimed Pinchinat, the 
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mulatto politician, was behind the affair. 
(155) 
Whichever was the 
case, it seems that, though the blacks' grievances were largely local 
in character, they had been deliberately exploited by Datty's secretary, 
who wanted, according to Toussaint, 'suivre le regime du Cap'. 
(156) 
Tension spread to Saint Louis and le Borgne. Toussaint had to rush 
northwards and, although the British took advantage of his absence 
from the Artibonite, he managed temporarily to restore calm. Never- 
theless the blacks in the mountains of Port de Paix were to revolt 
another five times in the next seven months. 
(157) 
Moreover, no sooner was order restored in the north-west than 
Villatte staged a coup at le Cap and threw Laveaux into prison. 
Uproar ensued as black and brown manoeuvred for dominance in the 
North. 
(158) 
Toussaint swiftly occupied le Cap but rebellions broke 
out all over the province. It is impossible to know exactly what lay 
behind these movements. Some thought them part of a concerted mulatto 
plot to make Saint Domingue independent or at least self-governing. 
Since early 1793, 'whites had warned 'that the free coloureds were now 
aspiring to complete dominance in the'land of their birth: 'They keep 
up a constant correspondence from one-end of the colony to the other. 
Their agitations, their movements, their Turbulence, their Discontents, 
the circular letter in which they recommend Union amongst themselves, 
Mistrust of White People; all this proves 'they seek self-government. ' 
(159) 
Rigaud and Villatte were old friends, and the southerner's complicity 
in the March 26th coup is strongly suggested by his having sent 
Pinchinat to le Cap early in 1796 and by the latter's actions there. 
(160) 
One further notes that even Beauvais, the least partisan of the mulattoes, 
was at loggerheads with Toussaint at this time. 
(161) 
Yet, with a French expedition due to sail for Saint Domingue, it 
is difficult to see what sort of independence the free coloureds could 
have hoped to achieve without coming to terms with the British, who, 
it is significant to note, kept a squadron cruising off the north 
coast throughout this period. British agents were active in the 
north-east and the Artibonite but no firm evidence exists of contacts 
with le Cap. However, a British. document dated 1st June 1796, 
mentions 'Villatte the mulatto who was much attached to the English' 
and also Danty ' who wished to surrender Gros Morne'. It adds: 
'All the inhabitants of Port de Paix betrayed the most extravagant 
symptoms of joy when they saw the English squadron pass on the 1st, 
2nd and 3rd of May. ' 
(162) 
This might relate to developmentsthat 
took place only after Villatte's coup had failed, or it might simply 
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be wishful thinking. A deal between Villatte and the British seems 
unlikely, when mulattoes were stirring up the blacks against Laveaux 
and Toussaint precisely by accusing them of conspiring with the British 
to restore slavery. On the other hand; in 1793 free coloureds in much 
of the North had favoured a British or Spanish occupation and the 
growing assertiveness of the plantation blacks may also have made northern 
planters eager for the return of slavery. One thing is sure - the 
Republicans' hold on the North was critically weakened by internal 
divisions. 
This was particularly true of the north-east, where British and 
Republican agents competed to win over Jean-Francois' soldiers, 
abandoned and unpaid since Spain's withdrawal from the war. Jean- 
Franjois commanded perhaps 4,500, Biassou 3,000, 
(163) 
independent 
chiefs perhaps 1,000 or more in the wild mountains of Valliýre and 
Grande Riviere. Their future allegiance, each side knew, could be 
crucial to ending the military stalemate. From mid-November onwards 
the vicomte de Bruges at Mirebalais sent emissaries via Spanish 
territory to negotiate with the various chiefs. A few were turning 
to the Republicans but Biassou rejected their overtures and apparently 
donned a red coat. Benjamin, Jean-Francois' second in command, wanted 
his men incorporated into the British Chasseurs, provided they could 
retain their rank. 
(164) 
Although Jean-Franjois went on fighting the 
Republicans, much to their alarm, the British failed to win him over 
and at the end of the year he, Biassou and Benjamin left Saint Domingue 
for Cuba. 
Nevertheless, several factors gained the British strong support 
among the remaining chiefs - their genuine leaning towards royalism 
(165) 
and long-standing hatred of those they called les citoyens; the 
promise of hard cash and of prestigious uniforms (when three-quarters 
of Toussaint's troops had neither shirt nor trousers), and the 
expectation that massive reinforcements would arrive imminently. 
On 6th January 1796, a treaty was concluded with the leaders Titus 
and Jean-Baptiste Gagnette, who commanded some 5,000 men, not all of 
whom were fighters. 
(166) 
They were confirmed in the ranks they held 
until they should be formed into regiments of Chasseurs, when the best 
officers (one in every hundred men) would exchange their present 
fanciful titles for the rank of captain. Men, women and children 
were to remain free. Ammunition and officers' uniforms would be 
supplied immediately; pay would commence once the British flag was 
raised, but until a signal was given, peace should be feigned with the 
Republicans. 
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Since December 11th, General Forbes with Admiral Parker's 
squadron had been cruising off the north coast waiting to intercept 
Abercromby's convoy before it reached the Mole. Using as an inter- 
mediary Colonel Cambefort, 
(167)they, 
too, liaised with these black 
Anti-Jacobins and in February landed several hundred guns near 
Maribaroux. 
(168) 
It was at this same period that Macaya was stirring 
up his fellow 'Congos' at Acul. 
(169) 
As Republican forces were con- 
centrated at Port de Paix and Gonaives, de Bruges thought he could take 
le Cap with 500 men. As it was, immediately Abercromby's ships should 
hove into view, they, the north-east blacks and the forces at Mirebalais 
were to converge on the town some 20,000 strong. 
Support was also promised by the Spanish settlers of Santo Domingo. 
By the terms of the Franco-Spanish peace they were now subjects of the 
godless Republic, though the French were not yet strong enough to 
occupy the colony. Anticipating the hostility of its Catholic slave- 
owners, the Republicans tried to force them to emigrate (it was said) 
by encouraging rebellion among its small slave population. Many did 
emigrate but the remainder were all the more disposed to resist any 
French incursions. British ships were usually well received in 
Spanish ports, by the colonists if not by officials. In December, 
the inhabitants of la Vega and Santiago secretly agreed to hoist the 
Union Jack if they received British protection, and by January 120 
Spanish troops had deserted to Montalembert's Legion. However, the 
colonists were naturally reluctant to show their hand until British 
(170) 
reinforcements had arrived. 
This was not true of the blacks in the mountains behind Port au 
Prince, where Pomp4 and Dieudonn4, who respectively commanded 2,000 
and over 3,000 armed men, broke with the Republic and opened 
negotiations with Montalembert and the merchant Caille, who was a 
trusted intermediary. By early December, many blacks had come down 
from their mountain retreats into the plain of Cul de Sac and were 
awaiting their masters' return. Within two months, work 
had re- 
started on a few plantations. 
(171) 
Pomps and Dieudonn4 were less 
precipitate but, to prove their goodwill, they restored the capital's 
water supply from Source Turgeau and in January laid siege to Leogane 
and Jacmel. The efforts of Rigaud and Beauvais to appease them were 
rejected and the Ldogane blacks began to desert to them once two of 
the town's outposts were taken. Contacts were also established with 
several lesser chiefs in the mountains nearer to the Spanish 
frontier. 
Some, like Jean Pineau, had already fought against the Republicans, 
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whereas Dieudonne himself was theoretically Sonthonax's successor as 
Commissaire Civile. Yet, he insisted his men were now willing to return 
to work for their old masters, and in early February, while Pompd 
attacked L4ogane, he claimed that all the blacks as far as les Cayes 
wanted to join them. 
(172) 
They were anxious, he said, that war with the whites should cease. 
He asked for a hospital to be built in the mountains and for a regular 
market where the two sides could trade. - The British were cautious and 
refused to supply ammunition until they were given control of the 
surrounding heights. However, on January 24th and the two following 
Sundays they allowed a market to take place on open ground outside 
Port au Prince where black warriors 'avec defiance et en armes' mingled 
with citizens of the capital eager to buy up at half-price the abundance 
of vegetables and poultry brought down from the mountains. 
(173) 
Though one might be sceptical about the likelihood of a mass return 
to the plantations, Dieudonn4's volte-face was undoubtedly genuine and 
clearly not caused by a shortage of food. After the fall of Port au 
Prince, he had seemed willing to join the British, and now, when 
massive reinforcements were again expected, he doubtless wished to 
secure his future, being in the front line of fire. However, behind 
this instability lay a complex of regional, class and racial conflict. 
Like the blacks in the mountains of Port de Paix, Dieudonne's men had 
complained of being mulcted when bringing down produce for sale in the 
urban markets. Most towns, but particularly L4ogane and Jacmel, were 
mulatto strongholds. There were no black commanders in the towns, 
Dieudonn6 said; the Revolution had benefited only the mulattoes not 
the Africans. 
(174) 
Maroon blacks had traditionally hated the free 
coloureds who hunted them in the marechauss4e. Probably most of 
those involved in these negotiations, including the famous Dokos, had 
been responsible for the January 1793 uprising against the mulattoes 
of Cul de Sac. 
Hence, in early February morale ran high in Port au Prince. Its 
British garrison was down to 200 men but hostilities had ceased and 
the renewed inflow of fresh water, fresh vegetables and poultry had 
had an immediate impact on public health. The Republican camp was 
deeply divided and in the West and north-east there seemed every 
likelihood that thousands of black fighters would be won over. 
Moreover, troops were finally starting to arrive from Europe. 
Even so, setbacks soon occurred. In the north-east, Titus was 
murdered, apparently by Spaniards who sought to disrupt British policy. 
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Some lesser chiefs began to turn to the Republic and a British landing 
party was captured at Maribaroux. 
(175) 
In the West, Pompe seems to 
have died around this time and Dieudonne complained of difficulties 
convincing some of his men they would be pardoned by the whites. 
According to Bryan Edwards, the negotiations broke down because 
Williamson refused DieudonnPs demand to help exterminate the free 
coloureds. 
(176) 
It was then that emissaries from Toussaint Louverture 
appeared in Dieudonne's camp, having crossed 30 miles of enemy territory. 
They appealed for unity against the invaders. Dieudonn6 was overthrown 
and replaced by his second in command, Laplume, whom Laveaux swiftly 
made a colonel. 
(177) 
All was not lost, however. The Republicans' advances in the north- 
east spurred Gagnette and other chiefs into open warfare aux nom'du 
roi. Toussaint complained in early March that he was surrounded by 
enemies on land and sea. 
(178) 
The arrival of 2,000 troops at Port 
au Prince enabled Williamson, as soon as the Dieudonne negotiations 
broke down, at last to attack Morne- l'Höpital. On February 28th, 
a British column took Camp Turgeaü on the lower slopes almost without 
loss. Meanwhile, watched by. the whole town, Dessources' 500 Chasseurs 
scaled the mountain avec une vitesse, incröyable and cleared the enemy 
from its summit. At least 13 camps were taken and perhaps 2,000 huts 
destroyed. An attempt to regain Turgeau-a week later was completely 
routed by its new occupants. 
(179) 
A strong post was soon established 
at Fourmy 3,000 feet above the town'and a blockhouse was erected at 
Neret. These guarded the route running behind the mountain which 
connected Lgogane with. the Cul de Sac. In 
both Port au Prince and 
the plain, after two years of embattled confinement, life could begin 
to return to normal. 
When Williamson finally set sail for England, therefore, on March 
14th, British fortunes were markedly improving, and his departure was 
much regretted. Just as he was getting to grips with 
his arduous 
task, it seemed, the 'virtuous' Governor was recalled, his hard-gotten 
experience now going to waste. It had been a familiar complaint under 
the Ancien Regime. However, the military and-diplomatic successes of 
his governorship owed little to Williamson himself and, despite pressure 
from Whitehall and the'Conseil Priv4, his efforts to reduce the costs 
of occupation had come to very little. Hence, although he had his 
merits, the Government was right to recall him. Unfortunately, 
it 
proved unable to provide a more effective successor. 
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Williamson handed over to Major-General Forbes, for the famous 
Abercromby had still not appeared. Two regiments had arrived piece- 
meal from Gibraltar but the great expedition had yet to materialise. 
Williamson had shown, nonetheless, what could be achieved, given a few 
thousand troops. Laplume, it is true, was not Toussaint Louverture; 
nor was Morne l'Hopital le Cap or les Cayes (though. it was formidable 
enough in its own way). However, had Abercromby's expedition arrived 
when expected in December, with the campaign season before it, and the 
Republican camp in a very vulnerable situation - indeed, had the 
expedition arrived at any time before Williamson's departure - the 
future of the West Indies could well have taken a different course. 
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CHAPTER VIII THE GREAT EXPEDITION OF 1796 
(i) Preparations. In both Europe and the Caribbean, British fortunes 
sank steadily in the second half of 1794, then plummeted in the following 
spring. The emancipation of France's slaves and the arrival of Victor 
Hugues transformed the war in the West Indies and forced the British on 
to the defensive. Guadeloupe was lost, and Grenada almost so, then 
St. Vincent and St. Lucia. Driven from the Low Countries, by May 1,7015 all the 
British infantry had been evacuated from the Continent, and Holland and Prussia 
had made peace. Spain and Sweden would soon follow- It was in these circum- 
stances that the Cabinet' decided in July that a new West India expedition 
should be the Government's priority. 
(') 
Dundas was the driving force behind the scheme. In 1794, under 
pressure from the West India Committee and City merchants trading with the 
Conquered Islands, he had fought hard against opposition from the Admiralty 
to get adequate reinforcements for the West Indies, complaining it was 
cruel to send out raw recruits"' Contrary winds, a shortage of shipping, 
the French fleet and epidemics among the troops all combined to spoil his 
efforts, with the results already seen. Refusing to dispatch troops during 
the sickly season, he temporarily turned his attention to the Cape of 
Good Hope, but played no part in organising the abortive invasion of 
Brittany launched in June. Whatever, happened there, he argued, 'a compleat 
success in the West Indies is essential to the interests and... contentment 
of this country'. No European success would palliate defeat in the 
Caribbean, but success in the Caribbean would compensate for reverses in 
Europe. Britain should therefore, he said, send out as large and as 
efficient a force as possible, and it should sail by September 15th. 
(3) 
The acceptance of his policy, in the face of Whig clamour about 
leaving Britain exposed to the threat of invasion, was greatly facilitated 
by two factors. Firstly, John Pitt had been replaced as First Lord of the 
Admiralty by the young, colonially-minded Lord Spencer; and in July 
Spain made peace with France, surrendering to her the colony of Santo 
Domingo. This was a blow the Government had striven to avert in the pre- 
vious months. Belated offers had been made to Madrid, and rejected, of a 
formal agreement on policy towards Saint Domingue. It had also been decided 
at the last minute to send Malouet to Santo Domingo to encourage the 
co-operation between the two powers that he had constantly urged 
! 4) 
But it 
was too late. Republican forces could now be diverted from the Pyrenees 
to the Caribbean and from the Santo Domingo frontier to the Artibonite 
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cordon. French privateers, now able to operate out of Spanish ports, 
could extend their depredations. Above all, it was feared Spain might now 
form an alliance with France and that they might turn their combined fleets 
against the British West Indies. 
Nevertheless, although the Franco-Spanish peace made Britain much 
more vulnerable in the Caribbean, it also added greatly to the prizes 
being fought for. Santo Domingo was not only twice the size of Saint 
Domingue but also more fertile and almost wholly undeveloped. Malouet 
pointed out immediately that its colonists could be expected to assist the 
British rather than become subjects of Republican France. The promise of 
land grants, he suggested, would make it easy to raise an army of 4migr4s 
to serve there. 
(5) 
De Charmilly was even more ambitious. He wanted Pitt 
to declare war on Spain and blockade the Spanish colonies. They would 
then declare their independence and become commercial satellites of Great 
Britain. As for the guerre ridicule in Saint Domingue, it could be ended 
in four months by a blockade and a unified, all-out attack by 12,000 troops 
(6) 
De Charmilly was now completely out of favour, despised by the 4migr6s and 
ignored by the Government, but Malouet's standing with the ministry had 
improved and his collaborator, the marquis de Bouil14, was now asked to 
submit further plans. 
With remarkable energy, Dundas spent the summer months putting together 
what was then the largest expedition ever to sail from Great Britain. The 
countryside around Southampton and Cork blazed with red uniforms and bell 
tents mushroomed row upon row in farmers' fields, as an army of 30,000 
men was assembled. Hundreds of tons of stores converged on the two ports. 
Bulky East Indiamen beat their way through gales across the Irish Sea and 
heavy-laden ordnance ships winched aboard cannon and shot at the wharves 
of Woolwich arsenal. Shipping was scarce, as British trade was expanding, 
but Dundas managed to procure in a short period 100,000 tons - over 200 
vesselsý7) Orders were sent to the West Indies to build barracks and 
hospitals, and building materials and horses were purchased in the United 
States(8) A new black corps was to be raised in Jamaica and pioneers 
were to be recruited in Barbados. Because of public concern about mortality 
in the islands, considerable care was taken to provide adequate medical 
supplies. A special Hospital Corps was formed and regulations regarding 
hygiene, 'diet and conduct were drawn up by Windham, though rarely followed 
by commanding officers. Conditions on the troopships were nonetheless 
better than in previous times and mortality on board was to be lower than 
in the American War 
(9) 
For this much Dundas deserves credit. 
- 179 - 
He was well aware, however, that the 30,000 men he had drummed up 
included regiments of the lowest standards, indisciplined and inexperienced. 
The best of them were gathered at Southampton, and there the expedition's 
commander, General Sir Ralph Abercromby, had to weed out numerous old men 
and boys. 
(10) 
Dundas sought to replace the worst with the elite Foot Guards, 
but the King's reluctance forced him to relent. 
(11) 
The troops' morale was 
not improved by the long delays the expedition experienced, which upset 
victualling arrangements and caused some regiments to run out of supplies. 
Poor liaison between the Transport and Victualling Boards was partly res- 
ponsible and we also find General Whyte being castigated by Dundas for 
not informing him of the shortages. 
12) Most of the troops were ready to 
sail, it seems, before the end of September but, as in the two previous 
autumns, strong westerly winds hindered both the assembling of the shipping 
and its exit from the Channel. The last ordnance ship, moreover, did not (13) 
leave Woolwich until October 26th. Meanwhile, behind the scenes, the 
whole expedition was being jeopardised by a dispute between the two admirals 
involved regarding precedence. Abercromby, as a result, wished to resign 
and Middleton, the best man on the Admiralty Board, actually did so. Once 
that was settled, relations between Army and Navy remained potentially 
explosive enough to keep Dundas permanently on tenterhooks 
(14) 
Despite all 
the delays, the ships still sailed, on November 13th/14th, at an earlier 
date than any previous West India expedition. 
(15) 
Yet their problems had only just begun. Buffeted by tremendous gales, 
the ships were forced directly back to port much damaged. Six hundred men, 
were drowned in the Channel. 
(16) 
In the middle of piloting the Sedition 
Bill through the House of Commons, Dundas, rushed down to Portsmouth to 
supervise repairs. The ships sailed again in December only to be scattered 
by the fury of the Atlantic. Some were blown southwards to Barbados; most 
limped back to Britain to try again. Forced to camp out through the winter 
on the Irish coast, half of the 9,000 troops at Cork went down with dysentery 
or typhus. Many deserted and over -: J¢ hundred died. Even more were left 
behind sick when the expedition finally set sail in February, and another 
570 had to be hospitalised on reaching Barbados. 
(17) 
Several ships were cap- 
tured by the French or sank in the Bay of Biscay. The wastage of life was 
enormous. Typical was the experience of the 32nd Foot, which was 954 strong 
on November lst but reached Saint Domingue six months later with a com- 
plement of only 633. 
(18) 
Although Dundas was eager for Saint Domingue's capture, it was 
apparently always taken for granted that the expedition's priority should 
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be the relief of Grenada, which was a British colony. Thereafter, it 
had to be determined whether or not Saint Domingue should have priority 
over Guadeloupe, St Lucia and Holland's undefended Guiana colonies. 
Guadeloupe, with its myriad privateers and proselytising revolutionaries, 
was the most dangerous, thought Lord Spencer, but Saint Domingue was the 
more valuable and, he curiously concluded, the easier option 
p9) 
Lying 
far to the leeward of the others, Saint Domingue would either need a 
separate expedition or have to go last on the agenda. Sailing ships could 
reach it easily from the Windwards but return only with great difficulty. 
Hence, Dundas's original plan, put forward in August, was for a two-pronged 
attack in the Caribbean, sending 15,000 men to the Windwards and 12,000 
to Saint Domingue 
(20) 
Neither Abercromby nor Admiral Christian seem to have 
had much interest in Saint Domingue but the former agreed that, if the cam- 
paign to windward finished early enough, he would send reinforcements 
there. On September 29th, Dundas wrote to Forbes, telling him he could 
expect 15,600 troops about the beginning of December, including 2,000 from 
Gibraltar, and that more might arrive later from the Windards$21) The 
forecast was culpably optimistic, but it would seem Dundas had not been 
informed how behindhand his preparations then were and did not realise that 
Abercromby would refuse to sail until they were completed(22) 
In November, the minister's attitude to Saint Domingue changed. The 
foreign troops destined for the colony had still not left Germany. Time 
was running short. On the 24th, he gave orders that fewer than 5,000 
should be sent there in the first instance, to reinforce the garrison, the 
remainder being concentrated in the Windwards until Grenada and St Lucia 
had been securedý23) in this, Dundas yielded to the demands of Abercromby 
and Christian, who were supported by Pitt. 
(24) 
Already, however, he had 
come to accept that the great offensive in Saint Domingue might have to be 
postponed or abandoned, because of the Maroon War in Jamaica. Since 
December 1794, it is interesting to note, Dundas had begun to display a 
new concern for the safety of Jamaica, clearly subordinating the campaign 
in Saint Domingue to the needs of the British colony. Its large population 
of prisoners and refugees, including a number of Republican agents, made 
it especially vulnerable in view of what he called 'the extraordinary 
and unprecedented system now adopted by the Enemy for overturning all 
(25) 
regular Government and subordination' It was not so much, it would seem, 
the emancipation of the slaves per se that had alarmed Dundas as Victor 
Hugues! subsequent and fearfully effective exploitation in Guadeloupe of 
this new power in Caribbean politics. Dundas's increasing caution was 
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naturally reinforced when he learned that most of the forces in Jamaica 
were being tied down by the revolt of the Trelawny Maroons. Early in 
November, therefore, he decided to allow Governor Balcarres to demand 
whatever assistance from Saint Domingue he needed, short of causing an 
evacuation of the Mole, whose harbour he thought vital for Jamaica's 
defence. 26) 
Yet, in January, after lengthy conversations, Pitt and Dundas decided 
once more to reverse their policy. It was a perfect example of that swift 
interaction of events in Europe and the Caribbean which kept policy-making 
for the West Indies several months out of date 
(27) 
When news of the pro- 
posed expedition reached Saint Domingue, it had considerably strengthened 
Britain's position there, prompting several black chiefs to negotiate a 
change of alignment. 
(28) 
Yet, by that time, Dundas had cut the expedition 
by two thirds. When he heard late in December, however, of these new 
developments and of the capture of Mirebalais, he had cause to think 
again. On January 3rd, Pitt informed Grenville that, once Grenada and 
St Vincent were retaken, Saint Domingue should be 'with a view either to 
war or peace... our first object of offence'(29) Having vainly called in 
November for another expedition to Brittany, Grenville was hostile to 
any West India venture, while some members of the Cabinet, like the Foxite 
Whigs, wanted to make peace. 
30) 
The King, however, would not hear of it, 
Abercromby had a real chance, he said, of taking Saint Domingue, and without 
it the West Indies would not be safe and any peace would be short-lived. 
31) 
Most interestingly, Lord Spencer argued that Saint Domingue should be 
placed first, even though by neglecting Guadeloupe all the British Leewards 
would most likely be lost. The security of Jamaica and the probable gain 
of Saint Domingue he thought more than sufficient compensation. 
32) 
Weeks went by, however, as the ships waited for a fair wind. Dundas 
was bitterly disappointed. Abercromby complained he had intended to 
finish the campaign in May/June not begin it. It was therefore decided 
that the easiest objectives should have priority. In early February, new 
plans were adopted and Saint Domingue went to the bottom of the list. The 
troops at Cork would sail there immediately, followed later by several 
foreign corps, but Abercromby was to concentrate on the Windwards and the 
(33) 
Dutch Guiana settlements. He was to liaise with Saint Domingue and send 
reinforcements once he had finished. In the event, he did not complete 
his operations until June and the only news he received from Saint Domingue 
4) 
was what he read in the English newspapers. 
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(ii) The Campaign and the Continuing Crisis in the Republican Zone. 
For Saint Domingue, the end result of Dundas's grand design was the 
arrival of 2,000 troops in February, of over 7,700 on May 3rd and around 
3,000 more before the end of July. Both Fortescue and Edwards considerably 
understate the numbers involved and depict them arriving later than they 
actually did. 
(35) 
Critically late though they were, they put the British 
garrison in a far stronger position than it had ever been before, although 
the numbers, it is true, are slightly misleading. Not only were they in 
Abercromby's words 'in all respects a very inefficient force'(, 
36)but 
some 
3,500 of them were Germans, French and Dutch serving rather reluctantly 
in 'foreign corps', almost all of which were cavalry. About 2,500 of the 
British were also cavalry, and in so mountainous a colony this heavy con- 
centration of horse is difficult to justify. Nevertheless, they were not 
quite so useless as their critics(37)claimed, for in the plains cavalry 
provided a mobility that was vital when perspiring, woollen-jacketed 
infantrymen were easily out-run by black insurgents, even though the thick 
plantation hedges made the terrain less than ideal. The expedition, one 
should note, had been intended to capture the great plaine du Nord. Much 
more of a drawback was the fact that most of the foreign cavalry had arrived 
without their horses. Since their terms of service precluded their fight- 
ing on foot, they had to remain non-combattants until supplied with mounts. 
These had been difficult to find in sufficient quantities and imported 
horses were just as susceptible to tropical diseases as their riders proved 
to be. Yellow fever, as in the previous two years, begain its ravages 
towards the end of May and decimated the new arrivals; in some cases even 
before they stepped ashore. Because the new barracks at the Mole were 
not finished in time, troops were kept crowded together on their ships in 
the narrow harbour. This was thought safer than putting them under canvas 
around the town but in reality it of course maximised the spread of 
infection. In May and June alone, nearly 1,300 perished. 
(38) 
Despite rapidly declining numbers, the garrison still contained in 
July 8,500 British soldiers and close on 4,000 continentals, (i. e. nearly 
50% more than is reported by Fortescue, ) together with about 10,000 colonial 
troops and militia, black, white and brown. 
(39) 
The carnage during the 
summer was terrible but recruits continued to arrive, so that on December 1st 
General Forbes still commanded some 8,500 European troops and over 1,000 
colonials.. One must bear in mind, therefore, this great accession of 
strength, when considering Forbes's failure to substantially improve the 
British position in the course of 1796, and ask whether more might have 
been achieved, given the means to hand. 
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Major-General Gordon Forbes became commander in Saint Domingue 
only by default. Neither Dundas nor Abercromby was keen to appoint him. 
Even the heavy-handed General Whyte was thought preferable, and for this 
reason was chosen by Abercromby for the Windwards expedition. The Army 
simply had no other able man with West Indian experience. 
(40) At the end 
of February, he returned from cruising off the north coast and took over 
from Williamson at Port au Prince, though he was not made Governor. 
Anxious to use the two fresh regiments from Gibraltar, but with Port 
de Paix and le Cap too strong for the forces at his disposal, he had to 
choose between attacking Gonaives and Leogane. His choice of Leogane was 
a bad one, prompted by considerations of popularity in the capital, 
41) 
though it was also favoured by Montalembert, (who was a Cul de Sac planter, ) 
and by Admiral Hyde-Parker. Gonaives was strategically far more important, 
being Toussaint Louverture's lifeline to the outside world. An attack in 
late March, moreover, at the time of the mulatto coup in le Cap, might 
have had far-reaching consequences. Instead, several thousand soldiers 
were embarked at Port au Prince on March 17th/18th and sent with a strong 
naval squadron 20 miles down the coast to Leogane. On the 21st, a bom- 
bardment began and the troops were landed. The attack failed for two 
reasons. Firstly, the town had been insufficiently reconnoitred. Its 
defences were found to be stronger and its defenders much more numerous 
than anticipated, with the result that no siege guns had been brought. 
Secondly, the virtuoso artillery work of Al6xandre Petion, future president 
of Haiti, not only forced out of action two of the squadron's three ships 
of the line and two of the frigates, but also dismounted the field pieces 
of the advancing troops. A sally by the defenders then drove the British 
back in confusion. A council of war was held. Some still wanted to carry 
the place by storm but Forbes thought it best to begin a regular siege, 
bringing ashore heavy guns from the ships. Hyde-Parker, however, never 
keen to co-operate with the military and always short of seamen, refused 
to risk the lives of any more of his men. The attack was called off 
(42) 
Spirits sank in the occupied zone as the campaign season came fruit- 
lessly to a close. With new confidence, the Leogane mulattoes moved up 
cannon to establish posts near Morne 1'H6spital. Forbes fortified the 
Grenier post that commanded the northern exit from the mountains but did 
not retaliate. Believing Port au Prince no longer safe, over 30 French 
families left for the United States 
$43) 
In the central region, where the 
brutality of the vicomte de Bruges had alienated the mulattoes of Mire- 
balais, several posts surrendered to the Republicans with little or no 
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resistance. 
(44) 
By April 1st, Toussaint Louverture had foiled the 
mulatto coup at le Cap and, not five years out of slavery, was made Deputy- 
Governor of Republican Saint Domingue. 
Far from abating, however, the social and political divisions within 
the Republican zone 
(45) 
became much more pronounced and throughout 1796 it was 
to be rent with internecine strife. The failure of the le Cap coup sent 
shock waves through the North Province and forced many mulatto cammanders 
into open or covert revolt, raising the blacks of their districts. 
(46) 
Villatte entrenched himself in the north-east plain, where he remained 
until the end of May, adding to the existing ferment in the mountains 
behind. In the north-west, a succession of rebellions broke out - in 
Gros Morne, Saint Louis, Jean Rabel and, again and again, Port de Paix, 
from whose coast British warships were cheered at the beginning of May. 
Even in le Cap, the situation was so volatile that Laveaux ea close to 
being killed by the very troops Toussaint sent to protect him. Just to 
complicate matters, a large number of mulattoes, including Candy and 
Savary, prisoners of the Spaniards, were returned to le Cap in April. 
Toussaint failed to get them arrested. 
(47) 
At this critical juncture 
everything depended, one of Laveaux's correspondents wrote in early May, 
on preventing the British from profiting from these disorders. 
(48) 
Yet, almost nothing was done. On the Artibonite front, the British 
did advance through the mountains to occupy the Hauteurs de Verrettes 
but then halted, probably waiting for the rains that would flood the 
Artibonite. The new Republican fort in the valley below was critically 
short of men, food and ammunition, as its defenders constantly complained 
to Toussaint, with some rancour. Apprehensively, they waited to be 
attacked, but months went by. 
(49) 
This inactivity seems all the more 
culpable after the reinforcements of May 3rd almost trebled the size of the 
British garrison. Forbes thought them 'very bad' soldiers, it is true, 
and within three weeks large numbers had fallen sick. 
(50) 
This might have 
been avoided, however, had he carried out Montalembert's plan for moving 
them immediately into the interior. 
(51) 
The baron wanted to extend the 
western cordon southwards in a chain of tightly-patrolled camps from 
Grands Bois to Saltrou. While providing a healthy place to acclimatise, 
this would reduce the loss of slaves and cattle from the occupied zone, 
he thought, and eventually permit the mountains of the West to be cleared. 
The plan had serious drawbacks but was surely preferable to just leaving 
the troops on their ships. The cautious General soon came to be called 
(52) 
'the old woman', or 'dowager Forbes'. 
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By late May, however, Forbes had solid reasons for being cautious. 
On the 11th, a squadron of ten Republican warships had anchored off 
le Cap. (The blockade had been called off two months before). They 
brought with them 30,000 muskets, 400,000 lbs of powder and nearly 3,000 
troops and National Guards. 
(53) 
Toussaint Louverture was now able to 
re-equip his army and enlarge it to include about 10,000 infantry and two 
cavalry regiments. The Army of the North was probably rather smaller, while 
Rigaud's Ldgion du Sud numbered a little over 5,000 infantry with 1,200 
cavalry. 
(54) 
All three, in addition, could call on large reserves of 
armed cultivateurs. Accompanying the reinforcements was General Donatien 
Rochambeau. He was a popular figure with the white planters and issued 
an enticing proclamation to those of the occupied zone which was much 
discussed there and contributed to the deep disillusion with British rule 
fast gaining ground. A plot was uncovered in Port au Prince, apparently, 
to seize the sole warship in the harbour and burn the town. 
(55) 
Privateers 
created havoc off the coasts and in mid-July a vessel was actually cut 
out at the entrance to the harbour. Although it was re-taken, there were 
similar incidents elsewhere and a flotilla of transports carrying 400 
troops - the crowning insult - was seized close to the Mole. 
(56) 
As regards 
ships of the line, the British squadron was stronger than ever, -a 40 gun 
French ship was taken off le Cap - but it continued to lack the sloops 
and brigs needed to deal with the privateers and was seriously undermanned. 
However, what really made Forbes's position difficult was the news that 
arrived on May 23rd that the French were expecting another, much larger, 
squadron under Admiral Riche'ry, said to be carrying 10,000 troops. 
(57) 
The situation of the previous autumn, so favourable to the British, was now 
completely reversed. 
Like Abercromby, Rich4ry was in fact never to reach Saint Domingue 
but this could not be foreseen. Forbes, therefore, after wasting most of 
April and May, would seem justified in having thereafter adopted a defen- 
sive strategy. Dundas certainly thought so. An offensive, he agreed, was 
not possible. 
(58) 
Some colonists, though, like the marquis de Fontenille, 
disagreed and scorned the British for being paralysed, as they saw it, by 
Rochambeau and his 'crowd of mulattoes'. 
(59) 
They were probably unaware, 
however, of Richgry's expected arrival. On the other hand, it should be 
said, at this time Forbes himself was still expecting reinforcements from 
Abercromby to arrive in July. Fearing for the worst, nonetheless, General 
Forbes turned to fortifying his outposts. He erected blockhouses and 
barracks at the Mole and in the Grand' Anse, and was probably responsible 
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for building the three forts in the mountains of Arcahaye now known as 
Ddlpeche, Lacroix and Drouet. Justified or not, this was an unfortunate 
policy. The tragic irony of the defensive strategy was that, by keeping 
soldiers inactive in the ports, yellow fever killed far more of them than 
the Republicans would have done had they stormed even le Cayes or le Cap. 
This lesson was not learned for another year. It applied equally, of 
course, to the Navy. Ships left idle in port had their crews decimated; 
those on blockade duty did not. With six ships of the line at the Mole 
and a potential strike-force of at least 6,000 troops, it is hard to 
believe that Gonaives or Jacmel could not have been taken. The problem 
of yellow fever would still have remained, unless the troops pushed on 
into the interior, which was perhaps not advisable in the rainy season, 
but it was far better they die of disease in Gonaives than Port au Prince. 
At the price of spreading his unprecedentedly numerous forces more thinly 
on the ground, Forbes might have struck a strategically important blow at 
the Republicans' sources of supplies and privateering strength, and one of 
incalculable psychological significance. This was particularly so as the 
Republican zone remained gravely weakened by internal strife, and some 
factions were apparently looking to the British as the lesser of two evils. 
Cambefort, the royalists' expert on the North Province, wanted to 
attack Jean Rabel and the island of Tortuga, both of them relatively 
healthy situations. 
(60) 
Tortuga was a useful base for blockading Port de 
Paix and le Cap, (which, unblockaded, received further reinforcements in 
July). Its planters, moreover, had preserved as much as they could of the 
slave regime and with their commandant, Labattut, were very reluctant 
Republicans. 
(61) 
Delair, the commandant of Jean Rabel, had been openly 
insubordinate for several months and was encouraging rebellion in the other 
parishes of the north-west. He had previously served the English and was 
said, at least by the Republicans, to be again in contact with them. 
(62) 
Forbes, however, concerned only to strengthen the Mole, decided to move 
against the village of Bombarde, which was valued solely as a source of 
fresh vegetables. At 9 a. m. on June 8th, some 3,000 soldiers left the 
Mole having been kept counter-marching, by error, throughout the night. 
Under a blistering mid-day sun and without water in their canteens, they 
had to cross 15 miles of Saint Domingue's most arid terrain. Beneath the 
cacti and thorn bushes dozens dropped to the ground, their tongues lolling 
from their mouths. After a short siege, Bombarde surrendered. Delair, 
significantly, did little to save it. The village, however, was found 
difficult-to supply, as convoys were frequently ambushed on the rocky 
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plateau and an outlying post where guard duty was neglected was overrun. 
Faced by a build-up of enemy forces, the isolated garrison left at 
Bombarde was evacuated after a few weeks. 
(63) 
This singular humiliation, 
a stark demonstration of the difficulties confronting the British, was, 
nevertheless, to be the low-point of their campaign for 1796. 
From the end of June, prospects began to brighten, albeit mainly because 
of divisions among the Republicans. Reinforcements continued to reach the 
Mole but these were predominantly, to Forbe's dismay, disgruntled and 
horseless foreign cavalry. The forces that had debarked at le Cap in May 
also sowed seeds of discord. They were accompanied by Sonthonax, heading 
another Civil Commission, and about 200 mulattoes came with them. Of these, 
Toussaint was within weeks demanding the deportation of Antoine Chanlatte 
for plotting to assassinate him. 
(64) 
Sonthonax did get Villatte and his 
1,500 men to surrender, but his policy of replacing mulatto officials 
with blacks and his reassertion of (white) centralised control increased 
existing tensions, as the British were glad to learn. Arrests of mulatto 
leaders multiplied, especially in the Artibonite, where Toussaint accused 
Valerai of conspiring to bring in the British. 
(65) 
Faced with increasing 
scarcity, food rations had to be reduced and paper money issued to the 
troops. General Rochambeau, clearly out of sympathy with the new order, 
clashed violently with Sonthonax and in July he left the colony along with 
several of the French warships, whose crews could be neither paid nor fed. 
His departure ended the speculations of the whites in the British zone that 
(66) 
the grass might be greener under Republican rule. 
The final withdrawal of the Spanish forces in June also brought to a 
head the competition to win over the colonists of Santo Domingo (now 
officially French) and the black Auxiliaries of the north-east, said to be 
io, 000 strong. 
(67) 
Anxious to maintain trade links with the British, the 
propertied Spaniards and their priests promised to defend their own soil 
with 20,000 men, in return for military supplies and naval protection, 
and they expressed willingness to become British subjects. The Republicans, 
therefore, decided to delay taking possession of the Spanish colony and 
only occupied Fort Dauphin. There they found the local mulattoes extremely 
insubordinate and ready to stir up the Auxiliaries whose allegiance remained 
uncertain. Gagnette was currently leaning towards the Republicans but many 
of the chiefs still used their 'royalist' titles and most, according to the 
Spaniards, still wanted a king. Much about them remains obscure but 
clearly they wanted to stay free of forced labour, and here the British may 
have been - paradoxically - at an advantage. While in the Republican zone 
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the distinction between a cultivateur and a soldier was rather hazy, 
and efforts to restore the plantation regime were alienating many blacks, 
it was fairly sure that the British would never dare risk subverting their 
hard-preserved slave regime by trying to force such seasoned fighters back 
on to the estates. British agents, assisted by the Spaniards, distributed 
guns and money among the chiefs. Sporadic fighting broke out among them 
and with Republican commanders, and through June and July the situation 
simmered. 
Meanwhile the British went on building up their forces in Saint Marc 
and in the six camps they now had in the region of Verrettes and Petite 
Riviere. Toussaint knew that the fort at Verrettes, critically short of 
food, would surrender if attacked. He therefore kept harrying the 
British positions, while himself preparing to attack Mirebalais, a move 
Sonthonax considered vital. in mid-July, we find him deriding the 
Projects vains and mesures mal combines of the anglo-royalists, 
(68) 
but 
this was a little premature. On the 22nd, he sent more than 1,500 of his 
men to attack Morne Diamant overlooking Saint Marc, a rocky eminence 
from 
which they were used to spying on the town and its harbour. The British 
were now building a stone fort there 400 feet above the sea, to be named 
after the new commander, George Churchill. As usual, the raiders emerged 
suddenly from the surrounding woods shortly before dawn. For two hours, 
the 130 or so colonial troops guarding the works held them off, but then 
were driven precipitously from the summit. Under cover, however, of the 
guns of Fort Brisbane and reinforced by 150 troops from the town, they (69) 
counterattacked and quickly put the blacks to flight. 
At about the same time, Toussaint himself occupied the Spanish posts 
of Lascahobas and Banica, thus threatening Mirebalais. 
The British res- 
ponded with a general attack on all fronts, at 
first unsuccessfully. The 
Republicans were severely stretched and Toussaint fell ill, but still 
managed to take three posts at the centre of the cordon, abandoned 
in 
panic by Brigadier-General Churchill. 
(70) 
Around August 10th, however, 
Toussaint suffered his worst ever defeat. His well-armed Ist battalion, 
said to number 3,500 men, was caught in open country near Lascahobas by 
the cavalry of the vicomte de Bruges and a detachment of British dragoons. 
Only fifty of his troops, he said, escaped. 
(71) 
A few days later, another 
300 were killed, again cut down by cavalry, some four miles from Saint Marc, 
this time attacking the new stockaded post of Gros Morne, built at the exit 
of the Gorge des Guepes into the Artibonite plain. 
(72) 
The British con- 
tinued to press hard and Montalembert now occupied most of the, formerly 
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Spanish, central savanna from Neybe in the south up to Banica. This 
permitted him to intervene more effectively in the north-east. There, 
soon after the battle at Lascahobas, Gagnet was murdered and the whole 
region erupted. Once more the Republicans had to fight on two fronts, or 
rather three, for in the north-west, too, rebellions continued to flare 
up throughout the summer and autumn. On August 18th, Sonthonax desperately 
declared la partie du Nord en danger and attempted to conscript all males 
aged between 18 and 25. This in turn led to further revolts by plantation 
workers. 
(73) 
Abercromby's decision, therefore, taken at the end of June, 
not to send reinforcements to Saint Domingue(74) was singularly unfortunate 
for General Forbes. 
In the mulatto-dominated South, the Republican position was much 
stronger both internally and externally. It was there, however, that the 
conflict between white and brown, centralised authority and local autonomism, 
achieved its most extreme manifestation and with perhaps the greatest 
potential benefit to Great Britain. 
(75) 
The commissioners that Sonthonax 
had sent to les Cayes in June with the express purpose of undermining the 
mulatto hegemony had by mid-August brought tempers to boiling point in the 
provincial capital. A combined attack, nevertheless, was organised against 
the posts of the Grand' Anse, which caught the British by surprise but 
failed to break the military stalemate. While in the east Camp Thomas, a 
minor outpost of Pestel, was captured, the column sent against Camp Raimond 
in the centre suffered heavy losses and inflicted none, though it burned 
several plantations in the Plymouth region. The main thrust was against 
les Irois, which Rigaud cut off and besieged for 18 days, beginning on 
August 11th. He lost many of his 3/4,000 men, while only nine of the 
British troops were killed, but the colonial losses included the very able 
chevalier de Sevrg, and for a while the situation seemed desperate. 
General Bowyer's attempts to counterattack with completely untrained 
Chasseurs proved hopeless and the garrison was lucky Rigaud suddenly with- 
drew. He had to hurry back to les Cayes, where a massacre of the white 
population was in progress. To restore order, the inept commissioners 
were compelled to invest Rigaud with supreme powers and depart. A complete 
breach resulted between the mulatto South and the Republican government 
in the North and in Paris. Thus isolated, Rigaud secretly let it be known 
both in Jamaica and Port au Prince that he was willing to surrender on the 
terms of 1793. Towards the end of the year, negotiations were begun via 
white intermediaries. 
(76) 
News of Rigaud's outmanoeuvring of Sonthonax excited dissidents in the 
- 190 - 
North, especially in Fort Dauphin, and in le Cap a plot was discovered 
to call in the British. 
(77) 
No sooner were rebellions suppressed in 
le Borgne and Valliere than others broke out in Saint Louis and Port de Paix 
and fighting flared up again in the north-east. And so it continued until 
the end of the year. Despite a vigorous campaign by General Pierre Michel, 
Valliere was not to be occupied until March 1797. By September the 
Republicans' stocks of guns and ammunition were once more running low, 
while troops protested, even rioted, at the continuing shortage of food 
and cash. 
(78) 
As the rainy season came to a close in October, Forbes and 
Montalembert were full of optimism. 
(79) 
Agriculture was starting to 
revive in the Cul de Sac and at Arcahaye production reached a new peak. 
The Grand' Anse recovered from the August invasion and raised another 
1,500 Chasseurs. Co-operation between the Army and Navy had notably 
improved since the departure of Admiral Hyde Parker. The news from Santo 
Domingo remained very encouraging, and over 800 Spaniards joined the 
colonial forces at Banica. When raiding the moutains of Leogane, 
Montalembert, to his surprise, met with no resistance and destroyed several 
camps. In the north-east, Lieutenant-Colonel Rouvray actually moved up 
into the mountains of Vailibre. 
(80) 
Had there been at Banica 'a thousand 
steady British infantry', it was later claimed, le Cap would have fallen. 
(81) 
The arrival of reinforcements certainly might have ended the hesitations 
of the north-east 'brigands', (as the Republicans called them), and further 
encouraged the hesitation of Andre Rigaud. If 8-10,000 troops debarked 
in December, Montalembert and Forbes agreed, Saint Domingue, or at least 
the North Province, would be conquered by May. All one can say is, they 
may have been right. 
However, no such reinforcements were to arrive. In December the 
garrison was even reduced, thus ruining whatever chances there were of winning 
over Rigaud. Perhaps prematurely the Government had given up its plans of 
conquest and, when Spain declared war in October, it had several regiments 
transferred to other islands. On the other hand, the fact that the British 
had made so little headway when the Republican camp was so divided also 
suggests that conquest could by this time have been achieved only at a 
prohibitive cost. The enemy are so much more respectable now than formerly, ' 
wrote a British officer in the South after Rigaud's attack. 
(82) 
In the 
North, despite some grave setbacks, Toussaint continued in the teeth of 
adversity to reveal prodigious powers of leadership, and alongside him 
other talented generals, such as Pierre Michel, were emerging. There were 
other signs, too, that Saint Domingue had finally slipped from the grasp, 
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of the white slaveowners and was, in fact, moving irrevocably beyond the 
sphere of European influence altogether. 
Ironically enough, most of the rebellions that so hampered the 
Republican war effort in 1796 were usually inspired by fears that Laveaux, 
Toussaint or Sonthonax were plotting to restore slavery, or were reactions 
against their attempts to revive the plantation economy. In the minds of 
the blacks, a decisive break seems to have taken place with the colonial 
past, a generalised rejection of slavery, certainly, but also of white 
authority, and to some extent of plantation labour as well. Even in 
Jean Rabel, where the plantation regime had suffered relatively little, 
the black labourers who stayed on their estates had long ceased to plant 
cane and were abandoning the former slave quarters to build new homes in 
the hills. Some of the creole families, it was later said, would never 
again work for whites. 
(83) 
Coffee, it is true, continued to be harvested 
everywhere in the North and Laveaux and Toussaint indeed achieved a modest 
success, despite extensive vagabondage, in reviving sugar production. 
Moreover, some of the unrest on the plantations was due specifically to 
wartime conditions - conscription and requisitioning or theft by soldiers, 
while some ateliers, it could be argued, might have worked for their 
former masters, although they refused to work for the ancien libre who 
replaced him. However, if the brief period of Toussaint's rule following 
the occupation suggests that the plantation economy in the North could 
have been revived, even under white ownership, Moise's revolt of 1800 
stands as a serious question mark to such a conclusion. In 1796, Lechasseur's 
rebellion at le Borgne was directed specifically against the presence of 
whites and mulattoes in the parish, and the same was true of the insurrect- 
ions around Port de Paix. Toussaint's nephew, Moise, would not enforce 
the new labour laws and let his officers obstruct white officials. Macaya, 
for all his royalist pretensions, suggested to Pierre Michel they combine 
to massacre the whites of le Cap. 
(84) 
In the north-west, many of the 
surviving whites were massacred in the spring, as were 200 or more at 
les Cayes in August. The departure of General Laveaux in October neatly 
symbolises this shift of power, which is more subtly expressed in Sonthonax's 
correspondence in the increasing deference he felt obliged to show Toussaint. 
Significantly, it was about this time that Southonax was supposed to have 
approached Toussaint with a view to declaring Saint Domingue independent. 
(85) 
More and more, it seemed probable that any attempt to re-establish slavery 
in the North, especially since Sonthonax had distributed guns on the plant- 
ations, would have to be carried to the point of genocide. 
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The irony, therefore, was double. The British Government gave up 
hope of conquering Saint Domingue just when the military situation was at 
its most favourable and the occupied zone was showing signs of prosperity. 
Now that success seemed within Britain's grasp, however, it was increasingly 
certain that the colony would prove a profitless, if not untenable, con- 
quest. 
However one interprets the long-term situation, it is clear that in 
the last two months of 1796 the Republican zone achieved a new degree of 
stability, as power passed squarely into the hands of the blacks and 
prospects of a British conquest vanished. The mulattoes remained 'absolu- 
ment incorrigibles', Sonthonax thought, but he ceased to fear their 
influence. For their part in crushing the le cap coup, various black 
officers, from Generals Toussaint, Leveillg and Pierre Michel down to 
Captain Henri Christophe, were promoted by order of the Directory, thus 
furthering their control of the army. At the height of the struggle in 
September, news of Napoleon's victories in Italy had raised the Republicans' 
spirits; by November, they knew that Spain was now their ally and that 
Britain was suing for peace. That month, Christophe's cavalry foiled an 
attempted landing in the north-east. As relations worsened with the 
United States, the fearfully successful corsairs of the north coast began 
seizing American shipping and this brought in much-needed supplies of food 
and money. At the end of November, Toussaint finally restored calm in the 
mountains of Port de Paix (and along with it his reputation, then being 
overshadowed by that of Pierre Michel). 'Je ne doute plus, ' wrote 
Sonthonax on December 2nd, 'du salut de la colonie. ' Two days later, he 
urged Toussaint, now the most powerful man in Saint Domingue, to begin at 
Mirebalais the final expulsion of the British. 
(86) 
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CHAPTER IX. THE DEBATE ON SAINT DOMINGUE'S FUTURE AND THE MISSION OF 
GENERAL SIMCOE 
(i) Policy-Making and the Public Debate on Saint Domingue. :, The 
'desolated island of St. Domingo, the Eden of the Western World' was 
r" 
becoming increasingly a matter of embarrassment for the British Government. 
The colony, it seemed, could not be conquered, but neither could it be 
abandoned, certainly not in wartime, and even if peace were concluded, 
l 
it could scarcely be returned to the Republicans with anything but extreme 
trepidation. Meanwhile, month by month, the costs of occupation escalated 
giddily. Fortunately for the ministry, the Opposition failed, in March 
1796, to get the cost of the war debated in Parliament, and the following 
month Dundas defended the West India campaigns in a major speech, later 
published, which was conspicuous for saying as little about Saint Domingue 
as possible. 
2 
About this time, however, the Agent-General's accounts were 
received, revealing the expenditure of nearly two million pounds in the 
colony 3 and during the spring it was learned from Forbes that, unless 
even more reinforcements were sent out, offensive operations were impos- 
sible. Dundas replied, in early July, that policy towards Saint Domingue 
was being reconsidered. 
4 1 
Of the hundreds of documents concerning Saint Domingue then passing 
through ministers' hands, one stands out for its originality and boldness, 
and ultimately for the accuracy of its predictions. It is a single-minded, 
lucid and forthright critique of the Saint Domingue venture by an officer 
in the 62nd Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Maitland. 
5 
On July 15th, he 
wrote to his brother, the Earl of Lauderdale, that both British and French 
were wasting their time in the colony. 'St. Domingo will end in being a 
Brigand Republick, ' he said, 'connected only with America... a Negroe free 
government arising out of the ruins of European Despotism. ' Given Saint 
Domingue's size, the difficulties of subjugating the rebel slaves, and the 
paucity of means to hand, he thought the original decision to intervene 
very dubious. Jobbery alone had maintained the reluctant allegiance of 
the colonists and crowds of emigres, and any retrenchment would entail 
their desertion. Port au Prince, Saint Marc and the Mole, he considered 
indefensible against large numbers and he doubted that the Government 
realised the full extent of the army's losses - nearly 6,000 dead up to 
March 1796. The British forces were now 'annhilatedO he claimed, 'and 
the dreadful scene of mortality exhibited' there exceeds every idea of 
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human credibility. 'Dundas should be told that, if the occupation had to 
be continued, to fulfill prior engagements or to preserve a bargaining 
counter, then a high-ranking, and intelligent officer must be sent out and 
a defensive policy only be pursued. The Government, as it happened, was 
already thinking along these lines. 
The prospect of a British withdrawal from Saint Domingue greatly 
alarmed Malouet and his fellow colonists. 
6 
It seemed particularly real, 
because the desire for peace was growing in Great Britain and in September 
renewed overtures were made to the French. Malouet realised Britain could 
not keep the colony and wanted peace but insisted that outright abandon 
would do incalculable harm. It would make a gift to the Republic not only 
of its 'enormous production' but of the specie and timber of Santo Domingo 
as well, and as a result, he suggested, France's paper credit and naval 
power might be restored. Jamaica, he warned, would be in the greatest of 
danger, and this sentiment was generally shared by British opinion. 
7 
He 
therefore proposed a compromise solution. British involvement in the 
colony would be greatly reduced but British sovereignty would be retained 
until the peace. The Administration would be placed entirely in French 
hands, which he had been advocating for about a year, but now at its head 
and in charge of all colonial troops he wanted to see a prestigious French 
commander, such as the marquis de Bouille. More emigres and mercenaries 
were to be sent out and more Chasseurs raised, along with increased taxes, 
to which the colonists would assent via a colonial assembly. If governed 
by themselves, they would less readily countenance the corruption then 
rife and be more willing to make sacrifices. When peace was negotiated, 
Britain would either declare Saint Domingue independent or restore it to 
France on condition that it be allowed to choose its own domestic regime. 
If endowed with sufficient military strength, the colonists, Malouet 
believed, could force the Directory to sanction in the interests of commerce 
the maintainance or restoration of slavery, and thus defuse the threat to 
the British West Indies. The plan was wildly optimistic but at this time 
Royalists and former slaveowners were becoming increasingly influential 
within a French Government dominated by moderates, and on these Malouet was 
pinning his hopes. 
Although in launching its autumn peace initiative Pitt's Government 
had no intention of trying to keep any of its French conquests8, there is 
no evidence it intended to adopt the special strategy for safeguarding 
Saint Domingue that Malouet wanted. The negotiations never got that far. 
On the other hand, the ministers were only too pleased to implement his 
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proposals for limiting Britain's involvement in the colony. Early in 
September, it was decided to send out General Abercromby, newly returned 
from the Windwards, to institute major reforms in Saint Domingue. All 
British troops would be withdrawn to the Mole and no more would be sent 
out, only emigres. These and the black corps, the main hope for the future, 
would be placed under French local commanders and all administration would 
similarly be handed over, though remaining under his supervision. 
Expenditure by the British, and this was to be his first concern, should 
be cut to just £25,000 per month. As war with Spain seemed ever more 
likely, the first of several orders was given withdrawing regiments to 
other colonies. 
9 
News now started to arrive, however, of the help proffered by the 
colonists of Santo Domingo. This inspired Malouet, a little contrarily, 
to put forward fresh plans of conquest, to complain the limit on expendit- 
ure was too low and protest at the proposed withdrawal of British troops 
to the Mole. He now even adopted de Charmilly's line, suggesting that 
Spanish America's 'inevitable, ' 'long-fomenting' move towards independence 
would be catalysed if Britain allowed free trade with Santo Domingo. 
10 
The Government, nevertheless, was intent on retrenchment. It asked Malouet 
to accompany Abercromby to help carry through the administrative reforms, 
and the marquis de Bouille was offered the command of the colonial troops. 
Malouet, duly flattered, sent his baggage to Portsmouth. The experiment 
in semi-autonomy seemed all set. Suddenly, however, in the middle of 
October, the scheme was cancelled. The reasons are not quite clear, but 
they involve both military strategy and political in-fighting. The Duke 
of Portland appears to have vetoed Malouet's appointment, either because 
he disliked his pragmatic politics or because he wished to protect his own 
protege, Lambert, the overpaid chef de justice. Perhaps because of these 
tensions in the London emigre community, de Bouille declined the Government's 
offer and, when war with Spain broke out, it was decided that Abercromby 
should lead an expedition, once again, to the south Caribbean. 
11 
Although this high-level triumvirate was no longer to go to Saint 
Domingue, Malouet's scheme of reorganisation was not dropped. It was 
reiterated in draft instructions drawn up in October for the new commander, 
who was yet to be named. These instructions12 were more flexible than 
Abercromby's in allowing for an improving or worsening military situation. 
Should the Spanish and French colonists choose to mount an attack on 
le Cap, then the Mole garrison would be permitted to act offensively and 
seize Tortuga. Alternatively, if the situation dramatically worsened, the 
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commander was to be allowed, short of exceeding the stated limit on 
expenditure, to act as he thought necessary. For the first time, there- 
fore, the possibility of a total evacuation was envisaged. 
Obviously alarmed, the London merchants trading with Saint Domingue 
held a meeting on November 4th whose resolutions were communicated to the 
Government. Like Malouet, they wanted to ensure that, if Saint Domingue 
were given up to the Republic, the planters of the occupied zone would 
not have their estates sequestrated leaving them unable to pay their debts. 
In response, Portland apparently promised that the merchants would not 
suffer if the British withdrew. 
13 
It soon transpired, however, that the Government was not yet ready to 
completely abandon Saint Domingue except at the conference table. When 
instructions were drawn up on November 25th for Forbes's successor, 
Lieutenant-General Simcoe, there was no mention of carte blanche in the 
event of unforeseen circumstances. 
14 
Simcoe's priority was to be the 
reduction of Government expenditure to £25,000 per month. To achieve 
this, he would be allowed to withdraw British troops from all the posts 
in Saint Domingue except the Mole. This, however had to be held, as it 
was considered vital for the defence of Jamaica and an important bargain- 
ing counter in negotiations with France. At the same time, Simcoe made 
it clear that he nonetheless hoped to be able to undertake offensive 
operations, and before he sailed in December the Government seems to have 
promised to send him British recruits, stores and arms along with the 
services of General Maitland. 
15 
There was thus a certain ambivalence 
about his mission that teflected the uncertainties of the situation in 
Saint Domingue. (News was then reaching Britain both of the divisions 
in the Republican zone and of the appalling losses suffered by Forbes's 
troops. ) 
16 
Through the first half of 1797, this ambivalence and uncertain- 
ty became more marked. While in Britain domestic pressures largely limited 
the debate to disputing as to whether the Mole should be held or the 
colony evacuated entirely, in Saint Domingue it was being questioned not 
only if the occupied zone need be contracted at all, but also if the 
whole colony might still not be conquered. 
It was probably just as well that Malouet never went to Saint Domingue, 
for his scheme not only found few supporters but created there an outcry 
against him. Forbes reported in December that any moves towards 
self-government would increase factional hostilities and he enclosed an 
address got up by Montalembert condemning Malouet's plan. 
17 
Meanwhile, 
with Lord Malmesbury negotiating in Paris, Malouet concentrated increasingly 
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on effecting a rapprochement with the Republic and made himself the more 
unpopular by publishing in December a pamphlet that was politically 
courageous and misunderstood. It stated both that Britain wanted 
Saint Domingue to be restored to France and that slavery was morally 
reprehensible and would one day be abolished. He was actually arguing 
that, for the present, slavery should be maintained and that Britain and 
France should co-operate in preserving it - this was the point of the 
pamphlet - but to the hard-line royalists and creole planters with whom he 
was working it was heresy of the worst order. 
18 
Under the Ancient, ' Regime, an eclaire administrator and friend of 
Raynal; in 1789, a monarchist of the lioeral school; Malouet was some- 
thing of an outsider among the colonial emigres. Nonetheless, despite 
this element of ideological difference, emphasised by R. H. Griffiths, 
19 
the monarchien and ex-bureaucrat was here surely acting first and foremost 
as an absentee planter. At bottom, both Malouet and the colonists who 
now cursed his name had exactly the same aims. Both wished to stop 
Saint Domingue being handed over to a French Government that would put an 
end to slavery and proscribe all whites who had collaborated with the 
British. The difference was this. Malouet in London knew that the 
British could not possibly keep the colony and that the Dominguans, there- 
fore, would have to make their peace with the Republic or remain (or become) 
refugees. The colonists in Saint Domingue, on the other hand, were rightly 
sceptical of any Paris Government's desire to p Aky with the emigres 
and, confronted with the rise of Toussaint and Rigaud, doubted France 
could even attempt to put the colonial clock back. They therefore, as 
the debate intensified in 1797, vigorously asserted their loyalty to 
Great Britain or abandoned the sinking ship. 
When Simcoe reached Saint Domingue in February, he found the colonists 
despondent in the expectation that he would evacuate Port au Prince. The 
news of the negotiations in Paris broke the colonists' confidence, he said, 
though the rather more cynical Maitland thought it was the knowledge that 
drastic economies were impending. Both agreed there was no public spirit 
in the colony and little military discipline. Corruption and Factional 
quarrelling were everywhere. Emigration and desertion now greatly 
increased. 
20 
Laborie, Cambefort, Duranton and others confirmed this picture 
in their correspondence. They had hoped that Malouet and de Bouille 
under Abercromby's direction might have saved the colony, though the gloomy 
Laborie thought no one could have done it. ". By mid-February, all three 
shared the general view that the blacks must eventually win and were them- 
- 198 - 
selves planning to leave. 
21 
At the same time, however, Montalembert raised another petition pro- 
testing against the proposals for self-government and calling on the 
British to remain in the West Province. The planters of Arcahaye did the 
same. 
22 
After one month's fighting, moreover, Simcoe's abilities inspired 
a general confidence in the colony that, along with the desperate circum- 
stances, did something to galvanise public feeling, as even Laborie admitted. 
A public collection was raised; the Conseils Prive and Superieur offered 
to take a cut in salary, and the planters of Cul de Sac volunteered their 
slaves as soldiers free of charge. 
23 
All regretted Simcoe had not appeared 
two years earlier. When copies of Malouet's pamphlet reached the colony 
about June, the reaction was extravagant and a public meeting in Port au 
Prince declared his Deputyship revoked. Even the citizens of the capital, 
who had never lost any love on the British or their 
emigre allies, were 
in no hurry to surrender to an army of ex-slaves believed to be ill-discip- 
lined and vengeful. 
24 
Simcoe was much impressed with Saint Domingue. 'It is no trifling 
prize', he wrote, 'that England has at stake. ' He was, moreover, convinced 
that the security of Jamaica depended on a British presence there. 
Maitland, too, somewhat surprisingly, came to think it 'indispensably neces- 
sary' in view of the potential danger from the black corps the British 
would have to abandon if they pulled out. 
25 
On other points, however, they 
differed. Maitland, whom Simcoe treated as an equal and who reported 
separately to Whitehall, recommended that the British should withdraw to 
the Mole and Jeremie, while they still had time to do it with decorum, 
after first having taken 
Jean Rabel, Tortuga and Tiburon to provide for 
their defence. These were all to be held purely as military posts. 
Saint Domingue, he thought, was Britain's most complex problem of the war, 
but this plan he considered a cheap and secure way of controlling the 
Windward Passage and preserving something to bargain with when peace was 
negotiated. He was extremely critical of the behaviour of the French and 
colonists in the occupied zone and suggested that if they wanted to try 
and hold the West Province they should be given ammunition and cash in a 
lump sum and perhaps two frigates and be left to fend for themselves. 
Port au Prince, Maitland thought both militarily indefensible and a centre 
of corruption and disaffection the British would be well rid of. While 
tending to take a pessimistic view of the military situation, he was also 
willing to admit that his more optimistic colleagues might yet be proved 
right. 
26 
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Chief among these was the Francophile, George Churchill. He blamed 
on officers unable or unwilling to speak with the colonists the idea 
that Saint Domingue was too big to be held, and noted that sickness in the 
garrison was now declining. The long-risident planters, he stressed, 
wanted only Britons in positions of authority and they implored him 'on 
their knees', he said, not to implement the scheme for self-government. 
27 
Simcoe, it soon emerged, had no intention of doing so. Local rivalries 
and the state of the colonial corps meant that the West Province, at least 
for the time being, would not be able to defend itself, and the Mole, he 
considered, despite General Whyte's fortifications, could not hold out 
alone. Withdrawal was therefore impossible. Conquest, on the other hand, 
Simcoe informed Dundas in April, would not be difficult. Three thousand 
troops landed in Santo Domingo six weeks previously could have taken the 
whole island, he wrote. Again in mid-June, he asserted that two thousand 
trained troops or six thousand new ones -a revealing comparison - could 
have conquered Hispaniola at any time since his arrival. 
28 
If such claims 
seem fatuous in retrospect, it should be said that Simcoe was always will- 
ing to return with an army to carry them out. 
29 
However, the dispatch of further reinforcements was out of the question, 
for in Britain, just when the Government faced an unprecedented financial 
and military crisis, 
30 
the full disaster of the Saint Domingue campaign was 
now becoming public knowledge. 'In these adventures, 'Edmund Burke declaimed, 
'it was not an enemy we had to vanquish but a cemetery to conquer... 
Every advantage is but a new demand on England for recruits to the West 
Indian grave. 031 In April, it was reported to the House of Commons by a 
Select Committee on Finance that the occupation had cost well over 4.3 
million pounds and had claimed in just its first three years the lives of 
32 
more than 7,500 British soldiers. Dundas wrote to Simcoe insisting he 
carry out the proposed reforms immediately, as the ministry now stood 
pledged on the matter to Parliament. 
33 
In March, there had appeared in the 
London bookshops Bryan Edwards' Historical Survey of the Island of 
St. Domingo, which publicised the shortcomings of British policy and 
endeavoured to show the hopelessness of trying to conquer the colony with 
the means the Government possessed. 
34 
Dundas's energies had already been 
turned to capturing Spain's colonies, 
35 
while the merchants of the City had 
for long been far more interested in Demerara and Martinique than the 
former perle des Antilles. Matters came to a head on May 18th, when the 
Foxite Whigs demanded an immediate withdrawal from Saint Domingue. 
36 
Fox made a skilful speech in which he followed Burke's line that it 
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was pointless fighting to preserve a colony that would inevitably be 
surrendered to the Republicans, and which was almost worthless as a 
bargaining counter. To abandon it, he said, would not affect negotiations 
with France. How harrowing it must be, he added with malice, for., a 
minister to see the faces of the soldiers as they embarked for the West 
Indies! In previous years, Fox had actually criticised the Government 
for sending too few troops to the Caribbean, but with his usual deftness 
he now argued that such practical criticisms of specific schemes were not 
inconsistent with his fundamental objection to any campaign in the West 
Indies. Dundas defended his West India policy deploying every argument 
at his disposal. He appealed, irrelevantly, to precedent and, speciously, 
to Saint Domingue's importance to the French Navy. The produce of the 
occupied zone, he said, amounted in the previous year to 111 million 
sterling and employed over 400 ships, forgetting to mention that its trade 
was mostly with America. Before the war, he claimed, the colony had not 
been unhealthy, which was somewhat less than the truth, while his promise 
that expenditure was now limited to £300,000 per annum was to prove wholly 
unrealistic. His assertions that Saint Domingue was both an important 
bargaining counter and vital for the defence of Jamaica were similarly 
dubious but they were opinions widely shared by his audience. Bryan 
Edwards, for example, now an M. P., 'was persuaded that all Europe could 
not prevent St. Domingo from being a negro colony' but still suggested 
Britain might keep Tiburon and the Mole to control the Windward Passage. 
Wilberforce, too, recognised the emergent power of the blacks, and thought 
British intervention had been unwise, but, while criticising some of 
Dundas's arguments, he also said there was no need to abandon the colony. 
The motion was defeated by 116 votes to 31. 
The troops, therefore, were to stay in Saint Domingue, but hopefully 
not for much longer. A new round of peace talks was soon to open in France 
and the reports then arriving from the colony of continuing high mortality 
during the winter and of corruption and disunity among the colonists both 
distressed the King and angered Dundas. On June 9th, he ordered Simcoe to 
immediately carry out his Instructions for reducing expenditure and with- 
drawal to the Mole, no matter what the, consequences. Jeremie might be 
retained as a military post but no reinforcements would be sent. If the 
West Province fell to the Republicans, it would not be for lack of British 
'liberality', he said, but for 'a want of energy, union and public spirit 
37 
in the Colony itself'. 
In this spring of 1797, we find Saint Domingue receiving an 
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increasing amount of public attention. Just as in Philadelphia Moreau 
de Saint-Mery was publishing his massive Description, which had remained 
in manuscript since the late 1780s, the baron Wimpffen's account of a 
visit to the colony on the eve of the Revolution now found printers in 
both London and Paris. Like Laborie, who was at this time writing the 
Appendix to his Coffee Planter, he cautiously suggested the British might 
still succeed in Saint Domingue. 
38 
De Charmilly, smarting from the 
attacks of Bryan Edwards, went further and claimed that conquest was still 
an easy matter. A vigorous propagandist, his Lettre to the Jamaican 
planter appeared in July, published at his own expense, and was distributed 
'ä toutes les personnes les plus importantes dans ce pays'. It was both 
a defence of his own reputation and a last-ditch attempt to change British 
policy on Saint Domingue. 
39 
Withdrawal, he argued, would be to betray the 
loyal efforts of her colonists and destroy Jamaica. Any peace with 
France - and here he showed more acuity - would be short-lived and 
prejudicial to Britain, which ought to keep all its colonial gains to 
counterbalance French expansion in Europe. Though beset with crises, 
Britain alone had preserved her industry and now monopolised the trade of 
Europe. "Que pouvait esperer de plus une nation commeriante? ' It was 
'le moment vrai de sa gloire'. The book is a monument to de Charmilly's 
debased delusions, but also to his prescience. 
A far more sombre work on Saint Domingue also appeared at this time, 
hastily put together by a doctor on leave from Port au Prince General 
Hospital, Hector McLean. The grisly prose of his Enquiry brought vividly 
to life the mortality statistics that were then the 'terror and astonish- 
ment' of the British public. 'The name of St. Domingo is execrated and 
dreaded by all descriptions, 'he wrote. Men would no longer enlist for 
fear of being sent to the West Indies. 'At present, ' he observed, 'neither 
military talents nor numbers are of use; our hospitals contain our 
garrisons. ' The 'Brigands' could be subdued only by a treaty or by other 
blacks, and even then it would be too dangerous to return them to the 
plantations. A policy of extermination, he added, would be both wrong and 
impossible. 
40 
At the end of June, Lord Malmesbury set out for Lille on his second 
attempt to make peace. The colonists of Saint Domingue were something of 
a problem. The British wished to be rid of them but the Republic regarded 
those who had collaborated with her enemies as traitors. Nevertheless, 
they were not the stumbling-block to peace that R. H. Griffiths imagines, 
41 
for, although the British Government intended to ask that they might remain 
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in the colony without suffering for their past actions, there is no 
evidence it was prepared to insist on it. Malouet had asked this to be 
made a pre-condition of the negotiations but without success. He was 
allowed, however, by Grenville to propose that a ceasefire be arranged 
independently of the talks. Thus neutralising the Saint Domingue question 
would save the colony from further destruction and create a friendlier 
atmosphere for negotiating. Above all, it would allow the colonists to 
bargain with the Republicans, he said, for the 're-establishment of order 
and subordination among the Negroes'. To this end, Malouet corresponded 
with the French deputy Vaublanc, a former slaveowner, hoping he could get 
himself invited to Paris for talks with the Government. 
42 
Politics were 
now moving to the right in France and many emigres had gained permission 
to return. Sonthonax had recently been recalled and Barbe-Marbois, the 
former Intendant, was now president of the Conseil des Anciens. Even so, 
Malouet's scheme proved completely unrealistic and on 4th September the 
peace negotiations themselves were brought to an abrupt end by a coup d'etat 
that purged the Government of right-wing elements. The Directory did not 
wish to make peace. The war was to continue. 
(ii) 'A Chaos of Vice and Folly': Reforming the Administration. 
Simcoe's priority, according to his Instructions, was the reduction 
of Britain's monthly outlay in Saint Domingue to £25,000. Yet, in the 
single month before he arrived, expenditure there had run to an incredible 
£700,000.43 In terms of administration and military organisation, little 
had changed since Williamson's day, although the army and occupied zone 
had considerably increased in size. After two weeks in the colony, the 
general was writing home, 'I have a wonderful Chaos of Vice and folly to 
44 
wade through'. V 
How much General Forbes knew about the corruption that flourished 
45 
around him is hard to say. Reports conflict. He spent much of his time 
promoting friends and relatives to new posts or to those of others he had 
dismissed, but this was not exceptional. In October 1796, he swore to 
Dundas he had received nothing more than his major-general's pay. His 
enemies, however, said he should be tried for venality. Unlike Williamson, 
he spoke no French and, even more than his predecessor, paid little 
attention to the Conseil Prive, which went on complaining about the ruinous 
contracts the British made and the complete absence of financial control. 
46 
William Wigglesworth, who replaced Bogle as Agent-General, was by all 
accounts an able, much-respected figure, who had been seconded from Pittis 
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Committee for Auditing the Public Accounts. Forbes appears to have made 
little use of his talents, preferring instead the advice of his secretary, 
James Esten. 
Bilingual, a man of smooth address, Esten was greatly disliked for 
his venality and the influence he came to wield. Originally Commodore 
r" 
Ford's purser, he had been Deputy-Commissary for the Mole until his 
irregular accounts and personal unpopularity led to his removal in 1795. 
He then attached himself to General Forbes and was made 'Secretary in 
Chief' of the Mole, profiting considerably from Government contracts. 
Though this post was soon suppressed as part of Williamson's belated 
reforms, he then stepped directly, as the Commander in Chief's secretary 
into the shoes of William Shaw. 
47 
The arbiter of promotion and dismissal, 
and the creator of new jobs, he earned many enemies. But above all, it 
was by becoming head of the Regie Royale of absentee property that he 
earned his fortune and at the same time substantially reduced the potential 
revenue of the occupied zone. 
48 
The failure to effectively exploit either the estate revenue of the 
absentees, or even the existing tax system, 
49 
let alone to tap the colony's 
full taxable capacity, and the failure also to pursue previous Administrations' 
debtors, largely explains the very low revenue raised by the British Admin- 
istration. Only the Customs were efficiently managed, with American ships 
paying double the former duties. What internal taxes were levied stayed 
mostly in French hands in the localities and frequently went. to line the 
pockets of district commanders like Lapointe, Montalembert or de Bruges. 
Simco was consequently authorised to increase taxation, though not too 
severely. As for the enormous sums expended, they can be attributed to the 
interaction of a number of factors. These include rampant monetary and 
real-cost inflation; the absence of administrative checks on public expend- 
iture; widespread individual corruption, and the wastful organisation of 
the military, the hospitals and of land and sea transport. 
The hospitals of the colonial corps were one area Simcoe did not have 
to investigate, as one month before his arrival Forbes finally sanctioned 
their overhaul. Having sprung up without permission throughout the 
occupied zone, they had been for two and a half years the subject of com- 
plaint and proposed reforms. Corps commanders had either run their own 
hospitals and presented huge bills for their supplies, or else they had 
contracted, to the Government's disadvantage, with a friendly surgeon. 
Sometimes the contractor was also the regimental surgeon and hence got paid 
twice. Contrary to French and British practice, no stoppages were made 
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from a soldier's pay when sick, and this represented a considerable loss 
since a third of a European regiment and 12% of a black corps were usually 
found in hospital. Henceforward, troops were to be treated within their 
regiments, stoppages were to be made and provisions supplied by the 
commissary-General. 
50 
s" 
Apart from provisions, corps were easily the Agent-General's largest 
item of expenditure. Although Williamson had dismissed many of the super- 
fluous officers he had commissioned, he never carried through his proposed 
reform of the colonial regiments. 
51 
Neither did his successor, who himself 
proved generous with commissions. Consequently, at the end of 1796 there 
were over forty different colonial corps, including militia, with only 
9,600 troops but about 1,800 officers and NCO's. 
52 
In reality, the situation 
was worse. Officers were concentrated in the black and emigre corps, and as 
Forbes held no reviews, the true number of troops was never known. Simcoe found 
in one corps of Chasseurs 200 less than were on the payroll. Some 
commanders, said Maitland, enrolled their own slaves and kept them working 
on their plantations, while pocketing their pay. At best, a corps of 
900 Chasseurs cost £32,000 per annum. One, in its first year, had cost 
the Government £60,000, so overcharged were its supply contracts. 
53 
Because of the military crisis that greeted Simcoe's arrival in the colony, 
he was not able to re-organise the colonial regiments until May 1797. He 
then reduced their number to 14 and put many officers on half-pay. Clothing 
contracts were taken out of the colonels' hands and the soldiers' pay was 
docked accordingly. While clothing was to be purchased in Britain, pro- 
visions, it was decided; were best bought from the Americans. 
54 
Henceforth, 
each corps was to keep proper accounts, and at long last it was ordered 
that all public accounts should be passed before payment by the Conseil Prive 
and the Governor. Furthermore, a joint-commission of the two Conseils was 
set up to examine the accounts of all public officials, trustees and lessees 
of absentee property. 
55 
In the meantime, Wigglesworth, at Simcoe's request, had produced a 
list of recommended economies. The most significant reform, and the 
biggest single saving outside the colonial corps was to be in the carriage 
of stores, then costing £46,000 p. a. The existing transport contracts with 
the planters of Cul de Sac and Mirebalais had been negotiated by the 
Conseil Prive itself but were unavoidably expensive, given the high price 
of mules and the wage levels then prevailing. More particularly, the 
carriage of military supplies to distant outposts like Banica and Neybe 
56 
were the subject of considerable abuse, it was said. By returning to 
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the corvee used earlier in the occupation, it was proposed to save over 
£40,000 p. a. 
57 
Sea transport was a bigger problem. The hire of armed 
schooners for ferrying troops and stores between outposts was currently 
costing around £86,000 p. a. In the last ten months of 1796, it had 
absorbed £130,000. Dundas wanted to replace the schooners with British 
transport ships, but Simcoe said these would have neither the speed nor 
the acclimatised crews of the local vessels. However, a more efficient 
use of them and the elmination of overmanning, he thought, would save 
another £30,000.58 
Simcoets other major cuts concerned military officers in all corps 
but particularly the foreign cavalry regiments, whose allowances were 
exceptionally high. By reducing the number of horses allowed to an 
officer and compelling him to collect his own forage, while reducing the 
amount allowed, it was hoped to save £30,000 in the coming year, and another 
£16,000 by abolishing the cash lodgings allowance. The number of staff 
officers was cut and so were the table expenses of district commanders. 
Lastly, the supply and delivery of wood, candles and oil were taken over 
by the Commissary-General with a planned saving of £25,000 p. a. It seems 
that the construction of fortifications had been a fertile ground for 
fraud, in which, there is evidence to suggest, the Conseil Prive itself 
collaborated with Major Pechon, ingenieur du roi. Simcoe decided, none- 
theless, to add to the defences of the capital, that were so beneficial 
to 
its building contractors. 
59 
In the civil sphere Simcoe made few changes, apart from cutting the 
secours of the Port au Prince poor from £15,000 to £5,000 p. a. The court 
at the Mole was suppressed o4 the Conseil Supe'rieur was restored to full 
activity after seventeen months of martial law, which Forbes had maintained 
at the request of the rival Conseil Prive. The salaries of the two councils, 
which totalled less than £18,000 p. a., were in some cases objects of envy, 
the general observed, but, in the circumstances, he doubted they were too 
high for the posts concerned. 
6o 
In June, Simcoe reintroduced the taxes of the Ancien Regime, till then 
uncollected outside the Grand' Anse, and increased their rates. The 3 
livres capitation on plantation slaves was raised to 4 livres; that on 
urban slaves from 24 to 26 livres. The 2/% house tax was revived at 7/% 
and the duty on exports, which provided the greater part of Government 
revenue, was increased by a third. The property of absentees, if not 
leased out by the Regie Royale, was to pay substantially higher rates; for 
example, domestic slaves belonging to absentees paid a surcharge of 66 
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livres. A business tax was also devised. Merchants, shipowners and 
entrepreneurs were to pay 10 portugaises p. a.; small traders and artisans, 
100 livres. Civil officials had their salaries reduced by 5%. All taxes 
henceforth were to be paid into the Caisses du Roi; the municipal, adminis- 
trations were suspended. Non-payment would result, after one month, in 
the billeting of troops on a property and, after six weeks, in the seizure 
of movables and their sale two weeks later. Every six months there was to 
be a cadastral survey and, once a year, a census. 
61 
The general clearly 
had long-term plans. 
It seemed unlikely, however, that even if all went to plan, the new 
fiscal regime would raise more than £250,000 p. a., and that was assuming 
the Regie Royale of absentee property would yield that year £100,000.62 
Simcoe's reforms, moreover, only reduced expenditure by £4-500,000 p. a. 
63 
It was simply not possible, everyone agreed, to get down to the limit set 
by the British Government, whose £300,000 contribution would not even 
cover the cost of the black corps on their new footing. At the end of 
August, General Whyte, having increased the taxes on shipping, retailers 
and imports, reported that even with a public revenue of £319,000 p. a. 
there would be a deficit of £125,000 on an annual expenditure he estimated 
at £744,000.64 
This was bad news for Portland and Dundas. It was made worse by 
accompanying reports of mass emigration and desertion to the enemy. 
Simcoe's public relations were good and it was generally admitted that, in 
carrying through his reforms, he created the minimum of friction. 
65 
The 
Conseil Superieur pointed out (wrongly) that the tax increases contravened 
the capitulation and (rightly) that the forecast increase in revenue was 
far too optimistic, but it registered the decree without demur. Its object- 
ions were poo-pooed by the Conseil Priv6, which suggested however Simcoe 
., 9ht consult an assembly of colonists about the reforms - an idea the 
Conseil Superieur naturally opposed. The suggestion, nonetheless, was 
probably not meant seriously, being a ritual gesture expected by public 
opinion. 
66 
In the Grand' Anse, however, the reforms met with much dis- 
content, compounded by an insecure military situation. But their greatest 
impact was on the foreiq 'tcorps, which experienced 'a frenzy of desertion'. 
Montalembert's Legion for some months seemed on the verge of mutiny and 
practically all the Rohan and Hompesch Hussars chose to return home rather 
than be drafted into a new corps. 
67 
It was only the promise of double pay 
that had got them to serve in the West Indies, and to replace them now 
would be extremely difficult. The leading colonial commanders - Montalembert. 
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de Bruges, Cambefort, - also pulled out, taking with them their accumulated 
wealth. 
Their departure of course did cut costs but, at the same time, inadequat- 
ely protected plantations could not produce revenue to pay taxes or rents; 
nor could planters whose animals were stolen perform the corvee. As more 
and more colonists took ship for America, the amount of specie in circulation 
dwindled, providing an additional obstacle to the collection of revenue. 
68 
After a certain point, the policy of retrenchment and financial autonomy 
became self-defeating. 
(iii) 'A Game of Chess': the Campaign of 1797. General Simcoe's 
arrival found the occupied zone in a critical position. Successive and 
still-continuing troop withdrawals had weakened the British garrison at 
the very time Toussaint was massing his forces for a general attack. Simcoe 
commanded, in theory, no more than 5,000 white troops (two-fifths of them 
foreign), 5,800 black Chasseurs and a militia capable of fielding 3-4,000 
armed men. 
69 
The true situation, however, was even less satisfactory, as 
account should be taken of sickness, inflated muster rolls and avoidance of 
militia service. Toussaint probably had around 20,000 men, though he claimed 
48,000, and Rigaud some 12,000.70 No advances had been made in winning over 
Rigaud and nothing decisive had been settled with the colonists of Santo 
Domingo. At sea, however, the balance of power had overwhelmingly shifted 
in favour of the British. Le Cap was under blockade and Simcoe straightaway 
ordered that Leogane and Gonaives also be blockaded. This considerably dis- 
rupted the Republicans" supplies, he said. 
71 
Moreover, during the spring 
the Navy was to conduct several successful cutting-out operations, seizing 
from Jean Rabel on April 20th nine merchantmen in a night raid. 
72 
A special- 
ist in the use of light troops, Simcoe had originally hoped to form a 
sea-borne strike-force of 1,000 picked soldiers. 
73 
Led by Maitland, it was 
to capture Tortuga and raid the north coast ports. He never got the chance, 
however, as the extra men and supplies he was expecting never materialised 
and on arrival the defence of the occupied zone immediately became his 
priority. 
At the end of February, when Saint Domingue's rivers were at their 
lowest level and the colony's roads at their most negotiable, Toussaint 
Louverture finally advanced into the mountains of the north-east, driving 
out the pro-British chiefs and winning over most of their few remaining 
men. Lieutenant-Colonel Rouvray, son of the famous planter, withdrew 
from Grande Riviere and with the chiefs Abraham and Roquelaure fell back 
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on Banica. 
74 
Toussaint then moved in early March against the outposts of 
Mirebalais. For five days, he besieged the camp at Boucan Carre before 
being driven off by its mulatto defenders, but he overran soon afterwards 
the posts to the south and west. On the 27th, Montalembert set out from 
Croix des Bouquets to relieve the vicomte de Bruges, shut up in, the fortress 
of Mirebalais. Because, said Maitland, of his foolish choice of route, 
he was ambushed in the mountains and lost almost a fifth of his men. 
75 
De Bruges, about to be cut off, set fire to his very expensive citadel and 
fled via Grands Bois into the Cul de Sac. After his brutal treatment of the 
free coloureds, he dared not risk a siege. The occupied zone was thrown 
into an uproar. The planters would not believe, perhaps unrealistically, 
that de Bruges had been faced by over 6,000 men. It was said he and 
Montalmebert had already planned to leave the colony, having no need to 
endanger further the fortunes they had made. De Bruges, for his part, 
claimed he was almost out of ammunition and that many of his 500 soldiers 
were wounded. Even so, he might have tried to hold Grands Bois and ought 
not to have withdrawn without informing his advanced posts. By something 
of a miracle, about 500 troops from distant Banica -a curious collection 
of guerriers, Spaniards and regular Chasseurs with their women and children - 
managed a circuitous retreat through Spanish territory to arrive in the 
76 
Cul de Sac over a week later. Meanwhile, in Mirebalais, Grands Bois, 
Neybe and Lascahobas, slave-owning colonists were surrendering to troops 
of battle-hardened ex-slaves. 
At the beginning of April, panic reigned among the whites of the plain. 
In the mountains south'of Port au Prince, forces from Leogane had invested 
Morne l Hopital and, with a battery erected on the mountain opposite, des- 
troyed the Grenier post by bombardment. The great danger now was that the 
forces of Toussaint and Rigaud would link up in the Cul'de Sac and march 
on the capital. Trying to restore calm, Simcoe went out to Croix des 
Bouquets on the 5th. He ordered Montalembert to re-occupy his posts at 
the edges of the plain and promised the colonists he would not withdraw but 
fight, if necessary, from town to town. To his great good fortune, rein- 
forcements arrived on the 11th from Jamaica. Mainly Irish, they were a 
disgrace, he said, but they strengthened his hand and within a week he had 
retaken all the enemy camps on the heights above the Riviere Froide. In 
this wild region, Dessource's Volunteers once again distinguished themselves, 
scaling precipitous slopes and manoeuvring silently in the upland woods, 
while a British column advanced unseen through the mists on the valley 
floor. Mid-way through the offensive, on April 17th, Toussaint made a timely 
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descent into the Cul de Sac from the north, but just as swiftly was 
driven back by Montalembert's cavalry. 
77 
Flushed by this success, Simcoe hurriedly embarked 2/3,000 Chasseurs 
at Port au Prince and sent them to Arcahaye. He was hoping to attack 
Gonaives but, finding that Toussaint had grouped most of his forces there, 
0, 
it was decided to move against Verrettes as a preliminary to the recapture 
of Mirebalais, which was thought essential. However, midway through 
hauling cannon over the mountains of Arcahaye, the attack was called off, as 
troops had to be rushed to les Irois in the South, where on April 20th 
Rigaud had appeared in strength. Only 50 men were in Irois fort, which 
stood on the seashore on a rocky outcrop, when at midnight Rigaud's men 
began scaling its walls. Some 330 Chasseurs cut their way through from the 
bourg nearby, and after a successful sortie forced the assailants to pull 
back and begin a regular siege. They burned the village of Dame Marie 
further up the coast but at Islet, east of Irois, were heavily defeated. 
Rigaud then began to land heavy artillery in the adjacent bay. Meanwhile, 
another Republican force ravaged the Pestet region. In the Grand' Anse all 
was confusion and the situation was looking serious, when, quite by chance, 
two British frigates arrived, which sank Rigaud's flotilla and drove his 
men into the interior. When Maitland's relief force appeared, the danger 
had already passed. The military position was thus difficult to assess. 
Rigaud had lost his navy, all his siege artillery and between 800 and 1,000 
killed and wounded. The Anglo-colonials had lost nine killed. Yet, Maitland 
dourly observed, the British were surviving only by rushing troops from 
one outpost to another. ' In the Grand' Anse, all public confidence and 
military discipline, British or colonial, was at end. If ever Toussaint and 
Rigaud, he said, should unite to launch a synchronised offensive, the effect 
would be fatal. 
78 
'Nous purgerons bientot notre territoire, ' wrote Toussaint on May 23rd, 
'des hordes tyranniques qui l'infsstent. ' 'Resserres daps de faibles parties 
de la colonie, ' the British, he thought, could not hold out much longer. 
79 
He had good reason to feel confident. Three weeks before, in recognition 
of his capture of Mirebalais, Sonthonax had proclaimed him Governor of 
Saint Domingue. An uprising in the north-east had easily been quelled, and 
he now gathered his forces for an attack on Saint Marc. Toussaint, however, 
had not counted on the pugnacity of his opposite number. Although Simcoe's 
mission was essentially civil in character and short-term, the general was 
still determined before leaving the colony to strengthen the position of the 
occupied zone. New blockhouses were built around Port au Prince and in the 
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Cul de Sac, and plans were made to attack Gonaives fort and then Tiburon. 
First of all, however, Mirebalais had to be retaken. 
So 
While it remained 
in Republican hands, the capital lay exposed to a north-south pincer move- 
ment and blacks would continue to desert from the plantations of Arcahaye. 
Although Simcoe complained that Port au Prince was so full of spies it was 
impossible to prepare a coup de main, his attack on Mirebalais appears to 
have taken Toussaint completely by surprise. At the end of May, in heavy 
rain, columns of cavalry and infantry crossed the mountains from Arcahaye 
and the Cul de Sac and re-occupied the region without a fight. Everywhere 
the Republicans withdrew before them; but, as so often before, escaped 
unharmed. Churchill's troops advanced too late to cut off their retreat 
and his hussars were unable to catch their well-mounted cavalry, though a 
number were drowned re-crossing the Artibonite, now in flood. 
81 
Meanwhile, the British at Saint Marc were 'all suspense and anxiety'. 
Toussaint had'collected at Gonaives 'a most formidable force' - variously 
put at 10-14,000 or 5-6,000 men .- and on June 3rd he launched a massive 
attack82 on the town that had kept him at bay for four years, the key to 
the occupied zone. After three assaults, the Gros Morne post at the 
mouth of the gorge was overrun and in the hills to the south Camp Guilhem 
was evacuated. Forces were concentrated on the defence of Fort Churchill, 
which came under heavy bombardment, as did the town itself, baron Cambefort's 
new fire brigade proving of great utility. On June 7th, the fighting 
achieved an unprecedented intensity, when 1500 of Toussaint's elite troops, 
ladders in hand, stormed the fort through a hail of lead shot. For half 
an hour their bodies piled up beneath its walls. Four times they fought 
their way through a breach and were driven back. Had their ladders been 
longer, the fort might have fallen. Yet again, seapower proved to be a 
vital factor, for another large column had advanced up the ravine on the 
fort's seaward side only to be decimated by the puns of a sloop anchored 
offshore. Then, welcomed as a saviour, Colonel Dessources arrived in the 
harbour of Saint Marc. The blacks withdrew, abandoning their artillery 
and leaving behind 500 dead. 
Now was the time to counter-attack, as Toussaint's dispirited troops 
re-crossed the swollen Artibonite. Port au Prince and the Grand' Anse 
were safe, as Rigaud and Laplume were then fighting each other, Simcoe 
seized his chance. Reinforcements were ordered up from the South and 
General Churchill was told to advance. The plan was to trap Toussaint on 
the left bank by landing troops near the river's mouth and sending 
Dessources's men down from the mountains and Depestre's from Mirebalais. 
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However, when Simcoe arrived at Arcahaye to press the attack in person, ' 
he found that Churchill, whose conduct at Jeremie had already been severely 
censured, had not moved. Dessources said the attack was impracticable and 
wished to retire to Jamaica. His and Lapointe's officers were in. high 
pique at the reduction of their allowances. Depestre, at the same time, r" 
had disobeyed orders and captured Lascahobas, only to find he could not 
safely withdraw. '0 for three half pay captains who scarce have bread to 
eat in England, wrote the general on June 17th, 'I believe we would have 
drowned Toussaint's army the other day and choaked the Artibonite with 
Blackamoors. 1 
83 
While torrential rains fell daily in the mountains, the plain turned 
more and more into a quagmire. For a while, Simcoe still thought he might 
take Verrettes, which was weakly defended, and the fort on the Crete ä 
Pierrot. He could then leave the colony with the British entrenched along 
the Artibonite. However, while a siege train was assembled at Saint Marc, 
the army bivouaced in the fields around Arcahaye became stricken with 
malaria, and the campaign fizzled out. 
84 
Towards the end of June, minor 
operations near Leogane brought some success, but overtures to both Laplume 
and Rigaud were sharply rebuffed. Simcoe concluded he had done what he 
could and sailed for England on July 10th. He was glad to get out, he 
confided in a private letter. Desertion was spreading through the colonial 
corps and he feared a mutiny. Of the British soldiers, he had a very low 
opinion; Dundas's adoption of 'Company troops', he described as a great 
blow to English military honour. Relations with the Navy were once again 
bad; the naval force was 'totally insufficient' and consequently he was 
refused a frigate for his homeward, passage. 
85 
Plainly, he felt cheated. 
The Government had sent him to reduce expenditure to an unrealistically 
low level, while with a little more support, he thought, he could have 
conquered the colony. 'I was beaten by proxy,, ' he claimed, '... had it not 
been for rain and an attack on Jeremie... I think great things might have 
been done... 3,000 men when I arrived might have finished the business... 
The cheapest way for Great Britain to act would be to conquer this island 
by contract; was I 20 years younger I would certainly bid. '86 
Cause for optimism could indeed still be found. Although Toussaint's 
attack on Saint Marc had greatly impressed the British and colonists, the 
town's outposts were soon rebuilt and subsequent raids in July and August 
were defeated with ease and considerable carnage. 
87 
The blacks of the 
north-east were once again making overtures; and so were the neighbouring 
Spaniards. In August, 3,000 of them repulsed a Republican attack near 
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Banica. 
88 
The Republicans otherwise showed little sign of activity. The 
spate of desertions in the colonial corps was halted after a number of 
executions, and General Whyte on the 28th reported a 'perfect tranquillity' 
in the colony. However, it was mainly due, he added, to the internecine 
strife then besetting the Republican zone. 
89 
Once Simcoe left, in fact, it became clear that slave-owning Saint 
Domingue was entering its last days. Though the occupied zone had been 
kept intact, it had suffered heavy loses in the spring campaign. At 
Mirebalais and in the Grand' Anse, the retreating Republicans had burned 
plantations and carried off many of the remaining slaves - 1,200 from the 
Plymouth region alone. 
90 
Even Arcahaye had been affected and the once 
opulent Cul de Sac now appeared 'an Absolute Desart'. The livestock con- 
voys that crossed the plain en route for the capital were often ambushed 
by large bands of raiders. The British troops there felt keenly the 
futility of their presence and longed to return home, while despondent 
colonists sold off their belongings at low prices and got ready to leave. 
91 
So many took ship for North America that in July all emigration had to be 
forbidden. 
Meanwhile, Simcoe's determination to fight on, and the political 
reaction in France then bringing fresh hope to Malouet and his friends, 
was in Saint Domingue bringing together in common cause all enemies of the 
old order, black and brown. The divisions in the Republican camp, which 
the whites always emphasised, as if they somehow justified their own 
desire for dominance, were slowly being overcome. In July, Toussaint 
arrested his chief riVal in the North, Pierre Michel, without any ill 
consequences, and abruptly the following month he had Sonthonax deported. 
A rapprochement with Rigaud now became possible, and along with it, the 
kind of co-ordinated campaign that the British feared. 
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CHAPTER X. WHITE SOCIETY UNDER THE OCCUPATION 
(i) The Population of the Occupied Zone. Wasted by years of 
revolution, many features of Saint Domingue society were accentuated 
during its final years, as with a victim of a fever approaching death. 
This was particularly true of its shifting instability of population, 
which makes any head-count of the British zone's inhabitants extremely 
hazardous. The number of slaves might be put at around 70,000 during 
the middle years of the occupation but it is more certain that it was 
subject to steady erosion. The free coloured population fell sharply in 
the autumn of 1794 only to rise and fall again successively as 
Mirebalais passed in and out of British hands, and the number of whites, 
too, was subject to similar fluctuations. 
Reliable data are sparse. According to de Charmilly, between 
September 1793 and May 1794,4,500 whites of all ages returned to 
their homes in the occupied zone. 
1 
Almost 2,000 of them had fled Port 
au Prince in March for Ldogane, whose civilian population at that time, 
mainly mulatto and black, numbered at least 2,500. Of the 2,500 civilians 
at the Mole; most of them refugees from the surrounding parishes, half 
were slaves, (table 3). Saint Marc's total population was perhaps some- 
thing over 3,000, again, mainly mulatto and black, and included 640 free 
men bearing arms. In the mountains behind Saint Marc and in the Ar+. ti- 
bonite plain, there were another 500 men under arms, and at Arcahaye 
there were 800 mulattoes and whites when the British arrived, of whom at 
least three quarters were mulattoes. 
2 
Before long, however, dis- 
illusioned planters were leaving for New England and petits blancs for the 
Republican zone. In June 1795, the Conseil Prive complained of 'une 
depopulation sensible'. 'La population blanche, ' wrote Chauvin Dumas 
three months later, 'B'est presque evanouie. '3 That of the Grand' 
Anse, he said, referring to adult males, had fallen from 4,000 to 1,500; 
that of Port au Prince, from over 1,800 to 500. At Saint Marc, only 
60 remained, and at Arcahaye, too, an exodus was beginning, 80 having 
left in the previous two months. 
In 1796, as the military situation improved, there were signs of 
a fresh influx from Europe and America, but emigration persisted and 
then accelerated until checked in mid-1797. At the Mole, during the 
last two years of the occupation, the civil population totalled about 
1,500, of whom 200, able-bodied free men aged between 16 and 60, did 
militia service. 
4 
The militia of Port au Prince, it seems, remained 
about 7/800 strong throughout the occupation, 200 of them being 
refugees from other parishes. The capital contained another 7/800 
TABLE 3 POPULATION of THE MOLE, 18th OCTOBER 1793 
REFUGEES 
Men Women Widows Girl's Boys. - Total 
Whites 338 69 * 16 86 101 
610 
Wattoee 10 35 45 
Slaves 305 373 
678 
1333 
RESIDENTS 
Whites 179 99 37 101 94 
510 
zXulattoes 14 39 1 16 
7 7T 
Slaves 265 345 
610 
1197 
SOME: Co 13T/91 
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able-bodied men who by virtue of payment or employment were exempt 
from militia service. The total free civilian population was probably 
nearly 5,000 and was balanced by an equal number of slaves. 
5 
What one 
cannot say is what proportion of the free men were whites, though the 
great majority of the women were presumably coloured. At Arcahaye 
and Saint Marc, mulattoes predominated; at the Mole and in the Grand' 
Anse whites were much the most numerous. In December 1795 in the whole 
colony there were over 5,000 men serving in the militia, but by March 
1797 there was said to be only 3/4,000 liable for service. 
6 
Hundreds 
of colonists, it is true, served in the different Legions or as officers 
in the black corps, though there they may have been outnumbered by 
emigres from France. In fact, during most of the second half of the 
occupation it would appear that half or more of the whites in the 
British zone were foreign soldiers sent from Europe. 
(ii) Town and Countryside; Environment and Economy. All the 
towns of occupied Saint Domingue were garrison towns. Cavalry 
clattered through their dusty streets and whole regiments drilled on 
their places d'armes. Everywhere amid the familiar throng of black faces 
and madras handkerchiefs, in the markets, bars and brothels, were red- 
coated soldiers with money to spend and time to kill. This was not 
an entirely new departure, especially for the Mole or for Port au 
Prince, where 1,200 troops had been stationed under the Ancien Regime. 
Even Saint Marc had been used to a peacetime garrison of 50, and more- 
over, it was only ten years since the last war. Governed by majeurs 
de 
la place or commandants pour le roi, well provided with gun batteries, 
Saint Domingue's towns had always had a military as well as a commercial 
function, and militia reviews in the colony had been frequent. Now, 
however, with the exception of Jeremie, they were places under siege, 
cut off from the surrounding countryside and ringed with fortifications. 
Hemmed in by mountains, crowded, claustrophobic and tense, they awoke 
with the morning gun and fell silent` at curfew. 
7 
Port au Prince8 had been ravaged by fire in 1791 and besieged 
three times before falling to the British. Stretching 1 1/4 miles 
from north to south, it presented to its conquerors a spectacle of 
scattered and dilapidated, sometimes empty, wooden buildings, most 
of them single-storied with verandas and sloping roofs. Its wide 
streets were pitted with holes and, according to the weather, thick 
with dust or mud. The drainage channels were choked with weeds, and 
stagnant water; the cemetery with corpses. Of some 1,200 properties, 
about a quarter were in ruins, without roofs, doors or windows, and 
the raising of fortifications led to further demolition and damage, 
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though during the occupation about 80 houses were rebuilt. In the 
upper town, half a mile from the wharves, could be found extensive 
barracks, a large military hospital and the spacious maison du roi, 
where beneath chandeliers the commander in chief entertained. It 
was the capital's only stylish building. While the barracks accommodated 
most of the garrison, officers were usually lodged privately. Until 
Williamson's arrival, all householders were obliged to billet troops 
and the army seems to have had few qualms about evicting occupants 
from desirable property. Further sources of friction were the 
reluctance of some officers (and British merchants) to pay rent and the 
keeping empty of property designated for troops, which led to thefts 
by vagabonds (and neighbours) and angered its evicted occupants. 
Under the occupation, Port au Prince possessed 6 inns, 12 billiard 
halls and well over a dozen cabarets, where the colonial passion for 
gambling was given full rein. In the market place, there were 150 stalls 
selling bread or meat products, 200 sellers of vegetables and 50 
marchands pacotilleurs. Among the various shopkeepers, there were 16 
beef butchers, twice as many as in 1789. The number of merchants, ship- 
owners and contractors in the colony, including foreigners, was put in 
June 1797 at 80, of whom the great majority would have lived in the 
capital. 
9 
The port was of course much quieter than in previous times. 
By 1795, privateers had all but ruined the coastal trade and trade 
with Jamaica, whilst almost the only sugar shipped from Port au Prince 
was that brought from Arcahaye. However, the capture of Mirebalais, 
in August, greatly increased the volume of produce exported, and imports 
from England during the following years were considerable, as 
plantations were refurbished. In 1796, an eye-witness, though a 
biased one, described the harbour as teeming with British merchant 
ships and dispatch boats, money in abundance, the wharves loaded with 
produce and warehouses full of agricultural implements. Even so, the 
quantity of coffee handled was probably little more than half that of 
earlier years and the amount of sugar about a tenth. 
10 
The next largest town in the occupied zone and the most comparable 
in situation was Saint Marc. Like Port au Prince, it was surrounded 
by a dry ditch and earthworks, with several small forts and redoubts 
in the hills behind. In 1789 it had contained 250 houses; of them, 
about 80 were burned down in September 1794; 'Ses propres ruines, ' 
observed Toussaint Louverture, 'lui servent de remparts. 1 
11 
A 
thousand yards in length and 500 yards wide, Saint Marc possessed a 
hospital, a large church and an impressive 'Government house' fronted 
by an Ionic colonnade. Unlike Port au Prince, many of its houses 
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were built of stone and, though usually single-storied, were among the 
finest in the colony. Rows of trees once lined the town square and the 
main street but they had since been cut down. As in the capital, the 
side streets were strewn with garbage and human excrement. A powerful 
stench pervaded the town and was all the worse for it being down wind 
of a churchyard where thousands of bodies lay but inches beneath the 
sun-baked soil. 
12 
A plan to build public toilets was cancelled as part 
of General Forbes' economies. Although the port of Saint Marc enjoyed 
a busy Indian summer in 1794, (appendix E (ii)), with the free coloured 
revolt in September its commerce was almost entirely destroyed. So, 
too, was its source of fruit and vegetables in the plain. The poor went 
hungry and many more deserted across the Artibonite2 
Jerdmie, on the other hand, peaceful and backed by a prosperous 
hinterland, was much busier than ever. It was a picturesque and 
salubrious small port built on the lower slopes of a hill. Most of its 
180 houses were two-storied with broad balconies and tiled roofs. Its 
garrison never numbered more than a few hundred and was usually 
dispersed on nearby plantations. 
The Mole, contrarily, was quite transformed by the occupation. 
Firstly, the arrival of the British caused about a quarter of the 
population, petits blancs and blacks, to decamp to the Republican 
lines. 
13 
Thereafter, astable 3 shows, refugees came pouring in from 
the surrounding parishes, and this they were still doing two years 
later. Between September and November 1795,138 enrolled there for 
poor relief, including 32 from le Borgne, 16 from Fort Dauphin, 11 from 
le Cap, 10 from Acul, and 8 each from Dondon, Jean-Babel and Port 
Margot. 
14 
At the same time, the mole gained a garrison that 
fluctuated between 500 and 1,500 men and became a base for a squadron 
numbering up to 11 ships of the line A great deal of building was 
undertaken, moreover, chiefly barracks and blockhouses that were 
linked by a new road, and the town itself must have grown considerably, 
if one can believe Lieutenant Howard. His journal mentions in may 
1796 1,100 wooden houses (? 110). They were like rows of stables, he 
thought, set out on a sandy terrain that was traversed by several 
15 
streams of fresh water. With a barren hinterland but a perfect 
natural harbour, situated nearly three miles inside a rocky inlet, 
the mole was essentially a naval base. Early in 1794, however, it 
drove a thriving trade exporting the produce of Jean-Babel and Spanish- 
occupied le Borgne. Yet, this soon came to an end and the town 
reverted to being the backwater it literally was, only now cut off from 
Bombarde as well, its main source of vegetables and poultry. The 
- 218 - 
population lived virtually in famine conditions and almost never ate 
fresh meat. Only 46 died, however, out of 1,500 in two years, until at 
the very end of the occupation an outbreak of smallpox decimated the 
non-whites. 
16 
Of the smaller bourgs, Croix des Bouquets in the middle of the Cul 
de Sac had become a rural fortress, surrounded by a deep ditch with 
a redoubt at each corner mounted with cannon. Entry was gained via 
one of two drawbridges and within the enceinte the presbytery had been 
converted into a citadel, also protected by a ditch and drawbridge. 
Most of its hundred or so houses were now thatched with banana leaves 
and covered with whitewashed mud daub. 
17 
It was here that the few 
remaining planters of the plain gathered of an evening. Here de 
Jumecourt and O'Gorman spent most of the occupation. Here, too, were 
the warehouses of the planters' transport company, where the mule 
trains and convoys of heavy carts gathered before crossing the Cul de 
Sac. But above all, Croix des Bouquets was the headquarters of the 
baron de Montalembert and his Legion. In May 1797, we find 2,000 
soldiers based there, along with 400 militia and marechaussee; There 
were also some 400 poor, receiving daily rations: - 10 men, 15 widows, 
133 wives and 225 children. 
18 
The bourg of Arcahaye, Lapointe's headquarters, was similarly 
beleaguered in appearance but a little smaller, more picturesque and 
situated on the seashore. In its busy port there were always several 
schooners loading sugar or coffee for Port au Prince. 
19 
Much smaller 
still, the hamlet of les Irois consisted of barely a dozen huts and a 
landing stage. And yet, a British officer noted, 'wretched as is its 
appearance .... it contains several 
billiard tables, to which game the 
French are much devoted. 120 A mud fort erected on a hillock further along 
the beach marked, after the loss of Tiburon, the frontier of the 
Grand' Anse. As for life in Mirebalais, isolated behind its mountain 
barrier, little is known. The town possessed a very fine stone church, 
a parade ground lined with elms and over 100 houses, mostly owned by 
Bens de coleur. It was overlooked by a hugely expensive stone fort, 
the work of the vicomte de Bruges. Livestock was plentiful there, and 
in June 1797 oxen apparently could be had for 3 dollars, sheep for 
half a dollar and horses for two dollars. 
21 
These prices, however, are scarcely credible, and can only be 
explained by the town having been burnt a few days before. Bullocks 
cost usually about 200 livres coloniales in the Cul de Sac and cavalry 
horses were then fetching up to £40 or £50 sterling in Port au Prince. 
A good mule cost between 500 and 825 livres in the West and up to 1,000 
or 1,100 livres in the Grand' Anse, where they had to be imported by 
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sea. 
22 
Saint Domingue, some said, was the dearest country in the world, 
and during the occupation prices were generally considered to be three 
times higher than in Europe. Prices had always been high in the colony, 
partly because of the prevalence of credit, partly because so much had 
to be imported. Now imports had to cross a sea infested with 
privateers and pay insurance rates often in excess of 25%. Labour was 
more scarce than ever, and the influx of specie that paid the troops 
probably also helped push up prices. During the autumn of 1793, the 
cost of a barrel of flour in the capital rose from 5 to over 8 dollars 
U. S. In the first five months of 1797, the price of lumber doubled. 
'The price in America, ' one Yankee trader observed, 'is nothing. It 
will meat a profit here. '23 
For the planter, however, the high cost of supplies and the hazards 
and expense of wartime freight were perhaps the least of a long list 
of problems. In addition to the usual dangers of drought and hurricane 
and fluctuating prices, most estates in the occupied zone had to cope 
with a shortage of manpower and of draught animals, onerous taxation 
and requisitions, sometimes extreme degrees of physical insecurity and, 
at worst, partial or wholesale destruction of buildings, equipment 
and crops. The plain of Leogane went up in flames almost as soon as 
the British arrived. Only 6 of its 54 sugar plantations escaped with- 
out damage, and though the factory buildings remained substantially 
intact, the plain remained too unsafe for much restoration to be done 
before the parish was lost in October 1794.24 The lower Artibonite 
in the same period was turned into a no man's land, where patrols 
clashed and brief campaigns were fought. Most of the slaves fled or 
were forcibly moved either across the river or to Saint Marc. The 
proximity of Toussaint's cordon made even the growing of vegetables 
dangerous. Elsewhere, however, plantation life continued, though 
under varying conditions. 
Sheltered behind the Massif de la Hotte, the region least affected 
by the Revolution was the Grand' Anse. Its roads, according to one 
officer 'infinitely too bad for description', 
25 
added to its isolation. 
East of Pestel lay swamps and thick forests, while the vertiginous 
track connecting Tiburon and les Irois narrowed to a few inches in 
places (as it still does) some 600 feet above the sea. Scattered 
through the mountains between Pestel and les Irois, guarding the 
passes leading southwards, were about a dozen fortified camps. 
They were manned by a militia of small planters, managers and book- 
keepers, along with 'such of their negroes as they can trust'. So 
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observed Captain Colville touring this region in September 1793.26 
He enjoyed the 'delightfully cool air' and found the scenery 'beautifully 
romantic throughout' with 'stupendous mountains and deep glens ... well 
broken by rivulets and waterfalls and covered with cedar, mahogany 
and others of the finest West India forest trees'. The famous camp 
Desrivaux then consisted of a mud fort partly enclosing the buildings of 
a coffee plantation and a temporary barracks. Its defenders, Colville 
noted, were still boastful of their victory over Rigaud three months 
before; their buttons bore the legend le 19 juin. 
The Grand' Anse, excepting Tiburon, possessed eight sucreries and 
about 200 other plantations, half of them of coffee. 
27 
Although overall 
few of them seem to have lost more than a handful of their slaves, 
28 
it 
is interesting that in the eastern region, even at this early date, 
Captain Colville found 'a vast profusion of coffee berries rotting 
in the ground for want of hands to take them in. ''The negroes', he 
recorded, 'had deserted some months since in great numbers and in many 
places we saw the dreadful monuments of their incendiary devastations. ' 
The coffee plantations, some of them 'at the tops of the highest 
mountains', were larger than in Jamaica but in fact among the smallest 
in the occupied zone. Outside the Fonds Rouges district immediately 
behind Jdremie many had fewer than 50 slaves and less than 60 acres 
planted with coffee. 
29 
Their grand' cases were rather spartan, with 
very little furniture or cutlery. Nevertheless, guests were sumptuously 
entertained. Captain Colville dined on the largest and finest- 
flavoured mutton and turkey he had ever encountered, and he echoed 
Moreau de Saint-Mery's praise of the profusion of European vegetables 
and fruit that was available in the mountains. There was also 'plenty 
of fresh butter and cream cheese'. He was much impressed by 'some 
very famous claret' and the 'large and frequent libations of 
'American Petite Bierre', as well as by the girls who served it. Some 
of the planters, he remarked, looked more like 'jolly English grasiers 
than French creoles'. Their life, he thought, was a comfortable one. 
Averaging around 100,000 lbs. per estate, coffee yields appear to 
have been high in la Grand' Anse. Under the occupation it exported 
more than 15 million pounds per year. This is, at first sight, 
extremely surprising, as in the period 1788-91 Jeremie's exports to 
France averaged only about five millions per annum. 
30 
Under the old 
regime, however, most of the region's produce was sent to le Cap or 
Port au Prince for sale, and this probably accounts for the discrepancy. 
Even so, it seems likely that production had increased in the early 
90s, as the high, virgin slopes of the interior, towards the very crest 
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of the Hotte Massif, were brought into cultivation. There, amidst a 
strange landscape of jagged peaks and wild escarpments, pitted with 
sinkholes and caverns, the coffee tree yielded up to 5 lbs. of berries 
per year. The canton of Plymouth, Moreau de Saint-Mery tells us, was 
in 1789 the scene of frantic pioneer activity. 
31 
It was Saint Domingue's 
frontier. As such, it had attracted 'tous les ambitieux, tous les 
speculateurs du reste de la Colonie'. These were the men, it should be 
remembered, of Camp Desrivaux. The coffee boom of the late 1780s and 
the competition between whites and coloureds for valuable land con- 
cessions may well explain much of the mental climate of the revolutionary 
Grand' Anse. 
32 
More than any other region of Saint Domingue, les paroisses unier, 
as they styled themselves, were 'a white man's country', characterised 
by an unusually high ratio of whites to non-whites. Early in the occupa- 
tion this ratio probably even increased, as the prosperity, security 
(and perhaps salubrity) of the area attracted many refugees as well as 
petits blancs seeking employment. Unlike in the West, the military 
found it difficult to recruit poor whites, as plantation work paid so 
well. It was the local planters, however, 'hair brained' riders of their 
unshod ponies, 
33 
who officered the militia and the regional black 
corps. Patriarchs on a small scale, they were among the first in the 
colony to arm their own slaves. Frequently creoles, like the 
chevalier de Sevre or the Onffroy 
brothers of Tiburon, or the Espeut of 
les Irois, they were fighting to defend or recover plantations where 
they had been born or which were their own creations. In the face of 
republican tendencies among the petits blancs, it was their self- 
righteous and independent settler mentality that held the Grand' Anse 
together. it also kept them for a long time self-governing. 'These 
distant districts, ' General Simcoe observed, 'are mighty apt to con- 
sider themselves independent and at parochial assemblies seem inclined 
34 
to distribute, secretly, their respective revenues. ' 
Yet, even here where the plantation regime was at its most stable, 
it was a long drawn out but losing battle. Plymouth, as Captain 
Colville saw, had been partly abandoned before the British came, and 
in June 1794 over 160 colonists left les Irois when much of the southern 
littoral was burned. Both regions were again ravaged in August 1796 
and once more in April 1797, when Dame Marie bourg was burned, and 
Plymouth alone lost 1,200 slaves. 
35 
These were, on the other hand, 
only frontier regions, and until 1797 production went on 
increasing. 
Coffee plantations were in a sense, moreover, difficult to destroy, 
being less dependent on male skilled labour and valuable equipment than 
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sucreries and having a less combustible crop. Even with grand' case 
and storehouses burned down and with their mature male slaves absconded, 
a cafdiere could still be kept going by its master or Brant making 
periodical visits from a nearby camp. Nevertheless, there is no doubt 
that the economic and political cost of Rigaud's successive incursions 
bore heavily on the Grand' Anse. 
The other coffee-growing areas were mainly inhabited by mulattoes. 
Grands Bois and Mirebalais, which had a militia of over a thousand men, 
had about 500 white inhabitants when they passed into British hands and 
most of these were refugees from the North. The mountain of Grands 
Bois stood on the Santo Domingo frontier, dominating both the plateau 
of Mirebalais and the easternend of the Cul de Sac. It covered about 
40 square miles and contained nearly 90 coffee plantations rising one 
above the other. Much of it was still wooded, most of the plantations 
being under 20 years old with largely African workforces. When Toussaint 
briefly visited the region in August 1795, he was greatly impressed 
by its 'habitations magnifiques ... et en grand rapport', though 
fifteen months later there were signs of a shortage of labour. 
36 
By 
that time about a fifth of the estates were under the Administration 
des Biens des Absents. Transport remained the region's worst problem: 
nothing could be moved except on the back of a mule. 
Frequently exposed to attack, Mirebalais seems to have fared less 
well. Many of its outlying plantations had to be abandoned and their 
remaining slaves, as at Saint Marc, regrouped on others closer to the 
Bourg, if they were not recruited as Chasseurs. Mirebalais' main crop 
was indigo, which even more than coffee needed constant attention, lest 
the plants be strangled by weeds. So fast do they grow in the 
Caribbean, that a few months neglect could be fatal. Apparently very 
little indigo was exported under the occupation; many estates seem to 
have produced only vegetables. Cotton production, however, may have 
remained considerable. 
37 
In both Grands Bois and Mirebalais taxation 
was extremely high. In place of the corvee, for example, the 
rapacious commandant, de Bruges, demanded a levy of 66 livres per slave. 
38 
Exactions were also very great in the mountains of Arcahaye. 
This is evident from the Debien's study of the Mauldvrier cafeiere, a 
plantation of some 130 slaves owned by an absentee. There, in addition 
to more or less annual contributions patriotiques ranging from 2,000 
to 4,500 livres, payments (apparently in kind) of about 1,300 livres 
were made every month towards the upkeep of the local camps. Further- 
more, arms had to be purchased and the plantation's dconomes were paid, 
it seems, an astonishing 66 livres per night to mount guard, though 
- 223 - 
this seems scarcely credible. Before the Revolution, Maulevrier 
employed one econome, at 1,200 livres p; a. plus board, or did entirely 
without. Under the occupation, to provide extra security, there were 
always two or three, and they received 2,000 livres along with their 
food, which was worth as much again. 
39 
The manager received 14,000 
livres, a substantial increase, though he no longer resided and made only 
monthly visits into the mornes, now more isolated than ever. None of 
the stewards stayed very long, and surely not because of their low 
wages; elsewhere in the Matheux and in the plain one finds dconomes 
paid only 1,000 livres plus board. 
40 
Life must have been very tense 
surrounded by slaves on these wooded mountain ridges, where raiders 
often appeared in the night. 
The Maulevrier study is particularly interesting because it shows 
how, even on a relatively well-preserved plantation, production could 
diminish. The annual yields were, in French pounds, as follows: - 
1790 146,000 lbs, 1791 135,000 lbs, 1792 124,000 lbs, 1793 c. 100,000 lbs, 
1794 73,000 lbs, 1795 86,500 lbs, 1796 (incomplete year) 50,000 lbs. 
41 
Then, in October 1796, when the estate was leased, its potential 
production was estimated at only 40,000 lbs p. a. Its buildings were 
in fair shape but it had lost a large proportion of its mobilier, in 
fact about 45% of its slaves. Only 77 remained, and its 65 carreaux 
of gardens (181 acres) were not tended as well as before. Moreover, 
being situated near a military post, it was liable to more corvees than 
other estates. 
42 
The loss of slaves is surprising, as the manager's 
correspondence does not mention any at all, bar the enlistment of five 
of the best men as soldiers. We learn only that the plantation was 
pillaged in 1796 and lost 10 of its 25 mules. 
43 
It is a curious 
illustration of the eg"rant-absentee relationship. 
Coffee cultivation was long established in the mountains of 
Arcahaye. A typical estate would have over 100 acres of coffee trees 
and an impressive array of stone buildings such as were rarely 
encountered in Grands Bois or la Grand' Anse. It would also be showing 
signs of soil exhaustion. 
44 
In may 1795, there was said to be 300 
plantations in production in these mountains, 
45 
an estimate that must 
have included not only the coastal range and the Matheux behind, but 
also the smaller estates on the third chain, which overlooks the 
Artibonite and was not officially part of the parish. This means that, 
although Toussaint's forces intermittently occupied the hauteurs de 
Verrettes, the region remained in production at this time and 
effectively part of the British zone. In August 1795, however, 
Toussaint ordered that the revolt be carried into the mountains and 
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that produce which could not be carried off should be burned. 
46 
Naturally, the cantons nearest the Artibonite suffered most. Many 
must have been abandoned, though les Delices was still being exploited 
at the end of the occupation. Fond Baptiste and the Matheux were 
apparently not greatly affected, at least until 1797. Troops who 
crossed the Montagnes Terribles in June 1797 returning from Mirebalais 
saw miles and miles of coffee trees heavy with berries but most of the 
plantation buildings in ruins; it seemed they had been destroyed in 
the previous twelve months. 
47 
Production, however, did not necessarily 
cease after such destruction. In September 1797, all the buildings on 
the Dumas/Fontenay plantation were burned along with 30,000 lbs. of 
coffee, but one finds threemonths later the owners harvesting a new 
48 
crop. 
Similarly, in the Montrouis district between Arcahaye and Saint 
Marc plantation life became increasingly precarious in 1797. The 
post on the isolated Marie sucrerie in the Ravine Seche was evacuated 
twice in four months, the second time, complained the plantation's 
lessee, merely on the rumour of an enemy incursion. He was able to 
spend only six consecutive weeks there in six months, though a year 
before it had been perfectly safe. Of the plantation's 100 slaves, but 
25 were field workers and of these 11 turned maroon, while the local 
commandant tried to recruit all the remaining males. Twenty of the 
mules, many he himself had supplied, had died of morves. The planta- 
tion, in addition, lacked water. Unable to cut its 100 acres of cane, 
the lessee, Jacques Marie Saint-Cheroz, would not pay the rent and so 
lost his lease. Yet, the estate was immediately re-let in January 
1798 for 26,000 livres p. a. 
49 
The road from Montrouis to Arcahaye passed through over 20 
miles of forest and by the middle of 1796 was all but impassible. Not 
only cut by the beds of torrents flowing down from the mountains, it 
was now overgrown with shrubs and creepers and blocked with fallen 
trees. On emerging, however, into the plain of Arcahaye, the visitor 
was struck by 'a general idea of vast opulence'. 
50 
All was cultivated 
and symmetrical in the narrow coastal plain; endless canefields and 
neat plantation houses, bridges, canals and aqueducts. Its 48 
sucreries were not large and most made only muscovado, but their soil 
was extremely productive. About half were left in the hands of drants. 
There were in addition about 70 cotton or indigo plantations, and 
numerous lime-kilns, potteries and distilleries, probably mostly owned 
by free coloureds. It was here that Jean-Baptiste Lapointe held sway. 
Because of his brutality, and of the mountains that rise up sheer from 
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the plain, hemming it in, the plantation regime remained largely intact. 
The volume of exports from the parish enormously impressed the 
British and, according to Lapointe, was greater than under the Ancien 
Regime. He claimed that, while Arcahaye had never previously produced 
more than 20 million pounds of sugar, production under him rose to 25 
millions. 
51 
This was probably not too much of an exaggeration, though 
somewhat artful. Firstly, a new sucrerie had been established in 1789. 
Secondly, under the occupation very little clayed sugar was produced, 
so that the volume of sucre brut (from which it was refined) would 
naturally have increased. From what one knows of conditions on the 
estates in this period, one would expect output to have fallen. The 
inventories of 14 of them, drawn up in the autumn of 1796, indicate an 
average output of only 382,000 (French) lbs. 
52 
Moreover, most of the 
figures given were predicated upon an increase in the labour force. On 
the other hand, there is good reason to think they were deliberately 
understated and certainly we find Governor Williamson in July 1795 
expecting a crop of 14,000 hogsheads, that is, over 24 million 
pounds. 
54 
More reliable figures are not available. The produce of 
Arcahaye was shipped partly to Port au Prince from Arcahaye bourg and 
the rest was sold directly to Americans from the wharves of les Vazes 
and Boucassin. 
The most serious problem confronting the plantations of Arcahaye 
was a lack of manpower. Of the absentees' estates that were leased out 
it was often observed that they needed 20,30,50 or even 100 more 
slaves to work at full capacity. This was in September/October 1796, 
before marrona e became important, in the spring of 1797. On the vast 
Poy la Generale estate, one third of the fields were left uncultivated 
because the workforce, although probably the largest in the plain, was 
too small. Of its 298 slaves, 35% were children, another 16% were 
without value and only 22% were adult males - an extreme example but of 
a widespread phenomenon. For most of these plantations, natural decline 
during six years without new imports was probably the main cause of 
this imbalance, though in the case of the Raby and Bellanger estates 
substantial losses had occurred during the local revolt of 29th/ 
30th march 1792. On the latter estate 246 acres of canes had gone up 
in flames. With one exception, however, only on the Robert plantation 
had buildings been set on fire, and at that only the slave quarters. 
In 1796, the Robert slaves were still living in a ou as they had built 
for themselves. 
54 
The recruiting of Chasseurs considerably worsened the 
labour shortage. (Poy la Generale had lost at least 20 of its best 
55 
men before the above inventory was made). As the 26th June 1795 
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decree allowed 1 in 15 slaves to be enlisted, irrespective of age or 
sex, it hit the sugar plantations, with their relatively low sex ratio 
and older population, especially hard. 
56 
Lapointe, moreover, refused 
to allow planters to put forward as recruits only their least-seasoned 
or specially-purchased Africans, which they were entitled to do, and 
there is also evidence that he enlisted specialist slaves, again 
contrary to the decree. 
57 
In addition, he requisitioned without pay- 
ment older males to serve in the camps as auxiliaries, thus further 
depleting the plantations. Whether or not these estates had relied on 
hired labour before the revolution to get them through croptime, many 
probably adopted this expedient under the occupation. Very few slaves 
seem to have been imported and practically none at all before 1797. 
For plantations living on borrowed time, it was not an attractive 
alternative. 
Judging from the terms of plantation leases, a month's work by 
a slave was nominally valued at 8 gourdes. In March 1796, the Conseil 
Priv6 suggested that a fair daily wage, in view of the scarcity of men 
and animals, should be 2 oug rdes for a white ouvrier, 
2 
og urde for a 
black manoeuvrier and 42 oug rdes for a cart with three mules and two 
drivers. In the Cul de Sac, however, at this time we find slaves hired 
57 bis 
out at the following rates: - 
field slaves 1 gourde per week 
carters, masons 2 gourdes per week; 6/8 gourdes per month 
sucriers, cooks 2 gourdes per week; 10 gourdes per month 
drivers 4 gourdes per week 
Yet, these were absentees' slaves let by the Administration in an area 
where there was little demand for agricultural labour. Rates in 
Arcahaye were probably much higher. 
Although compensation for supplying recruits to the army amounted 
to only 2,000 livres, planters and managers were so anxious not to part 
with their own 'seasoned' slaves that they often preferred to purchase 
a substitute, which usually cost them 3,000 livres. Arcahaye, according 
to Malouet d'Alibert, was the most expensive part of Saint Domingue58 
but in the Grand' Anse, in fact, substitute Chasseurs sometimes cost 
4,000 livres. Or so their purchasers claimed. They were frequently, it 
appears, imported Africans. James Esten, however, bought a group of 
adolescent Ibo males at only 2,000, as well as c\% rs 
e Z, 500 o13,000, 
while Jean Kina seems to have paid no more than 2,200 for the fighting. 
men he purchased. 
59 
Mules, too, were an important item of purchase, as 
only 11 of the sucreries in Arcahaye had water mills. Even a small 
sucrerie making 300,000 lbs p. a. needed more than 50 mules for its 
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moulin a betes and another 24 to pull four carts. 
60 
Under the occupa- 
tion, water mills were erected on at least two more plantations. 
Even in the plain of Arcahaye, at the heart of the occupied 
zone, agriculture became something of a military operation, particularly 
on the exposed plantations of Boucassin, near the opening of the Cul 
de Sac. There, where the plain extended into forested gorges, 
plantation life took on a pioneer aspect, with slaves carrying arms and 
grand' cases turned into blockhouses pierced for musketry, always open 
to attack. When raiders appeared, the whites and the male slaves would 
take up their guns and retire inside the grand' case, from where on a 
small plantation they could cover the other buildings. With its 
elevated position, its ground-floor masonry two feet thick, and upper 
storey of pitch-pine, the average grand' case was in structure not un- 
like the tall blockhouses that the British erected throughout the colony. 
On the Montbazon estate, in 1798 theg rant actually added his own ditch 
and drawbridge. 
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Not even on the coast were plantations free from 
attack, for in both Arcahaye and the Grand' Anse privateers from Petit 
Trou or Baraderes came ashore to pillage. 
Formerly owned by the chevalier de Rohan, the Montbazon plantation 
in the district of Boucassin is of especial interest as it was taken 
over by the London merchants Turnbull Forbes and managed by their Port 
au Prince subsidiary, Bertrand, Littledale and Co. 
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Via the accounts 
and correspondence of its manager, Jean Lestage (former lessee of the 
small Mare plantation), its vicissitudes through at least the last 
year of the occupation can be followed in some detail. In March 1797, 
it employed a g'erant, who was paid 16,000 livres p. a., two economes 
receiving 1,000 livres with board, and a comptable, who was paid 
24,000 livres p. a. but who probably was not employed solely on the work 
of the estate. It then possessed only 122 slaves - 32 children (26%), 
43 men and 47 women. Of the adults, 25 (20%), were too old or other- 
wise infirm to work; 6 were domestics (5%), and there were always 
between 8 and 12 (6-10%) in the hospital. One can say, therefore, 
that nearly half, depending on what work the children did, were almost 
entirely unproductive. Another 12 acted as watchmen, watermen and 
hedgecutters, and there were 8 sucriers and 4 carters. The number 
actually working in the field fluctuated between 18 and 29 - not enough 
to cut one third of the cane. 
Artisans from nearby plantations had to be hired to perform 
specific tasks, and in May 50 field-workers were hired from the planter 
Larac. That month, following the loss of Mirebalais, over 100 
Chasseurs were camped on the plantation for 40 days. On June 16th 
- 228 - 
the estate was raided and four men were abducted. They later escaped 
and returned. Between March and June, two males died and two were 
drafted into the army. Two more recruits were called for in December; 
for one of which a substitute was supplied. As the campaign season 
opened, the situation grew more tense. Boats plying to and from Port 
au Prince now needed an armed escort. The manager, however, remained 
optimistic. The quality of the sugar, he admitted, was not good, but 
this was due to the poor state of the equipment, particularly the mills. 
The estate, he insisted, could still make the same quantity as in the 
past. He was even hoping to buy some slaves. Because of the planta- 
tion's exposed position, its hired workers were withdrawn and the 
manager had great difficulty finding someone willing to supply replace- 
ments. In January an attack was beaten off without loss save the 
expending of 500 shots, and the plantation was again raided in 
February. By the end of the month, the workforce was down to 85 
adults and 29 children, with between 12 and 15 in the hospital. Yet, 
it remained untouched by the fierce fighting that had now reached the 
plain. Boucassin fort was besieged for four days until its 3,000 
attackers were forced to withdraw. For a while, an atmosphere of 
bravado prevailed. 'Les habitants" it was claimed, 'apres s'etre bien 
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battus, sont rentrds chez eux et roulent. ' 
In March, however, the posts in the mountains were suddenly lost 
and the Montbazon estate became part of the Boucassin cordon. Troops 
were billeted there for 14 days, their officers eating up a lot of its 
food. The whites of the plain were in despair, loath to see the 
British pull out but afraid of staying and being massacred. 
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Anxious 
to get his crop in, Montbazon's dg rant managed at great cost to hire 44 
slaves and paid a new levy of five slaves in cash. Armed barges from 
Ldogane then seized and carried off 22 barriques of sugar from the 
plantation's wharf. About a month later the parish was evacuated. 
But in the meantime, it was said, all the managers of the plain had 
established secret connections with the armed men in the forests who 
had once worked for them and, remarkably, when the British withdrew, 
few of the whites of Arcahaye went with them. 
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Strange though it seems, production on the Montbazon estate had 
gone on increasing throughout the occupation. Though it apparently 
never equalled its pre-revolutionary output, it steadily recovered 
from the dislocation of the years 1791-93, when probably little planting 
was done and when it may have lost many-of its slaves. Between March 
1793 and May 17th 1794, it produced only 203,200 (French) lbs of 
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muscovado and 109,000 lbs of syrup. Then a fire took place on the 
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estate. Between August and December 1794,131,200 lbs were produced 
from 24 cane pieces of 3rd, 5th, but mainly 6th ratoons, and 22 cane 
pieces were planted. Between January and June 1795,192,000 lbs were 
produced from 66 pieces, 17 of them 1st ratoons but many also were being 
cut for the 6th or 8th time. Thirteen pieces were also planted. Hence, 
even before the estate changed hands, its fortunes were improving under 
Lapointe's stern eye, although running at a loss. From August 1794 
to 17 June 1795, its revenue and expenditure respectively amounted to 
146,000 and 152,000 livres. In the period up to 28th January 1796, 
the estate moved into the black, selling 259,000 lbs with another 
48,000 lbs left in store. Unfortunately, the accounts for the spring 
of 1796 have not survived. This was the cutting season and the first 
time that new canes would have been cut under the occupation. A final 
account shows the estate making a substantial profit. Between 1st 
June 1796 and 31st December 1797, it shipped 569,366 lbs of muscovado to 
England and sold in Saint Domingue 131,673 lbs, as well as 267,175 
lbs of syrup. Revenue amounted to 569,629 livr es; expenditure to 331,215 
livres -a profit of 238,413 livres, or nearly £7,000. 
Hence, although the record is not complete, it would seem that 
through 1795-97 the plantation was producing about 450,000 lbs p. a., 
perhaps more, at an annual profit approaching £4,300. For 1798, a 
crop of 550,000 lbs had been anticipated. The profit to the owners, 
however, was probably even greater. The above calculations used only 
local prices, while most of the crop was sold in England. The final 
account shows prices per 100 (French) lbs ranging from 68 to 75 
livres with an average of 70 livres. In England at this period, the 
prices paid by importers excluding duty were over 50% higher. 
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In 
November 1797, Turnbull Forbes informed the Government that that year 
alone they had received from the estate over 400 hogsheads, producing 
a clear profit of more than £8,000.68 Although the two accounts do 
not tally, they both clearly suggest that towards the end of the 
occupation sugar cultivation could produce a gross profit of around 
40%. 
How far one may generalise from such a limited example is by no 
means clear. Earlier in the occupation sugar prices had been lower, 
in England falling below 40 shillings per cwt in the latter half of 
1794. Thereafter, however, they had risen steeply, remaining over 60 
shillings after April 1795 and passing 70 shillings in March 1798.69 
Local prices, nevertheless, are more relevant, as most of the trade 
of the occupied zone went to the United States. 
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According to 
Lapointe, the average price of muscovado during the occupation was 75 
livres per quintal71 but this seems unlikely. The average price the 
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Montbazon estate received for its locally-sold sugar in 1796-97 was 
71 livres. In mid-1796, prices were around 63-66 li vres, and a year 
earlier about 60 livres, which was their level through 1789-90. How- 
ever, one must remember that this was still very much higher than their 
pre-Revolutionary level of around 40 livres. 
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As for coffee, the 
indications are less clear. During 1789-90 prices fell from an all- 
time high of 30 sous per lb to the still good price of 20 sous but then 
dropped lower. Under the occupation, plantation inventories invariably 
show coffee left in store estimated at 15-16 sous but selling prices 
were undoubtedly higher, if only because of the transport factor. 
Debien records a sale at Port au Prince in June 1795 at 30 sous but 
the acquisition of Grands Bois a month later probably depressed prices 
somewhat. At le Cap in August 1796 coffee was selling for 26 sous. 
In 1797, the Cassanet plantation in the Grand' Anse received an average 
price for its coffee of only 201 sous but prices were also said to 
have fallen that year. 
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The price of cotton, on the other hand, went 
on rising on the international market and must have made many fortunes, 
among merchants if not planters. 
In November 1794, the Conseil Prive claimed that even in Arcahaye 
and the Grand' Anse planters were making only one third of their 
former revenues. Malouet, ten months later, observed that a third of 
the planter's income was being swallowed up by public contributions. 
Laborie said that the labour shortage greatly limited production on 
some plantations but also noted that the accounts of absentee estates 
drawn up in 1795-96 revealed very large receipts. They also showed 
very large debits, but he doubted these were genuine. 
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The considerable 
sums paid for absentee property when it was put up for auction, and 
the substantial bribes supposedly paid when it was not, certainly 
indicate a high level of return on staple production under the occupa- 
tion. So, too, does the public revenue raised in Arcahaye, which 
built at least five fortresses and provided la Croix des Bouquets with 
a loan of 600,000 livres. High taxes and rents, bribes and increasing 
running costs, all were made possible, it would seem, by the con- 
siderable profits made from selling at wartime prices. 
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The destruction of the North had cut a large hole in the world 
supply of both sugar and coffee. The strength of demand for Saint 
Domingue's produce during the occupation can be seen not only in prices 
but in the double duties paid by American shipping. Thanks to this 
expedient and other increases, the annual customs revenue of the 
British zone came close to half of that of the entire colony before 
the Revolution. Complete trade figures for the period of the occupation 
- 231 - 
do not exist, but production was evidently much higher than has been 
thought. Lepkowski, the only historian who has attempted to assess 
the decline of Saint Domingue's economy in these years, gives figures 
that are infinitely too low and which apparently take no account of 
either the occupied zone or of the Republican South. 
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In April 1796, 
the Conseil Privd estimated that the occupied zone, at a maximum, 
possessed 800 plantations worked by 60,000 slaves, producing 60 million 
livres of exports - 30 million pounds of coffee, 15 million pounds of 
sugar, million pounds of cotton, 20,000 pounds of indigo. Annual 
customs revenue, it said, came to about 3 million livres. 
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In 1796, 
in fact, customs revenue amounted to some 4 millions, or £114,000 
sterling. Whereas in 1788 the entire colony's exports had been valued 
at just £51 million, those of the occupied zone in 1796 still came to 
over £1 million; Dundas put them at Eli million. 
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This was probably 
the year of highest output, but not necessarily so; exports to Great 
Britain were actually higher in every other year of the occupation 
except 1793 (appendix E (iv)). The production of the British zone, 
then, was comparable to that of most other colonies in the Caribbean. 
As an economic unit, Saint Domingue had not been destroyed in 1791. 
This should be remembered when considering the recovery, or supposed 
recovery, of the years 1799-1802. 
The great plain of Cul de Sac, nonetheless, seems to have remained 
entirely unproductive under the occupation. Extending some 20 miles 
in length and between 5 and 10 miles in width, with 118 sucreries 
producing before the Revolution some 50 million pounds of sugar, it 
seems to have produced under the occupation little more than a few 
casks of syrup. In 1791-93 it had been the scene of pillaging, murder 
and a number of pitched battles. Many slaves had fled the plantations 
or been killed; much of the livestock had been carried off, though 
few buildings had been burned. Work was abandoned for months at a 
time. Hedges and fences were broken down and the fields became choked 
with weeds. When the British arrived in June 1794, work had been 
resumed since a few months, at least on the estates near Port au Prince, 
but few whites dared stay overnight in the plain. For a week or so, 
the plantations came to life. Missing slaves returned and production 
restarted. Then, just as at Leogane and in the Artibonite, armed 
bands came down from the mountain forests and all around the capital 
plantations went up in flames. 
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The Cul de Sac never really recovered. 
By September 1794, Montalembert, whose own plantation was reduced 
to ashes, had gained some control over the plain and he intended to 
restart production on the states around his fortified camp at la Croix 
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des Bouquets. What success he had is not certain, but the construction 
of his citadel and the high price of lumber undoubtedly led to the further 
pillaging of plantations for building materials. 
so 
Absentees' estates 
were the obvious targets. Until the middle of 1796, at least, probably 
no whites resided on any of the estates, though owners and gerants 
made visits in daylight to 'encourage' their remaining slaves, and forage 
was collected for the cavalry. The only communication between Port au 
Prince and la Croix des Bouquets, a distance of ten miles, was by armed 
convoys of wagons. These became more frequent after the capture of 
Mirebalais and Grands Bois in August 1795. Montalembert's exactions 
from the local inhabitants were by all accounts extremely vexatious, 
even extending to fines for disobedience. Tired of having their 
carts and mules requisitioned without payment, they set up that autumn 
with Government assistance a haulage company. On October 17th, 33 
planters and managers, including de Jumecourt, O'Gorman, Merceron, 
Lemeilleur and Lathoison Desvarreux, assembled in the presbytery to 
discuss terms. These were eventually settled a month later after further 
meetings with the Agent-General, representatives of the Conseil Prive 
and of the planters of Mirebalais, Grands Bois and Trou d'Eau. 
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Each of 50 participants agreed to provide a well-equipped cart with 
10 mules, a driver and valet; two pack-mules with a driver, and to keep 
4 mules in reserve. Forage was to be supplied from their plantations. 
The company would buy mules in Santo Domingo and each participant would 
pay five portugaises for harnesses. The Government agreed to a loan of 
300,000 livres on the security of the participants' properties. Each 
week, unless the rivers and roads were impassable, a convoy of 50 
carts was to be sent to Port au Prince carrying crops. It would return 
with provisions for the planters and stores and ammunition for the 
army. The Government would pay 3 gourdes per cartload of 1,200 lbs 
as far as Croix des Bouquets and 3 gourdes per day thereafter. A pack 
mule carrying up to 175 lbs would cost 2 gourdes. The commandant of 
Croix des Bouquets was to provide an escort at the cost of 1 ourde per 
white or black infantryman and 2 gourdes per cavalryman. For each 
cannon supplied the company would provide a cart and team. At the 
foot of the mountain of Grands Bois a post and entrepot were established, 
from where mule-trains carried the planters' coffee to Port au Prince 
at a cost of 33 livres per load. The Planters of Mirebalais brought 
their produce to the warehouse at Croix des Bouquets and then paid 
per 200 lbs load 2 gourdes, for coffee, 3 ourdes, for cotton, or 6 
oug rdes, for indigo. Like the inhabitants of Grands Bois, they received 
gratis each return trip 5 cartloads for provisions. 
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As already seen, 
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conditions began to improve in the Cul de Sac at 
the end of 1795 and the capture of Morne 1'0pital the following 
February brought a new degree of security to the region. Plantation 
owners rushed, it seems, to appoint managers and overseers to their 
estates, so as to begin repairs, plant food crops 'et commencer meine 
une culture utile'. Nevertheless, even on the Damiens plantation only 
three miles from the capital it was still not considered safe enough 
in July for the manager to reside. 
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By the autumn, however, when 
military posts were being established in different parts of the plain, 
including lonely Fond Parisien, prospects for the whites were looking 
brighter. Montalembert, who had merely 22 slaves left on his estate, 
was planning to hire a workforce and, having driven many planters to 
live in the capital, now tried to persuade them to return. A census 
was taken in August, and in November a general corvee was organised to 
clear the roads of tropical undergrowth. During November and December, 
some 40 absentees' estates were inventoried and leased out. 
Almost all the estates, everyone agreed, needed two or three 
years before they could make any taxable revenue. The canes left 
standing were so old they were fit only for making syrup or for re- 
planting. Even the Lemeilleur estate with its 225 slaves, whose owner 
was on hand and which had lost only 12% of its workforce, had but seven 
canepieces free of weeds. The Cazeau plantation had six, all in 
ratoons, and the Descloches plantation thirty acres but they were 
among the more immediately workable of the absentee estates. Before 
the Revolution, one had been worth £10,000 p. a. while the other used 
to yield a half million pounds of sucre blanc. Usually, the canefields 
were in a state of complete abandon. Conditions, however, varied. 
The Bauge plantation, one of the most ravaged of the plain, had kept 
most of its slaves but had all its buildings burned down bar two 
slave huts. The duc d'Orleans' long-abandoned, and admittedly small, 
estate had only 79 slaves but all its buildings intact, if dilapidated, 
and valued at 113,000 livres. The giant Peyrat estate, on the other 
hand, with most of its buildings burned still had 110,000 livres worth 
in good shape and over 300 slaves but not a single animal. Situated 
near a forest and isolated, it was frequently raided, though rare, 
anyway, was the estate with over 30 mules. In general, those near Port 
au Prince had lost most of their slaves, while those beyond the Grande 
Riviere had at least one or two hundred. On almost all, however, were 
the buildings badly damaged and falling into ruins, with a great many 
showing signs of arson. 
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Impressive ruins they were, nevertheless, these massive stone walls 
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topped with charred timbers - water-mills, warehouses, stables, great 
aqueducts arching across the countryside. The grand' case of the Lepine 
plantation near Fond Parisienhad marble floors and papered walls, 
though this was exceptional. 
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Unlike in the plain of Arcahaye, half 
the estates had made refined sugar, so that, adjoining the main factory 
building with its row of copper cauldrons, there was usually a long, 
solidly-built refinery which might itself be worth as much as all 
the buildings on a medium-sized cafeiere (40,000 livres). These 
purgeries, along with the grand' cases and cases ä ndgres, seem to have 
been the buildings most frequently damaged. The boiling-houses and 
mills, the most important structures, tended to survive, perhaps 
because their roofs were more often tiled, rather than shingled or 
thatched. On the Laserre plantation, however, the cauldrons of the 
sucrerie had been punctured by saboteurs. 
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The plantations of Saint 
Domingue, said Hector McLean, a doctor at Port au Prince military 
hospital, were 'more splendid and permanent' than those of the British 
West Indies. French colonists, he thought, regarded the islandsas 
their home. Whether or not his reasoning was correct, it was an 
observation he extended to the capital, too, whose water supply, drainage 
ditches and rows of trees distinguished it, he said, from its British 
Caribbean counterparts. 
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Venault de Charmilly, in a similar vein, 
wrote of his surprise on seeing the lack of irrigation works in 
Jamaica. 
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In February 1797, General Forbes reported to London that 
agricultural work or re-building was under way on many plantations in 
the Cul de Sac. 
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Others, however, said that raids from the mountains 
continued and that the few erb ants who returned to the plain based them- 
selves in the military camps and merely exploited the plantations for 
their forage, milk and wood, not even attempting to persuade the 
slaves back into the canefields. 
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This was perhaps a little exagge- 
rated. The leases of Cul de Sac plantations put up for auction in 
July/August fetched good prices, while one would not find Richard 
Dalton, lessee of the Coustard estate, hiring five sucriers, unless he 
was harvesting a lot of cane. 
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Laborie, however, also painted a gloomy 
picture, albeit diplomatically. Agricultural work, he observed, was 
being 'attempted with diffidence, difficulty and danger'. 'Almost 
all' the plantations, he added, had recently been burned by troops 
to prevent raiders hiding in them. 
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A more absurd irony could 
scarcely be imagined Ta defence of plantation slavery relying not 
merely on enlisting the slaves but on burning the plantations as well! 
General Simcoe put a stop to the destruction but apparently too 
late. 'It is indeed melancholy, ' wrote Dr. McLean early in 1797, 
'to ride among these wide-extended ruins. Everywhere marks of 
opulence, elegance and commerce, all now levelled with the ground. '93 
When Lieutenant Howard arrived in the Cul de Sac in August, there 
were only three plantation houses left standing and work was in 
progress on only 'one or two' estates near the main road. It was 
the only road still visible. By late November, raiders were descen- 
ding from the mountains in large bands. Playing cat and mouse with 
the soldiers, they abducted or killed slaves and burned or looted 
what remained on the plantations. Some of them were now mounted and 
attacked the livestock convoys that crossed the plain from Santo 
Domingo, driving off cattle into the woods. With its buildings 
burned down, trees torn up by the roots, fences broken and equipment 
scattered over the countryside, the Cul de Sac, wrote Lieutenant 
Howard, had become ' one great Ruins' overgrown with weeds. Early 
in 1798, amidst apocalyptic desolation, he wrote its epitaph and 
that of all slave-owning Saint Domingue: 'Unhappy colony, I do not 
know if you merited your fate ... I leave that to Him who in His 
wrath sends the destroying Angel "to ride on the whirlwind and direct 
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the Storm". 
(iii) Colonists, Emigres and Englishmen. Dominated by the 
pursuit of gain, white society in Saint Domingue was profane, selfish 
and fast-living. Under the occupation, profligacy and irreligion 
Laborie said, took still deeper root, despite the whites' straitened 
circumstances and what he considered the manifestation of divine 
wrath. 
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In the highly-charged, fin du monde atmosphere of the British 
zone, the traditional tensions 
between merchants, planters and 
lawyers, between residents and absentees, civilians and soldiers, 
were heightened, while the past turmoil of the Revolution and the 
presence of a foreign occupying army further complicated the situa- 
tion. Sources of friction, therefore, were cultural and political, 
as well as social and economic. Creoles and emigres, British, Germans, 
Dutch and French, royalists and revolutionaries, were thrown 
together in the most exotic of circumstances, where corruption, 
debauchery, disease and sudden death were the common motifs of daily 
life. 
Laborie, like Malouet and so many other liberals then turning 
into conservatives, argued that the strict enforcement of the law 
and the revival of organised religion was 
the path to social salva- 
tion. 
96 
As seen above, however, the judges appointed in Saint 
Domingue in 1794 were objects of 
derision or factional hostility, 
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while under martial law a multitude of crimes went unpunished. 
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The colonial police, moreover, headed by Roland de Buissy, was noted 
for its illegal exactions, venality and petty oppression. 
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As for 
the efforts of Guillaume Lecun, the Apostolic Prefect, they seem to 
have met with little success. While the first police law passed 
under British rule exhorted the population about the neglect of 
religion in the colony, three years later we find Lecun denouncing 
to the Pope the immorality of the great white families. 
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Gambling 
remained a ruling passion, and right up to the evacuation of Port au 
Prince thousands of gourdes continued to change hands every month in 
its gaming houses. 
100 
What was perhaps the philosophy behind such 
behaviour, was pithily expressed in the rather unorthodox will 
of one Jean-Baptiste Bon, of Fond de Negres: 'Quelque soit 1' 
evenement qui m'attende, peu m'importe, je m'en f. Je m'y prdpare 
sans le craindre ou l'apprehender. '101 
The Dominguan temperament, all commentators agreed, was violent 
and disputatious. Even under the Ancien Regime, the marquis de 
Bouilld warned, he had found the French islands more difficult to 
govern than the occupied British colonies, while Governor Balcarres 
considered the French refugees in Jamaica 'a set of people infinitely 
more clamourous and ferocious' than those he had had to deal with in 
the Channel Islands. 
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Factious and turbulent, the Dominguans 
seemed to embody for the British the worst features of the French 
and West Indian personalities. They were, de Charmilly observed, 
'des malades qui sortent des convulsions de quatre annees de 
troubles' and, he added, 'leer sensibilite merite d'etre menagee. '103 
This is precisely, of course, what hard-line xenophobes like General 
Whyte and Colonel Murray had no intention of doing, and it is 
surprising perhaps that disputes within the armed forces were not 
more frequent than they were. Duperrier, the militia colonel 
commanding Camp Desrivaux, refused to acknowledge any authority below 
that of the Governor and was consequently arrested, while in 1797 one 
Major Desbrosses was sentenced to be beheaded for striking the 
British commander of les Irois. 
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Among the planters, Lieutenant Howard distinguished two types. 
The 'great planters', it seemed to him, had been brought up in France 
and had returned to recoup their squandered fortunes. They were 
cruel to their slaves, ' profuse, devoid of all Religious Ideas, 
passionate, Proud and particularly zealous in what is called the 
point of Honour'. He did not like them. On the other hand, there 
were the military officers, cadets of good family, who served in 
Saint Domingue, married a mulatress or white creole, became rich and 
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had children who then conformed to the 'great planter' stereotype. 
105 
What appears to be a third type were the creole planters described in 
the Precis Historique, who 'libres de tout ambition et ayant renonce 
au desir de revoir la patrie de leurs peres, vivoient dans une 
entiere incurie au milieu de leur attelier; se consolant de leurs 
dettes entre les bras de leurs esclaves ... et ayant toujours assez 
leur cave et leur ma asin etoient suffisamment a 
106 
quand g pprovisionnds'. 
Were these the men, one wonders, that Maitland later described107 
as 'a number of the lower order of the old French who have fixed 
themselves in possession of parts of the interior, who are totally 
indifferent to (British) or French manoeuvres till you interfere with 
them and whose only idea of Government is to raise enough to live on, 
deriving their luxuries from America, neither wishing to attack you 
nor to be attacked themselves'? These stereotypes are difficult to 
pin down. Dulau d'Allemans, for example; or Cocherel, whom Howard 
doubtless had in mind, (being commandant at Saint Marc), might fit 
both the first and the second. Clearly, wealth, place of origin and 
of residence were variables that in themselves did not connote a 
specific social type. Under the occupation, however, the chief 
division between planters was that which separated those who had been 
ruined from those still in production. However much plantation 
profits were reduced during these years - and as seen, for some they 
probably rose 
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- the planter whose property had been destroyed 
had to rely on jobbery, Government handouts or an officer's pay in 
the black corps. This may help explain why so many political and 
administrative posts went to southern and northern creoles who had 
lost their estates, which in turn may have influenced legislation. 
Opposition to payment for militia service and the extra duties it 
implied was apparently greatest in areas where such a diversion of 
manpower most stood to harm agriculture. Similarly, while no planter 
welcomed requisitioning by the military, the levy of slaves for the 
black corps was most resented in Arcahaye and the Grand' Anse, where- 
as at Saint Marc the Government compensation was probably seen as a 
useful source of income. 
All planters, however, shared certain sectional interests that 
set them at odds with the merchants and lawyers. It has already 
been described how the vexed question of debts became a source of 
controversy during the governorship of Williamson. 
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Creditor 
merchants gained leave to recover from planters still making profits 
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25% of their past advances, and were supported by lawyers seeking 
to increase the volume of litigation. 'Les habitants, ' complained 
the Conseil Prive, 'sont les veritables partis a consulter. ' 
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As 
the merchants never had a voice in the council, the law was eventually 
withdrawn. The merchants, nevertheless, made considerable profits in 
the British zone and, until the shipping tax of 1797, contributed 
little to the costs of occupation. 
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(Urban slaves were never 
recruited, nor, until 1797, taxed. ) This was particularly galling, 
as their fortunes had suffered less during the Revolution. On the 
other hand, they continued, and especially after the evacuation of 
Mirebalais, to accumulate bad debts, while militia service in the 
capital was said to be 'ecrasant'. 
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Mounting night guard on the 
ramparts of Port au Prince, we find in 1795 even the recalcitrant 
merchants of the British community. 
They and their clerks came from both Britain and Jamaica, and 
in the former instance suffered high rates of mortality. The most 
prominent was Richard Dalton of Dalton, Leriche and Baumann (or 
Beaumont), a man with influential City connections, who set up in 
Port au Prince soon after it fell and who remained there, moreover, 
after its evacuation. Already established in the capital, was the 
Jamaican James Grant Forbes, while Bertrand, Littledale, the 
Turnbull, Forbes subsidiary, appeared rather later. Other 'Port au 
Prince merchants', leasing houses in the city for 3 or 5,000 livres 
p. a. were S. B. Whitaker and Wilton, Guillis, while Donaldson, Forbes 
of Kingston had an agency at Jeremie, run for them by Dubourg Saint 
Colombe. Several of the British civilian officials, men not noted 
for their honesty, were also merchants and others like Esten who 
wished to become merchants traded on their own account. As already 
seen, some returned to England with huge fortunes. 
113 
Several 
speculated in plantation leases. As early as 1794, Dalton had 
leased five sucreries in the Cul de Sac. Donaldson and Co. leased 
two estates near Jeremie, and George Bogle two more with a combined 
rental of 32,000 livres p. a. In the Cul de Sac, at least, these 
ventures were not a success. William Forbes, who took on two of 
the better estates in the plain and a cafeiere in Grands Bois, was 
unable by mid-1797 to pay his rent and Dalton, too, refused to pay 
his, because of debts owed him by the Government. 
114 
In 1794, it 
seems, he had advanced some 300,000 livres for the equipping of 
Chasseurs and the fortification of Croix des Bouquets, as well as 
making a loan of 600,000 livres to the planters of that parish, with 
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the intention of speculating with their produce. 
115 
The largest single lessee of absentee property was the Port au 
Prince merchant Francois Daumas, who took on eight estates as part 
of a short-lived contract to supply the army with firewood and 
forage. 
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He was one of the Government's main suppliers, but 
probably the wealthiest of the capital's merchants was Arnaud Roberjot 
Lartigue. Boastful and big-spending, friend of former Governors and 
Versailles magnates, he owned some 21 million livres' worth of urban 
and rural property, and sided with the planters on the question of 
debt repayments. 
117 
Although he was said to be 'toujours ouvert 
au parti triomphant', most merchants, one gets the impression, were 
hostile to the British presence. Closely allied to France's 
mercantile bourgeoisie, and penalised by the law on debt, 
they played little part in the public life of the occupied zone. Though 
many themselves owned estates, they were less committed to the slave 
regime than were the planters. Among the organisers of a plot 
discovered at Saint Marc in January 1795 was one Massac, 'negotiant 
fort riche', 
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and when Port au Prince was evacuated in May 1798, 
it was Jean-Baptiste Camfranq, Bernard Borgella and other merchants 
who led the way in welcoming its conquerors. 
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In this, they were 
joined by the poitevin entrepreneur Louis Bagnos, one of the capital's 
richest men. Considering the huge amount of building and demolition 
work undertaken in the British zone, he and his fellow contractors 
were probably among the chief beneficiaries of the occupation. 
Saint Domingue's lawyers were objects of a particular resent- 
ment. Not only had they shared but little in the losses of the 
Revolution, for which many of them, 'Coryphees des Assembldes, were 
held partly responsible, but they were paid high salaries from 
public funds at the same time as avoiding militia service and 
charging expensive, sometimes illegal, fees. 
120 
In the summer of 
1794, the council of the Mole ordered that judicial charges in its 
jurisdiction be cut by half. It was overruled, however, by the 
Conseil Prive; Vincendon-Dutour claimed that legal business was at 
a tenth of its level of three years before. Merchants could not sue 
for debt; most planters were absent, and the remainder were too 
poor or too busy in the camps to undertake lawsuits. 
121 
Lawyers 
were always well represented on the Conseil Prive, be they conserva- 
tives like de Ronseray, radicals like Vincendon or moderates like 
Ango, Billard and Busson. As most were plantation owners, they did 
indeed share in the losses of the Revolution - hence the bribes 
paid to get posts on the Conseil Superieur and an assured income. 
Of those who failed, we find the former greffier Louis Bonvallet 
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practising as a notary, while Pelage-Marie Duboys appeared as a 
barrister before the court of which he had been Deputy Attorney- 
General. 
122 
Duboys also managed an absentee estate in the Cul de 
Sac, until he was replaced by a Jamaican merchant, but it was doubt- 
less rents from his eight houses in the capital that bought him the 
leisure to write his invaluable Precis Historique, Because of the 
dearth of litigation, minor officials who depended heavily on fees, 
such as seneschals, registrars and lieutenants de juge, frequently 
complained that they were not earning a living wage. 
123 
However, a 
lot of inventory work was generated by Government demolitions and the 
Administration of Absentee Property, for which notaries charged 
eight livres an hour, albeit grumbling about the high cost and poor 
quality of their clerks. 
124 
As Saint Domingue became more and more an absentee society, it 
seemed to the planters in Europe that it might become dominated by 
lawyers and dishonest estate attornies. In 1789, absentees in 
Paris, fearful of a 'despotisme senatorial', called for a reduction 
in the powers of the Conseil Superieur. Those in London in 1793 
demanded both that judicial procedures be simplified and made 
cheaper and that plantation managers be compelled to produce regular 
accounts to be inspected by the Administration. These provisions, 
moreover, they wanted written 
into the Capitulation lest a future 
Colonial Assembly, controlled by avocats and attornies, attempt to 
revoke them. 
125 
The resentment felt by resident planters, on the 
other hand, for their wealthier absentee neighbours had also flared 
up at the beginning of the Revolution, and 
in the occupied zone this 
turned into bitterness on the part of men worn down, as Malouet said, 
by continual service in the camps, public exactions and internal 
quarrels. -126 Officially, though belatedly, given vent through 
differential rates of taxation, this resentment was most profitably 
expressed by the military and the employees of absentee estates, 
particularly in the Cul de Sac. There Montalembert was supported 
against the local planters by the erg ants and economes, who 'tous 
trouvoient plus ou moins leur avantage dans le subversion commune'. 
127 
Some, like Carpot de Montville on the Damiens plantation, were able 
to combine negligent and self-serving supervision of an estate with 
a captaincy in a black corps. 
128 
All whites on the plantations any- 
way spent much of their time soldiering. At the same time, no doubt, 
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they had to develop their range of persuasive powers to keep the 
slaves on the estates and working - cajolery, bribery, brutality - 
but of this we know little. 
129 
A great many, however, were thrown out of work by the Revolution, 
and this was true of the petits blancs in general, 'that herd of 
foreigners', one Frenchman observed, who called themselves 'Gargons'. 130 
It was especially true of the seamen in the coastal trade, who from 
the beginning of the occupation began deserting to man the privateers 
of Leogane and Port de Paix, or simply to become pirates. They thus 
further destroyed the livelihood of the remaining caboteurs. In 1795, 
a dispute blew up between the planters of Arcahaye who wanted to 
trade directly with American shipping, and the caboteurs and merchants 
of Port au Prince, who wanted to maintain their role as inter- 
mediaries by confining American ships to the capital. The Administra- 
tion compromised by allowing Americans access to the wharves of les 
Vazes and Boucassin but not to Arcahaye bourg, 
131 
-a fair balancing 
of interests. It was unemployed seamen, enlisting for two years, 
who provided most of the early recruits for Montalembert's Legion. 
United by colour prejudice rather than by any desire to protect the 
colonists' property, they had to be given, so the baron argued, 
severe discipline plenty of activity and 'une abondance'. 
132 
This 
meant extra pay and plunder. Their turbulent past history in the 
National Guard helps explain why the royalist baron faced so many 
plots, real or imagined, amongst his men, though his retaining them 
after their contracts had expired also created much discontent. 
From the gamblers and felons of the capital to the restless 
overseers moving from estate to estate, the petits blancs, said 
Lieutenant Howard, were 'a disgrace to human nature', 'the Dregs of 
the Nation'. Daily they committed 'murder, rape, oppression, cunning 
and low deceit', and it was the blacks and free coloureds who 
suffered. As in all the islands white society had to keep up a 
show of solidarity, and with amusing results. Because of the 
'exhorbitant' prices of all 'Handicraft works, construction and 
mechanical operations', artisans got rich very quickly and behaved 
with wild extravagance. A farrier, the lieutenant claimed, would 
come to shoe a planter's horses wearing a silk coat and fine linen 
with three or four slaves carrying his tools. Flashing diamond rings 
and a gold snuff-box, with complete familiarity he would invite him- 
self to dinner and discuss politics, as if an old friend. 
133 
Yet, 
there were limits, as the desertions to the Republicans show, both 
to the solidarity of the whites and the racism of the petits blancs 
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One reason the Conseil Prive opposed the markets held for Dieudonn6's 
men in January 1796 was fear that 'des gens malintentionnes de tous 
couleurs' would conspire with the 'brigands'. 
134 
At the very bottom of white society, were the destitute, the social 
debris of the Revolution, They included men and particularly women 
and children of all social groups, but especially widows, the aged and 
disabled, From the very start of the occupation, they received a 
daily food ration from the Quartermaster's stores and, later, a weekly 
cash payment as well, usually of two gourdes. Cases were vetted by 
the cure, then by the Conseil Prive. Some, as already seen, 
135 
were 
more favoured than others. The once wealthy were spared the indignity 
of collecting a daily ration and given cash in lieu and sometimes an 
additional payment, if the Governor intervened. The vicomte Leroi 
de la Potherie, who in August 1793 had got drunk and gambled away 40 
portugaises in a night, 
136 
received seven gourdes per week. Also 
deferentially treated was the baron de Romilly, formerly of Louis 
XVI's bodyguard; who had lost all his property and was disabled by 
wounds, Less favoured were the likes of Laroche, 'vieillard honnete, 
deplorablement pauvre', or the blind veuve Seigniere with three young 
children. Regarded with some suspicion was Jeanne Dufour, also with 
three young children, who had lost her licence to sell alcohol and 
whose husband obviously was absent in the Republican zone. In the 
half year from September 1795 to February 1796, some 675 individuals 
were added to the list of officially destitute. Six hundred were 
whites, of whom about 240 were children, over 30 of them being 
orphans. A hundred were men, unemployed through sickness, infirmity 
or market conditions, and of the women another hundred were widows. In 
the case of the veuves Guillot, Dupouy and Salagnac, we find three 
137 
generations of widows in the same family. 
For much of the occupation, it seems, colonists formed only a 
minority of white society, By February 1797, it was claimed that 
they were outnumbered by 'at least' ten to one by 'the more numerous 
class of Emigres, strangers to the Colony and Adventurers of all 
descriptions'. 
138 
As soon as Port au Prince had fallen, there 
appeared strutting in its streets some 50 or 60 young emigres from 
London, sent by Malouet, they said on a mission. 
139 
In the get- 
rich-quick tradition of the West Indies, hundreds more followed, as 
the army of the Princes dissolved, seeking compensation in the colony 
for what they had lost in Europe. 
140 
They thus reinforced the 
attitude of British officers like Whyte, Spencer and Murray, who con- 
sidered that Port au Prince was theirs by right of conquest and 
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felt cheated of its spoils. As of August 1794, emigres were paid four 
gourdins per day and later, despite the hostility of Governor 
Williamson, they gained posts in the legions and black corps. The 
appointment in September 1795 of Lambert and de Cotte (who was 
already living in Jamaica) opened up the civil administration to 
them, and some leased absentee property or even bought small planta- 
tions. 
The colonists uniformly hated them. They were invariably 
described as intriguants, violent, vexatious and ignorant (of colonial 
ways, that is). Outsiders had never been popular in the colony, even 
those who owned estates, and relations between the colonists and the 
military were notoriously bad in the Caribbean. 
141 
Moreau de Saint- 
Mery had attributed the deprivation des moeurs in Saint Domingue to 
the influx of troops in wartime. 
142 
At the Mole, conflict between the 
officers and the inhabitants was of long-standing and in the first 
year of the occupation it was of considerable concern to the 
British. 
143 
The conflict now had a political dimension, of course, 
most emigres being fervent, if not vindictive, Royalists. Their 
presence thus sharpened political divisions in the colony, and the 
frequent denunciations of supposed conspirators by Montalembert, de 
Bruges and de Bussy added greatly to the feeling of insecurity among 
whites and coloureds. 
144 
The military credentials of the emigres 
were often very impressive, and Laborie had to admit they were usually 
brave and good officers. However, when the command of a foot company 
brought an annual profit of 18,000 livres and that of cavalry regiment 
200,000 li"vres, the patronage they received naturally enraged indigent 
planters who scraped along as lieutenants and ensigns. Moreover, it 
was in their interest to prolong the war and with it their profite- 
ering. This outlook, Laborie said, eventually spread to the 
planters, too. Indeed, the emigres had no monopoly either of patronage 
or corruption, but being outsiders were obvious targets for resent- 
145 
ment. 
Attitudes towards the British themselves of course depended to 
a large extent on the political viewpoint of the individual colonist. 
Also, there is no doubt that of the different commanders Williamson, 
Horneck and Simcoe were more popular than Whitelocke, Whyte and 
Forbes, none of whom could speak French. Initial enthusiasms, more- 
over, were clearly soured early on by the weakness of the occupying 
forces, disputes between the Army and Navy and the preoccupation 
with 'plunder and prize money', even though very little actual 
pillaging took place. 
146 
Even the strongest partisans of a British 
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occupation must have regarded the official rhetoric about 'protection' 
and 'generosity' with some cynicism. Furthermore, the behaviour of 
the troops justified only too well Moreau de Saint-Mery's strictures 
on the garrison influence. Although the first regiments sent from 
Jamaica won high praise in the colony, General Simcoe thought that 
the 'depravity' of the British and Foreign troops was partly responsible 
for the indiscipline of the colonial corps. 
147 
On the other hand, 
he himself, accessible and disinterested, was evidently much admired, 
as was the stern but just General Maitland, and at Saint Marc suc- 
cessive British commanders appear to have got on well with the 
population, particularly General Churchill, who married a local 
creole. 
148 
The author of the Precis Historique, in fact, who was 
opposed to the British presence, presents on balance an almost 
favourable portrait, more critical of the factions that exploited 
British ignorance and weakness than of the British themselves. 
149 
Although its national genius tended to be perceived, not least 
in Saint Domingwer as one of bluff, calculating hypocrisy, Britain 
enjoyed at this period considerable international prestige. Even 
Commissioner Sonthonax drank a toast to George III with the observa- 
tion that he ruled a free people. However, while the French liked 
and admired the English, wrote Charles Malenfant, the English hated 
the French. 
150 
Obviously an exaggeration, - Malenfant had been 
imprisoned in irons by General Whyte when badly wounded - the contrast 
was nonetheless real. Early on in the occupation, garrisons smitten 
by disease began to blame the colonists for having called them in. 
At the Mole, Major-General Grant used to taunt the French by saying 
that Britain did not want to keep Saint Domingue, adding cruelly that 
the Republic was sending 20,000 troops and that the colonists would 
all be guillotined. When reproached, he declared that an Englishman 
had a right to express his opinion. 
151. 
As for the haughtiness of 
General Whyte and his mockery of the colonists, General Maitland him- 
self disapproved, and he lost notoriously little love on Saint 
Domingue and its inhabitants, regarding them for the most part as 
factious and corrupt. 
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Even a British civilian official, sympa- 
thetic to the colonists' plight and willing to praise the 'prodigies 
of valour' of the 'brave few', displayed an incredible condescension: - 
'With the utmost admiration, ' he wrote, 'must the civilized world 
reflect on the philanthropy of the British nation, that forgiving 
and forgetting every species of political finesse and hypocricy, 
demonstrated by (France) at various periods, the godlike emanation, 
forgiveness, actuated them to render that benevolent assistance in 
every shape to its miserable subjects in that colony. '153 
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Lieutenant Howard clearly agreed but was rather more bitter. 
The British, he exclaimed, were sacrificing all in the colonists' 
cause, while they, instead of thanking England 'for every morsel of 
Bread they put in their mouths ... hate us, nay even despise us by 
making a ridicule of all our military motions ... laughing at our 
discipline, courage and military knowledge ... those Gentlemen have 
so much to do in decorating their pretty persons and debauching the 
wives and daughters of honest citizens that it would be horrid to 
take up one moment of their precious time. '154 He was specifically 
angry about the poor co-operation received from an dmigrd artillery 
commander, the comte de Gauville, but he was also, it would seem, 
sensitive about the abilities of the inexperienced British corps, 
as well as jealous of the French preponderance in lucrative military 
and civil posts. Although every officer in the Legions de Saint Marc, 
de Contades and du Sud had been an officer in the French Army, 
Colonel Murray demanded in September 1795 in the name of all the 
British field officers that French officers of superior rank should 
no longer be allowed to command British officers. The demand was not 
accepted, it seems, but it served to prevent de Charmilly, promoted 
from militia captain to colonel of dragoons, being allowed to return 
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to the colony. 
Another example of friction within the armed forces was the 
free use made by army officers of the horses of the Marechaussde, which 
under Cadusch's colonelcy was pretending to be a cavalry regiment. 
156 
More often friction occurred between soldiers and civilians. In 
April 1795, at the height of Montalembert's influence in Port au 
Prince, the magistrate Jean Baron was struck by a British officer 
for protesting at being evicted from his house and was imprisoned. 
He cameclose, some said, to being shot. 
157 
A few months previously, 
when the chevalier de Volant's plantation buildings were burned down 
for military reasons, General Horneck did not bother to inform their 
owner in advance, although he was Lieutenant-Colonel of Port au 
Prince militia. 
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When eleven York Hussars deserted from Saint Marc 
in March 1797, it was immediately assumed that townspeople were 
responsible for leading them astray. Arrests were made and a trial 
begun, which for lack of evidence soon had to be abandoned. 
159 
As 
for the British civilian community, its avoidance of militia service 
and the corruption of men like Shaw and Esten can hardly have 
endeared it to the colonists, particularly in hard-pressed, Anglo- 
phobe Port au Prince. 
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Even its most admirable figures, the hospital inspectors Jackson 
and McLean, were engaged in a bitter dispute with their French counter- 
parts about the treatment of the sick. Grappling earnestly with the 
mysteries of yellow fever, Hector McLean daily spent from six to eight 
hours on horseback visiting the sick, changing his sweat-soaked 
shirt five times. Equally dedicated, Robert Jackson, an indefatigable 
eccentric, went everywhere on foot, visiting sometimes twice a day 
every barrack and hospital in Port au Prince. Theirs was perhaps 
the grimmest experience of any expatriate to survive the occupation. 
In the packed wards of the military hospital, 'surrounded by ... 
countrymen, in every stage of misery, looking up for assistance, ' 
wrote McLean, acutely aware of his own ineffectiveness, '... I have wit- 
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nessed scenes of misery I can never forget. ' 
Unusually, McLean was willing to learn from the French, at least 
in matters of diet. In this respect, it is curious that, whereas 
most commentators made much of plantation hospitality, the substantial 
breakfasts and late-night petits plats, he represents the colonists 
as being frugal and sober, consuming little meat or wine, in marked 
contrast to the British. 
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Both he and Captain Colville were also 
struck with the colonists' love of bathing, either in a river or a 
baignoir, in which they would spend sometimes hours immersed up to 
their necks, reading, eating or receiving visitors with a lack of 
modesty the captain considered typically French. 'Some of them are 
satisfied with demi-bains, 
' he wrote, 'in which to see them seated 
with their hair full dressed is ridiculous enough and did they not 
assure you of the contrary, you might suppose them in the situation 
(in which) General Harnick at Port au Prince (was received) by the 
Chevalier de Montault ... which is not reconcilable to English ideas 
of delicacy. ' 
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In having a good word to say for everyone, from Borel to 
Montalembert, Governor Williamson was exceptional, but even he 
strongly disliked the emigres, whom he equated with adventurers. An 
early complaint from the royalists in both Saint Domingue and 
Martinique was that the British were favouring Patriots, petits blancs 
and mulattoes. 
163 
One of Whyte's officers wrote in July 1794 that 
he preferred to command 20 mulattoes to 100 petits blancs 'or even of 
the Royalists, Emigrants or whatever they call themselves'. 
164 
Even so, a number of officers did praise the performance of the 
Legions, and one or two passed favourable comment on the Grand' 
Anse militia, though Simcoe thought it 'much inferior' to Rigaud's 
forces. 
165 (So it probably was by that time, though Simcoe never 
actually visited the region. 
) Several officers, in fact, and not just 
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Brisbane, Bradshaw and Churchill at Saint Marc, appear to have enjoyed 
genuinely cordial relations with the French. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bowyer, for example, of the 66th Foot, who succeeded de Sevre as 
commander of the Chasseurs des Irois, left the Grand' Anse with the 
warmest of feelings towards its 'many worthy Inhabitants', whose 
'civility and attention', he told a colleague, he would long 
remember. 
166 
Overall, there can be little doubt that the dominant impression 
the British received of their collaborators was one of verbal 
restlessness. At the Mole, they were 'prone to argument and theory', 
at Saint Marc 'naturally volatile', in Port au Prince 'all quarrelling 
amongst themselves'. 
167 
De Charmilly, in Williamson's words, had 
'many good points ... but was a thorough Frenchman ... a little too 
lively in his ideas of character and fact'. For General Forbes, both 
colonists and emigres were a 'violent, discontented and turbulent 
set of men ... their party violence, 
' he said, 'exceeds anything of 
that kind which ever existed perhaps in any Nation. '168 
Such assessments were felt to apply with even more force to the 
Republicans, with regard to whom the British assumed a posture of 
blunt pragmatism, sometimes pompous, sometimes humourous, but 
invariably cynical. Thus, Colonel Whitelocke's first proclamation 
announced that the purpose of West India colonies was to make money, 
not to extend the range of human knowledge or to act as a theatre of 
republican virtues. 
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In the same spirit, Commodore Ford wrote to 
Laveaux in March 1794, 'The ... arrogant Threats ... respecting 
Negroes and People of Colour under arms, and not free, is no more than 
I expected from an officer whose Mind appears so strongly marked 
with Republican Effusions ... When Prisoners are found intriguing 
for vile and seditious purposes, planting the Tree of Liberty, hoisting 
the Bonnet rouge and singing unbecoming Songs in the Streets ... 
contrary to all Precedent such conduct will not be passed over with 
Impunity by Britons, whose General Comportment is like their Govern- 
ment, not tinctured with Levity, nor stained by Cruelty. '170 'A 
complete drubbing to the French Maniacs' was the usual sort of 
toast drunk in the Kingston European Club, while the Jamaican planter 
Henry Shirley described Dominguan politics as consisting primarily 
of 'violent aristocrats' and 'violent democrats', the latter being 
'madmen'. 
171 Sonthonax was universally dismissed as a corrupt 
charlatan, and, having failed to bribe Laveaux, Williamson persisted 
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in believing as late as September 1794 that he would seek an honourable 
surrender. 
172 
Rather aptly, one finds much of future Anglo-colonial relations 
during the occupation prefigured in the diary entry of a British 
captain dated 21st September 1793. The day the first troops dis- 
embarked at Jeremie their officers were invited to a dinner held in 
their honour. The regimental band performed; artillery was fired, 
and creoles and redcoats regaled each other with songs, one written 
especially for the occasion. The atmosphere was jovial. Barthelemy 
Faveranges gave 'a long harangue ... in which the generosity of the 
English was extolled as was also (the colonists') own bravery ... But 
not withstanding their professions, ' the captain wrote, 'the true 
Frenchman could not be hid and their politeness went no further than 
words and idle communing as they placed themselves in the best seats 
and helped themselves to what was most delicate while several of the 
British officers were obliged to feed standing, two out of the same 
plate ... The 
dinner ... was also charged at a high rate to the 
173 
British Government. ' 
(iv) Attitudes to annexation. In chapter III it was suggested 
that, while there existed in Saint Domingue a small number of 
positively Anglophile-activists (mainly planters) and a minority of 
committed Republicans (maint) petits blancs), the attitude of most 
colonists towards Great Britain was determined not only by socio- 
economic status and past political beliefs but also, and to a large 
extent, by the unfolding of events in the colony and in France. 
This remained so during the occupation and, while one can be sure 
only that the colonists always violently disagreed with one another, 
various general trends can be identified. British prestige in Saint 
Domingue, such as it was, declined rapidly after the first few 
months of the occupation, mainly because of the paucity of the troops 
sent, their behaviour and their propensity to die in large numbers. 
At the same time, the French Republic went dramatically from strength 
to strength in Europe, while its domestic regime steadily retreated 
from the extremism of the year II towards a moderation that 
suggested, at least to Malouet, that it might eventually countenance 
the restoration of the colonial status quo. On the other hand, 
colonial Royalists drew increasingly closer to Britain as their cause 
in Europe became a lost one and as the Spaniards, on whom many had 
pinned their hopes, met with or caused in Saint Domingue even 
greater disasters than the British. Meanwhile, the increasing 
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monopoly of power in the Republican zone by ex-slaves made British 
rule seem relatively more attractive, and it undermined, to an extent 
Malouet completely misjudged, the appeal of returning under French 
rule with an end to hostilities. Nevertheless, in the long run, the 
prospect of restoring agriculture under a forced labour regime and 
the degree of security offered by the ascendancy of Toussaint 
Louverture made this for many an acceptable option, at least 
preferable to exile, and for some perhaps a Brave New World. 
At Jeremie, Arcahaye and doubtless elsewhere, the first British 
troops to arrive in 1793 were met by cheering crowds, though behind 
the scenes a certain amount of bribery and intimidation had gone into 
preparing the ground for them, 
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Charles Malenfant and the vicomte 
de Grouvel, both writing in 1814, claimed that the colonists 
credulously were misled into believing the British would take Saint 
Domingue in the name of the Bourbons, but this is untrue. Although 
at the mole and Saint Marc colonists had requested that the Royalist 
flag be raised, the request was refused or dropped before the 
capitulation was signed. 
175 
On the other hand, in the Grand' Anse, 
at the mole and particularly Port au Prince, it was noted that there 
existed une masse de Canaille that was Republican in sympathy though 
from September 1793 onwards it decreased in size as desertions among 
petits blancs and mulattoes mounted. On the eve of the occupation, 
there was among the 'Emigrants' in Kingston, Captain Colville said, 
a strong pro-Spanish party, and a year later Williamson opined that 
the 'strong Monarchists' would revolt against British rule if 
ever the Bourbons regained the French throne. 
176 
Briefly, in 
September 1794, after the collapse of the Spaniards and the massacre 
at Fort Dauphin of over 700 colonists, he seemed convinced that all 
property owners had been won over to the 'superior Excellence' of 
the British Government, but British fortunes themselves continued to 
plummet and, by November the new Governor had to admit that the 
British were facing far more hostility than previously. 
177 
Colonel Whitelocke had observed in July that a few colonists 
zealously supported the British Government but that 'a very considerable 
body of Inhabitants still favoured 'the Democratic Government of 
France'. Captain Colville agreed that annexation by Britain was the 
policy of a 'weak and unsupported minority' but said that the majority 
genuinely desired, or feigned to desire, eventually to return under 
Bourbon rule. 
178 
Henry Shirley's analysis -a Kingston viewpoint - 
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was a mixture of these two. The majority of colonists were either 
violently pro-Bourbon or violently democratic, the latter supporting 
the British only so long as a French fleet did not appear. 'Entirely 
English', however, were certain 'Trading People', (? Grand' Anse 
merchants like Plunkett), and a few 'Gentlemen', who were led by 
Cadusch and included many ex-revolutionaries. 
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In the Jamaica 
Royal Gazette, we find a 'French gentleman' writing from Saint Marc 
in March 1794 singing the praises of English law, but equally the 
official celebrations in Kingston following the fall of Port au 
Prince included toasts drunk not only to the Royal Family and Duke 
of York but also to 'la prompte restauration de la Monarchie en 
France'. 
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As for the petitions drawn up in July at de Charmilly's 
behest, they are difficult to interpret. Most are fairly explicit 
about desiring closer ties with Britain but not all and their 
signatories, it seems, numbered no more than 600.181 
By November 1794, according to Billard, une defiance facheuse 
reigned in the British zone and particularly in Port au Prince, where 
the 'vain and arrogant' General Whyte had made many enemies. 
Republicans could be found in all districts but in the capital they 
were especially strong and a few months later were openly avowing 
their allegiance to the Convention. 
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At the beginning of 1795, 
plots to overthrow the British were discovered in all the occupied 
towns, Malenfant implied, rather dishonestly, it seems, that dis- 
illusioned moderates and royalists were behind them, but all the 
evidence suggests that the men involved were former revolutionaries 
of all colours. 
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However, even at this low-point in the occupa- 
tion, we find the editor of the Courrier Royal de Saint Domingue, 
which was published at Saint Marcy reporting British news in terms of 
'notre Cabinet' and 'nos Generaux', and more significantly, anxious 
to reassure his readers that the British Government still intended 
to retain its colonial conquests. 
184 
While most of the Republican 
zone remained in anarchy, men of property, like it or not, knew their 
options were few. Talk of American rule, a rejection of both Britain 
and France, was purely fanciful and one doubts how sympathetic to 
such ideas were the phony creole marquises and chevaliers who chose 
to ennoble themselves during the Revolution and occupation. 
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Similarly, Royalists like the vicomte Saint Pont went out of their 
way to stress that the great majority of colonists had never wanted 
Saint Domingue to become British and resented the imputation, but 
then admitted that, if the Bourbons were restored and forced to cede 
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the colony, they, too, like Montalembert, would accept to become British 
subjects. 
186 
For surely the majority of planters at least, Cadusch 
summed up the situation in lapidary fashion: 'Saint Domingue ... 
veut et doit 8tre anglais; sans cela plus de fortune pour notre 
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generation. ' 
However, in the spring of 1796 disaffection in the British zone 
reached a new high. The Abercromby expedition had not arrived and 
the attack on Leogane had failed ignominiously. Then at le Cap 
General Rochambeau appeared, who was something of a hero among French 
planters. Rightly suspected of pro-slavery opinions, he offered an 
amnesty to the colonists in the British zone. This excited a lot of 
attention; another plot was discovered in the capital and a dangerous 
situation developed in the Grand' Anse. There, rumours of betrayals 
had frequently circulated and in the previous year a militia sergeant 
had run up the tricolor at les Cayemittes. Now, it seems, certain 
chefs de Camp approached the Republican commissioners in the South 
offering to surrender the Grand' Anse provided that Rigaud was not 
a party to the treaty and that only European troops garrison the 
region. 
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The negotiations, however came to nothing and Rochambeau 
stayed only two months in the colony. After his departure most 
colonists were said to have supported the British, not wishing to 
surrender to Toussaint or Laplume any more than to Rigaud. 
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More- 
over, the prosperity of the occupied zone had considerably increased 
by 1796, and to such an extent said Grouvel 'qu'it ne fallait rien 
moans qu'une vertu surnaturelle pour ne pas oublier tout a fait notre 
patrie, nos parens et nos amis. ' 
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It was in this atmosphere that 
the colonists learned of the British scheme for partial withdrawal 
and Malouet's plan to approach the Directory. Outside Port au 
Prince, opposition seems to have been virulent and widespread, 
uniting both vrais proprietaires and military and civil officers anxious 
not to lose their jobs. 
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Ironically, the British were never so 
popular as when they began making plans to pull out. 
At this point, in January 1797, a curious sketch of the state 
of colonial politics was drawn up by the idiosyncratic General Rouvray 
fiere, a pompous right wing eccentric who had been the backbone of white 
resistance to the slave revolt in the North. 
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While advancing an 
Anglophile interpretation of the Dominguan esprit, it testifies in 
itself to the byzantine petty hatreds that were the legacy of the 
Revolution. Saint Domingue, Rouvray said, was dominated by two 
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factions that were each split into several mutually hostile groups. 
Their two leaders (Montalembert and Cambefort) were merely military 
figureheads as real power lay with the lawyers, alias couleuvres de 
le socidte civile, whose opposition to the Administration had caused 
the Revolution, and also the rising of 1769. They now combined with 
the military royalists only because they needed men who stood well 
with the English. Of these, Cambefort and de Villars were not real 
royalists, he said, and in 1791, moreover, they had aided the rebel 
slaves. He himself regarded the monarchy as having ceased to exist 
after the 'October days' of 1789. This was both estimable in 
appearance, one notes, and ethically convenient. Rouvray was fiercely 
royalist in sentiment but he had long advocated in his private 
correspondence a pragmatic neutrality as regards the Princes: family 
property came first. 
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He had also long been a partisan of colonial 
free trade. The planters' real desires, he now claimed, whatever 
their posturing, were to become British. Even if the Bourbons were 
restored in France, only British capital could restore slavery in 
Saint Domingue. Britain alone could protect her colonies, which 
enjoyed, furthermore, the most liberal of political systems and of 
criminal law. Although French law should be retained in Saint Domingue, 
the courts should be reformed. Rather like Mahe de Cormere, there- 
fore, or the officers of the Mole garrison, the marquis de Rouvray, 
seems to provide another example of Royalist secessionism. 
According to Laborie, however, among those who denounced 
Malouet's manoeuvring most loudly were men who in a crisis would be 
among the first to go over to the Republic, 
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The author of the 
Precis Historique, moreover, enjoyed recording how the thanksgiving 
services held to celebrate allied victories in Europe met with very 
little public support. And when news arrived of the coup d'etat in 
France that put an end to Malouet's plan, he described the public 
response in a similarly jaundiced manner. Some, he said, feared that 
the new intransigejnce would prevent their ever returning to France; 
others hoped that a continuation of the war might lead to the 
restoration of the monarchy, while a few reconciled themselves with 
everything, as long as the English would be humiliated. 
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Although 
the London absentee community began pressing in the autumn for an 
all-out British conquest, or at least urging that the West Province 
should not be abandoned, 
196 
it must have been obvious to everyone 
there was now no real possibility of Saint Domingue ever becoming 
British. 
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By late November, Malouet was suggesting that, in the event of a 
withdrawal, if a capitulation could not be signed protecting persons 
and property then planters and their slaves should be shipped to 
Britain's new and largely uncultivated possession of Trinidad to begin 
a new life. In December, though still with de Charmilly calling for 
a British conquest1 he proposed that, in case of defeat, he and 
Montalembert should lead the colonists to settle in Canada and so 
guard it against republicanism -a scheme Dundas regarded with some 
favour. 
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Most Dominguan exiles, however, since 1793 had headed for 
the United States and this seems to have been true of those who left 
with the British in 1798. In May, when Port au Prince, Saint Marc 
and Arcahaye were evacuated, 206 whites (perhaps family groups) took 
ship for North America, one third going to Charleston, and 159 for 
Jamaica. Another 220 or so were sent to Jdremie, from where the 
following month 46 went to the United States and 12 to Jamaica. 
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There were already at this time about a thousand refugees receiving 
public aid in Jamaica. At the end of October, after the evacuation of 
Jdremie and the Mole, the Governor listed 700 male and 200 female 
white evacuees (excluding children under ten); 
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it is not clear if 
these were just recent arrivals. In England, the number of refugees 
rose to about -150 at the end of 
July and by the end of the year it 
stood at about 200f including women and children. 
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All these figures 
are indubitably incomplete, and of the numbers who left in 1797 we 
know next to nothing. It seems likely, however, that in 1798 more 
whites chose to stay than to leave, 
The factors affecting such a decision were numerous. Irrespective 
of political beliefs and degrees of racism, one may presume that the 
colonists who had spent most of their lives in Saint Domingue were 
more inclined to remain than men accustomed to living in Europe. 
Creoles were particularly numerous among those who went to Jamaica, 
especially creoles from the Southf Debien has observed. 
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Planters, 
of course, stood to lose most under Republican rule, but planters 
whose estates were still in production had more reason to stay than 
those who owned abandoned ruins. Departures from Arcahaye and the 
Grand' Anse were surprisingly fewj the British found. As for 
merchants and lawyers, one finds few in Jamaica, and along with some 
wealthy planters, Malouet said, there remained behind almost all 
town householders, shopkeepers, overseers and artisans. 
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Louis 
Ragnos and Roberjot Lartigue remained in Port au Prince, and though 
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Francois Daumas left for the U. S., he returned in 1799. As the 
Republican authorities officially proscribed all who held public 
office under the British (bar militia officers continuing in their 
posts), degree of association with the occupying power was obviously 
a critical factor; Although Toussaint and Rigaud agreed to an 
amnesty, no one would have expected Lapointe, de Bruges or Montalem- 
bert to have stayed, in view of the atrocities they committed or 
acquiesced in. Perhaps another consideration was the existence of 
friends or relatives already in exile or the previous transfer of 
funds, for colonists had been sending their valuables and families to 
both Jamaica and the United States since 1791. 
There may also have been a regional factor. As whites tended 
to regard Toussaint as humane and Rigaud as cruel, one might expect 
emigration from the Grand' Anse to have been relatively greater than 
from the West. Yet, there is no. strong reason to believe this was 
so. Rigaud secretly agreed to the same capitulation as had Toussaint 
and when Jeremie, Cayemittes and Pestel were evacuated in the last 
week of August, almost all the planters, it was said, stayed put, 
willing to test the amnesty. This is the more surprising in that in 
Jamaica, (unlike North America), there were considerable opportunities 
and demand for men skilled in coffee cultivation. In fact, five Grand' 
Anse planters claimed to be the only ones to have left the region for 
Jamaica, 
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presumably meaning in the final evacuation, for there 
were certainly others. The five concerned were extreme Royalists, 
all soldiers owning large cafeieres, four of them Croix de Saint 
Louis. Most had held prominent positions under the occupation. None, 
however, were noted Anglophiles, far from it, and one is not surprised 
to find Desombrages 
204 
moving at the peace of Amiens to Cuba. Lastly, 
the very tight controls in Jamaica on the admission of slaves from 
Saint Domingue must have been a weighty consideration for planters 
reluctant to abandon large workforces that represented a great part of 
their fortune. While there is some evidence to suggest that colonists 
leaving for the United States took with them slightly more slaves 
than those going to Jamaica, privileged figures, such as Loppinot 
and de Montagnac, were given special permission to ship their slaves 
to Jamaica, and this was clearly an opportunity that could not be 
turned down. 
Of the figures prominent during the occupation, one can say 
fairly certainly that the lawyers tended to remain when the troops 
pulled out, especially if they had been out of favour with the British, 
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like P. M. Duboys, or had a leopardin background, like Mongin, Baron and 
Berault Saint Maurice. Billard, Laborie and de Ronseray, on the other 
hand, moved to Jamaica along with several other members of the 
different Conseils Prives, - Dulau d'Allemans, Dubreuil de Villars, 
de Jumecourt. (The latter presumably decided that his supposedly 
great influences over the blacks of the Cul de Sac had now come to 
an end. ) The creole Belin de Villeneuve, however, whose eyesight 
was failing and who remained relatively uncompromised, returned to 
his plantation in the North. He was killed there two years later in 
Moyse's rebellion. Other creole planters who chose to try their luck 
under the new regime were Pierre Collette of Jean RabelI and J. B. 
Digneron and the comte O'Gorman, both of the Cul de Sac, all very rich 
men. O'Gorman, however, gave up and moved to Jamaica in 1800. The 
Rochejacquelein, though rather more tenacious, provide a similar 
case, 
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and another creole Royalist, Major Kenscoff, also decided 
to stay, 'oblige pour ne pas mourir de faim, ' he said, 'de prendre 
he parti qui dost 1'humilier pour le reste de ses jours. ' He had 
served throughout the occupation and hinted that perhaps one day his 
Chasseurs might again be of service, if ever the British returned... 
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Jamaica, nonetheless, was where most military officers went, at least 
in the first instance - Cocherel, de Bruges, Dessources, etc. 
The Belgian Julien Depestre, however, a colonel of Chasseurs, went 
to the United States and the baron de Montalembert back to England. 
De Rouvray pare returned to Baltimore, hoping to obtain a concession 
in Cuba or in the British Caicos Islands, but his son remained in 
British service as a colonel of black troops. 
Laborie, the aged creole lawyer, told his absentee friends in 
England that he would have liked to retire to France with the 3,000 
gourdes he had saved up but that his political principles, his colonial 
habits and his inclinations left him no choice but to settle in 
Jamaica, 'chez la puissance ä laquelle je me suis voue sans autre 
restriction que ma qualite naturelle de sujet des Bourbons rois de 
France. ' Both by buying an estate and publishing what became a much 
sought after manual, The Coffee Planter of St. Domingo, he endeavoured 
to capitalise on the Jamaican coffee boom. 
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Prominent among those 
who settled in the colony, were creole and creolized families from 
the south coast - the Onffroy, the Espeut, L. M. de Ldaumont, Reignier 
du Timat, the Plunkett brothers, etc. Several became naturalised. 
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As the region had long been closely linked with Jamaica, this movement 
might be considered as the natural culmination of Anglophile creole 
autonomism, although also founding Jamaican dynasties at this time we 
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find colonel Deneux, who surrendered the Mole, and the less than 
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Anglophile administrator Louis Vendryes, who had come to Saint Domingue 
only in 1788. 
Venault de Charmilly, under sentence of death in France, was 
already a naturalised British subject, and played the role sufficiently 
well to escape detection when he was captured at sea and briefly 
imprisoned in Bordeaux. After the evacuation, he married an English- 
woman and used her fortune to buy a sugar estate in Jamaica, just when 
the British sugar market collapsed. He divided his time between 
Jamaica and England, and served in the Peninsula War as a colonel of 
cavalry. Regarded as an importuning nuisance by the Government, he 
retained his reputation as an indigent and dishonest foreign 
adventurer and was never really accepted, it seems, by his adopted 
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countrymen. 
(iv). Military Life. Most of the British soldiers sent to Saint 
Domingue - at least three in every five - died there. European troops 
Who survived a year in the colony usually saw six or seven out of 
every ten of their comrades perish. But for frequent reinforcements, 
many regiments would have been almost entirely wiped out. Without 
doubt, death from disease211 was the central experience of the 
soldier's life in Saint Domingue. It created an atmosphere of fear 
and despair, and even before leaving Europe, a contemporary wrote, 
'the officer and soldier bound for this service look upon themselves 
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as doomed to certain destruction'. 
While such an attitude clearly affected the behaviour of the 
troops in the colony, it also made recruiting for the Army a difficult 
task. Along with the massive wartime expansion in the armed forces, 
it helps explain why standards in the Army sank to a low level in 
these years. To produce the numbers required, Dundas allowed young 
subalterns to recruit independent companies in the workhouses and 
gaols, which were then assembled into regiments and sold to whoever 
could afford the price of a colonelcy. 
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The large number of Scots 
officering these corps adds to the impression that political patronage 
carried more weight than military experience. Half-trained, without 
discipline or esprit de corps, the new regiments were, in the words 
of one of their surgeons, but random agglomerations of 'men radically 
ill-calculated for soldiers'. Largely raised in the manufacturing 
towns, they were 'unsound in health, dissolute in morals, aggrieved 
and discontented on various accounts'. 
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The growing social and 
political tensions in English society also found expression, it 
seems, in the army. These, then, were the troops sent to Saint 
Domingue, the better regiments being reserved for the Windward Isles 
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or, as with the Guards, kept out of the West Indies altogether. 
There were some exceptions. Williamson thought the troops he sent 
from Jamaica 'choice lads' and certainly the prestigious Royals were 
admired by other corps as the 'neatest, best-looking men' in Port au 
Prince. 
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The 82nd Foot also, which disembarked in August 1795, 
impressed many observers, though one colonist remarked it was the 
first batch of reinforcements that even looked like a corps r4gld. 
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The 82nd, significantly, after a trouble-free voyage from 
Gibraltar, was one of the few regiments to arrive in good health. 
Usually, troops had spent the previous winter camped on the coast 
of Ireland, buffeted by storms and weakened by dysentery. Typhus 
frequently broke out in their makeshift hospitals or amid the 
accumulating filth of the troopships on which the men were generally 
confined for from two to six months. Of the 9000 gathered at Cork 
in the autumn of 1795, over 500 died before the convoy set sail. 
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Desertion was rife. Mutinies were numerous, and at Southampton, too, 
troops rebelled against the poor quality of their food. One ship 
was left three days in the Channel without any provisions. Because 
of the freak gales that lashed the European coastline in 1794-96, 
the voyage itself was often a nightmare. 'The vessel rocked so much, ' 
wrote one junior officer, 'that almost every wave broke directly 
over so that ... the soldiers 
in the Hold were almost drowned in 
spite of everything I could do to keep the water from them, ' On 
the Abercromby expedition, in fact, hundreds of troops were drowned 
in the Channel and the Bay of Biscay, their bodies being washed 
ashore along the south coast. 
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Manchester mill-hands, Lincolnshire labourers, Irish and West- 
phalian peasants, however novel 
for them was the experience of becoming 
a soldier, their introduction to the West Indies must have been still 
more dramatic. Towering mountains and 
lush vegetation, a violent 
climate and a bizarre population, these were the soldierb first 
impressions as he was drawn into a world of savage conflict, where 
death assumed the most terrifying forms, and on a scale of fantastic 
senselessness. 
'Broiling on a gridiron must be fool's play, ' wrote Lieutenant 
Howard at Saint Marc. The heat in August, he claimed, was un- 
imaginable. 
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In Port au Prince, soldiers fainted in the street. 
On a twelve mile march, over 50 out of 2000 died of thirst; while a 
regiment of hussars travelling mainly by night, took 
77 hours to 
cover the 60 miles between Saint Marc and the capital. 
220 
The 
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colonists themselves thought temperatures higher than usual, and it 
may be relevant that the troops came from a Europe slightly cooler 
than it is nowadays. However, the ease with which they became 
fatigued probably owed much to their tightrfitting flannel uniforms 
that became caked with sweat, and the soldiers' tendency not to 
wash. 
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"" It was not 
only the heat that impressed the newcomers. 'Dreadfully disagreeable, 
high, parching, blighting winds' were also subjects of complaint 
and soon after arriving Lieutenant Howard felt moved to describe the 
worst thunderstorm of his life: 'each flash or sheet of fire seemed 
to swamp the whole plain, the Deluge of rain ... came down as if a 
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River was falling from the Clouds. ' 
During the first half of the occupation, most of the British 
troops were confined to the coastal towns. Surrounded by an exotic 
enemy, hydra-like and elusive, numbering tens of thousands, they were 
unable to set foot beyond their picket lines without being attacked. 
Patrols were ambushed; sentries and forage parties were sniped at. 
As their numbers dwindled, military duties fell the more heavily on 
the survivors. Consequently, men went for months without taking off 
their clothes for a full night's sleep. 'Imprisoned within the walls 
of a town half demolished', the Port au Prince garrison was under 
particularly severe strain, until the Morne VH6pital was captured. 
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As only four of the thirty or so regiments sent to Saint Domingue 
managed to arrive in the dry healthy months from December to March, 
it was never very long before new arrivals were struck down with 
yellow fever or malaria, The effect could be shattering. Men, fit 
in the morning were sometimes dead by nightfall. Two weeks after 
reaching Saint Marc, a bewildered officer was writing, 'hundreds 
almost were absolutely drownded in their own blood bursting from 
them at every Pore, some died raving mad, others forming plans of 
attacking, others desponding'. Thirty blacks, he said, spent all the 
daylight hours digging graves and could scarcely keep pace with the 
dying, though up to five bodies were placed in each grave. 
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At 
Saint Marc, the sick were crowded into barns and stables. At Port 
au Prince, the great wards. of the General Hospital were packed with 
the victims of yellow fever, whose groans and stench in the summer 
heat made the building a nightmare to experience. Dr. McLean 
described the rows of prostrate figures, their 'low, muttering, grim, 
melancholy which is lost in meditating wrath, without an attempt to 
move. ' 'The eye has an expression, ' he said, 'of anguish unspeakable, 
and a langour in its movement; an inclination to shut all objects. ' 
As death approached, the patient would throw up large quantities of 
digested blood, the fearful 'black vomit'. He became incontinent, 
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and fetid secretions oozed from his gums. His nose would often 
bleed and a haemorrhage might also occur from the corners of the 
eyes. Some men, delirious, tried to leap out of the windows. Others, 
tragically, remained clear of mind until death. 
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The troops lived 
in terror of the General Hospital; so few ever returned from it alive. 
If a soldier fell sick, he hid his symptoms for as long as possible. 
Depressed by the 'daily spectacle of death', without confidence in 
their doctors, the British garrisons sank into a 'general gloom'. 
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On landing at the Mole, Simcoe was immediately struck by the listless- 
ness of the troops. Some regiments gave themselves up for lost, 
Lieutenant Howard remarked, and tried to hasten their end. 
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Trapped between the mountains and the sea, between un terrein 
brOlant and un soleil homicide, and poisoned, so it seemed, by the 
very air they had to breathe, troops of all ranks found an escape 
through drunkenness. Rum was cheap. In the boredom of the rainy 
season, when they were left idle in their barracks, soldiers including 
officers daily could be found in a drunken stupor. 
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Along with 
their ten ounces of salt meat and pound and a half of bread, they 
received each day a quarter of a pint of rum, which they liberally 
supplemented in the cabarets and billiard halls of the seaports. 
Laws which limited the number of such haunts and banned from them 
soldiers and seamen do not seem to have had much effect in the early 
years of the occupation. Similarly, efforts to replace the rum ration 
with spruce beer had only a belated and partial success, though the 
measure was recommended to the government in 1793. 'Drunkenness in 
those days, ' wrote a former regimental surgeon, looking back from the 
1840s, 'was unrestrained and terrible. ' 
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Of course, it was an age 
of alcoholic excess. For the six week voyage to Barbados, the 
officers of the York Hussars took with them thirty dozen bottles of 
port. 
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Even an advocate of moderation like Dr. McLean thought it 
reasonable for an officer to drink a whole bottle of claret with his 
dinner. 
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However, the stories of troops filling their canteens 
with rum before campaigns or smuggling it into their messes suggest 
an obsession born of desperate circumstances. 
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The tension eased somewhat when the reinforcements of 1796 
arrived and some of the British troops began to be moved into the 
countryside and mountains, formerly the preserve of the colonial 
corps. By the end of 1797, we find them camped in ruined plantations 
in the Cul de Sac, in blockhouses on the hills around the Mole, manning 
outposts up the Irois river and on the Norne 1'H6pital and even 
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astride the Montagnes de la Hatte with a view of both sides of the 
southern peninsula. For these fortunate few, all of them light 
troops, this meant a healthier if more lonely existence. In the 
forts on the high mountain ridges behind Arcahaye, troops were not only 
free from fever but also escaped the dysentery and leg sores that 
were the perpetual complaint of soldiers in the plain. At the same 
time, they had to endure extreme isolation, cut off from the coast by 
a landscape of huge chasms, plunging ravines and thick woods, where 
raiders could move freely. Four and a half thousand feet above the 
Artibonite, nights were chilly and deathly silent, a stark contrast 
to the steamy plains where insects droned incessantly. It was another 
world but equally oppressive in its own way. 
However, military life was not without its lighter side. 'A 
man inclined to libertinism, ' Lieutenant Howard noted with studied 
discretion, 'finds here perhaps the largest field in the world to 
gratify himself in. '233 Sex, like rum, was cheap; (though- many 
soldiers in fact had brought their wives with them). 
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An officer, 
furthermore, might even play the country gentleman. A few days after 
a battle at Saint Marc and in the midst of an epidemic we find 
Lieutenant Howard going off to join a bird-shooting party on a nearby 
plantation. He evidently enjoyed the conviviality and clubbishness 
of mess life. Having transferred to Port au Prince, he proudly 
recorded in his journal the foundation on January 1st 1798 of the 
'St. Domingo Cavalry Club' by a handful of junior officers; its 
motto: 'Loyalty'. 
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More surprisingly, he whiled away spare hours 
in the Cul de Sac by taking down descriptions of the local flora. 
He admired the plain and the 
'immense mountains' surrounding it, 
'covered to their very tops with wood', and also the verdant confusion 
of the slave quarters, 
'the most Picturesque Prospect I have ever 
seen'. When a party of 600 dragoons and 
hussars in the uniforms of 
their different corps made a gruelling fourteen hours' ride without 
food across the Montagnes Terribles following vertiginous tracks 
sometimes twelve inches wide, and when 
for the greatest part of the 
journey, 'the horses appeared to be standing on their heads or vice 
versa', he was still able to 
describe it as a 'singular and ... 
charming sight'. 
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To a large extent thoughts of promotion seen to have occupied 
the minds of the young subalterns. This is the impression given by 
the correspondence of Captain Guthrie at Jdremie, and Thomas Howard, 
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too, mentioned the 'immoderate desire of Command' of his German 
colleagues, who rejoiced at the death of their Colonel. 
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Saint 
Domingue, in this respect, offered considerable scope for advance- 
ment. Moreover, supernumerary staff and garrison posts abounded 
which brought officers extra sources of income, while some colonels 
were able to double the command of a British regiment with that of a 
colonial corps. The allowances granted to officers in the foreign 
Hussars actually amounted to double pay. 
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Until lodgings allowances 
were instituted, officers profited as regards accommodation by 
commandeering the most palatial of the town houses left by absentees 
and leaving the government to pay the rent. 
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Rank and file also 
benefited in that the usual deductions from their pay to cover the 
costs of clothing and hospitalization were not made during much of 
the occupation. Most of these abuses, however, which grew up under 
Williamson and Forbes, were eradicated during or shortly before the 
governorship of General Simcoe. 
Such perquisites it was argued, were justified by a cost of 
living said in May 1797 to be at least four times as high as in Europe. 
A pair of riding boots cost two portugaises; and an officer might need 
four pairs a year. Horses died as frequently as men, and new chargers 
could cost over £40 sterling. The repair of weapons was especially 
expensive. Most interestingly, in an effort to stay alive, some 
officers spent in less than a year £100 or £150 on medical treat- 
ment. 
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Nonetheless, many soldiers clearly did well out of the 
occupation. The colonels of the colonial corps were considered 
extremely corrupt and were accused of pocketing the pay of their 
Chasseurs, seizing absentees' property and speculating in the provision 
of clothing and medicaments for their men. Depestre and Dessources 
may have been exceptions but Montalembert undoubtedly amassed a 
fortune. 
241 
British officers, too, evidently shared in the spoils. 
Although Governor Williamson used most of his personal fortune in 
supplementing his £5000 salary, his successor, General Forbes, lined 
both his own pockets and those of his friends. 
242 
The corruption at 
Saint Marc was notorious. In July 1797, we find a major in the 66th 
Foot, recently returned home, writing for the enlightenment of a fellow 
officer, 'that if he wants to invest any of his St. Marc's wealth in 
the funds, to let me know as they are now very low'. 
243 
Another enterprising officer was Lieutenant-Colonel George Hallam, 
who for most of 1796 lived it up in Government House with his brother 
in law General Forbes. As well as being given a number of staff 
appointments, which were later vetoed or withdrawn by the Government, 
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he used his influence to obtain the lease of a valuable plantation on 
the river Seringue and imported some 70 slaves from Jamaica to 
increase its workforce. Other officers also leased absentee planta- 
tions. When commandant of les Irois, he spent so much of his time on 
the estate that Simcoe ordered him to relinquish the lease. He 
refused, pointing out that the articles of war did not prohibit the 
growing of coffee by officers, but he was eventually cashiered. 
244 
Simcoe's reforms caused most of the foreign troops to choose 
to return to Europe. At the same time, many deserted. Desertion had 
not been uncommon in the foreign corps, which consisted to a large 
extent of French prisoners of war recruited in British gaols and 
discontented Germans who had enlisted to serve only in Europe. 
Their officers were emigre provincial nobility or minor German 
aristocrats. In June 1796, Montalembert's Legion, which was gradually 
transformed from a colonial into a foreign corps, lost 37 of its new 
recruits, who fled to the enemy with their horses and equipment. 
245 
British soldiers found desertion less attractive. Of the one or 
two hundred who had deserted by the autumn of 1796 most had probably 
tried to escape from the colony as seamen. 
Friendship, food and drink, women, promotion and graft: the 
soldiers on occasion also had to fight; but not often. For the most 
part, this was a war of posts and ambushes. Colonial troops sometimes 
conducted raids but the Europeans usually fought on the defensive 
behind fortifications. Apart from the capture of Tiburon, Fort 
l'Acul and Fort Bizoton in 1794, and the brief Morne l'H6pital, 
Ldogane and Bombarde expeditions of 1796, the main exception was the 
fighting in the Artibonite, which came to an end in 1796. The capture 
and recapture of Mirebalais involved only minor skirmishes. For this 
and other reasons, battle casualties were remarkably few, although 
Republican losses were enormous. 
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Lieutenant Howard described 
with enthusiasm cavalry actions in and around the Gorge des Guepes in 
which hundreds of ill-trained raiders were massacred on their feet, 
their heads split vertically or sliced off through the mouth by the 
sabres of the hussars and dragoons. 
247 
This sort of engagement, 
which also took place in the Cul de Sac, at Lascahobas and in the Grand' 
Anse, clearly did much to boost morale, especially when fought 
against numerically superior forces. But more often there was the 
tedium of endless guard duty and the frustration of trying to pin 
down an enemy, adept at ambush and night raids, who could not be out- 
run or out-ridden. Not least, there was the climate and the terrain 
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of what Forbes called 'this vile country'. 
248 
Because the transport 
of tents and baggage was difficult, troops on campaign had to sleep 
in the open, usually soaked to the skin. It took nearly five days to 
get a cannon from Arcahaye to the Hauteurs de Verrettes for an attack 
that never took place. When the York Hussars were sent to attack 
Mirebalais, they had to cut their way along a narrow mountain path 
overgrown with shrubs and blocked by fallen trees. Overcome by the 
heat and lack of water, feverish men dropped out begging to be left to 
die, only to be bled by the surgeon. On the Bombarde expedition, 
soldiers drank their own urine, 
249 
However, it must be pointed out 
that, on the Mirebalais expedition, while the hussars were wilting 
on their horses, their slaves were carrying a 6-pounder cannon along 
the same path. 
According to a Haitian historian, the war between Toussaint and 
the. British was distinguished by its humanity; prisoners, he said, 
were always well treated. 
250 
According to a memorialist writing in 
1798 however,: 'Jamais guerre n'a plus degrade l'humanitd. ' He 
singled out, it is true, the vicious conduct of the colonists but 
also implied their example was followed by all concerned. 'Cette 
guerre qui ne porte aucune des caracteres de civilisation et de la 
raison humaine ... fait de tigres dangereux des soldats qu'on y 
emploie ,.. De part et d'autre ... on se 
livre (a une) atroce 
251 
fureur. ' 
Specifically, he was pleading for the better treatment of black 
prisoners - 'car ce sont des hommes, ' he felt it necessary to point 
out, 'et ils ont goute de la liberte. ' From the start of the occupa- 
tion, colonel Whitelocke thought the whites of the Grand' Anse 
'perfectly savage' to the blacks and mulattoes they captured. 
252 
In 
December 1794, Toussaint denounced in a proclamation the'cruautes 
atroces et inouis' of the British on the Artibonite; prisoners were 
drowned at sea in batches or languished in chains, their cheeks 
branded Georges Roy. This was a frankly propagandist piece aimed at 
the mulattoes of le Cap, but as already seen, it certainly had a 
substantial basis in fact. 
253 
Six black chiefs captured in the plain 
at this time were beheaded by troops under Brisbane's command. 
Toussaint's soldiers (white and black) also decapitated their enemies 
(white and black) and sent their heads back to him as trophies. 
254 
When Lieutenant Howard came to Saint Marc in mid-1796, he found that 
neither side took prisoners, and apparently had no qualms about following 
suit. Williamson, in fact, wrote approvingly to Dundas that 
Dessources' Chasseurs gave no quarter. 
255 
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This was both a race war and a civil war. It partook of the 
intensity of both types of conflict. While the colonists had never 
treated rebellious blacks with anything but savagery, they and their 
dmigre allies were regarded by the Republicans as traitors to their 
country. By the beginning of 1795, so many had been executed on 
falling into Republican hands that their morale was seriously shaken. 
256 
Concerned about 'the nature of the war in Saint Domingue', Whitelocke 
approached Laveaux early on, arguing that the whites ought not set 
an example of cruelty. Although he refused to let 'Francais 
anglomanises1 be exchanged as prisoners of war, Laveaux personally 
ordered the deaths only of two, one of whom had been guilty of mis- 
treating Republican prisoners. When Jean Rabel was re-occupied in 
March 1794, he protected its planters from the violently Republican 
Lesuire, who hated colonists. Thwarted, Lesuire took revenge by 
shooting 64 whites captured at le Borgne. 
257 
Mohtalembert, for his 
part, was known. to execute Republicans who would not shout vive le 
Roi. 
258 
It is not clear how far the British troops themselves suffered. 
Laveaux early in 1794 threatened to take vengeance on his British 
prisoners if ex-slaves were not given p. o. w. status. 
259 
Probably he 
did nothing, but certainly in 1796 British troops were used to build 
fortifications at le Cap and Fort Dauphin, Moreover, in the desperate 
summer of that year, we find Sonthonax urging the Republicans in the 
South 'exterminer les Anglais et les traitres qui se battent sous 
leurs drapeaux ... Qu'aucun pitie, qu'aucune consideration vous 
arrete. '260 Presumably, it was not without reason that Lieutenant 
Baskerville, abandoned in Tiburon fort, committed suicide rather than 
fall into the hands of Rigaud's men, 
261 
Yet, it is difficult to get an overall picture. Hundreds of 
prisoners were exchanged by both sides and the British enrolled large 
numbers in their black corps. They also generally allowed women and 
children to join their families in the enemy zone, which was not true 
of Rigaud. The atrocities, it-seems. were largely the work of the 
colonists. They did most of the fighting and presumably all the 
questioning of prisoners. The British attitude was a mixture of dis- 
approval and acquiescence] 
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salutary neglect, it was doubtless 
thought. Colonel Whitelocke, however, despite his ignorance of French, 
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was able to save from execution a number of-Grand' Anse Patriotes. 
263 
Grouvel and Malenfant, writing for a French audience in 1814, stressed 
how hard were conditions on the British pontoons, where many died, 
but Malenfant also added that whereas Whyte was severe to prisoners, 
Williamson was more typical of the British officers. Mulattoes were 
kept in chains, but many white officers were allowed parole at the 
Mole or in Jamaica. The Precis Historique, in fact, is remarkably 
complt. mentary to the British. 
264 
'The war is horrid', wrote General Simcoe a month after his 
arrival in February 1797. 'The Eastern appendages of Jackals and 
Vultures are really {? wanted} and an honest {? Frenchman} has faith- 
fully promised me to import two pair of the latter species to breed 
in our mountains. ' Finding that neither side gave quarter, he ordered 
that 'cruelties and outrages' in the conduct of the war should 
cease. 
265 
With Toussaint ascendant in the Republican zone, it is 
probably from this period that date the more humane and better known 
relations between the two sides. They were nonetheless marred during 
the final campaign in 1798 when Lapointe massacred his prisoners. 
In many ways, the quality of life improved in the last 18 months 
of the occupation. However, with Lieutenant Howard the futility of 
the war weighed heavily. Whatever was gained in the healthy season 
was lost in the sickly months, while the troops continued to waste 
away. The Government, he thought could not possibly know the full 
facts. 'I hope in God Government ... will decide on recalling the 
miserable remains, ' he wrote in September 1797, 'and not leave us here 
to perish without being ... of the smallest utility. '266 
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(vi) Attitudes to Race and Slavery. 'Car ce sont des hommes, ' 
Dumouriez' remark267 (see above, p. 26-5) suggests that the savagery 
of the fighting owed much to the combattants' attitudes to race. Of 
course, this can only be a partial explanation. Blacks tortured 
blacks. Whites slaughtered whites, in France as well as in her 
colonies. The slaveowners were fighting for their survival as a 
class: the blacks for their freedom. Undoubtedly, however, even at 
265 
a time when many slaveowners, unlike succeeding generations, denied 
that negroes were innately inferior beings or thought this an open 
question, 
268 
the whites' perception of their black opponents as at 
least physically different and culturally inferior made it easier 
for them to treat them with inhumanity. 
Although London possessed a large black population in the late 
18th century, it is probable that many, if not most, of the troops sent 
out to the West Indies were seeing negroes for the first time. 
Lieutenant Howard on first stepping ashore noted with pleasure that 
some slaves were 'by no means ugly setting aside their colour'. 
269 
Lack of prior acquaintance did not mean lack of preconceptions. It 
is amusing to read the lieutenant's account of being lost in a wood 
at night during a thunderstorm. When he and his anxious men came 
across seven or eight negroes roasting a carcass in a clearing, they 
immediately assumed it to be an act of cannibalism, 'a thing not at 
all uncustomary among the Caribbean Negroes'. 
270 
Yet, such prejudices 
and fears did not necessarily imply hostility. Howard arrived believing 
the slaves to be cruelly treated. Every time he heard a whip crack, 
he said, he wanted to snatch it and whip the master. 
271 
The anti- 
slavery campaign, as such posturing suggests, had already reached a 
wide audience in England. Simcoe, somewhat ironically for a commander 
trying to conquer the colony, was opposed to slavery on religious 
grounds, and when Governor of Upper Canada had sought to abolish it. 
One thinks of the ambivalence of Pitt's position. Besides striving 
to 'chock the Artibonite with Blackamoors', the general also hoped, 
according to his biographer, to free the slaves in Saint Domingue. 
272 
However, he must have kept extremely quiet about it, or he would not 
have been so popular with the colonists. They remained totally 
committed to the slave system, as the uproar over Malouet's pamphlets 
shows. Even an advocate of mild reform like the lawyer Duboys was 
unimpressed with the Republicans' experimentation with forced labour 
and continued to regard slavery, it seems, as a necessary evil. 
273 
Curiously, Lieutenant Howard's opinions changed in the West 
Indies, just like those of baron Wimpffen and many others before him. 
'I am persuaded my heart is not grown harder, ' he wrote after 15 
months in Saint Domingue, 'yet i {now} see the Business in a very 
different Light. ' He expressed sympathy for those 'poor unfortunate 
blacks' who were the victims of acts of cruelty and he thought pro- 
tective legislation should be introduced, but the slave regime in 
general he found far less harsh than he had anticipated. 
274 
In this 
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change of attitude various factors may have been involved. Conditions, 
in some ways and in some places, doubtless were better than some 
Europeans believed, but simply the sight of the system functioning, 
that is, of men 'accepting' to be slaves, surely also gave it an air 
of reasonableness. The lieutenant was certainly impressed by the 
wealth tied up in the West Indies and was also influenced by the 
planters' claim that their self-interest was a check against cruelty 
and that most imported Africans had been born bondsmen. Moreover, 
remembering how the disillusioned Wimpffen ended up declaring that 
the slaves and planters deserved each other, 
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one wonders if Lieutenant 
Howard, too, was disappointed to find on the plantations not noble 
savages but real men. 
Of the slaves, he preferred the Africans, being 'by no means so 
corrupted in their morals and behaviour as the creole slaves than 
which nothing can exceed', and who, he noted, had been set a bad 
example from birth. Most of the Africans, however, he considered fit 
only for manual tasks, as their 'natural handicaps' persisted, 
either through 'obstinacy' or 'incapability'. 
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His prejudices were 
thus tempered with environmentalist ideas, and one may be fairly sure 
that he was merely indulging in metaphor when he described the mulattoes 
as a 'Race of Evil Beings rather than men'. He praised the respect 
they showed to their parents and he thought that the bronze-skinned 
griffonne, the offspring of a mulatre and a negress, exceeded in 
beauty all other colours except white. Nevertheless, with the 
exception of the 'harmless, inoffensive' free blacks, he depicted the 
male free coloureds as treacherous and inhumane, 'sanguinary, proud, 
disdainful, ignorant except in low cunning and deceit'. Mulatto 
slaves he described in the same terms. 
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Evidently, the revolts at 
Saint Marc and Leogane in 1794 were seen as confirming all that the 
colonists said about the mulattoes. It should be recalled, however, 
that earlier in the occupation British officers had generally had a 
high opinion of the free coloureds and that some, like Major Brisbane, 
had mixed freely with them. 
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How far attitudes to the blacks were affected by the war and the 
experience of defeat is difficult to gauge. Coming to rely for their 
own defence on an army largely composed of blacks, and eventually 
being taught a lesson in warfare and in humanity by an aged ex-slave, 
the colonists, one might expect, had to make considerable mental 
readjustments. Clearly, they had difficulty in recognising in 
Toussaint's disciplined demi-brigades of 1797 their field-hands and 
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flunkies of four years before. The morose Laborie complained that the 
British commanders thought in European terms, not realising that a 
handful of whites could defeat an army of blacks, 'without courage or 
discipline, ill-armed and worse commanded', but by the spring of 1797 
he had to admit that day by day the rebel slaves were turning into 
effective soldiers. 
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Yet, in the eyes of the defeated, 'brigands' 
they remained. When the blacks' martial qualities were acknowledged, 
it was not their bravery, or determination or tactical skill that 
were usually emphasised but their 'cunning', their barbarity, their 
familiarity with the climate and terrain, their ability to survive 
with little food and no clothing, that is to say derogatory qualities 
or biological factors that set them even further apart from the 
whites; in short, 'slavish' attributes. 
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For Edmund Burke, the 
blacks of Saint Domingue were a 'race of fierce barbarians', who 
thrived on the 'poisonous air' whites could not safely breathe. 
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The black Chasseurs, it is true, were praised for their courage, 
loyalty and toughness, and an intense esprit de corps grew up in some 
of the regiments which must have brought black and white closer 
together, just as on those plantations where masters, overseers 
and slaves fought side by side. However, the relationship remained 
a paternal one - white officers and black troops. Loyalty and 
physical endurance were precisely the qualities, of course, that 
made a good slave, and any black who courageously defended the system 
ipso facto reinforced it. Courage on the part of blacks was anyway 
no new discovery, and had often been explained as a product of their 
lack of foresight. 
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They had temeritd, the colonists conceded, but 
not bravoure, or as de Charmilly opined, negroes do not know 'what we 
call courage ... but they have a sort of indifference for life ... '283 
The colonial lawyer Duboys had relatively liberal views on 
slavery and race relations but his attitudes to blacks were changed 
very little by the cataclysm in Saint Domingue. Through most of the 
Precis Historique he insisted that negroes were incapable of either 
working or rebelling without external compulsion; the entire slave 
revolution was 'un mouvement imprime si eloignd de leur caractere. 
apathique'. When Christophe Mornet occupied Port au Prince in 1798, 
he admired the discipline of his ragged troops but explained it in 
terms of the 'caractere du Noir, naturellement docile, sobre et 
habitue a toutes especes de privations'. Even in the autumn of 1799, 
we find him only slightly more willing to see blacks as autonomous 
beings. Slavery, he then wrote, so undermines a slave's confidence 
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that he always hesitates to act by himself and will do so only in 
284 
extreme circumstances. 
The British were equally grudging. Wilberforce warned the House 
of Commons in may 1797 it took too little account of the blacks of 
the French islands. They were no longer, he said, like the inhabitants 
of India, 'too low for the storm that was passing over them; they 
stood erect, and influenced its direction. '285 
'Experience has proved, ' wrote Robert Jackson a year later, 
that they would not 'barter their independence for a Madras handker- 
chief or an ear-ring. ' Nevertheless, the doctor continued, they 
are by disposition so indolent, so unenergetic in action, and so 
divided amongst themselves, that it is ... more than probable that ... 
the conquest of Saint Domingue might have been effected. '286 Lieutenant 
Howard noted in his journal daring exploits and courage on the part 
of his opponents but also poor marksmanship and a general tendency 
not to stand and fight when attacked. 
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He seems to have neither 
respected nor disdained them. The much more bigoted Colonel Chalmers, 
however, arguing a political case, insisted that Toussaint's men did 
not 'merit the name of soldiers' and was adamant that Britain's 
failure had nothing at all to do with her 'contemptible foe'. 
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Such prejudices had some basis in fact. In terms of casualties, 
the British undoubtedly were defeated by disease and not by the 
insurgents. 
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European troops, moreover, were apparently never beaten 
in open country, and no major stronghold was ever stormed by the 
Republicans. Because the blacks generally kept to the mountains, 
however, Chalmers felt able to characterise them as 'timid' and assert 
that negro troops would never be able to oppose Europeans. As 
Inspector-General of Colonial Troops, he had to admit that Dessources 
and Depestre moulded their men into 'very respectable' units but he 
immediately added that these were good only for fighting other negroes, 
which in the circumstances could not be disproved. Blacks were 'grown 
up children', unfitted for liberty. Toussaint, he claimed, 'this 
boasted chief', relied mainly on mulatto officers. He even attributed 
the success of the Jamaican maroons to their 'Spanish blood', and 
then went on to state that neither blacks nor mulattoes were 'of a 
warlike disposition'. They in fact had 'an almost insuperable 
aversion' for warfare. 
290 (One wonders whom the British were fighting. ) 
Similarly, Bryan Edwards reported that in the Republican zone planta- 
tion blacks did their best not to be recruited, having learned how 
hard was a soldier's life. 
291 
This was naturally just what a planter 
wished to believe. It is more surprising, however, to find Thomas 
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Maitland, soon after the evacuation, describing Toussaint as timid. 
He thought him ambitious but neither very able nor very determined, 
possessed of 'cunning' rather than 'sense', and like most creoles, 
'strongly attached to (his) ancient prejudices'. The greatest 
favour he was able to do for him, he said, was to send to him his 
old master, who was a prisoner of the British. Maitland seems to 
have thought Rigaud a better soldier and regarded the mulattoes in 
general, alias 'all trash of colour', as more dangerous. Toussaint's 
failure to declare Saint Domingue independent, which evidently 
annoyed Maitland, he attributed to the black leader's 'fears' and 
predicted he would surrender to the French without a fight. 
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CHAPTER XI. THE SLAVES AND FREE COLOUREDS 
(i) The slave population of the occupied zone. It is a common- 
place that the history of a slave society must rely for the most part on 
the perceptions and representations of that society by its master class. 
Of the thoughts and feelings of Saint Domingue's slaves, we know next 
to nothing; of their actions, we know almost only what whites chose to 
record. This is true even of the basic structural features of black 
society, for the makers of censuses and inventories had different 
notions, for example, of what constituted ethnic identity, of who was 
creole and who was not, of what age a slave might be, and whether the 
existence of the old and very young deserved to be recorded at all. 
1 
Hence, not only does the individual slave remain a distant and obscure 
figure, a quasi-caricature, but the overall picture presented by the 
slave community can be extremely hazy. This is particularly the case 
as regards the fundamental question of numbers, for which data are any- 
way sparse. 
When in 1794 the administration of the Grand' Anse reported there 
were 30,000 slaves in the paroisses unies (presumably including Tiburon), 
the Conseil Privd assumed there were 33,000.2 It was apparently 
customary to estimate under-registration at 10%. Either figure, however, 
indicates a substantial increase on the returns of 1788-91.3 The 
Plymouth region, we know, had been rapidly expanding, and one might 
expect population returns to have been more accurate when the planters 
were self-governing than under the Ancien Regime. On the other hand, 
these global figures are difficult to square with what is known of the 
size of plantation workforces under the occupation. This, however, 
derives solely from absentee estates, which here may have been smaller 
than average, and dates from the start of 1797, by when it is possible 
numbers had diminished. 
4 
One can only be cautious, therefore. Lapointe 
claimed that the slave population of Arcahaye numbered 18,000,5 that 
is slightly more than the official pre-Revolutionary figures, which 
seems possible, though there is no question of the population having 
naturally increased. In the Cul de Sac, a census of September 1796 
revealed 11,400 slaves on 180 estates. This, it was observed, meant 
that over 15,000 slaves, 'les plus alertes, les mieux portans', were 
missing, and this accords well with the evidence of surviving plantation 
inventories. 
6 
The slave population of Port au Prince was 4,600 in 
November 1797 and had probably fluctuated little during the occupation. 
That of the Mole was about 1,000, and that of Saint Marc Probably about 
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the same, with an uncertain number in the surrounding hills. In 
Mirebalais and Grands Bois, the Precis Historique mentions 4/5,000 
before the withdrawal of March 1797,7 which seems surprisingly few, though 
doubtless much of Mirebalais was not in British hands. 
Taken together, these figures suggest a total slave population of 
around 70,000 prior to the spring of 1797. This matches the Conseil 
Privd's estimate of April 1796, which mentioned 60,000 slaves on 800 
plantations and apparently excluded urban slaves, although it was given 
as a maximum. Another estimate - of May 1797 - that there were 37,000 
slaves working in agriculture and over 3,400 engaged in trades or domestic 
service, apparently refers only to productive adults and so does not 
really give an indication of the losses incurred that spring. 
8 
These 
affected Arcahaye and more particularly the Plymouth region, which lost 
1,200 slaves, as well as Mirebalais, where whole ateliers disappeared 
over the Montagnes Noires into the Republican zone. 
Fortunately, a fairly detailed picture of the slave population on 
the eve of these losses can be assembled from the inventories of the 
absentee plantations leased out by the Administration between September 
1796 and February 1797. About 200 survive, providing a sample of some 
15,500 slaves. Drawn from all parts of the occupied zone and accounting 
for about a quarter of the blacks living in the countryside, it may be 
considered representative, though far more so of the West than of the 
Grand' Anse. 
9 
Compared to the pre-Revolutionary population, the sample 
is more creolized, with more children, fewer young adults and a lower 
proportion of males. It shows the impact not only of the Revolution 
but also of the five-year cessation of slave imports, during which the 
higher rates of mortality suffered by Africans and males in general must 
in any case have reduced their preponderance in the population. On 
the coffee plantations, just over half of the slaves were Africans; on 
the sucreries, two-thirds were Creoles. 
Almost half the Creoles, however, were aged under 15, so that among 
the adults Africans easily predominated in the mountains and were 
nearly as numerous as Creoles in the plains. On the cafdieres the sexes 
were almost equally balanced (103: 100), but on the sugar estates, where 
the sex ratio was 93: 100, women clearly outnumbered men. Remarkably, on 
both types of plantation, children accounted for 28% of those present, 
while around 10% were listed as aged 60 or over. 
On many estates in the Cul de Sac, children made up 35%, even 40%, of 
the workforce, and in June 1797 the Bonrepos sucrerie had 39 working 
adults and 104 children. 
10 
To a great extent, these high percentages 
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TABLE 4 THE EVOLUTION OF THE WO MRCE OF THE LABARRE PLANTATION 
(f ) 
Men Women Children Total 
ULO 71 47 51 169 
1796 44 50 57 151 
1798 49 49 59 157 
(ii) 
Men Women 
1790 1796 1790 1796 
15-19 11 399 
20-29 19 2 10 13 
30-39 22 11 16 10 
40-49 8 14 6 12 
6o 30 41 44 
Sources: A. N. O. M., Absentee Inventories VI, Labarre inventory; 
Debien, Comptes II, 18-20,43-44. 
of children, and the positive growth rates that went with them on 
some plantations, simply resulted from heavy losses of male adults. 
However, it also seems likely that natality may have increased and 
particularly in the Cul de Sac, where very little work was done. On 
the Damiens estate near Port au Prince, the birth rate accelerated 
during the years 1793-96, so that in September 1796 11 of its 46 
children (those under 15) were less than a year old. 
11 
Several planta- 
tions - Boutin, Coustard, Marin, d'Orldans, - exhibited fertility ratios 
(children under 5 per 1,000 women of childbearing age) well above 800,12 
far exceeding those of 18th century France and Sweden or of modern 
central Africa, which are in the range 700-780. 
i3 
Yet, caution is 
required. On the Laboulle Desmornays plantation, one finds a fertility 
ratio of 1,550 which surely cah only be explained by mothers having 
abandoned their children, or having been killed. 
14 
Moreover, even 
including these examples, the overall fertility ratio for the Cul de 
Sac was only 540.15 
In the plain of Arcahaye, where the slaves worked 'comme en 1789'16 
and which was relatively little affected by marronage, especially female 
marronage, the ratio was much lower, as one might expect - 321.17 How- 
ever, there was a tremendous variation between individual estates, 
reflecting differing age distributions within the fertile age band, 
different proportions of creoles within this group and doubtless other 
factors as well, not readily discernible. We have noted already the 
case of Poy la Generale (p. 225) whose slaves were 35% children and who 
had a fertility ratio of 640. The Raby atelier, by contrast, had only 
10% children and a fertility ratio of 138. The Labarre plantation, which 
is similarly the subject of a well-known mongraph, turns out to be the 
most exceptional of all - 37% children; fertility ratio, 784.18 
Unusually, we are able to follow its evolution through until after the 
British left (table 4). For much of the occupation, it would appear, 
the workforce was actually growing; in 1796,29 of its 57 children were 
under 5 years old. The Labarre plantation is remarkable for two 
reasons. Firstly, it was leased to Lapointe, whose reputed severity 
towards the blacks was proverbial, though here its impact is not 
apparent. Secondly, over half of the women of childbearing age on the 
estate were African, which was unusual in this region. Unlike, however, 
the nubile women of the Raby workforce, a similar proportion of whom 
were African, they were concentrated in the 15-29 age-range and this 
doubtless explains their fecundity. 
Creole women, on balance, and not only in Arcahaye but also in the 
Grand' Anse, tended to be more fertile than the Africans, but this may 
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simply be because in this sample they were also younger. 
19 
There seems 
no doubt, however, as to the influence on fertility of plantation 
labour. The coffee plantations of the Grand' Anse reveal a fertility 
ratio fittingly mid-way between that of the run-down sucreries of the Cul 
de Sac and those of Arcahaye - 439. The heavy and more intensified 
labour demanded by the truly industrial sugar plantations, and maintained 
by the severity of Lapointe, evidently made its mark. Furthermore, 
considering that in the plain of Arcahaye most of the females of child- 
bearing age were creole, whereas in the Grand' Anse the great majority 
were African, the sterilising effect of sugar plantation work is all 
the more startling. 
One may not, of course, be measuring variations in fecundity so 
much as frequency of intercourse, which could well have been lower on 
the sucreries and among Africans; either way, it seems likely that 
fertility was related to the incidence of disease and disability. African 
women were about 40% more likely than creoles to be sick or disabled, 
while both groups but particularly the creoles were notably more un- 
healthy in the plains. Without counting those over 60 listed as infirme, 
we find that about one in ten of the rural slave population towards the 
end of 1796 was either wholly or partly incapacitated. 
20 
This must 
have seriously limited its productive potential, particularly in view of 
its unfavourable age-structure. In fact, only one fifth of the slaves 
were valued at 2,000 livres or more, the lowest price paid for an un- 
seasoned field hand. As table 4 shows, Lepkowski and others who point 
to plantations where the number of slaves scarcely declined 
21 
forget 
that during the five or six years that slave imports had virtually ceased 
the mature had grown aged, while the rebellious and able-bodied were 
supplanted by babes in arms. Probably no more than 40% of the slaves 
were physically fit field hands. 
When we realise that, of a sample of 15,500 slaves, nearly two- 
fifths were over 60 or under 15, that one tenth were classed as 
entirely worthless, that one in ten of the total population, one in 
sev en of the adults and one in six of the men aged between 15 and 49 
were sick, disabled or dying, we gain a considerable insight into not 
only the physical limitations of plantation slavery but also into the 
'loyalty' of those slaves who chose not to rebel. 
(ii) Treatment and conditions. For too long, proclaimed General 
Whyte following the fall of Port au Prince, had the slaves of Saint 
Domingue been the playthings of the deceitful Civil Commissioners. 
Henceforth, he announced, they were to enjoy under honest and straight- 
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forward British rule ... Iles bienfaits dune vie consacree a 1' 
industrie'. The British, it appears, were in no doubt as to what slaves 
were for. They would be protected by the law againstý. cruelty, Whyte 
stated, and all runaways who came to Port au Prince within a week would 
be pardoned, unless guilty of murder or insurrection, but thereafter 
all who were found armed would be executed as traitors. 
22 
As will be 
seen, however, the question of how to regard the slave who bore arms 
could not be settled so simply. Although black prisoners often were 
savagely treated, at this very time Whyte was negotitating with the 
chief Dieudonne, hoping to use his men as mercenaries, and in the 
Artibonite the British were actually buying back from the plantation 
slaves the guns and sabres they had acquired in the previous two years. 
23 
Exactly how far the conditions of the slave's life changed under 
the occupation is not easy to say. One can identify certain influences 
at work but probably the discrepancy between the law and its enforce- 
ment, and the variations between one plantation and another, were as 
great as in earlier times, if not considerably greater. Marriage between 
slave and free was very swiftly forbidden, and, rather spitefully, 
public prosecutors were authorised to seek to nullify existing 
contracts. Manumissions, in theory, became restricted to slaves who 
had performed a notable public service, such as the betrayal of a con- 
spiracy, and in October 1795 the Conseil Privd decided to forbid all 
manumissions, at least temporarily, in whatever circumstances. However, 
Governor Williamson remained open to persuasion in given cases and we 
still find after this date planters freeing their mistresses and coloured 
offspring in their wills or banding together to insist that a certain 
local commandeur be rewarded with his liberty. Sometimes, freedom was 
made conditional upon serving three years in the mardchaussee. 
24 
Also in the autumn of 1795, the large number of 'ostensibly free' 
but unemployed blacks living in Port au Prince became the subject of a 
complaint by Colonel Murray. He insisted they were a danger. The 
Conseil Prive, however, replied this was a delicate issue and that it 
was far safer not to enquire too closely into their legal status. This 
also seems to have been the attitude of the Ancien Regime administrators, 
to judge from the account of M. Fouchard, who argues that these 
marginals had long been very numerous in the colony. 
25 
The urban blacks 
were a privileged sector among the slaves, and not just as regards 
their freedom of movement and, presumably, higher standard of living; 
right until the end of the occupation, successive administrations held 
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back from drafting them into the army, despite pressure from the 
military. Domestic servants and artisans, though some had been used as 
soldiers by the Port au Prince extremists and later by Sonthonax, they 
seem to have been reluctant soldiers and sceptical of Republican 
promises of emancipation. 
26 
Like the slaves of le Cap, they had 
remained close to the whites for most of the Revolution, and living in 
such proximity and with a high degree of interdependence, both groups, 
it seems, were mindful of each other's interests. Many whites, moreover, 
otherwise destitute, depended on the earnings of two or three of their 
slaves who hired themselves out in the towns. It was because of them 
that the urban capitation was not collected until 1797 and the same 
reasons probably applied to recruitment. According to the police law 
of 24th June 1794, unemployed blacks and runaways had to be denounced 
to the authorities within 24 hours of their discovery but, evidently, 
this was not taken seriously, though the penalty was corporal punish- 
ment. 
27 
The same law also prohibited the sale of alcohol to slaves and 
forbade their playing games or even sitting at a table in the cabarets 
of the capital. Each slave had to carry a pass bearing his age, name 
and profession, which his master was to renew every four days, and those 
caught carrying a weapon, or just a stick, were to receive 20 lashes. 
Slaves were forbidden to rent dwellings and had to obey a 9.30 curfew, 
half an hour before that of the whites. Like soldiers and seamen, 
they were barred from trafficking with jewellers and goldsmiths. This 
was an effort to prevent thefts and the movement of stolen property, 
which were prominent features of urban life. Even bulky goods, left 
unguarded on the wharves, tended to disappear, and easy pickings were 
to be had in the empty houses of Port au Prince. Just as town slaves 
were said to raid the gardens of the blacks on the nearby estates, 
earning their enmity, it was supposed that plantation slaves, evading 
the night patrols, committed much of the larceny in the capital. The 
volume of crime, combined with martial law, caused so much overcrowding 
in the prisons that in January 1796 Governor Williamson set up a cour. 
prev6tale to deal summarily with such cases. It took a hard line and 
hangings were apparently frequent. Although it was abolished a year 
later, the police chief, de Buissy, was known to act without reference 
to the courts where blacks were concerned. This laxity, however, could 
sometimes work both ways. When a slave belonging to the Captain of the 
Port killed a sailor in a waterfront brawl, the matter was ignored. 
28 
On the plantations, we hear of at least one instance of Grants 
being court-martialled - they were also Chasseur officers - for killing 
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the commandeur of the estate they managed. 
29 
Yet, when slaves were 
whipped to death, the law was never invoked, said Lieutenant Howard. 
He implied, however, this was not a common occurrence and opined that 
soldiers and thieves in England were whipped more severely. On the other 
hand, he also described the grim situation on certain large estates, 
where the cruelty of the planter evoked a sullen apathy among the slaves, 
which in turn led to punishments that were unheard of in Europe. 
Moreoever, the behaviour of the lower class whites repelled him, as 
already seen, some of them boasting when drunk of the number of blacks 
they had shot. 
30 
Nonetheless, the lieutenant's overall impression of 
slavery was a favourable one, and he concluded that once protective 
legislation was introduced guarding the slaves against wilful injury, 
they could be considered better fed, housed and clothed, and less worked, 
than any European day labourer. This was not an unusual reaction among 
visitors to the West Indies and, as Howard's ideas were initially anti- 
slavery and as he was aware of the overtly cruel aspects of the system, 
his testimony merits some consideration. At the time of writing he had 
spent some 14 months in the colony, mainly in the Saint Marc/Montrouis 
area, but he had also made a few trips through the plain of Arcahaye, 
as well as to Port au Prince and Mirebalais. His experience, therefore, 
was shallow but he had probably seen conditions at their worst. One 
might ignore as myopic or uninformed his opinion that, as most plantation 
blacks had been born and brought up as slaves, slavery itself did not 
embitter their lives, and his admiration of regulations regarding communal 
provision grounds and their periodic inspection by government officers 
may also have been naive. However, his observation of physical con- 
ditions is less easy to dismiss. 
The plantation slaves' day, he reported, started at 5 or 5.30 a. m. and 
they worked until 8 a. m., when they broke for breakfast. This lasted 
half an hour, but was sometimes dragged out until 9 o'clock. Dinner 
was at 1 p. m. and lasted one or one and a half hours, and the working 
day ended at 6. This might suggest that working at night had become 
unadvisable, or perhaps Lieutenant Howard never saw a sugar estate in 
crop-time. On every plantation, he said, clearly meaning sucreries, 
there was a large hospital and the slaves were well cared for. No 
master, Howard noted, would let his slaves carry the sort of loads English 
city porters bore, for fear of injury. The children, in particular, he 
thought well fed. More or less every hut had its pigs and chickens, 
and usually two or three goats, which provided milk. On Sundays and 
public holidays, the slaves worked in their own gardens. They were 
forbidden, it seems, to wear shoes, bare feet being the badge of slavery 
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but on market days, the women would dress up in the finest linen, wearing 
petticoats of muslin worth 15 or 18 shillings a yard, gold earrings, 
and handkerchiefs costing three or four pounds each. One might guess, 
therefore, that, to afford such finery, the slaves can have eaten 
precious little of their poultry and drunk little milk. Even so, one 
gets the impression that, in straitened and difficult circumstances, 
the planters were paying more attention to their slaves' well-being. 
32 
More than ever before, however, Saint Domingue's plantations were 
in the hands not of their owners but of managers and attornies, to whom 
paternalism had little to offer. It was almost axiomatic that on 
absentee estates, through neglect or overwork, the slaves suffered, 
and in wartime it was practically impossible for an absent owner to 
exercise any supervision. In the present circumstances, moreoever, 
all losses could be conveniently blamed on les brigands or easily covered 
up, 
33 
while, as workforces diminished in strength, the temptation must 
have been to drive the slaves harder. Perhaps an even less favourable 
trend was the leasing out of absentee estates, for leasing had always 
engendered short-term, wasting policies on the plantation and con- 
sequently had been rare in the colony. James Esten, who leased three 
estates in Arcahaye, had longterm plans but these themselves involved 
working the slaves hard. In the ten months he leased the Imbert planta- 
tion, instituting a programme of repairs and replanting, as well as 
harvesting, he lost 9% of the workforce, - 14 maroons and 4 dead. 
34 
One 
would not be surprised, in fact, given the example of the British West 
Indies in the 1820s, to find that, as time began to run out for the 
slaveowners, a hardrdriving ethos became widespread in the occupied 
zone. 
Yet, though a plausible scenario, this does not seem to have been 
the case, and for a variety of reasons. Lessees of absentee property 
were at least in theory made responsible for any losses they caused 
and the Esten case might easily be explained by political developments 
(the Republican capture of nearby Mirebalais), while the number of 
deaths that occurred, even in a young, acclimatised workforce, actually 
seems rather low. Many planters and most gerants and economes, we have 
seen, intended to remain in the colony after the British left, or take 
their slaves away with them; such interests obviously ran counter to 
a policy of maximum exploitation. Above all, the British took over, 
not the slave system of 1789, but that of late 1793. From early in the 
Revolution, Debien has noted there was a tendency towards stricter 
surveillances of the slaves but also greater liberality as regards their 
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material well-being. 
35 
Then, the disruption of the years 1791-93 
brought spasmodic rebellions, periods of idleness, bargaining between 
whites and blacks over conditions, and finally Sonthonax's reforms 
culminating in emancipation. 
36 
Even in the plain of Arcahaye, we find 
in 1793 workforces denouncing their masters or gerants to the municipality 
and generally standing up for themselves; 'on ne peut leur faire aucun 
chatiment', it was said. 
37 
La Grand' Anse, it is true, experienced 
much less disruption, but one may doubt that even there the large-scale 
arming of slaves would have been undertaken without some mollification 
of the slave regime. Such evidence as exists of conditions under the 
occupation, when the blacks of the North and South were living as free 
men sometimes only a few miles away, certainly suggests that the whites 
of the British zone were at pains to keep their slaves bien disposes. 
Apart from the observations of Lieutenant Howard, one discovers 
that in the first two years of the occupation the baron de Montalembert 
distributed over £400 (Jamaican) 'to the deserving Negroes to encourage 
and dispose them well towards the British'. 
38 
This may have referred 
to certain 'brigand' chiefs, but more likely it meant the head drivers 
of the Cul de Sac. The commandeur was a crucial figure on any estate, 
and on several in both Arcahaye and the Grand' Anse we find the driver 
had been freed, and in two cases was paid a salary of 600 livres. 
39 
On the Montbazon plantation, after the raids of February 1798, the 
manager distributed 25 portugaises to its loyal workforce. Though 
critically short of hands, it was apparently never worked on Sundays. 
40 
This was also true of the Maulevrier plantation in the Matheux, where 
around 1792-3 the manager began making extra issues of food and 
clothing, (though no more than the Code Noire prescribed, one notes), 
and persuaded the slaves to establish gardens of their own on the 
estate, allowing them two free hours at mid-day, as well as Sundays 
and holidays, and every now and then an extra free day. This was 
not intended as an economy, for he purchased from the slaves, in 
addition to any mules they raised, their maize and beans, which he 
then distributed as their weekly ration. 
41 
For these slaves, at least, 
this was a new departure, a new independence and prosperity. However, 
as the manager's intention was to keep them on the estate and isolated, 
they were also forbidden to leave, as were strangers to enter. There 
and elsewhere, it appears, maroons found it difficult to get very far 
without being betrayed by a reward-hungry slave neighbour or being 
caught by a patrol. 
42 
The pattern would seem, therefore, one of extra 
handouts and tighter surveillance. But what of the working day? 
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Lepkowski, pointing to an estate where output greatly declined 
but the number of slaves did not, has suggested that under British 
rule the pace of life on the plantations probably slackened. 
43 
This 
may have been so, but the argument is fraught with difficulties. As 
table 4 shows, an estate might suffer little overall decline in numbers 
and yet lose in six years fully half of its young men. At the same 
time, in the productive areas of the occupied zone, - Grands Bois, the 
Grand' Anse and the plain of Arcahaye, - it is by no means clear that 
output did decline, and it may well have increased, though not because 
the slaves were working harder. 
44 
on the other hand, it is fairly certain, given the circumstances 
and the state of most plantation buildings and hedges, that little repair 
work was undertaken in this period, and on the sucreries there is some 
evidence of a tendency to continue harvesting ratoons, so as to avoid 
the demanding and time-consuming business of planting new canes. This 
was undoubtedly the situation on estates that were leased. 
45 
Programmes 
of improvement, moreover, must have been few, and, considering that on 
the Maulevrier plantation construction work had previously occupied 
at least one third of the atelier's time, 
46 
this may similarly have 
represented on some estates a notable reduction in work-load. However, 
this has to be off-set against frequent corvees for the military and the 
proportionately greater demands made by the daily round when the 
strongest men in every workforce had been lost to the Chasseurs or 
the Republicans. On the Dumoulceau estate in the Cul de Sac, for 
example, we find most of the 70 and 80 year olds, though nominally 
worthless, working in the fields. 
47 
Labour was at a premium. But 
so, one imagines, was moderation. In truth, it seems impossible to say 
if on the sucreries of Arcahaye or the cafeieres of the Grand' Anse 
slaves really were working 'comme en 1789' 
48 
or not. 
In the Cul de Sac, however, there is no doubt that the slaves' 
lifestyle had radically changed. During the entire occupation, it 
seems, very little cane was either planted or cut and most ateliers 
cheerfully let the cane-fields become choked with weeds, like the roads 
that ran through the plain. By the time the British left, there must 
have been on its abandoned estates men in their twenties - though few 
enough - who had never cut cane in their lives, as well as children who 
had done no work at all. With the exception of a few plantations, the 
'revival' of 1796-97 probably amounted to little more than clearing 
up operations and the collecting of forage. 
49 
The slaves, however, 
were not necessarily idle nor left in peace. Some were drafted into 
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the military camps to minister to the troops. Most, it appears, ran 
away. The remainder were exposed to attacks by raiders, especially if 
they attempted to work in the fields, and as elsewhere, they were 
liable to be killed, abducted or have their huts burnt down. 
so 
Nevertheless, left to their own devices, they were turning to their 
gardens and livestock, perhaps building a new ajoupa, and fashioning a 
new life. Malenfant described the industry with which they set about 
adding to their jardins negres, planting vegetables along the plantation 
paths and selling them to buy clothes and bananas. Only a few old 
Africans, he said, roamed the forests looking for firewood, which they 
would exchange for rum. 
51 
Changes were taking place that already looked 
far beyond the Revolution. As on the Maulevrier estate in the Matheux, 
or the Foäche plantation at Jean Rabel, imperceptibly, a peasantry was 
being born. 
(iii) 'Bons negres', 'Brigands' and Peasants: Black Responses to 
the Revolution 
At the end of August 1791, a few days after the great revolt began 
in the Plaine du Nord, some Spanish soldiers guarding a hilly part of 
the frontier met with a solitary negro, armed with a lance, a machete 
and a pair of pistols. The insurgents, he told them, were not concerned 
with the Spaniards but in the French part not a white was to be left 
alive. The rebel leaders were promising their followers, it was later 
reported, that once the whites were eliminated they would divide up 
the land. 
52 
This, one might say, was the authentic voice of the Haitian 
Revolution, a direct expression of its most profound aspirations. It 
represents, however, only one extreme of a broad range of slave 
responses to the events of the 1790s. While this brief encounter was 
taking place on the frontier, plantation slaves on estates in Quartier 
Morin were fighting off the rebels and thousands more were fleeing 
into the hills and forests, and into le Cap, to avoid the conflict. In 
the West, Port au Prince went up in flames, but the slaves of the Cul de 
Sac did not move. Meanwhile, after two months; the disillusioned 
rebel leaders, were trying to negotiate something very close to a return 
to the status quo. This does not mean, of course, that their followers 
would have accepted it, but then again, the rebels, both in the North and, 
when they belatedly appeared, in the West, showed themselves willing 
to traffic in slaves and, later, to co-operate with the Spaniards in 
defending the slave regime 
53 
Hence, even among those who themselves 
refused to remain slaves, the commitment to overthrowing the system, 
as opposed to opting out of it, was to say the least ambiguous. 
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In Saint Domingue, and in presumably any slave society, there had 
always been slaves who plotted and slaves who betrayed the plotters, 
inveterate rebels and devoted servants and, it would appear, a mass in 
between who'accepted what apparently they could not escape. If the 
slave system was scarcely founded on consent, it did not survive through 
brute force alone. Whips and bayonets and warships engendered attitudes 
of submission which themselves took on a life of their own. 
54 
To over- 
come them, it required not only a demonstrable weakening in the power 
of the master class but also courage, imagination and energy, a bold 
appraisal of how things might be, and literally - in view of the tens 
of thousands who perished -a determination vivre libre ou mourir. How- 
wever, as liberty resides very much in the eyes of the beholder, the 
political options that confronted the plantation slave were not simply 
for or against revolt. The slave who took up arms at this time and 
headed for the hills may have been embarking on a war against slavery, 
or he may have been seeking, like many before, the lonely and less 
militant life of the maroon. Either way, as we have noted, he might 
become a sort of bandit mercenary, a type not uncommon among 'primitive 
rebels', 
55 
self-serving, employing a conservative, 'Church and King' 
rhetoric, perhaps demanding certain reforms in the system but also willing, 
at a price, to defend it. On the other hand, plantation blacks, left 
largely to their own devices on abandoned or semi-abandoned estates, 
might effectively cease to be slaves and take a different, though 
similarly circumscribed, view, feeling little desire to leave their 
huts and gardens to risk death when they were already as free as they 
wished to be. In the Republican North they might even rebel against 
being recruited. 
56 
While some might regard this state of independence 
as a temporary wind-fall, and later submit to a revival of the planta- 
tion routine, others, having become accustomed to being masters of their 
own time, might fight to the death rather than be coerced back into the 
fields, either as slaves or as paid cultivateurs. Revolutionism and 
militancy, in other words, did not necessarily go together. Nonethe- 
less, we can say that from 1791 onwards the Dominguan slave had 
basically three alternatives: - he could remain a slave; he could become 
a soldier, or a peasant. 
Slavery, said Toussaint Louverture, was borne by the blacks only 
so long as they knew no better state. Now free, he wrote in November 
1797, they would die a thousand times rather than again be enslaved. 
57 
Just when slavery became intolerable in the minds of most of Saint 
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Domingue's blacks, it would be foolish to try and say. However, a 
succession of significant events may be singled out as having progressi- 
vely both weakened the structure of white power and encouraged a 
revolutionary mentality amöng the blacks. The slave regime having been 
undermined by the reformism and, more particularly, by the revolutionary 
disturbances of the years 1784-90, the great leap forward obviously 
came in the autumn of 1791 with the outbreak in the North, though it 
also demonstrated, one should note, that rebellion would bring starva- 
tion, torture and mass slaughter. The defeat of Governor Blanchelande 
a year later by the rebels of les Platons, Garran-Coulon mentions, was 
of great inspiration to the slaves, 
58 
although the geographical area 
of the revolt was then shrinking. Meanwhile, it was becoming apparent 
that European troops sent to the colony were dying like flies, and with 
the whites abandoning the countryside, even the non-rebellious were 
tasting the fruits of freedom. In the spring of 1793, we have noted a 
new militancy in the West followed swiftly by the profound impact of 
the war, which soon led the French, Spanish and eventually British to 
compete in offering guns and freedom to part or all of the slave 
population. 
59 
The hitherto powerless began to sense their power. 
Sonthonax's decree, some said, was felt like un coup d'6lectricit6.60 
The Spaniards immediately found to their cost they could not control 
the blacks they had enrolled, and in a single day in July 1794 these 
curious counter-revolutionaries would massacre more than twice as many 
whites as had been killed in the first month of the rebellion. More 
than this, at the beginning of 1794 some of the Auxiliaries and unarmed 
plantation blacks had taken a stand against Spanish attempts to restore 
slavery and it was behind this movement a few months later that 
Toussaint Louverture finally and for a variety of reasons flung his 
weight. 
61 
On the one hand was the Government of France, declaring all 
the slaves to be free, on the other was an army of blacks, no longer 
rebels, now explicitly committed to making black emancipation a 
reality. The French, like the Spaniards, became almost entirely 
dependent on black troops, and the effect of their victories and 
increasing expertise hardly needs stressing. 
When the mulatto coup of March 1796 was foiled, there was no doubt 
that an ex-slave had become the most powerful man in Saint Domingue. 
It was also at this time that Toussaint began extending his influence 
into the west Province. In February, in the mountains behind Port au 
Prince, Dieudonne was overthrown when trying apparently for the second 
time to carry his band over to the British, and some months later the 
famous Dokos maroons, who had also flirted with the British as well as 
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traded with the Spaniards but otherwise remained aloof, similarly 
decided to open relations with Toussaint. 
62 
These were important events, 
not simply from a military point of view but also because they indicate 
the development of a mature revolutionary-consciousness among the 
smaller rebel bands and were major steps towards the re-unification of 
the colony under black rule. (Much of the anarchy that swept the 
Republican zone in 1796 was itself attributable to a violent determina- 
tion never to see slavery restored). The final dispersal of the reactio- 
nary mercenaries in the north. -east early in 1797, brought both movements 
significantly closer to fruition, and made the remaining slaves of the 
occupied zone appear archaic anomalies. 
How, then, had they responded to this mounting military and 
psychological pressure? Laborie, writing at the beginning of 1797, 
thought that in six years their numbers had been cut by over 50%, but 
that while the submissiveness of the remainder had been somewhat 
eroded, he considered it amazing that it persisted at all. 
63 
Although 
by mid-1795 atmot every estate had lost at least some slaves, 
64 
Laborie's figure of 50% seems rather high and suggests he was unduly 
influenced by what he saw in the Cul de Sac. Not all the slaves 
missing, of course, were insurges. Six years without slave imports and 
the normal rate of natural decrease could have accounted for about half 
of these losses. In the first four years of the revolt, 12,000 slaves 
from the colony as a whole had been taken to the United States, 
65 
and 
more left in 1796. Others were in Jamaica. Some of those missing, 
according to the whites, had been kidnapped or forced to join those 
they referred to as les brigands. Many had been killed; mostly in the 
act of rebellion, no doubt, but some also in fighting the rebels. 
Among the rest, there appears to be a basic division between those who 
had actually revolted, usually before the British had arrived, and those 
who slipped away, generally later and by themselves, perhaps to join the 
insurgents, perhaps to hide in the towns or to live independently in 
the mountains. Wherever they went toe most are classed partis pour les 
brigands 
66 
Table 5, based on the more detailed of the inventories of absentee 
estates drawn up between September 1796 and February 1797, gives an idea 
of the range of losses in the plain. The Bellanger plantation, it was 
noted, had suffered most of all the sucreries of Arcahaye. Its 45% 
can therefore serve as an undoubted maximum figure for that region's 
losses. In the Cul de Sac, the plantations of Croix des Bouquets seem 
to have survived better than those of Port au Prince, where 14 sucreries 
had an average of only 63 slaves each. In the Grand' Anse the recorded 
losses were only a few per cent. 
67 
Surprisingly, the Maulevrier 
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cafeiere in the Matheux68 was mentioned as having suffered considerable 
losses which appear to have been around 40%, (though one should note that 
before the Revolution the atelier had had a very high death rate). 
Such indications are useful and help to compensate for the absence of 
information in most of the inventories. The data are far from 
satisfactory, but one might hazard the guess that, by 1797, losses 
amounted to well over a half in Port au Prince parish, well under one 
fifth for Arcahaye and the Grand' Anse, and somewhere in between for 
the other occupied districts. 
A clear distinction needs to be made between those areas where 
production had been maintained almost without interruption, (La Grand' 
Anse, Arcahaye. Mirebalais and Grands Bois), and areas where the planta- 
tions had known long periods of idleness and disorder, (Port au Prince 
and Croix des Bouquets, Leogane, the Artibonite). In the latter, 
revolts broke out within weeks of their falling to the British. The 
former do not seem to have experienced any notable insurrection during 
the whole of the occupation. This distinction, however, needs to be 
qualified. Firstly, even in the Grand' Anse, with its small, mainly 
African (and therefore not very homogeneous ateliers), and its 
exceptionally high ratio of whites to blacks, higher than ever during 
much of the occupation, there was no shortage of conspiracies. While 
it was said that the arrival of the British forestalled a rebellion on 
the south coast, we find four months later that some more plots had 
been uncovered, and this was mentioned in such a matter of fact way 
that might suggest they were not unusual. Others come to light en passant, 
which, doubtless like these, had been betrayed. 
69 
On the other hand, 
one cannot assume that the revolts in plains of Ldogane and the Artibo- 
nite and around Port au Prince were necessarily caused by the plantation 
blacks baulking at attempts to get them back into the canefields and 
boiling houses. The whites claimed that each of the three conflagra- 
tions was the work of existing rebels raiding from the mountains and 
intimidating the slaves still on the estates. 
70 
This was probably more 
true than false. At Leogane, great numbers of slaves, instead of 
joining the attackers, crowded into the town and, remarkably, even 
after Rigaud had driven out the whites in October, the planters tried 
to send back an envoy to speak with the slaves and so maintain them, it 
was supposed, in obedience to their absent masters - an extraordinary 
episode. 
71 
The Artibonite rebellion in February did far less damage, 
and, though the plantation slaves clearly joined in in large numbers, 
estate work was resumed and the plain continued in production until 
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Toussaint's coup in September. Having been infiltrated and revolutionised, 
all the ateliers in the plain then rose once and for all, although the 
mountains behind Saint Marc remained unaffected, and in the town the 
domestics fought alongside their masters. 
72 
In the Cul de Sac, the 
ascendancy of de Jumecourt, acting through the young voodoo priest 
Hyacinthe, had been broken by 1794, but apparently there were signs 
that slaves, having been forced to search nomadically for food, were 
returning to their estates when the devastating attacks began from the 
mountains of Riviere froide. 
73 
As to the identity of the insurgents, the structure of the popula- 
tion left on the plantations provides few unequivocal indications, as 
so many variables are involved, The exceptional predominance of 
females among the coloured slaves points clearly towards heavy losses 
among their male counterparts, although at the same time the planta- 
tion mulatress, almost always a domestic, frequently a menagiere, was 
arguably the least likely of all slaves to take to the hills. 
74 
The 
negative sex ratio of Africans in their twenties is itself eloquent 
but scarcely enlightening. More certain evidence is provided by some 
35 inventories which together list 575 slaves missing of their own 
volition. To these I have added four jailed as mauvais sujets. In all, 
10.7% were children, usually babies taken by their mothers or 10-14 
year olds who had fled by themselves. Of the adults, 36% were women. 
Men, therefore, accounted for less than three fifths of the rebels 
and runaways, which shows the limitations of using the sex ratio as 
an index of slave losses. However, the amount of variation between 
these few examples shows the folly of trying to generalise. In the 
Grand' Anse, few losses are recorded and these were as a rule solitary 
marrons. In Fond Baptiste all 183 of the well-fed but hard-driven 
slaves of the Andrault cafdidre had disappeared. 
75 
Even in the same 
parish, many different factors might influence the behaviour of an 
atelier during the Revolution other than its actual composition, - 
treatment in the past, presence of the master, attitude of the head 
driver, security of personal possessions, food supply and shelter. 
Perhaps the most important, certainly as regards runaways during the 
occupation, was the proximity of the plantation to some wooded no-man's 
land or to Republican territory, and hence its exposure to enemy 
incursions. This might explain the two vague patterns we find. Where 
losses were few they were on the whole male. However, where a mass 
exodus was possible the proportion of women was close to that of the 
men and this in turn entailed losses of children. The sex ratio in the 
plain of Arcahaye was actually lower than in the Cul de Sac, not because 
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TABLE 5. LOSSES OF SUGAR PLANTATION' SLAVES THROUGH 
REBELLION AM DESERTION c. 1791-9 
j of the original 
'atelier' missing by 1797 
Total Men Women Children 
Port au Prince1 
Damiens 25 30 22 16 Since June 1793.2 Another 13% 
Bellevue Desmornays 35 56 41 7 were 
dead 
Laboulle Desmornays 63 75 66 33 
Croix des Bouquets 
Baug4 17 18 21 10 
Lemeilleur 12 29 4 0 
Jouanneau 15 30 16 0 
La Judonnerie 73 85 65 63 
Laserre 14 24 10 0 
Michau 28 21 57 0 
Noailles 1 6 0 0 
Sogur 16 33 13 0 Since September 1792. Another 
13% were dead. 
Arcahaye 
Bellanger 45 ? ? ? Either absent or shot. 
Borderie 1 1 0 2 
Descac 6 ? ? ? 
Foucault 3 10 0 0 Since February 1794. 
Guilhem 5 ? ? ? 
Labarre3 17? 40? 0? 0? 
Rabýr3 30? ? ? ? About another Ur/af had been 
Verges 3 7 0 0 
killed. 
1) The information for this parish was taken from P. R. O., T 64/228. For the 
others it derives from A. N. O. M., Absentee Inventories. 
2) However, it seems that over a third of the original workforce had already 
been lost in the first 18 months of the revolt. 
3) The 1791 figures have been estimated from data in Debien, Com tes II, 20, 
43, and L6on, Marc hands 148, As it was assumed that male births were 
balanced by natural mortality, the Labarre losses are probably understated. 
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it had lost more males, but because it was so difficult to escape from; 
few females could have got away successfully. In the Cul de Sac, 
however on an exposed plantation like Laboulle Desmornays, the 
insurgds included various infants, invalids, and even an Ibo woman ninety 
years old. 
76 
While the statistics of slave loss are not in themselves easy to 
interpret - is it more surprising that 20% of a workforce rebelled or 
that 80% did not? - one wonders what sorts of distinctions really lay 
behind the terms used, marrons, insurges, parti pour les brigands. 
Marrons were usually solitary (and Africans), while insurges went in 
groups. But should not all maroons now have been classed as rebels? 
According to the ideologues of Haitian history, the maroon had always 
been a militant; 'flight led to fight', as Manigat says. 
77 
Debien, however, who disagrees, points out that planters continued 
during the early years of the Revolution to distinguish marrons from 
brigands, and must have had some reason. 
78 
The situation, in fact, was 
probably even more diversified. De Charmilly claimed, in August 1795, 
that three-quarters of the blacks living in the forests were there 
because they feared being killed by the rebels if they stayed on their 
plantations. 
79 
Though a long way short of the truth, this was surely 
not a complete fabrication. At any rate the maroon/rebel distinction 
was still commonly made during the occupation. Planters, in fact, 
complained that 'discontented' slaves who had merely left their 
master 'for a time' were immediately classed by the British as deserters 
to the Republicans and when they returned were wrongly seized and 
enrolled in the black corps. 
80 
Petit marronage, in other words, per- 
sisted in the midst of revolution. But for some historians, this was 
not real marronage anyway. Lieutenant Howard, however, was familiar 
with the phenomenon of bands of 5-10 blacks living in the forests around 
Saint Marc and Montrouis. They were referred to as runaways not rebels, 
and were not considered dangerous. 
81 
As to what relations they had 
with the larger, armed bands, one can only guess. 
The majority of the insurgents were of course Africans, who 
formed the majority of the adult population. On the other hand, it 
was the creoles who by and large took control of the revolt and became 
its chief beneficiaries. One would like to know, however, if the 
African, brooding over his lost freedom in an alien world, was more 
prone to rebel than the creole, born into slavery but more receptive 
to the new ideas coming from Europe, and possessing more 'pretensions', 
as the whites saw it. M. Houdaille has suggested that desertion was 
less common among the Africans, but the sample he used was not very 
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large. 82 
Of the 517 adult insurgents mentioned above, 57 were listed as 
creole and 93 as African. As the districts concerned were highly 
creolized, this seems to indicate substantially greater losses among 
the latter, but when the origins of so many of the slaves was unknown 
much uncertainty remains. The only really detailed inventory we 
possess suggests that the contrast was not so much between creole and 
African, as between the creole women and the rest of the slaves. 
83 
Of particular interest is the behaviour of the specialist slaves, - 
drivers, domestics and artisans. Although their positions of relative 
privilege gave them some stake in the preservation of the system, their 
social skills and status within the slave community meant that they 
also had most to gain from the revolution. To judge from the absentee 
inventories, drivers were almost as common among the rebel males as 
among those who stayed behind. They were men accustomed to command and 
possessed a good knowledge of creole, and sometimes of several African 
languages. While examples exist of commandeurs who fled their estates 
almost alone; 
84 
it seems that very often their influence was decisive 
in deciding the fate of a plantation. The revolt in the North is 
said to have been organised by some 200 commandeurs, (though Boukman 
himself was apparently a postillion), and in the Cul de Sac in 1792 
it was the head drivers that the whites negotiated with. On the other 
hand, we find drivers in the North rewarded with medals, or executed 
by the rebels, for keeping their estates intact and in production. 
85 
Hairdressers and valets, on the other hand, became more expendable in 
times of revolution. Though enjoying close relations with their 
masters, they were perhaps for this very reason - the Figaro syndrome - 
less likely to mythologise them and accept their hegemony, and if one 
may generalise from a couple of examples they were not infrequently 
mauvais sujets. 
86 
As for the relative losses of specialist and other slaves, only 
two inventories provide any details. 
87 
On one estate 75% of the male 
domestics and artisans and 88% of the male (79% of the female) field 
slaves were absent; on the other, 40% of the male domestics and 
artisans, 70% of the male field slaves. As the specialists included 
more aged slaves than the n6gres de jardin, it seems that elite status 
did not do very much to reconcile the male specialist to his lot. 
What, then, can we say of the slaves who remained on their planta- 
tions, those whose subordination, if diminished, Laborie found 
astonishing? Firstly, they contained a high proportion of old and 
sick, even before the heavy losses of 1797. Secondly, the impact of 
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the Convention's emancipation decree had probably not been immediate. 
Sonthonax's power to abolish slavery was viewed with some scepticism 
and the British, it seemsf encouraged the belief that the Republic 
would one day execute all slaves who were illegally freed by the 
Commissaire and bore arms. 
88 
However, by the summer of 1795 it was 
said that the blacks were well-apprised of the true situation in the 
Republican zone. 'Believe me, they are a very knowing people, ' 
Governor Williamson informed Whitehall, 'and it takes a great deal 
of art and management to keep them in the right way. '89 'Art and 
management', we have seen meant extra dconomes on the plantations and 
extra hand-outs and free days for the slaves to tend their gardens. 
The slave's garden and his hut, his pigs and chickens, were obviously 
an important focus of attachment. This was an aspect greatly stressed 
by Colonel Malenfant in 1796, and M. Debien has brilliantly evoked in 
two studies the way in which slaves were slowly transformed into 
peasants. 
90 
Not simply because of their thatch roofs were slave huts 
frequently targets for the firebrands of raiders, whose strategy, it 
seems, was as much to disperse the labour force as to destroy the means 
of production. It was perhaps the absence of individual gardens and 
the sense of belonging they brought, (as well as of the free time that 
went with them), that caused the mass departure from the Andrault 
cafei6re mentioned above (p. 1 U. The high losses of the Maulevrier 
estate, too, might be connected with its late development of jardins 
ne res. 
Altough little is known of the slave family in Saint Domingue, 
social ties must have been another stabilising factor, and the per- 
sistence of petit marronage or short-term absenteeism underlines, in a 
way, that it was not simply coercion that kept the slaves on the plan- 
tations. However, social bonds were not necessarily broken by making 
a break for freedom. Solitary children were sometimes snatched by 
bands of raiders that apparently contained their mothers, while some 
took their young children with them when they fled. Among small and 
polyglot groups of insurgents one also notes couples of the same age 
and ethnic group. 
91 
The following paraphrased extracts from the 
letters of a Cul de Sac errant give an idea of the to-ing and fro-ing 
that could take place as a plantation was steadily destroyed. The 
year is 1797. 
6 February. When the workforce was out cutting wood, raiders burned 
a slave hut and ran off when the manager appeared. 
2 March. Charles, aged 16, absconded with the manager's horse and the 
blanket of a Chasseur camped nearby. 
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31 March. Charles returned a few days later, then left again with his 
mother, aged 50, his two brothers, aged 10 and 8, and a rifle and 
cartridges stolen from the guard house. 
19 May. Pierre, a mulatto aged 18, joined the maroons. 
10 July. Raiders burned a thatched grand' case and the hospital. 
12 November. Two young boys returned after marooning for over a year. 
92 
whether voodoo ceremonies continued under the occupation to be 
practised in the Cul de Sac is not known. It seems to have been an 
important element in the uprisings in the plain, and participation had 
been severely punished by the whites. 
93 
However, those who would see 
voodoo solely as a vehicle for rebellion must remember that for nearly 
three years the houngan Hyacinthe put his influence and connections at 
the service of the planters and was one of their main allies. 
94 
More- 
over, it was said of de Jumecourt, the leader of this party, and a man 
who stood well with the commandeurs of the plain and even, it appears, 
some chefs de brigands, that he owed his reputation as 'le blanc qui 
connoit tout' to the fact 'qu'il s'est fait recevoir vaudoux'. 
95 
This, 
of course, was the opinion of his enemies. Yet, their denunciation of 
him as 'l'ami des nýgres et l'ennemi du reste' and the picture they 
paint of his affable relations with blacks and his pretence of great 
influence over them is a useful warning against polarizing opposites. 
For example, what is one to make of the behaviour of the rebel chief 
Samson, who towards the end of 1797 began sending to his former mistress 
in Port au Prince presents of fruit and vegetables from her abandoned 
estate? In January 1796, when he and the other rebels in the mountains 
south of the Cul de Sac came to the special markets held outside the 
capital, '(il) ne daigna meme pas d'informer de sa maitresse; et dans 
toute occasion manifesta de la plus grande insolence. ' Now, however, 
he assured her of his devotion and that he had been exerting his 
influence on the chiefs Mamzelle and Pierre Cyr to protect her planta- 
tion. 
96 
Only the grand' case was destroyed. 
This appears to have been a matter of political manoeuvring, and 
anyway it is quite understandable that an ex-slave might take a subtle 
pleasure in doing a favour for his former master or grant, - like 
Toussaint Louverture and Bayon de Libertat. Nevertheless, it does seem 
clear that slave loyalty, or black acceptance of the ideology of white 
rule, was along with fear, inertia and varying calculations of self- 
interest an important element in keeping slaves slaves. Planters began 
arming selected slaves in 1791, and on some estates, we have seen, 
whites and blacks continued to fight alongside one another right up to 
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the evacuation. 
97 
In 1794, as Republicans gained control of the south- 
west, those slaves that had previously been armed held out at Cap 
Rouge and refused to serve the Republicans, while those on the estates, 
it was said, seemed disposed to accept their masters back. 
98 
Conspiracies 
were denounced and maroons caught and handed over by fellow blacks. 
On the Montbazon estate in June 1797, four male slaves were tied up by 
raiders and carried off thirty miles it was said, into the woods. Yet, 
they escaped and returned. 
99 
Though we know little about relations 
between plantation blacks and the rebels, 'abducted by brigands' was 
clearly not always a euphemism, In the Cul de Sac, it was believed 
the rebels had contacts on every estate, who tipped them off and helped 
them lay their deadly ambushes. 
100 
On the other hand, we hear of 
slaves being killed by raiders, and their livestock and gardens were 
surely not spared the insurgents' depredations. Mullin and Debien 
have written of the resentment created in the slave quarters by the 
marauding of maroons, and one can see that such resentment might be 
reciprocated by the fighting men with contempt. 
101 
Plantations where the 
slaves huts had been burned down but most of the workforce stayed put102 
testify to this hostile clash of different mentalities. Although 
distance, social and spatial, tends to lend enchantment, it was doubt- 
less among the specialist slaves, and in the grand' case in particular, 
that the whites came closest to achieving hegemony. Servants and 
drivers, we find, handled large sums of money for their masters and 
some even ran estates single-handed. The Lacour plantation in les 
Cayemittes was managed for at least two years by its driver, a forty 
year old Chamba named Hyppolite. According to his planter neighbours, 
he was better than the best white grant and in 1797 they demanded he 
be freed. 
103 
Until its final hours of existence in Saint Domingue, slavery as 
a social institution remained as complex as ever. With the Republican 
successes of the spring of 1797, the loss of slaves from the British 
zone greatly increased and notably from Arcahaye, where, General 
Simcoe observed, sugar estate work had become 'peculiarly odious' to 
the blacks. 
104 
When Christophe's army broke through into the plain a 
year later, some 300 slaves decided their moment had come and fled to 
the Republican lines. Others, however, muskets in hand, withdrew with 
their manager and book-keepers inside their plantation blockhouse and 
remained slaves. Some companies of Chasseurs deserted; others fought 
with a suicidal bravery few colonists were willing to display. From 
the interior of the Grand' Anse, Lieutenant-Colonel Hallam's 71 slaves 
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(34 of them men) marched cheerfully to the coast, he said, ready to 
accompany him to Jamaica. 
105 
Most, it is true, had come from Jamaica 
in the first place, but this could not be said of the 90 slaves who, de 
Montagnac claimed, followed him freely to the British colony. In all, 
1,600 adult and adolescent slaves were evacuated to Jamaica, 700 of 
them males. Many perhaps went under duress, but the impression they 
made there was of being 'an innocent, loyal and attached people'. 
106 
On the other hand, it was also said that, at Jeremie when the evacua- 
tion was announced, the hitherto passive slaves became extremely 
insulting, gathering in small groups to discuss their coming freedom 
and at night singing Revolutionary songs. The chevalier de Montagnac, 
in fact, about to take ship, was abandoned by his trusted valet, who 
had accompanied him to America over 20 years before. He was now, he 
told his master, as free as he was. 
107 
(iv) From Slave to Soldier. 'Armer les negres', observed a 
colonist in 1776, 'c'est vouloir ddtruire les maitres'. 'If you train 
them to arms', argued de Charmilly twenty years later, 'to that pride, 
that equality, and familiarity necessary in the military life, all the 
sistem of the colony is lost'. 'C'6toit la dechirer de ses propres 
mains'. 
108 
Although the use of slave-soldiers began in various parts 
of Saint Domingue in the autumn of 1791, it was always regarded as a 
dangerous experiment and was only adopted under the occupation because 
there was no alternative. Before the British arrived, some 170 
armed slaves had been freed in the Grand' Anse (presumably Jean Kina's 
corps) and during the summer and autumn of 1794 other units were 
raised in the Artibonite and Cul de Sac. At first, recruiting was 
confined to slaves volunteered by willing planters or those taken from 
forfeited or absentee estates. Then in June 1795, a levy of 1 slave in 
15 became compulsory and regiments were raised in all parts of the 
occupied zone. The institution, therefore, strongly favoured by 
military men, was able to establish and prove itself gradually, 
leaving its opponents unable to take a stand, and the refusal of 
Whitehall to allow the manumission of recruits after five years' 
service was simply ignored. 
109 
Around 1,000 strong in June 1795, by the end of the year the 
black corps numbered some 4,300 including officers, who were all 
whites, and by the end of 1796 they contained about 6,700 men of whom 
just over 5,000 were ex-slaves. In July 1798, there were perhaps 
6ix. 
110 
At no time were there anything like the 9,000 or more 
mentioned by Pauleus-Sannon and others, and while they may have 
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suffered a high mortality rate, 
III 
it seems highly unlikely that the 
total number of black troops raised even approached the 12,000 reported 
by Malenfant. 
112 
The great majority of these men served as Chasseurs 
in corps about 800 strong. While all the officers were whites, 
affranchis were allowed to enlist as sergeants and occasionally as 
sergeants-major. The rank and file were armed with a musket and a 
machete, and wore a red jacket, coarse trousers and a round hat with 
a panache. Some corps, like Dessources's Volunteers, also had 
companies of horse. The men received British pay and rations, and 
shared equally with white and coloured troops in the distribution of 
prize money. Care was apparently taken they should not feel discrimina- 
ted against. Their distinctive characteristics - their machetes and 
the sergeants' lack of a sword and breastplate - were functional. 
Moreover, when hospitalised they were allowed full pay, whereas white 
troops, in theory, were not, 
113 
Practically all of the black troops were Africans; that is, four 
fifths of those supplied by sucreries, who were usually in their thirties, 
and nine tenths of the recruits from coffee plantations, who were 
mainly twenty years old. Owners and managers were allowed to choose 
which of their able-bodied slaves should make up their quota and they 
naturally preferred to keep their best workers. The least favoured 
'nations' , Mina, Mozambique, Moco "- were unusually prominent in the 
corps and accounted for almost a fifth of the Africans conscripted, 
though nearly a third were Congoes, as in the population at large. 
114 
Towards the end of the occupation, planters tended to supply newly-imported 
slaves specially purchased to fill their quotas. However, the 
original levies were to a large extent trusted slaves whom it was 
thought safe to arm and eventually manumit. Others were former 
rebels who had changed sides, apparently attracted by the terms of 
service. And some were genuine volunteers, for in the panic at the 
end of 1795 colonels were briefly permitted to recruit any slave who 
presented himself, irrespective of his master's wishes. Although the 
response was apparently disappointing, there seems small doubt that 
for the young fieldhand enlistment in the Chasseurs was a very 
attractive proposition. It was said, in fact, in March 1796, that half 
of the Chasseurs were former rebels who had changed sides, apparently 
attracted by the terms of service. 
115 
Money, a full stomach and a prestigious uniform: the attractions 
were up to a point those that caused young males in any poor and 
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oppressed social group to become soldiers. However, for the slave at 
the bottom of the plantation hierarchy the appeal must have been 
unusually great. 'A soldier's ration', wrote Governor Effingham when 
black corps were first being discussed in Jamaica, 'will be a great 
temptation to them'. 
116 
Ten or twelve ounces of meat, sometimes 
fresh, a third of a loaf of bread and a gill of rum, together with 
fresh vegetables purchased out of a wage of six pence (later eight 
pence) every day: - this represented a substantial improvement in diet, 
and comparative wealth besides. The uniform, too, for men who normally 
spent six days a week half naked and, moreover, who prided themselves 
on their Sunday best, must have seemed singularly attractive, while the 
transition from bare feet to shoes was itself pregnant with symbolism. 
For, above all, military service meant freedom, immediate freedom 
from the plantation and, eventually, the status of a free man. This 
was guaranteed, furthermore, not by shadowy authorities born of 
revolution, but by the planters and a king. Being the traditional sources 
of power in the colonial world, they projected a certain security, 
along with a comprehensible ideology of legitimacy and hierarchy that 
was decked out in the usual trappings of flags, medals and ceremony. 
In the distribution of medals to their slaves, the planters had 
displayed since 1792 an uncharacteristic liberality, and the scarlet 
tunic, of course, was not just a flamboyant item of clothing but, in 
Jean Frangois's words, 1'habit du Roi. 
117 
Each black corps had a 
chaplain who was instructed not only to inspire his charges with the 
love of religion but also to end each prayer with three shouts of 
Vive le Roii and each service with 'God save the King' (apparently in 
Latin). 
118 
As for the regimentation, discipline and flogging, these 
were nothing new; slaves adapted well to military life. 
119 
To the climate and terrain, they were already adapted, and this 
was their great strength, though 12% were regularly hospitalised. 
Able to survive on only water and bananas, they were capable of 'an 
infinitely greater degree of fatigue' than white troops and were 
powerful runners, whom Europeans could catch only on horseback. 'La 
guerre de ce pays', wrote Belin de Villeneuve, 'dolt se faire avec 
les jambes. C'est la troupe qui marchera ... la plus vite qui aura 
tous les succes'. (For this reason, officers had to be young Creoles, 
he said; badly-chosen emigres were like 'des tortues ä la tate des 
levriers'. )120 Williamson praised the Chasseurs' intimate knowledge 
of the mountains and passes and General Whyte agreed, in the forests 
and mountains black troops were 'formidable'. However, he pointed 
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out, they enjoyed no special advantage as regards the rain; there was 
nothing they would not do, he said, to avoid getting wet. 
121 
Like 
their opponents, they fought by surprise and ambush, and we have seen 
them infiltrating dances in enemy camps and manoeuvring silently 
through the mountain forests. Yet, they could also be bold in attack 
and, as already noted, storm gun batteries on the tops of mountains 
and launch frontal assaults up steep slopes with incredible speed. 
122 
In the plains, and particularly under artillery fire, the black troops 
were less effective and this seems to have been especially true of the 
Republicans. According to Lieutenant Howard, on the rare occasions 
they drew up in regular order, they never stood their ground after the 
second or third discharge. 
123 
Evidently they lacked the training 
that enabled European troops to stand still and be killed. 
When attacking, however, the Republican blacks displayed a 
bravery that was only too often suicidal. Throughout the occupied 
zone, whether 'nus comme des verres de terre' like Toussaint's men 
in 1795, or fully equipped and regimented as in 1798, they were cut 
down by the hundred, year after year. And yet, their numbers grew 
and at the same time, as was frequently noted, their skills in the 
arts of war. 
124 
Perhaps the most famous action was the attempt to 
storm Fort Churchill described above (p. 211), when Toussaint's 
troops, finding their assault ladders too short, stood on one another's 
shoulders trying to scale the walls, while for fully half an hour 
their dead piled up around them, They were said to be his elite 
corps; Desrouleaux's demi-brigade, which attacked a month later, cut 
much less of an impression 
125 
- or was it, as Toussaint used to claim, 
his presence that made all the difference? Of their style of fighting, 
we learn disappointingly little. They tended to emerge suddenly from 
the woods at dawn and attack en masse, scattering if resisted to snipe 
from behind bushes and rocks. This exploitation of the terrain, of 
weight of numbers and the use of surprise would seem to have been 
general. In the Cul de Sac by 1797, bands of raiders 60 or 70 strong, 
sometimes mounted, would appear without warning to attack a convoy or 
plantation and then melt away again into the woods, to the frustration 
of their pursuers. 
126 
A graphic description of the difficulties of 
mountain warfare has been left by the vicomte de Grouvel, which 
apparently refers to the expulsion of Dieudonne's band from the Morne 
1'HOpital in 1796. The blacks not only appeared in great numbers, 
firing from rocky eminences and from behind trees, but further un- 
nerved their opponents by beating drums, howling and whistling, and 
trumpeting eerily on conch shells. 
127 
Was this how Toussaint's men 
fought, too? Or did the acquisition of a uniform imply a certain 
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Europeanisation? 
Another fascinating glimpse of Republican troops in action is 
provided by Captain Colville, who took part in the attempted landing 
at Tiburon in October 1793. While trying to row ashore, the British 
boats floundered and were then thrown into confusion by a hail of 
musketry from the beach that was both powerful and disturbingly 
accurate. 'The enemy', the young captain ruefully admitted, 'were ... 
seen to turn up their backsides in derision at our ineffectual fire. 
They seemed to take their time with great coolness and either retired 
into the wood or threw themselves on their bellies or back to reload - 
some even fired in these positions. Either their pieces or their 
powder must have been of a quality superior to ours to give them such 
an advantage over us in the range of shot - their balls even going 
through the sails of the transport a mile distant'. 
128 
In view of the 
location, these were more likely to have been former free coloureds 
than ex-slaves. Trained in the marechaussee, accustomed to hunting, 
the Bens de couleur already had an established reputation as sharp- 
shooters. From what we know of the plantation blacks, on the other 
hand, they did not turn into marksmen overnight 
129 
and there is no 
reason why they should have done. Given the constant references in 
Toussaint's correspondence to the need to conserve powder, his soldiers 
can have had little opportunity to practise. 
130 
On the other hand, the 
constant admonitions themselves are probably connected with an 
exuberant tendency, noted among several rebel groups, to fire off 
their weapons 'pour s'amuser'. 
131 
Before the campaign of 1798, in 
fact, we find Toussaint issuing orders against insubordination and the 
desertion of posts 'pour piller, marauder ou fuir et se cacher dans 
les bois', 
132 
which suggests that the problems of moulding his levies 
into an army were not yet entirely overcome. 
As for the war at sea, we know that armed barges, powered by 
oars and crammed with fighting men of all colours, were the terror of 
becalmed shipping. Although they seem to . 
bear at least a passing 
resemblance to the marauding naval brotherhoods that were then 
operating in the Bight of Biafra, 
133 
they were, according to Laborie, 
mostly manned 
Äpetits blancs who had fled the British zone. 
134 
They 
were thus a creole institution, and perhaps not so much revolutionary 
as throwbacks to the 17th century, for they preyed on Republican and 
neutral shipping as well as British. For this reason, Rigau clamped 
down on them towards the end of the occupation. 
135 
Returning to the black troops in British pay, one corps in 
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part$cular stands out, that of Jean Kina. Though not quite the only 
136 
corps commanded by an ex-slave, its chief was one of the dominant 
figures of the occupation, the equal of Toussaint Louverture, some 
said, if with a good deal of exaggeration. 
137 
Jean Kina was an African 
from the Laroquer-Turgeau estate in the bay of Carcasses, near Tiburon. 
it was a cotton plantation and its owner apparently resided in the 
colony.. 
138 
One might suppose, therefore, that the type of slavery 
he experienced was of the small-scale, patriarchal kind, and where the 
work-load was relatively light. Middle-aged at the time of the 
occupation, he had probably lived some twenty years in Saint Domingue; 
on the probable conservatism of creolized Africans, we have already 
remarked. Furthermore, the extremely isolated position of the 
plantation , on a very rugged stretch of coast far from any town, 
139 
suggests it was among those least troubled by the turmoil of the 
Revolution. Hence, it is not so surprising that it was this region 
that produced the planters' ideal 'bon negre', a fearless defender of 
royalty, slavery and white supremacy. He first emerges from the 
anonymity of the plantation in 1792, leading a corps of nearly 200 
slaves freed by the white masters in the conflict with the free 
coloureds. 'Ce negre', it was said, 'est craint absolument de tous 
les brigands et non brigands, mulAtres et negres, son aspect les fait 
trembler'. 
140 
A man of fierce temper, he appears to have shared in 
that mentality, common to white and slave, which classed the free 
coloureds as objects of envy but not respect. He is reputed to have 
refused several times to accept his liberty, 
141 
though one may well 
doubt it, for as early as 10th May 1792 we find the Colonial Assembly 
and Governor ratifying his manumission, already effected by the 
commune of Tiburon, with his master's consent. Two months later the 
Assembly awarded him a medal and a pension, later fixed at 300 livres 
(half of the rate for free coloureds), though he never received it. 
142 
In January 1793, the column commanded by him and the chevalier de 
Sevre was almost solely responsible for the capture of the inaccessible 
rebel stronghold of les Platons, where five months before an expedi- 
tion led by the Governor had been routed. 
143 
As the southern planters 
waited for an attack by the Civil Commissioners, his corps was 
increased in strength and at the beginning of September the Conseil 
de Sflrete de la Grand' Anse began paying him a pension of 500 livres 
per month in lieu of providing food for his family (which had been 
costing rather more). 
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At the beginning of the occupation, we find him at les Irois, 
attached to Morin Duval's army. 'He is a well looking, middle aged 
man of great fidelity', Captain Colville wrote, 'and has frequently 
refused the freedom offered him, conceiving his example of more effect 
on those of his colour in arms while acting apparently from the motives 
only of duty and attachment to his master. By a superior degree of 
activity and cunning and more courage than is generally met with in 
negroes, he has acquired great influence over them and under his orders 
they have remained uncontaminated by the neighbouring disaffected and 
in a bush fighting warfare peculiar to themselves have at different 
times a good deal annoyed them. Their appearance was as it may be 
supposed very grotesque - instead of Drum and Fife they used the 
Banger and Coromantee Flute, the musical instruments of their native 
country. Some had fire arms, others bill hooks fastened to long poles 
and plantation watchmen's hangers and were in general wretchedly 
attired in their osnaburgh frocks'. They were now, however, promised 
British pay and clothing, and as a first instalment, were immediately 
issued with shoes. 
144 
The Grand' Anse whites stressed to the British the extent of his 
influence over the blacks, and Whitelocke and Williamson were careful 
to award him marks of respect. After the capture of Tiburon in February 
1794, he was presented with a ceremonial sword. The following month 
he and his men distinguished themselves, when besieged by greatly 
superior numbers, by executing a bold sortie from the fort and putting 
their attackers to flight. He seems to have inspired an intense 
loyalty, for so incensed were his soldiers on this occasion that he 
had been wounded that they forced their prisoners, before killing 
them, to lick his wounds. 'The King has not a better friend', wrote 
Colonel Whitelocke in July, 'than Jean Kino'. His attachment to the 
whites was 'remarkable'? his attachment to royalty 'as conspicuous 
as his Honour and Integrity', 
145 
His men were described as a 'Negro 
Militia', fluctuating in number between two and five hundred. This 
would suggest that only a minority of them had been freed, and when 
Williamson in September said he would put them on the same footing 
as the other black corps then raising in the Artibonite, he presumably 
meant they would gain their liberty after five years' service. 
In December, however, the corps was decimated, when after a long 
bombardment it was forced to abandon Tiburon and make a desperate, 
retreat through the mountains to les Irois. 
146 
Thereafter, his 
'Volontaires' seems to have become a strange mixture of slave and-free. 
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Apart from manumitted slaves, they also contained many anciens 
libres, some with property in the Grand' Anse and others, deported from 
Arcahaye and Saint Marc, whom he recruited in Jamaica on the pontoons of 
Port Royal. 
147 
While his men on night patrol occasionally tried to 
abduct slaves from plantations he began in 1796 to purchase Africans at 
his own expense, whose pay he then kept himself. In September, he was 
allowed to buy in Jamaica 37 'new negroes ... accustomed to a state of 
warfare in their own Country', whom the Government agreed to replace if 
killed. With Simcoe's reforms of the spring of 1797, the corps was 
divided into two companies, one of Chasseurs and one of gens de couleur, 
and in the final months of the occupation we find it split into three. 
It consisted of 148 rank and file and 46 others, 10 of whom were women 
or retired officers. As most of the men in the first two companies 
had a surname, one suspects that anciens libres, or at least manumitted 
slaves, then predominated. The second in command was a Major Schevenard, 
doubtless a 'Curagolien', not uncommon on the south coast, but of what 
colour? 
148 
Kina's importance after the fall of Tiburon became more symbolic 
than practical. He commanded fewer men and his corps was dwarfed by 
the new regiments of Chasseurs that favoured whites were allowed to 
raise. Having been transferred to Port au Prince, (where his officers 
lived in a derelict house until evicted to make way for a body of 
Chasseurs) 
149 
his corps ceased to play a prominent part in military 
matters. In the capture of Morne 1'H6pital, it was Dessources's 
and Depestre's corps that had the key roles, with the whole of the 
capital for an audience. Moreover, as a declared enemy of the free 
coloureds, (though now one himself), he had to contend with the power 
of Lapointe, who with Montalembert brought to an end his recruiting 
in the gaols, which anyway had created great alarm. 
150 
Mortality in 
his corps would appear to have been high. In a petition to George III 
dated 7th May 1797, he complained that, having commanded 450 blacks, 
he now had none and had to purchase forty to make up a company. 
151 
This was probably untrue, though of the 37 he purchased in October 
1796 8 died in nine months. In June 1795, he had recruited 60 men 
in Jamaica and another 60 four months later, (although most of these 
were gaoled in Saint Domingue or seized by Lapointe). His ability to 
buy so many slaves, if obviously dependent on credit, suggests he was 
a man of some substance. He received a colonel's pay of some £40 
sterling per month, and at the end of 1795 he began to draw his pension 
300 
from the Administration of the Grand' Anse. In December 1796, it 
was increased to 600 livres p. a. He had at least one personal servant. 
152 
If Jean Kina was an exceptional figure, his mentality, such as we 
perceive it, was not atypical and may indeed have been common to the 
black Chasseurs in general. Whether it was rooted in a certain 
experience of slavery, or simply shaped by the tempting opportunities 
of military life and the ideology that went with it, thousands of 
Dominguan blacks became armed and loyal defenders of the slave regime. 
in colonial societies, it is not an unfamiliar phenomenon: sepoys, 
askaris, Salptu Scouts ... In March 1796, Belin de Villeneuve wrote of 
the Chasseurs' 'extreme subordination et leur fidelite'. They knew, 
he said, they were much better off than the Republican troops. 
153 
General Maitland, trying to dispel the doubts of Governor Balcarres, 
called them 'inoffensive' and 'orderly' in the extreme; 'the only 
feeling I have known them to possess is panting to return to their 
old masters', though he added this did not apply to mulattoes and 
newly-arrived Africans. 
154 
Perhaps surprisingly, desertion in the 
black corps was almost non-existent before the defeats of 1797, and 
prior to the final campaign it was still less than among the white 
troops. 
155 
Those who did desert in 1798, according to Maitland, did 
not join the Republicans but told their officers they thought they 
were going to be sold and 'left ... with tears in their eyes'. 
156 
Certainly, several officers regarded the disbanding or abandoning of 
their regiments with considerable emotion, suggestive of an intense 
esprit de corps that cannot have been entirely one-sided. 
157 
'Armer les negres', therefore, did not mean the end of slavery, 
as Malouet and many others had at first feared. No black Chasseurs 
seem to have actually rebelled, though some at Mirebalais did pass 
information to the Republicans. 
158 
The British and planters, more- 
over, unlike a Confederate general of the next century, 
159 
found no 
real contradiction in slaves making good soldiers, at least none they 
could not easily rationalise. 
160 
Other problems, however, were posed 
by the slaves who took up arms themselves. Firstly, those who at the 
end of 1795 were permitted to enroll themselves in the Chasseurs 
without their masters' consent had considerably perturbed the Conseil 
Prive. A desperate measure, it shook the foundations of the colonial 
regime, it was said, and hence was quickly dispensed with. 
161 
The 
negotiations held with Dieudonne and other chiefs also created a sharp 
controversy between military and planter opinion. Could the Governor 
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recognise as free armed men whom colonists would still claim as their 
property? To treat rebels as free men, argued the Conseil Prive, and 
bargain with them in the market place as equals was a bad example, both 
for the loyal slaves and for the rebels, whom it would only make more 
confident. Such 'tolerance', they said, was 'humiliante pour les 
proprietaires et dangereuse pour la colonie'. Montalembert replied 
that it was strategically important and that it was pointless trying 
to treat the chiefs of armed bands as if they were still slaves. 
162 
Each 
argument carried weight, and in the event, both parties were willing 
to defer to the other, when Laplume's coup rendered the debate academic. 
The same problem had to be faced, nonetheless, every day, as regards 
the treatment of captured rebels. Having borne arms, could they 
safely be sent back to the plantations, or even to the chaine du Roi? 
Was it fitting to accord them p. o. w. status and exchange them for white 
prisoners? Or should they all be killed, which after all was the 
traditional solution to slave rebellion? All three methods were 
used, though to what extent is not clear. It was a vexed question, 
particularly in 1794, when Laveaux seems to have threatened to give tit 
for tat. Commodore Ford replied that whether or not blacks were 
slaves was 'the Question at issue by the contending Powers' and still to 
be decided. 'I have no Enmity ... whatever to Men of any Colour', he 
said, 'on the contrary, I wish all men were as free as my thoughts on 
the Subject'. 
163 
What this meant, however, is hardly clear. Two 
years later, we find Belin de Villeneuve insisting that captured 
'brigands' should not be sent back to the plantations. They should 
not be exterminated either, he said, albeit less forcefully, but en- 
164 164 
as Chasseurs. 
Yet, once peace came, what would become of all these black soldiers? 
This was a question that troubled both Republicans and Anglo-Royalists. 
Colonel Malenfant thought they would happily settle down as estate 
workers, if their gardens and poultry ceased to be pillaged. Governor 
Williamson said they would want to re-enlist, if they were not already 
dead. 
165 
To an uncertain degree, both were proved right. Strangely 
enough, however, it was Colonel Jean Kina himself, who on the island 
of Martinique in December 1800 was to lead a revolt against the 
166 
plantocracy, 'mangeurs de chaire humaine'. 
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(v) The Free Coloureds. At the beginning of the occupation, free 
coloureds were extremely numerous in the British zone, far outnumbering 
the whites in the Artibonite, Saint Marc and Leogane and in the parish 
of Arcahaye, and probably equalling their numbers in Croix des Bouquets 
and Port au Prince. Their military importance, the wealth and education 
of their richest members, the beauty of the women and the great number 
unemployed in the towns, these were among the British soldier's first 
impressions of the colony. After the revolts of the autumn of 1794, 
however, and the plots, deportations and executions that followed, they 
bulked less large in the population. Although still numerous and 
though the acquisition of Mirebalais brought many more into the occupied 
zone, they are not easily visible through the medium of official 
correspondence. 
They were a very diverse social group, as we have seen, 
167 
and it 
was apparently the wealthiest, slave-owning sector that was closest 
to the whites, while the men of small property looked to the 
Republicans. 
168 
The free blacks, however, may have been an exception. 
Earlier in the Revolution, they had allowed themselves to be manipulated 
by the whites into opposing the free coloureds proper, and under the 
occupation commentators like Malouet continued to advocate a policy of 
playing one group against the other. 
169 
While, like many others, 
expressing the strongest dislike of mulatto males, 
170 
Lieutenant 
Howard found the average free black 'a harmless, inoffensive 
creature', either very industrious or a 'complete vagabond', engaged all 
day in 'sleep, love, smoking and gambling'. Much less likely to have 
been born free than the mulattoes, many were probably runaways, 
affranchis sans l'etre. Having made the transition from slave to free 
in their lifetime, their ambitions may not have been as great as those 
of other Bens de couleur. Closer to the slave population, they may 
unlike poor mulattoes have favoured the preservation of the slave 
system, since from it derived what status they had. Equally, if the 
richer, lighter-skinned free coloureds were similarly anxious to 
assert their own claims to distinction the resulting alienation might 
well have made free blacks willing allies of the whites. Montalembert, 
hard on the mulattoes# treated the ne! gre libre Joseph Cazeaux as a 
171 
confidant. Whatever the reasons, at the time of the evacuation 
many more male free blacks accompanied the British to Jamaica than 
172 
did mulattoes. 
Very much the majority of free coloureds, however, were women. 
While some of them got rich through prostitution, almost all, it was 
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said, were retailers of muslin and Madras handkerchiefs, which was a 
big business in the Caribbean. They dressed with style and taste, 
and were accounted 'much more elegant in manners and appearance' than 
those of Jamaica. 
173 
Nevertheless, they might still have to live 
several to a small house or even to a room, together with their children 
and perhaps their black mothers, too. 
174 
Under the occupation, according to Laborie, 
175 
the free coloureds 
were treated better than under the Ancien Regime. This was both true 
and untrue. As within white society, existing social trends and 
tendencies were pushed to extremes. In some places and under certain 
circumstances, as Laborie said, gens de couleur were treated as equal 
with whites. Elsewhere, however, and on other occasions, persecution 
was as savage as in the worst days of the Revolution. Relations, we 
have seen, worsened in mid-1794, when the discriminatory article 4 
of the Capitulation was registered as law, when slave free/marriages 
were declared null, and when the local Conseils on which some free 
coloureds served were abolished. The revolts that followed greatly 
strengthened the racist reaction. A policy of juste milieu, Billard 
claimed, was no longer possible; it was dominate or be dominated. 
176 
When Dundas argued two years later that the free coloureds had to be 
treated with equity, because their co-operation was vital, Forbes 
replied that they could never be trusted; they were incorrigibly 
deceitful, he said, and planned to kill all the whites. 
177 
However, 
as long as political institutions remained non-existent, the issue of 
racial equality could to some extent be glossed over; there was room 
for special cases and local variation. What was unacceptable in the 
Grand' Anse, was probably unavoidable in Arcahaye, where it is 
difficult to see that mulattoes could have been excluded from parish 
meetings, (which was apparently the case 
in the Cul de Sac). In 
fact, Williamson seems to have told Lapointe that the equal rights 
granted by the defunct Code Noire were still in force, since the 
Capitulation reactivated all previous colonial laws. 
178 
This was a 
transparent but convenient fiction. Among the destitute, non-whites 
were positively discriminated against; they received food rations but 
never cash payments, even if habitants. Whether, as soldiers, they 
ever served outside the corps specially reserved for them, either with 
whites or as officers in the black corps, is not clear, but in the 
Grand' Anse and in the Artibonite, some at first seem to have served 
mixed up with blacks in corps of Chasseurs. 
Many were doubtless demi'-libres, anxious to have their freedom 
ratified by military service. 
179 
In the Grand' Anse, however, the 
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free coloureds had never enjoyed the independence of those of the 
West. In Billard's words, they even contained a few 'bons sujets', or 
as Berault Saint Maurice observed with a sinister scorn in January 
1794, 'ils sont plus souples et plus humbles que jamais'. 
180 
Most, 
however, had already left Jdremie; and only a year later, following 
the loss of Tiburon, a rebellion seems to have occurred. Two hundred 
were arrested and their leaders executed. 
lei 
This coincided with a 
mulatto plot at Saint Marc, itself betrayed by a mulatto. 
182 
Then 
in the autumn a crisis blew up among the anciens libres in the 
Chasseurs des Cayemittes. Already aggravated by arrears of pay, they 
seem to have become alarmed that they were being assimilated to the 
blacks in their corps and that they would lose their free status. 
There was talk of them going over to the enemy. Thereafter, it was 
recommended they be grouped separately in flank companies (du Roi and 
de la Reine) so as to preserve their ancien esprit. 
183 
By denying them civil equality. but protecting their rights as 
slaveowners, the British occupation had placed the free coloureds in 
a position of crippling uncertainty, that was all the worse for those 
who were perhaps already aspiring to be masters of an independent 
Saint Domingue. Both the Republican and British zones, we have seen, 
were constantly troubled by their wavering, plotting and tergivers- 
ation. 
184 
Just as the coloureds of Saint Marc spied for Toussaint, 
those of Petite Riviere spied for the British. Though Guyon and 
Reubel were agreed in driving the Spaniards out of Mirebalais, they 
then divided on who to replace them with. Families, like the famous 
Chanlatte and Savary, were frequently split. The free coloureds of 
Arcahaye and Saint Marc had many relatives in Mirebalais and the 
Artibonite, and this added of course to their political instability. 
In this respect, though much mistrusted, Lapointe was quite unusual. 
His godson, Grdfin, however, having been persuaded to admit the British 
into Leogane, declared he had been tricked when only 250 soldiers 
arrived, and as a result was arrested. Lapointe had him freed and 
brought to Arcahaye, but as he then called Lapointe a traitor, his 
godfather had him executed. 
185 
Despite this disunity, even so, we 
have also seen fear growing among the whites that the mulattoes were 
becoming a colony-wide political force, and extreme racists like 
Berault Saint Maurice thought they were out to subvert the New 
World. 
186 
The resentment and fears the free coloureds had always 
aroused thus became magnified during the occupation and the white 
response became in some quarters yet more barbaric. It was a vicious 
circle. 
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The 1794 rebellions, as noted above, met with bloody retribution. 
187 
'Envoyer au Cayes du Fond' became a grim metaphor for dumping mulatto 
bodies in the sea. 
188 
Thereafter, the free coloureds of the occupied 
zone had to live with a constant feeling of insecurity, always 
liable to be arrested if not murdered. Some whites, Williamson 
admitted, really wished to exterminate them. 
189 
The baron de 
Montalembert never left Croix des Bouquets on campaign without taking 
hostages from the mulatto population, and the Port au Prince police 
exercised a petty tyranny against them, exacting arbitrary fines and 
seizing their slaves at will. 
190 
Hundreds were deported to Jamaica. 
The worst persecution, however, took place in distant Mirebalais or 
beyond, on the Spanish frontier. For example, the Chasseurs of the 
vicomte de Bruges used to forage daily on the plantation of an old 
mulatto named Laserre, who, when reduced to his last patch of maize, 
finally resisted and in defending his house shot dead one of the 
soldiers. His property was burned to the ground in retribution, 
which in turn caused fifty mulatto soldiers to desertto the Republicans. 
In August 1796 alone, some forty free coloureds were murdered in this 
area, either out of spite or to appropriate their property afterwards; 
some of them were in Government service, In May 1797, Maitland 
reported that de Bruges had apparently been responsible for some 400 
murders in the region, using the blacks of the marechaussee or units 
of Chasseurs. 
191 
No wonder then we find in March 1796 over 800 free 
coloureds surrendering their camps in the Cahos mountains without a 
fight. (it is interesting, moreover, that they consisted of only seven 
or eight families. 
192 
Although filial piety was sometimes mentioned 
as a characteristic of the mulattoes, the existence of these extended 
families comes as something of a surprise; as a political force, it 
must have made them the more feared). Apparently, the situtation was 
at its worst under General Forbes, who spoke no French and was anyway 
too weak to discipline de Bruges. 'La difference de la langue de la 
puissance dominatrice elevoit entre eile et les opprimes un mur 
impenetrable pour la multitude; toutes les avenues d'ailleurs qui 
pouvoient les en rapprocher etoient occupees par les oppresseurs'. 
193 
This raises the question of Lapointe's relations with his fellow 
free coloureds and his position under the occupation. Both are 
difficult to assess. According to many, he established his credibi- 
lity with the whites only through his extreme severity to the ens de 
194 
couleur of Arcahaye, so earning their enmity. On the other hand, 
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he was referred to as the leader of the free coloured community, 
demanding for it equal rights; he was able to win over the mulattoes 
of Mirebalais, and he protected those persecuted by Montalembert and 
de Bruges. 
195 
Now, it seems quite clear that whites like Malouet and 
particularly Billard exaggerated the number of executions that took 
place in Arcahaye, and that Malenfant completely misrepresented the 
situation by claiming that the victims were white moderates or 
royalists. To depict him as a monstre, it would appear, was a way of 
justifying their prejudices. The Prdcis Historique, in fact, doubts he 
was party to the massacres and attributes them to the white planter 
Laval and his henchmen. 
196 
This, however, would suggest that his power 
within his own parish was considerably less than it otherwise would 
seem. Most probably, after the revolt at Saint Marc he had come under 
pressure from pro-Republican elements in Arcahaye and ordered or 
acquiesced in the murder of about 100 mulattoes and blacks. 
Thereafter, his local position was secure, and the whites slowly 
ceased to mistrust him. At the height of the crisis, he had sent his 
family to Jamaica to prove his loyalty (but perhaps also to transfer 
funds there, just in case), and the Republicans had to admit he could 
not be bought. 
197 
Williamson praised his 'superior firmness'. The 
whites were careful to call him 'citoyen de couleur', said Malenfant, 
'et les negres n'osaient lui parler'. 
198 
With the capture of Mirebalais, 
his influence greatly increased and he began to dissociate himself 
from Montalembert with whom he had allied to oppose and overthrow the 
racist Cdte Ouest party. Although Depestre's black corps may have been 
a rival source of power, like Rigaud in the South and temporarily, 
Villatte in the North, he achieved a high degree of local independence. 
He ran Arcahaye as an autonomous financial unit collecting taxes and 
building fortifications. British troops were very rarely stationed 
there, and he seems to have supplied the Administration with few 
military statistics. 
Jean-Baptiste Lapointe was, interestingly, a griffe, darker than 
a mulAtre and without white parentage. He had been educated in France 
and may have been at some time an officer in the French Army. He was 
by all accounts an intelligent man who seems to have impressed all who 
met him. Even de Charmilly acknowledged he had 'real talents'. The 
mainspring of his behaviour is not difficult to locate. He owned over 
400 slaves and by the end of the occupation four plantations whose 
value he estimated at four million livres. If this was an exaggeration, 
there is no doubt he was a very wealthy man. To cover his 'expenses' 
in calling in the English, he said, the local planters gave him a 
gratuity of £11,000, and when in 1798 one of his plantations was 
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burned, they again collected for him an indemnity. 
199 
According to 
Lieutenant Howard, he had by 1797 amassed £100,000, which he mainly 
had invested in English funds. 
200 
Although he lost most of his fortune 
during the evacuation, he was still able to buy a number of properties 
in Jamaica, where he eventually settled. 
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CHAPTER XII THE ADMINISTRATION OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY 
(i) The Establishment of '1'Administration des Biens des Absents'. 
When the British arrived in Saint Domingue, they found 'les proprietes 
du Pals mais tres peu de proprietaires', it was said, 'et par 
consequent beaucoup de proprietes A 1'abandon et en peril'. 
1 
Absenteeism, long prevalent in so rich and unhealthy a colony, had 
been greatly increased by the Revolution, which had scattered colonists 
between Basle and Boston, St. Thomas and Scotland. Moreover, through- 
out the occupation, mulattoes and petits blancs continued to flee to 
the Republican zone, abandoning their property in the occupied 
parishes. Emigration was a constant factor, and Dominguan refugees 
in North America and Europe tended to prefer the security of their 
often penurious exile to the prospect of return to la perle des Antilles. 
Keeping a keen eye on events, though receiving personal news sometimes 
years out of date, most were determined to sit out the bloody struggle 
in the Caribbean. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate what proportion 
of colonial real estate belonged to absentees at this period. Hard 
evidence obtains only for property sequestrated because its owners 
could not prove residence in a friendly or neutral country. (Since 
some were sequestrated unfairly and others exempted through bonus 
proof, and an unknown amount of property remained in the care of 
Curateurs des Successions Vacants, even this category is not exactly 
represented). Between 30 and 
40 of Arcahaye's 48 sucreries were 
sequestrated, though on 15 of these a co-owner was present. 
2 
Port 
au Prince parish also contained 
48 sucreries. An official list dated 
October 1796 shows only 6 with all, or almost all, their owners 
present, 9 whose owners were in a friendly or neutral country (mainly 
the U. S. ) and 14 with an owner presumed to be in France, though three 
of these had a co*-owner present). 
3 
Of the remaining 19 we know 
nothing, being either beyond reclamation, British jurisdiction or 
simply the administrators' knowledge. Of the parish's 61 other 
plantations, we can be sure only that they were not sequestrated, but 
most probably they were all abandoned. In the town of Port au Prince, 
less than a fifth of the inhabitable houses belonged to absentees, 
though at Saint Marc, where many of the houseowners were free coloureds, 
the figure was about a third. 
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Although the absentees who drew up the London Propositions had 
expressed considerable concern about this large amount of landed 
property left in the uncertain care of attornies, managers or 
tenants - 'mercenaires en general tres infideles' -4 the final draft 
had not mentioned the problem. However, once the fall of Port au 
Prince had assured the British a firm foothold in the colony, an Act 
of Parliament was passed, placing in Government custody the revenue 
from all properties whose owners resided in enemy territory or could 
not prove otherwise. Those deemed 'Enemies of His Majesty' would be 
liable to forfeit their revenue. For the rest, some sort of safe- 
keeping was envisaged. The details were left to be worked out on the 
spot. 
The Government's principal motive at this stage was to prevent 
colonial revenue reaching France and indirectly helping the Republic's 
war effort. But at the same time 'Enemies of His Majesty' could also 
be punished and other proprietors persuaded to leave France and return 
to the colony, (which some did, via a neutral port), to tend their 
property and join the fight to retain slavery. Griffiths is wrong to 
say that absentee property was sequestrated to provide subsistence 
for the troops, but at least one administrator suspected that the 
Government intended 's'assurer dans les cas prevus dune indemnite justi- 
flee par les loix de la guerre'. 
5 
Portland's correspondence on the 
subject lays great stress on safeguarding the rights of the 
individual. 
6 
it reflects a genuine Whiggish regard for private 
property and, more importantly, a desire to advertise it to potential 
British subjects. 
Happily for public relations, sequestration did have a more 
benevolent face. As Governor Williamson told the Conseil Superieur, 
'La sagesse et la prudence ordonnent le sequestre des biens des 
absents pour etre administr6s sous les yeux du Gouvernement. Mais 
cette administration vraiment paternelle loin d'effrayer, sera un 
moyen d'assurer aux malheureux 
leur propriete et de les sauver de la 
cupidit6 des depositaires 
infideles, le gouvernement devenant par 
cette loi le d6positaire et le garant de produits'. 
7 
This was not all 
propaganda. Eager to extract all 
it could from the Customs dues 
of the occupied areas, and with an eye on the future, Pitt's ministry 
had every interest in preventing the dilapidation and ensuring the 
most productive use of property misappropriated, neglected or abandoned. 
The dishonest estate manager has always posed a problem to the 
legislator, and during the Revolution in Saint Domingue such men seem 
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to have had a field day. The army, too, was known to seize crops and 
building materials and make excessive requisitions from plantations 
without resident owners. 
8 
Government supervision might check not only 
private fraud but also clandestine sales of sugar and coffee to 
American ships. Ruined or abandoned estates also raised legal 
difficulties best solved by government intervention, while the problem 
also had strategic dimensions, since much of the property consisted 
of increasingly restless slaves. 
Little could be done until May 1795, when Williamson finally 
arrived in the colony. At the first meeting of his Privy Council, he 
told its members their immediate priority was to frame a law concerning 
absentee property. After receiving his consent, it was published on 
June 27th. As it erred from Portland's instructions by sequestrating 
all absentee property, 
9 
the decree had a short life and consequently 
will not be discussed here. The error was partly due to careless 
phrasing in a letter from Portland to Williamson, 
10 
which gave the 
Cote Ouest council scope to express vengefully the bitter feelings 
of the resident colon towards proprietors who watched from a safe 
distance the struggle to save the colony. The decree denounced the 
'calculs egoistes, craintes pueriles, esperances criminelles' of those 
who had fled to the U. S. and elsewhere. It also envisaged penalising 
the returning absentee by withholding part of the accrued revenue of 
his property. It was, on the other hand, less severe than Sonthonax's 
decree on absentee property, which decreed the confiscation of property 
of those in enemy territory. The Conseil Prive regarded the prospective 
revenue as a welcome means of meeting current expenditure. By 
September, some 61,000 livres had been 'anticipated' in this way. 
11 
However, the decree created uproar in absentee circles and among 
enemies of the Cote Ouest. The Administration it set up was able to 
make no headway, paralysed (partly) by public knowledge that a new 
decree was necessary. 
After several weeks' work by a new, more conservative Conseil 
Prive, this appeared on September 26th. 
12 
It was much more detailed 
than its predecessor and more favourable to both absentees and their 
representatives. Only if a property lacked a legally accredited 
representative was it to be sequestered by the Administration. Those 
with bona fide attornies but whose owners could not be proved resident 
in a friendly or neutral 
country were not to be taken over but to 
account to the Administrateur Principal every six months. If-an 
attorney could prove both the legality of his procuration, 
13 
and 
that his employer was not living under French rule, the property would 
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be left alone. Wherever possible, managers should be kept on, because 
the safety of the occupied zone depended on the military service of 
this 'classe nombreuse'. However, representatives would be dismissed 
and taken to court, if their accounts showed that they had abused 
their position, while owners who should subsequently be judged enemies 
of Great Britain might suffer outright confiscation. All occupants of 
absentee property, therefore, were to present their credentials to 
their local administrator. Those maintained were to produce their 
accounts within one month. Sequestrated property was to be 
inventoried, and either exploited directly through a manager or leased 
out to the highest bidder. All the revenue accruing to absentees 
of uncertain residence was to be paid over to a Receiver General until 
the merits of each case could be judged. Close relations of an 
absentee proprietor might receive assistance out of the revenue of 
his property or be made its attorney, should it lack one. 
In addition, the administrative organisation was to be restructured. 
Laurent-Marie de Leaumont, now his brother was no longer on the Privy 
Council, lost the ostensibly lucrative post of Principal Administrator 
of the West. He was confined instead to overseeing the five parishes 
within the senechaussee of Port au Prince. Louis Vendryes, administrator 
of the parish of Port au Prince, likewise had his scope for commission 
reduced by the hiving off of the parish of Croix des Bouquets. In 
other respects, the decree followed that of June, which itself was 
based on the old colonial institution of Biens et Successions Vacants, 
which continued to exist alongside it. 
(ii) opposition to the Administration. The swift redundancy of 
the June 27th decree was not the sole reason for the meagre results it 
achieved. The new Administration encountered an immediate and deep-rooted 
opposition at all levels of colonial society that lasted throughout 
the occupation. In August 1797, Vendryes was to write, 'Ma place, en 
opposition avec tout le public, continuera ä me susciter de nouveaux 
ennemis en pressant comme je le dois l'interAt du Gouvernement, et 
ä abreuver ma famille, mes amis et moi-meme d1amertume et de chagrin'. 
14 
The opposition initially took the form of objections to the appointment 
of individual administrators and then of wholesale of the decrees. 
At least one man was gaoled for attacking an administrator in the 
course of his work. The hostility is not hard to understand. Given 
the precedent of the 1784-86 reforms, the absentee legislation was not 
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likely to please anyone. Essentially, it threatened interests in 
all classes of society. 
In the towns the new decree meant an end to the rent-free accommo- 
dation for squatters and the tenants of absentees' houses, as well as 
the invasion of privacy entailed by an official inspection. Attornies, 
even not impostors, stood to lose their procurations if they began 
between January 1792 and the start of the occupation, and anyway 
they had little desire to have their accounts examined. One Duprg, 
attorney of the merchant house of KercaAo, had been forging bills of 
lading, and though he had the audacity to claim that his employers 
20,570 livres, he was found to have defrauded them of over 380,000 
livres. 
15 
Plantation managers could be dismissed only if guilty of 
malversation. However, to a large number, this condition offered no 
security at all. Chapoteau, who managed an estate for the infamous 
Caradeux de la Caye, now in Philadelphia, was one of the many prompted 
to leave the colony by the establishment of the Administration des 
Biens des absents. Having sold the plantation's domestics, he was 
arranging to ship its copper cauldrons to America, when Vendryes asked 
that his passport be withdrawn. 
16 
The management of the plantations 
was to be based on the decrees of 1784-86, that had attempted to 
systematise plantation book-keeping and secure better treatment of 
the slaves. They had then created a storm of protest; now the 
managerial class had even more to hide. While the revenue and resources 
of an absentee estate had perenially offered its employees scope for 
peculation, the manager of a plantation that had ceased to make enough 
revenue to pay his wages was perhaps under even greater temptation, 
especially when contact with a distant master was extremely precarious 
and any loss could be blamed on les brigands. 
Not only attornies and managers were at fault. Some co-owners, 
like the vicomte d'Allemans, appear to have profited greatly from 
their partners' absence, 
17 
while abandoned or negligently-supervised 
estates were prey to anyone willing to risk a foray into an often 
treacherous countryside. Slave huts and outhouses were known to be 
demolished and carted away. Timber was very scarce. Even mills were 
stolen. 
18 
Slaves, too, on absentee plantations were appropriated by 
neighbours, who, especially in the Saint Marc area, proved reluctant 
to reveal their presence. 
19 
Thus, not all damage to plantation 
property was the work of the 'brigands'. 
A rumour reached London late in 1794 that the magistrates of the 
Conseil Superieur were seizing goods from absentee estates in anticipa- 
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tion of their salaries. 
20 
Though apparently untrue, it is indicative 
of colonial attitudes. Absentees had always been resented by less 
fortunate or more 'American-minded' colonists, and their opting out of 
Saint Domingue's revolutionary struggle increased this resentment. The 
Revolution, however, had also enabled a lucrative retribution to be 
enacted, and it is with this spirit of malevolent profiteering that 
the Administration clashed head on. 
By the end of 1795, only the Grand' Anse and the towns of Port au 
Prince, Saint Marc and the Mole had been brought under the Administra- 
tion. 
21 
Taken by the British in August 1795, Mirebalais and Grands 
Bois resisted until January 1796. In the meantime the coffee crop 
had been transported to the coast and shipped with probably little 
benefit to its owners and none at all to the Administration. At 
Croix des Bouquets, two administrators in succession failed to 
establish themselves, though finally successful in July 1796. 
Greatest resistance came from the well-preserved and immensely wealthy 
parish of Arcahaye, which held out until August 1796. Here public 
objections forced out the first administrator; the second resigned 
two weeks after opening his office and a third choice declined the 
appointment. Certain plantations in the parish were placed under the 
direct supervision of the Principal Administrator, de Ldaumont, but 
not one of their occupiers sent him their accounts. Elsewhere, when 
accounts were examined, they were generally found wanting (debattu) 
and very little cash reached the Administrators. 
22 
Not surprisingly, 
then attornies and managers were reluctant to declare their 
credentials. 
- 314 - 
Such remarkable recalcitrance owed its success partly to the 
difficulty of communication in these darkest years of the occupation, 
and partly to faulty legislation and a defective executive. From Sept- 
ember onwards, de Ldaumont complained in a series of letters to the Gover- 
nor in his Privy Council that the decree was being ignoredto the 
detriment of Government policy, absentee interests and respect for the 
law: (and also, he might have added, his own commission-based salary). 
No penalty had been provided for failure to present credentkals, he 
repeatedly pointed out. As the Administration was 'toute francaise', he 
blamed the Conseil iriv4 for inaction rather than the Governor. Actually, 
Williamson, always distracted by thewar, probably lost interst in such 
matters after October 1795, when he knew of his recall. 
De L&umont, much disliked by the Conseil Prive, seems justified in 
his complaints. He received no reply to his letters. 
23 
He brought the 
Duprd and Chapoteau affairs to its notice but it failed to have them tried 
in a higher court or to withdraw their procurations. In Dupr4's case, 
they even accepted his nominee for areplacement after fleeing thecolony. 
Similarly, the Administration got little help from the military, who, 
especially in the Grand' Anse, granted passports to indebted individuals 
without giving the stipulated three weeks' warning for the benefit of 
creditors. - The September 26th decree, he said, should be enforced 
24 
properly or be abrogated. Abrogation would at least end the dangerous 
struggle against authority and save theadministrators becoming a financial 
burden on the Government. The implied suggestion that a minimum wage 
should be fixed, since commission on their meagre receipts was insuffic- 
ient, was perforce adopted in February 1796. Few other adjustments were 
made until the whole Administration was reorganised in October. 
Table 6 shows what was achieved in these first sixteen montis. If 
such figures are far from impressive, the facts behind them are even less 
so. Because of the accessibility of urban property, it was in the towns, 
that the Administration first got off the ground, and urban rents account 
for about one third of its total revenue. Absentee houses, particularly if 
empty, tended to be preferred for Government use. In the summer and autumn 
of 1795, Louis VendryAs and an assistant engineer carried out the unpopular 
work of valuation in Port au Prince. British officers initially refused 
them entrance to their lodgings, as Williamson had forgotten to inform 
them of the administrators' mission. It was characteristic of the way 
inefficiency worsened relations, always strained, between French civilians 
and British military. 
On September ist it was estimated that out of 145(inhabited) absentee 
properties in the town, the 61 occupied by the Government ad an annual rental 
of 286,000 livres, while the 74 others were valued at 1715,000. The British 
had picked the best of the absentees' houses. Captain Young, Captain of the 
Port, was ensconced in a merchant's house worth 15,00D liý vres p. a. The 
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Conseil Prive', conscious that the colony was bound'by the Capitulation to 
foot the bill for the occupation, tried several times to have the troops 
paid a lodgings allowance instead of using absetee property indiscrimin- 
ately. It persuaded Governor Williamson to issue a decree to this effect 
but he never implemented it, probably for two reasons. Firstly, a lodg- 
ings allowance required specie and this was in short supply. Secondly, 
officers like Colonel Murray and Major Spencer tended to regard Port au 
Prince as British by right of conquest and absentee property as theirs to 
dispose of as they wished. 25 
Not only British, colonial and emigre troops were lodged at public 
expense but also certain needy refugee squatters, who were occupying 28 
small houses in September. Williamson demanded thier eviction, but in many 
cases appears to have relented, having a ready sympathy for such casualties. 
of the war. Also rehoused were houseowners evicted by the Government. The 
Government's bill in POrt au Prince for this period ran to nearly 440,000 
livres for absentee property alone. To save on specig it was paid into 
trust in notes of the Commissary General. Nearly a dozen of th*ouses 
when vacated by the troops evidently proved too derelict to attract more 
discriminating tenants, but nevertheless considerable repair work was 
financed out of individual rents. It accounts for most of the debit in 
Table 6. 
Plantations and slaves in Port au Prince parish, supplied. a mere ninth 
of its revenue, and this itself is deceptive. Most of it came from the 
recruitment of 24 slaves into the}hasseurs, for which 2,000 livres were 
paid each. Although payments was supposed to be made to th angers or 
attornies of absentees' estates only if they possessed the local administ- 
rator's permission, apparently the money, (one third cash, two-thirds in 
bills drawable on Jamaica), often went to line dishonest pockets. The 
remaining revenue from the handful of plantations taken into possession at 
this time came entirely from the hiring out of their slaves. 
In the other parishes a similar situation prevailed. At Saint Marc, 
67 houses were leased by December 1795 but not a single plantation had 
been taken over. Its impressive revenue came from the slae of slaves, 
(569 in 1795), to the Chasseur regiments of Dessources and Cocherel. Black 
recruits likewise account for most of the Administration's revenue in 
la Grand' Anse, Mirebalais and la Croix des Bouquets, while the Mole 
produced only urban income. Three factors explain this paucity of revenue 
from the absentees' plantations: their physical condition, the military 
situ. mtion, and Government indecision what to do with them, compounded with 
the popular opposition already mentioned. The Administration des Biens des 
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Absents failed not merely to put them into productive use but to take more 
than a few into possession in the first place. This is understandable, 
at least in the Cul de Sac and Mirebalais. As long as the countryside rem- 
ained unsafe, outlying plantations were difficult to visit, let alone live 
on and bring into production. It was in thsi situation that the Admin- 
istration had to locate the absentee plantations and ascertain the where- 
abouts of their owners, to assess the competing claims of often bogus 
attornies and then determine their suitability to continue. As already 
seen, the extracting of credentials and accounts proved a hard job. Matters 
were further held up by appeals against sequestration, disputes with the 
Curateurs aux Successions Vacantes and delays granted for procuring 
residence certificates, while the ease with which these were fabricated 
meant that time had'to be taken to change the law. Special cases like 
that of the duc d'Orldans' plantation had to await consideration by the 
Governor. The Ingdnieur du Roi was often too busy to assist in the 
valuation of property and the proclamation of martial law in December 1795 
held up the granting of leases. However, the fundamental issue was: what 
to do with these plantations? Should the Administration try to exploit 
them directly, or should it lease them out, or just put the slaves up for 
hire? 
26 
On July 28th 1796, the Governor seems to have decided to lease out all 
the slaves from the plantations that could not be defended. Up till then 
Vendryýs had been pursuing such a policy in Port au Prince parish with the 
slaves of the Damiens plantation, 100 of whom he had assembled in the town. 
However, he now objected that slaves should be kept on or returned to their 
own estates now that the plain of Cul de Sac was becoming more safe thanks 
to the multiplication of posts in the plain and mountkins. Significantly, 
he noted in a draft letter, (though later crossed through)';? that 
'preservation not production' was the aim of the Administration. 
27 
This 
attitude, however, was probably dispelled by the arrival of irate letters 
from the Duke of Portland, as it became evident in Whitehall that Saint 
Domingue could not pay but a minute fraction of the spiralling costs of 
occupation. Of all the departments involved, the Administration des 
Biens des Absents caused most concern. Insofar as was consistent with 
justice to the individual, 'every advantage' was henceforth to be reaped 
from absentee property. 
28 
It has been seen that over half the Administration's total revenue 
in this period was not regulär revenue at all but came from the sale of 
slaves to become Chasseurs. At 2,000 
i livres each, they represented a net 
loss not only to their owners but alsd to the assets of the Administration 
and to the cultivable capacity of the colony. Though specialist slaves 
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were exempted from recruitment, the Chasseurs of necessity siphoned off 
the strongest part of the labour force. 
Some two-thirds, then, of the Administration's gross revenue came from 
the Govern-ment. This pleased neither the economy-conscious ministry in 
London nor the administrators themselves, who received a low commission on 
Government rents. Additionally, as most of these payments were not made in 
cash, individual administrators often had difficulty in meeting current 
expenditure. Apart from in the plain of Arcahaye, which evaded the Admin- 
istration's control for fourteen months, and la Grand' Anse, where 114 
estates were sequestrated, most plantations were still beyond its cogniscence 
and of those that were it would seem that only one was actually in production. 
Even where the Administration functioned best, in the Grand' Anse, plantation 
managers proved reluctant to hand over their revenues; after one year, they 
owed the Administration 110,000 Iivres. 
29 The low yield of the Administ- 
ration was the only complaint against it. The Conseil Privy, acutely 
suspicious of the administrators accounts, accused de Leaumont of delaying 
the transfer of funds in his possession for the purpose of speculation. Such 
behaviour was encouraged by the illegal but general practice of paying rents 
in bills of exchange, and had been commonplace in Ancien Regime accounting in 
France and Saint Domingue. Certainly the tardiness in rendering account looks 
suspicious: Vendryes' account for 1795 gras presented in August 1796, and de 
Leaumont's general account for July-October 1796 in May 1797. Nevertheless, an 
examination of their papers suggests they had in fact little leeway for 
misapplying funds-30 The fault lay with the occupants of absentee property. 
(iii) The 71IR4fae Royale'. Even before Portland's criticisms were received, 
Lapointe and the Attorney-General de Cotte had proposed a scheme for leasing 
out the absentee estates of Arcahaye, which Forbes had shelved owing to the 
opposition it aroused and the--pressiire of military business. Around the same 
times the racist extremistsVa entin de Cullion file returned to the colony 
from America. He wanted to the absentee policy being pursued by Sonthonax in 
the North adopted in the British zone. Instead of trying to ascertain the 
whereabouts of absentees and the validity or otherwise of their representatives' 
credentials, all absentee property should be sequestrated and leased out. 
31 
The leasing of plantations had been very rare in Saint Domingue, 
32 because 
the property always suffered by its despite legal safeguards. Now, however, 
wa 
it seemed the only to ensure that those running absentee estates would part 
with any of the revenue. Providing that commercial rents were charged, 
the absentees would benefit in thA long run, and the Administration would have 
a valuable source of cash. 
There was , however, considerable scope 
for administrative corruption, 
and it was this that brought together Lapointe, de Cullion and General Forbes's 
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influential secretary, James Eaten. In August they had an ordonnance drawn 
up permitting them to farm out all the absentee estates in Arcahaye, which 
was then specially amended by instructions from Forbes. The whole project 
was opposed by the Conseil Priv4 and it was never registered by the Conseil 
Superieur. The amendments enabled Esten to fix rents and choose tenants 
ä l'amiable, not as previouslystated, according to the highest tender and in 
the presence of a judge. Managers, moreover, were no longer asked for their 
past accounts. Being able to choose tenants, Lapointe claimed, was both prud- 
ent and just, since it meant that men long connected with an estate could be 
preferred over outsiders indulging in speculation. This , however., -Was not 
the only use to which it could be put, and it was not a policy that was always 
followed. Besides, the highest bidder would often be the man with most 
personal interest in an estate, as would later be found. In a single day, 
34 sucreries and 33 cafeieres along with a number of houses and slaves were 
leased out for a total annual rental of 1.7 million livres. Esten, Lapointe 
and their agents were said to have taken at least as much in bribes from the 
lessees. 
33 Estates producing 5/600,000 lbs of sugar or 150,000 lbs of coffee 
were let for extremely low rents around 30/40,000 livres or 20/25,000 livres 
respectively. As in the North, rents were generally put at between a sixth 
and a third of gross revenue, whereas even a half would have been considered 
much too small. 
34 Public opinion in Saint D0mingue and London was scandal- 
ised and factional hostilities were increased, but in October a R4gie Royale 
was set up to apply the same methods to the rest of the occupied zone. 
The plan was initiated by de Ldaumont, who had decided to throw in his 
lot with Esten. The previous system had clearly failed and most of the 
Conseil Priv4 accepted that. leasing was the simplest and best alternative. 
(Belin and Dulau d'Allemans, on the other hand, were not exactly disinterested 
parties, having been awarded leases in Arcahaye, and Belin also stood surety 
for Eaten as a lessee. ) The Conseil Sup(rieur offered no criticism; everything 
depended, de Ronseray remarked, on who was running the new Administration. 
Contrary to the evidenee of the Precis Historigue, the Conseil Privy also 
approved Forbes's exclusion of 
disputes involving absentee property from the 
cogniscence of the law courts and his arrogating that jurisdiction to himself. 
Legal wrangles had cost the previous administration a lot of time and money. 
However, it was no reason for abandoning leg-il checks on the granting of 
leases; this did seem suspicious, the Conseil Priv4 observed. Forbes blust- 
ered to the Duke of Portland about 'some miserable legal forms' and looked 
rather guilty. De Ldaumont retained his post, more mistrusted than ever,, 
and Malouet d'Alibert, Malouet's nephew, was kept on as a receiver as before, 
though now merely a sinecurist, as receipts could easily have been paid 
directly to representatives of the Agent-General. 
35 
To be formally taken into possession, absentee estates were visitkd by the 
local administrator together with a notary and 
three local habitants who drew 
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up an inventory and agreed on the rental value. Such was the web of conplicity 
involved, and in Arcahaye, the influence of Lapointe, that little trust 
could be placed in such safeguards. The leases followed standard forms, and 
required the tenant to supply two guarantors, forbade him to use the slaves 
off the estate, and stipulated that at the expiry date the plantation should be 
well provided with food and, in the case of sucreries, that a quater of the 
canes should begrandes cannes. Any necessary repairs carried out would be 
reimbursed at the end of the lease. Some clauses were novel: - estates on 
which troops were billeted had to provide one slave for every 30 infantry and 
15 cavalry, but also any extraordinary taxes could now be deducted from the 
rent. 
Considering all the controversy aroused, one is a little surprised to find 
that the majority of the new lessees were the estates' previous represent- 
atives. In Arcahaye, where 15 absentee-owned sncreries were already under 
lease y Este* leased 15 to a resident co-owner, 3 to their manager and only 7 
to outsiders. In the British zone as a whole, at least one fifth of the 
leases were granted to co-owners, probably slightly more to the absentees' 
attornies (or guardians if they were minors), and at least 10%4, went to men 
who, though possessing no formal connection with the property,, were close 
relatives of the owner. 
36 Of the remainderv, most were local planters living 
close by. About a seventh overall were local military commanders. The records 
are not complete but fewer than 10ýf seem to have been British: - 4 merchants, 
3 administrators,, I soldier and the Jamaican planter, Henry Shirley, acting 
through Jean-Suzanne de Leaumont. 
37Esten himself leased three estates, or 
rather arranged for three minions 
to retrocede their leases to him. This did 
not add to his popularity. The properties were considerably underva,. ued, and 
when put up for auction in July 1797 , after Esten's demise, they were re-let 
with increases in rent of respectively 
60f, 114% and 306%. 
38 
The Regie Royale had a short history. With General-Simcoe's arrival the 
Conseil Privd came into its own. In March, it called Esten to account in 
person and in June the Regie was ablished. Some wanted all the leases to be 
annulled so as to restore confidence in the Government. Simcoe and Portland, 
however, thought it was more important to keep faith with the present lessees 
and only in cases where collusion could be proved in the fixing of rents were 
plantations re-leased, this time to the highest bidder. The new rentals were 
usually about three times as high as the old. 
39 The administrators were placed 
under the direct supervision of the Conseil Prive and the Agent-General's 
department, to which they now had to transfer their receipts every month. All 
had to re-apply for their jobs after their accounts had been investigated. 
De Leaumont was sacked and de Cullion was replaced by Malouet d' Alibert, 
whose sinecure was abolished. 
Esten made a timely resignation. Accounting 
procedures were standardised. In Port au Prince, rents were revalued to 
bring in an extra 20,000: livres p. a. Although this represented an under- 
valuation of only 7%, we find certain influential figures like the baron 
Santo Domingo having their rents tripled. At the other end of the scale, 
the likes of veuve Millet 'sans moyens', who had not paid any rent for two 
years, were now evicted. Even so, of the capital's 120,000 livres of rent 
arrears two-thirds were considered unreclämable. 
40 
It was only in the occupation's last year, therefore, that the great 
resource of absentee property began to be efficiently exploited, and even then 
it was handicapped by the artificially low rents established by the Re' ie 
Royale. They came to some 3.1 million livres, just over half deriving from 
31 suareries in the plain of Arcahaye. and 31 cafcfiýres in the mountains behind. 
About 10% were urban rents, mainly from Port au Prince, and the 113 estates in 
the Grand' Anse were leased for 828,700 livres. 
41 
Hence, though it consider- 
ably increased Government revenues, it was never as important as the Customs 
duties. 
In spite of the reforms, the administration of absentee property cont- 
inued up till the end of the occupation to be a subject of bitter complaint. 
About 25 proprietors in Britain tried repeatedly to have the sequestration 
order lifted from their estates, though very few succeeded, usually because 
they did not p ossess their title deeds, it seems, or because they did not 
send a proper certificate of residence. A letter of recommendation from 
Grenville or Portland was not acceptable. General Whyte said there was littb 
point in the whole business, if it did not force absentees to return to the 
colony, since their managers were growing nothing but fodder and pocketing the 
proceeds., Nevertheless, even when 
they did return, most were not allowed, in 
contradi^"tion of the September 1795 decree, to re-possess their properties. 
The Government, General Maitland said, needed the money, and he did not feel 
inclined to act otherwise. 
42 
- 321 - 
TABLE 6. THE ADMINISTRATION OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY RECEIPT AND EXPENDITURE 
(i) July 1795-October 1796 000s livres coloniales 
CD Balance 
Port au Prince 
Arcabaye 
Grand' Anse 
Croix des Bouquets 
Mirebalais 
Mole 
Saint Marc 
Other 
723 218 504 
0 0 0 
774 119 654 
145 21 123 
72 45 27 
. 
178 24 
. 154 
1,562 256 1,306 
1e 3 15 
3,386 600 2,786 
(ii) October 1796-Evacuation 
Port au Prince 
Arcahaye 
Grand' Anse 
Croix des Bouquets 
and Mirebalais 
Mole 
475 85 390 
1,872 24 1,847 
824 14 809 
163 18 145 
c. 130 
3,334 141 3,321 
Notes: Both tables are based on the accounts and correspondence in P. R. O. 
T 64/223-226B. The figures for Saint Marc are estimated from : he data for 1795 
only. The figure for the Mole in table (ii) is derived from the half-period 
total in WO 1/68,283. The Grand' Anse figures in table (i) derive from 
p. 641224/4, with the addition of 388,000 livres receipts for 194 recruits, 
though it was not actually paid in this period, and of 88,020 livres, added to 
both credit and debit columns, which was the amount of expenditure and coanjss- 
ion deducted before receipts were credited and not entered as ai&ebit in the 
original account. This was doubtless the sort of variation in accounting 
procedures that irritated the Conseil. Prive so much. 
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CHAPTER XIII 'LIKE THE LEAVES IN AUTUMN': DISEASE AND MORTALITY 
AMONG THE BRITISH TROOPS. 
(i) Yellow Fever in the West Indies. In the Caribbean and on 
the North Atlantic seaboard, 1793-98 were years of notably high mortality, 
apparently caused by a 'pandemic' of yellow fever spread by the great 
population movements resulting from revolution and war. It is not 
entirely clear just how unusual such outbreaks had been in the region. 
Relying only on contemporary clinical descriptions, one cannot be 
sure. The 18th century mind tended to confuse one fever with another 
and medical men were especially contradictory on the subject of 'yellow' 
fever. 
1 
It would seem, however, that the disease was introduced into 
the West Indies from Africa in the 1640's and that thereafter it 
enjoyed a spasmodic history, appearing as epidemics of the 'black 
vomit fever' or maladie de Siam. 
2 
Yellow fever begins with lassitude, a sudden headache and burning 
fever. It can vary greatly in severity, but in 'classic' cases the 
eyes become inflamed, nausea is experienced and pain in the muscles 
and back. The pulse is initially high but falls as compulsive vomiting 
sets in. Jaundice and delirium may appear but its most characteristic 
symptoms are a falling pulse accompanied by continued high tempera- 
ture, the vomiting of partly-digested blood, and, in the later stages, 
generalised haemorrhage. It is not contagious and survival of an 
attack gives immunity for life. Unfortunately, its clinical 
resemblance to other fevers, including pernicious tertian malaria, 
viral hepatitis, leptospirosis, dengue and blackwater fevers, makes 
it difficult to diagnose even nowadays. 
3 
Even so, after considering all 
the clinical and epidemiological evidence, one may be fairly certain 
that the grisly descriptions of the 'St. Domingo Remittent' published 
during and after the occupation generally refer to yellow fever. 
4 
Robert Jackson and Hector McLean, who served as Assistant 
Inspectors of Hospitals with the British forces, realised that jaundice 
was not necessarily always present in an attack and that it also occurred 
in other diseases, as did occasionally the vomiting of altered blood. 
While stressing the appearance of haemorrhage and black vomit, they 
both noted the fall in the pulse, the reversion from constipation to 
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diarrhoea, the coated tongue with bright red edges and other signifi- 
cant symptoms. They also remarked how the symptoms changed on the 
third day. The disease occurred all year round but principally from 
May to November. it was largely confined to the ports. Typically 
affected were young men recently arrived from northern climates. It 
was neither contagious, nor amenable to treatment with cinchona bark 
and rarely occurred twice, they thought, in the same person. Yellow 
fever is the obvious diagnosis. It is true that McLean insisted the 
disease was different from the one that ravaged Philadelphia in 1793, 
now acknowledged to have been yellow fever, but quite clearly he was 
misled by reports that it was contagious. 
(5) 
The epidemics that spread through the Caribbean were similarly 
often thought to be contagious. 
(6) 
However, urban yellow fever tends 
to be localised; its vector, Aedes aegypti, rarely travels over 100 
metres. Hence, one can see how such a confusion might take place. 
More surprisingly, perhaps, the disease was often treated as a ghastly 
novelty. De Charmilly, in fact, claimed that until the Port au Prince 
outbreak of June 1794, yellow fever was known in Saint Domingue only 
by name. 
(7) 
This might make one think that either this disease or 
its antecedents was not actually yellow fever. Yet, it was every- 
where observed that 'Seamen and Strangers' proved far more vulnerable 
to it than did colonists. West Indian born whites and other long 
residents suffered little more than the black and the coloured pop- 
ulation which generally escaped infection. 
(8) 
Curiously, we find 
the same phenomenon in the 1729 outbreak at Cartagena - local in- 
habitants largely immune, yet adamant they had never before encount- 
ered the disease. 
(9) 
It was in the south Caribbean that the great epidemic of 1793 
first took hold. The French troops sent to Saint Domingue in 1792 
to put down the slave rebellion had suffered very severe losses from 
disease, and at the end of the year, sickness was also said to have 
reached exceptional levels in the Jamaica garrison. However, these 
outbreaks attracted little attention and their cause remains unknown. 
(10) 
In March 1793, a 'malignant, pestilential fever' of novel appearance 
broke out in Grenada, possibly introduced by a ship from Boullam in 
West Africa. 
(11) 
Whether the fever was really spread by shipping 
has been hotly debated, but it soon appeared in neighbouring islands 
and in may was seemingly carried north to Jamaica. Not till October, 
however, when some thought it was re-introduced by sailors, did it really 
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begin to spread there. After disappearing for five months, it 
returned with renewed violence in the summer of 1794. At first 
some Jamaicans thought it to be the plague; some, an entirely new 
disease; others, 'a severe version of the common remitting fever of 
this isle'. Only in mid-1794, after much debate, were doctors 
identifying it as the synochus putris or 'the yellow fever of the 
West Indies'. 
(12) 
When British troops had landed in Martinique in June 1793, they 
stayed on shore only 48 hours but immediately contracted a 'putrid' 
fever which revealed itself on the return voyage. 
(13) 
In the early 
summer of 1793, refugees from Martinique seemed to have already carried 
the disease to Dominica and Barbados, where by October it had killed 
500 and 300 whites respectively. In July, as is well known, a great 
epidemic was started in Philadelphia by the refugees who fled le Cap 
with Governor Galbaud, or by the ships they sailed in; over 4,000 died 
in four months. 
(14) 
At the same time, 'calenturas putridas malignas, 
de toda especie' destroyed the Spanish batallions guarding the Santo 
Domingo frontier. 
(15) 
Nevertheless, only in June 1794, de Charmilly 
claimed, did la fievre jaune first reach Saint Domingue, introduced 
by troops from the fever-ridden army in Martinique. 
This clearly cannot be true. 
(16) 
Penning and Collyer's New 
System of Geography, published in 1786, interestingly classed Saint 
Domingue unlike Jamaica and Martinique as salubrious, but Moreau de 
Saint-Merv and other writers leave one in no doubt that the haemorr- 
hagic maladie de Siam-had already had a long history in the colony 
and that the West Province in particular was noted for its fevers. 
(17) 
More importantly, under the occupation the colonists seem to have been 
by and large immune to the disease that decimated the British forces, 
just as the refugees who caused the epidemic in Philadelphia rarely 
fell victim to it themselves. The extent of the colonists' immunity 
is not precisely known. Epidemics in the period 1793-98 killed many 
in the small towns of Saint Marc, Mirebalais and les Cayemittes, though 
yellow fever was not necessarily responsible. 
(18) 
At the Mole, no 
colonist succumbed to the disease, but in Port au Prince in July 1794, 
Cadusch reported 10-12 inhabitants dying each day along with 25-30 
soldiers. Henry Shirley, however, said the inhabitants were not 
affected, but then again, he was not there. 
(19) 
It seems quite 
possible that there was a high death rate among recently-arrived 
colonists, but equally it cannot be doubted that most habitants (de 
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Charmilly included) had had prior experience of yellow fever. 
'Contagionist' arguments for the origin of fever often concealed 
an element of parti pris. No-one wished their own town to be branded 
a source of deadly infection. Disease, therefore, should be shown 
to be imported. Moreover, West Indians who traced the Grenada out- 
break to the Boullam expedition were only too happy to discourage 
colonising ventures in West Africa. 
(20) 
As for de Charmilly, he 
was hoping Britain would annex, Saint Domingue and was to a great 
extent responsible for the British presence there. Nonetheless, 
though he and Cadusch had good reason to lie, their statements need 
not be dismissed as fabrication. As noted already, a great many who 
experienced the epidemics of the 1790's had difficulty relating them 
to any previously known disease. The dramatic impact of the 1793-94 
pandemic and contemporary confusion as to exactly what was yellow fever 
can best be explained if one examines its previous history in the West 
Indies. Epidemics of yellow fever had been at their most common in 
the Caribbean in the period 1690-1770, when the proportion of non- 
immunes in the population was assuredly at its highest. They tended 
to appear in areas of most rapid development - at first in Barbados, 
then Martinique, Saint Domingue in the 1730's and 1740's, the Guianas 
and Windward Isles in the 1760's, Cuba somewhat later. However, it 
is important to realise that few outbreaks have been recorded in the 
two decades after 1770, especially among civilians. 
(21) 
Dr. William 
Wright practised in Jamaica during the years 1764-77 and 1783-86 
without ever, it seems, encountering the disease. 
(22) 
Though medical 
historians have generally assumed otherwise, it was probably malaria 
rather than yellow fever that decimated the British expeditions sent 
to Havana in 1762 and San Juan in 1781. 
(23) 
In Saint Domingue, 
Moreau de Saint-Mery implied, the disease had become fairly unusual 
by 1790. Both there and in Jamaica it was believed to affect only 
newcomers. 
(24) What is more, it seems to have become less virulent. 
With a remarkably felicitous choice of metaphor, an early 19th century 
writer described the years 1773-93 as follows: - 
Iles germes de la fievre jaune demeurds latens, daps les lieux 
qu'elles avaient infect4s, se developpArent pendant cette periode, 
quand des circonstances favourables le leur permirent; mais il 
parait que... la maladie... dans le cours de ces vingt annees devint 
aux Antilles, sporadique, individuelle, lente daps sa marche, et 
incertaine dans ses effets meurtriers'. 
(25) 
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One might assume, therefore, that yellow fever had become both 
less virulent in this period and effectively endemic. Local inhabi- 
tants must have acquired immunity in childhood or shortly after arrival 
in the Caribbean, often through a mild or inapparent attack. It thus 
did not, as some historians have thought, appear solely in epidemics, 
disappearing for many years at a time. 
26 
The disease was probably 
maintained through the regular introduction of infected mosquitoes 
by slave ships from West Africa or by shipping from other infected 
areas. 
27 
Given the presence of infected aegypti, the prevalence 
of yellow fever is determined mainly by the proportion of non-immunes 
in a population and their physical proximity. Since infection can 
be spread only by non-immunes in the early stages of an attack, the 
relation between incidence of immunity and of infection is more geo- 
metric than arithmetic - hence the disasters that befell European 
armies crowded into Caribbean port towns in war time. In the late 
colonial period, though the influx of newcomers was great, they were 
absorbed piecemeal into a largely immune population. Moreover, a 
growing percentage of them went to work on coffee plantations in the 
mountains far from the towns that were the foci of infection. These 
factors probably ensured that new arrivals did not become infected 
en masse. At the same time, increasingly frequent contacts with 
West Africa, as the slave trade reached its peak, ensured they did, 
in time, become infected. By postulating a low level of endemicity, 
one may thus account for both the decreased incidence of yellow fever 
epidemics and the immune status of the resident population in the 
1770's and 1780's. 
More difficult to explain is why the disease became less 
virulent. It may be that decreased incidence of itself led to 
decreased virulence. As the virus cannot be transmitted from 
mosquito to mosquito, fewer infected humans at any given moment 
also meant fewer infected mosquitoes. The chances of infection 
resulting from the bite of only one mosquito, rather than of many, 
were thus increased and, therefore, it could be argued, the prospects 
of acquiring immunity via a mild or inapparent attack. This might 
seem a likely hypothesis, given that cases do appear more severe in 
epidemic than endemic situations and yet vary considerably within 
those situations. 
28 
However, experiments with monkeys have so 
far failed to reveal a marked correlation between initial dosage of 
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virus and the severity of an attack. 
29 
Alternatively, it could be that different strains of the yellow 
fever virus, although producing cross-immunity, vary greatly in viru- 
lence. 
30 
In the decades before the Revolution, the strain preval- 
ent in the Caribbean could have been of a mild variety, sometimes 
described as 'yellow fever', sometimes as a type of 'common remittent', 
which nevertheless rendered its victims immune against other more 
fulminating varieties known earlier in the century and which regained 
prevalence in the 1790's. Interestingly, both Dr. Jackson and William 
Lempriere observed that the 'common remittent' of Jamaica tended to 
produce immunity against 'yellow fever'. 
31 
Thus, it might not have been 
without reason that most doctors in Jamaica and those tending the 
British troops in Saint Domingue considered 'yellow fever' to be merely 
an 'aggravated' form of the 'common remittent'. 
32 
It is not clear how far the epidemics of the 1790's were actually 
spread from island to island and how far they resulted simply from an 
influx of non-immunes. In the first case, the idea of an extra- 
deadly strain of virus is peculiarly apposite; in the second, it is 
superfluous. Whether or not the virus was unusual, the pandemic was 
doubtless intensified by the movements of refugees and soldiers from 
island to island which increased the circulation of infected men and 
mosquitoes. Greatest stress, however, should be laid on the wartime 
influxes of non-immunes. Seamen, soldiers, their wives and children, 
prisoners of war, military contractors and their clerks, they doubled 
the white population of many West Indian towns. Simply by over- 
stretching the existing medical services and creating in themselves 
new health risks (and, therefore, the chances of multiple infection), 
they might explain much of the apparently increased virulence of yellow 
fever in the 1790's. Here the example of Jamaica is instructive. 
The greatest increase in the death rate of the island garrison in 
these years took place in 1792, before the pandemic had begun and when 
several new regiments arrived. Furthermore, during the war its over- 
crowded seaports witnessed a general increase in morbidity that 
affected everybody and an increased case fatality in many diseases 
besides yellow fever. 
33 
A third contributory factor may have been the climate. Rainfall, 
and more particularly temperature, can affect the incidence of yellow 
fever through its influence on the breeding of the Aedes aegypti. 
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While in the 1780's Jamaica and Saint Domingue experienced long 
periods of drought, we know that the Jamaica and Philadelphia epi- 
demics of 1793 were preceded by unusually hot, dry weather following 
on exceptionally heavy rains. 
(34) 
During the years the British 
occupied Saint Domingue rainfall was observed to be unusually high 
at the generally dry, and healthy, Mole Saint Nicholas and every- 
where temperatures were thought to be higher than usual. 
(35) 
Increased 
rainfall, it is true, would have had more impact on the malaria-bearing 
Anopheles than the domestic Aedes, which breeds in man-made containers 
rather than puddles, and certainly, dual infection may have been an 
important factor behind the high death rates that will be examined 
below. However, remembering that Port au Prince's water supply was 
cut off for much of the occupation, thus increasing reliance on storage 
vessels, it is highly significant that urban water shortages are known 
to cause the number of Aedes to multiply in a town. 
(36) 
In Philadelphia 
and Baltimore, during the epidemics of 1793-94, it was noted that 
mosquitoes had become unusually numerous. 
(37) 
This may well have 
been the case in Saint Domingue. 
Thus, in addition to the great influxes of non-immunes into an 
endemic region, the movements of population between infected areas 
and the possible introduction of a new strain of virus, Saint Domingue 
in the 1790's may have witnessed a notable increase in the vector 
population as well. These factors go far in explaining the level of 
mortality in British-occupied Saint Domingue. 
(ii) Counting the Dead. In the 18th century, many of the 
European troops sent out to the West Indies died there from disease. 
Losses were especially severe in wartime, but it is difficult to get 
an overall picture from the scattering of data available, some of 
which is reviewed at the end of this section. During the 1780's, 
the problem attracted the attention of a number of writers in Great 
Britain and by 1790 we find Lord Grenville at the Home Office and 
Adam Williamson in Jamaica actively concerned with reducing the loss 
(38) 
of life in West India garrisons. Nevertheless, it was to take 
the deaths of thousands more troops in Saint Domingue and the Windward 
Islands before even basic lessons would be learned regarding the siting 
of camps and the use of black regiments, while real medical advances 
still lay far in the future. 
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TABLE 
MOLE NAVAL HOSPITAL 
(i) 
f of deaths duo to 'favor' 
(not including 'hectic' &'intormittont' favors) 
Jan/mar Apr/Juno Jul/Sept Oct/Doc 
1794 70 55 73 
1795 31 56 45 50 
1796 63 60 00 68 
1797 32 27 58 33 
1798 22 57 43 
Overall - 1743 - 54% 
tü) % of terminated 'favor' cases resulting in death 
(slightly exaggerates fatalities as cases who 
absconded not included) 
Jan Mar Apr/Juno Jul/Sept Oct/Doc 
1794 33 29 56 
1795 33 29 30 34 
1796 28 32 48 29 
1797 20 28 54 30 
1790 29 59 47 
Overall 943 - 2461 - 36% 
Sourcot ADM 102/730 and 731. 
During the first five months that the British were in Saint 
Domingue, mortality and morbidity among the troops were, if anything, 
fairly low. This was the 'healthy season'. Most of the soldiers 
sent from Jamaica had already spent at least a year in the West Indies. 
Some were more recent recruits, but equally some were probably creoles. 
They were, therefore, to some extent acclimatised. Many, moreover, 
were stationed in Jer4mie, the most salubrious part of Saint Domingue. 
In March and April, however, disease spread rapidly in the other out- 
posts so that by June 4th about 14% of the soldiers sent from Jamaica 
had already perished. 
(39) 
Well under a quarter of them were killed 
in action. Yet, until 'incredible numbers' began to die in Port au 
Prince of 'a most dangerous fever', 
(40) 
Williamson remained unconcerned. 
Probably most of the fever cases in these early months were either 
malaria (the 'intermittent fever' common in the dry season) or some 
other local fever with relatively low mortality that were considered 
a normal part of West Indian life. 
(41) 
The sole information we have on 
case-fatality comes from the Mole naval hospital. There the mortality 
rate in 'fever' cases, before as well as after June 1794, remained 
fairly constant at about 33% (Table 7 (ii) ). This could mean 
that seamen had brought the disease from Jamaica before June 1794, 
as one might expect. Case fatality in the Philadelphia 1793 epidemic 
was, significantly, around 30%. However, such a rate could not 
possibly account for the high overall level of mortality. In 
Jamaican hospitals mortality in fever cases was rather higher. 
(42) 
It would seem, therefore, that the fever among seamen at the Mole 
was not generally yellow fever. 
Certainly, the level of mortality among the British troops after 
June 1794 was exceptional. While the death rate for the army as a 
whole in the period June 1st - September 1st apparently averaged a 
lugubrious 10% per month (at least), that of the Port au Prince garrison 
was even higher. 
(43) 
Phenomenal losses were incurred by the newly- 
arrived 41st and 23rd Regiments, three-quarters of whose men were 
stationed in the capital (Table B). The death rate in their batallion 
companies in July and August was six times higher than the rate in those 
of their sister regiment, the 22nd, which was stationed mainly at the 
Mole. However, in September and October, the 22nd, too, was to be 
decimated, losing 60% of its complement in eight weeks. 
(44) 
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TABLE 8. Estimated monthly death rates, summer 1794. 
Partly-acclimatised and unacclimatised troops . 
% dead no. dead 
Men dead per 100 in 3 months in 3 months 
June July Auýc . 
1st Foot 10 8 83, 24 107 
49th Foot 6 532 102 20 65 
23rd Foot 22 29 10 48 319 
41st Foot 15 24 12 44 318 
Sources: WO 17/95,125,151,162 and 1986. 
Not surprisingly, the four 'Jamaican' regiments fared rather 
better, (Tables 4 and 5). Yet, it is strange to note that in the 
summer the detachments of 'Jamaican' troops at Port au Prince generally 
suffered fewer sick and dead than did their comrades in the other 
outposts. This was certainly true of the 49th and the Artillery, 
often so of the Royals (or 1st Foot), and was apparently also the 
case with the 13th and 20th Regiments, who seemed to have lost 
around a third of their men in the three summer months, although 
garrisoned principally in the Grand'Anse and at the Mole. 
(45) 
The 
explanation is probably twofold. As immunity to yellow fever is 
acquired after only one attack, while immunity to malaria in the 
West Indies is a product of several years' exposure to the disease, 
one might presume these troops were more vulnerable to the latter 
than to yellow fever. In the summer, when yellow fever raged at 
Port au Prince, malaria was probably not present there to the extent 
it was in the more rural areas. 
The capital, indeed, was only partly responsible for the hecatomb 
that engulfed the British forces. Of the 2,000 soldiers who died 
between June and December, not 60% were stationed in Port au Prince, 
where the death rate during the autumn fell below that of the army 
as a whole. The mean monthly rate of loss for the period August 
31st to December 31st was about 9.5%. 
(46) 
The movement of troops 
between the different outposts makes it difficult to localise and 
explain this continued high level of mortality. The fighting 
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TABLE 
Monthly Returns of the 49th Foot 1793-94 
No. % No. 
Dead Dead Sick Observations 
1st Nov. 1793 0 0 11 
1st Dec. 4 1 26 
1st Jan. 1794 2 0.5 19 
1st Feb. 4 1 38 
1st March 8 2.2 21 
1st April 17 4.7 88 
1st May 10 2.9 96 
1st June 22 6.6 96 
lst July 19 6.1 106 
1st Aug. 16 5.5 106 
1st Sept. 30 10.4 119 
Ist Oct. 17 6.5 99 
1st Nov. 19 7.8 112 
Total: Dead 168 44% 
Discharged 6 
Deserted 5 
368 men arrived Sept/Oct. 
12 enlisted between 
January and June. 
17 P. O. W. s 
16 P. O. W. s 
2 P. O. W. s 
21 enlist 
4 enlist 
around Saint Marc doubtless contributed but the number of British 
involved was small. The loss in December of Tiburon was a costly 
disaster but most of its British defenders had already died of 
disease when Rigaud attacked it. Between August 1st and December 
1st, its garrison of 200 men (mostly of the ill-fated 23rd and 41st 
Regiments) had been whittled away at a rate of well over 15% per 
month. 
(47) 
Possibly, this period saw yellow fever transmitted 
from Port au Prince to the other outposts, particularly to Saint Marc 
and the Mole, where the 22nd Foot was suddenly stricken and where 
from August to October two-thirds of the garrison were sick. This 
hypothesis receives some support from the registers of the Mole naval 
hospital, in which the percentage of fatal cases caused by 'fever' and 
the percentage of 'fever' cases resulting in death rose to exceptional 
levels in the last quarter of the year, (Table q). Throughout the 
occupation, Port au Prince was to retain its reputation as a death-trap 
but it came to be recognised that between August and October, and 
especially in November, the Mole was equally or even more unhealthy. 
(48) 
Always split up into several detachments, the 49th Foot served 
at one time or another in almost all the outposts of the occupied 
zone. Although it proved along with the Royals one of the most 
durable of the British regiments, and was therefore exceptional, its 
experience of Saint Domingue was in a sense representative (Table 5). 
It appears that from the end of March until December, this 'healthiest' 
of regiments always had between a quarter and a half of its men sick. 
By August, in fact, it was the only regiment with half its men fit 
for duty. However, in most corps morbidity levels began to drop 
in October, and by December Port au Prince was the only centre where 
the sick still outnumbered the healthy. In its second year in Saint 
Domingue, the 49th's mean monthly rate of loss did not fall but rose, 
from 4.6% to over 5%, and when the regiment was drafted at the end of 
August 1795 only 125 veterans were still alive. The originally much 
larger 23rd and 41st Regiments had shrunk to almost the same size. 
In their first year in Saint Domingue, they buried over three-quarters 
of their men and at least another 20 deserted or were discharged. 
(49) 
Catastrophic though they were, the losses of 1794 were out- 
matched by those of the following year. As always, in the early 
months of the year mortality was low. However, in May and June 
fever once more spread throughout the army. Chiefly affected were 
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TABLE . 
10 
Selected Monthly Mortality Rates - 1795 
officially reported deaths per 100 men 
July : AH. Sept. Oct. 
Nov. 
81st Foot 7.0 8.6 25.4 27.4 17.2 
96th Foot 23.6 c. 35.5 42.4 8.5 ? 
82nd Foot 5.1 14.8 23.2 24.2 
83rd Foot 1.1 27.8 c. 60.0 ? 
130th Foot 0.8 34.2 c. 33.0 62.3 
All British forces 13.5 c. 15.5 17.7 21.4 17.4 
Total no. 
reported dead 
334 381 552 547 371 
Source: WO 17/1987 
the 96th Regiment that had arrived from Ireland in April. Least 
affected were the original 'Jamaican' regiments, while the 22nd, 23rd 
and 41st suffered to an intermediate extent. By July 1st, the 96th 
had lost since embarkation 41% of its men. Yet, the worst was still 
to come. The desperately needed reinforcements that appeared in 
August and October (including recruits for the 96th) disembarked 
straight into their graves. As Table10 shows, they disappeared at 
a rate scarcely credible, though the number of dead may well be under- 
stated by more than 100. The surviving sources are far from complete 
and contain several inconsistencies. Nevertheless, a close examination 
of regimental and general returns allows one to estimate with some con- 
fidence that the total British dead of 1795 amounted to around 3275. 
(50) 
Perhaps another 200 perished in the first two months of 1796, 
battle casualties bulking large for the first time. However, in 
March when apparently 73 more died, the death rate fell to 1.8% per 
month, despite the great influx of fresh troops, who now made up half 
the British forces. This figure is open to doubt, as the returns are 
self-contradictory. Even so, by April 1796, it is fairly certain that 
the death toll in the British forces sent to Saint Domingue had reached 
something close to 5730. This estimate, based on two sets of calcu- 
lations, tallies well with one made by Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland 
which put the number dead at 129 officers and 5720 men. 
(51) 
Given 
some of the errors in his calculations, which he admitted were rough, 
the figure of 5730 would seem to be accurate within 1%. 
For the period after April 1796, however, calculations become 
steadily more hazardous. The number of regiments and parts of 
regiments sent out to Saint Domingue greatly increased. Some did 
not stay very long, while when a regiment was disbanded, it is not 
always clear if the troops were repatriated or drafted into other 
corps. 
(52) 
Troops sent to Jamaica to convalesce pose special 
problems, and the position of the Irish Brigade is particularly 
obscure. Above all, very few returns survive for this period and 
their accuracy is questionable. Fortescue, in fact, thought losses 
were deliberately covered up. 
(53) 
The two regiments that arrived from Gibraltar shortly before 
Williamson's departure suffered almost no loss in February and March, 
but in April the 66th Foot at Port au Prince was suddenly stricken, 
apparently with yellow fever, which by the end of May was rampant both 
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there and at the Mole (Tabled). 
TABLE 11 66th Foot: Monthly Mortality Rates 1796 
Total 
strength % dead no. dead 
1105 March 0.3 3 
1103 April 9.1 100 
1018 May 17.1 174 
844 June 19.2 162 
683 July 5.9 40 
Sources: WO 17/186; S. R. O., GD 188/28/6. 
On May 3rd, when the great convoy from Cork finally reached the 
Mole, it contained but two-thirds of its original complement of nearly 
9,000 British troops. 
(54) 
Over 500 had died in the camp at Cork 
between mid-October and mid-February and another 556 were left behind 
in its squalid hospitals. Several hundred more seem to have died on 
the voyage and 563 were left hospitalised at Barbados. However, 
allowing for some 700 late arrivals, the number of British troops that 
debarked in Saint Domingue was considerably more than Bryan Edwards 
imagined. 
(55) 
Although epidemic fevers raged in almost all the out- 
posts during the summer months and the loss of life was appalling, 
mortality rates did not reach the-levels of previous years. The 
overall rate for the British troops seems never to have exceeded 9% 
per month during the period June-September and by November was down 
to 4.9%. Some 1260 British soldiers were buried in May and June and 
around 1940 between July and September. 
(56) 
These might best be regarded, 
however, as minimum figures as the official returns do not inspire much 
confidence. With the exception of the 82nd Foot at Mirebalais, which 
was said to have lost two-thirds of its men in three months, 
(57) 
the 
greatest losses were apparently suffered by the foreign corps sent by 
sea to Saint Marc and Port au Prince. They had arrived in better shape 
than the British and on July lst only 13% were sick, as opposed to 40% 
of the line regiments. 
(58) 
Nevertheless, in just 10 days in July, the 
York Hussars lost 23% of its men -8 officers, 16 NCO's and 150 troopers. 
(59) 
When Pitt's Government, in the spring of 1797, was forced by the 
Whigs to reveal the cost of the Saint Domingue campaign, it placed the 
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following statement before Parliament. 
TABLE Losses up to 30th September 1796 (Official Figures) 
Dead Discharged 
British Troops 7530 333 
Foreign Troops 
in British Pay 1067 
Source: P. P., 1796-7, XLIII 867. 
Deserted 
123 
These figures are certainly understated. They may not have included 
West Indian recruits into the British regiments but these surely 
numbered no more than a few hundred at most. Even so, fraudulent though 
they probably are, they provide no justification for the response of Sir 
John Fortescue, who declared: 'I have no hesitation whatsoever in saying 
that the number of dead is positively misleading and should at the very 
least be doubled'. 
(60) 
By my own reckoning, about 500 British had by 
then deserted or been discharged and some 9050 had died. There is 
little doubt that by the end of 1796 about 10,000 British soldiers had 
died in Saint Domingue. 
To Dundas's surprise and the distress of George III, the death 
rate rose during December and January to around 7% p. m. 
(61) 
When 
General Simcoe arrived in mid-February, it was estimated that over 1600 
British troops had died since September lst. 
(62) 
However, the death 
rate fell suddenly in February and March and, though sickness spread 
rapidly in April, fatalities remained relatively few, even at Port au 
Prince. In May, the death rate was still only 2.5%, although a quarter 
of the British troops were sick. Calculations are complicated because 
of the withdrawal of more than 2000 troops between December and March, 
the discharge of many in January and the arrival of some 1000 reinforce- 
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ments early in 1797. Nevertheless, for the six months following 
December lst, the number of British dead can be put at 'only' 780. 
(63) 
During the summer months, too, it seems that mortality was lower than 
usual (Table 13). 
TABLE13 Death Rates in Two Regiments: Summer 1797 
% 
June July August September Location 
67th Foot 2.7 2.6 4.2 ? the mole 
69th Foot 5.3 2.4 8.8 3.3 les Irois 
Source: WO 17/187 and 190. 
The army, of course, was becoming increasingly acclimatised, but even 
so, over a third of a regiment such as the 67th Foot consisted of 
recruits arrived within the previous nine months. It appears highly 
likely, therefore, that Simcoe's reforms had had a salutary effect. 
For the last year of the occupation very few general or regi- 
mental returns have survived and almost no evidence of arrivals, 
departures or losses. One has to rely largely on guesswork. The 
3rd Irish Regiment appears to have lost 80% of its men in the last 
seven months of 1797; others remained almost intact. The newly- 
arrived 60th Foot, we are told, suffered severely from yellow fever, 
as did recruits for the 56th. Between May and mid-July 1798,200 
invalids were discharged as being 'perfectly useless'. However, by 
the latter month, most of the 2,100 British survivors were seasoned 
men, 'by no means liable to the violent disorders of the Climate; 
but falling off gradually from waste of Constitution, [an dj the dis- 
orders incident to constantly living on Salt Provisions in a Tropical 
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Climate'. 
(64) 
All in all, most regiments probably lost around 
60% of their complement between 1st June 1797 and the end of the 
occupation. 
No figures for total losses during the occupation can pretend 
to accuracy within 500 men, but one may fairly assume that in five 
years some 12,500 British troops lost their lives in Saint Domingue 
and nearly 1,500 had to be sent home as invalids (Table 14v) . 
TABLE 14= Annual Arrivals, Losses and Departures of British Troops 
Arrived Departed Died Discharged/Deserted 
1793 800 0 10 0 
1794 3215 0 2180 75 
1795 4050 495 3275 120 
1796 10210 2290 4700 420 
1797 before 
June 1st 1000 955 400 520 
Final 16 
months 1250 2100 2130 575 
20525 5840 12695 1710 
Note: The number of troops sent to Saint Domingue was actually 
under 20,525 but 330 men of the Irish Brigade served in 
the colony on two occasions. 
Probably another 1,000 died on their way there. The losses of the 
foreign corps may be put at between 2,500 and 5,000. Bryan Edwards 
thought the number of British seamen who perished to be well over 
5,000. However, as only 1,730 died in the 'Mole naval hospital, 
where the rate of loss was about three times higher than at Port au 
Prince, a more likely estimate is 2,500. 
(65) 
One is thus a very long 
way from Malenfant's guess that over 45,000 white troops, excluding 
French allies, were lost by Great Britain, and even further from the 
ludicrous figures reported by B¬renger-F4raud. 
(66) 
Above all, given 
that Fortescue thought that 'at the very least' 15,000 British soldiers 
died in Saint Domingue before 1797, when in the whole Caribbean he thought 
25,000 had perished, his much-quoted global figure of 100,000 men lost 
through the West India campaigns would seem highly questionable. 
(67) 
Britain's losses in the Windward Isles must have been far greater 
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than in Saint Domingue, though, as with the Leclerc expedition four 
years later, the proportion due to battle casualties was undoubtedly 
much more important. One would like to know just how unusual the 
British losses were in the context of Caribbean warfare. McLean 
thought them unique. 
(68) 
However, comparable data art not easily 
come by, nor can one generalise too readily about the British ex- 
perience itself. While the Royals and 49th Foot lost some 45% of 
their men in their first year in the colony, the 23rd, 41st, 96th 
and 130th lost about the same proportion in only three months. 
Some cavalry regiments that arrived in May 1796 lost little more 
than a third in a year; another, the 29th Light Dragoons, lost 64% 
in six months. Death rates were higher in 1794-95 than in 1797-98, 
but overall were usually in the range 50% - 75% p. a. 
(69) 
Amazingly, under the Ancien Regime, the average annual mortality 
of the Saint Domingue garrison had been only 6.25% p. a. (sailors, 
3.13%): Moreover, by 1785 these rates had improved to 2.86% and 
1.85%. 
(70) 
Similarly, in Jamaica the garrison death rate was only 
3.3% p. a. in 1790-91, rising to over 5.5% in 1792, and 8.7% in 1793. 
(71) 
At Martinique during the years 1770-73 the Perigord Regiment was said 
to have been persistently attacked by yellow fever but still lost only 
35% of its men. 
(72) 
It was in wartime, which brought great influxes 
of non-immunes, that the West Indian 'disease environment' was at its 
deadliest. 'A los primeros pasos de la Guerra', wrote a Spanish 
administrator in 1795, 'el Europeo estA moribundo'. 
(73) 
In 1792-93, the French corps sent out to Saint Domingue to 
suppress the slave rebellion suffered very severe losses, though one 
must remember that they included over 1,500 prisoners of war as well 
as troops who were deported or driven out with Governor Galbaud. In 
the North, the second ba ^al i on of the 44th Regiment lost, nonetheless, 
(74) 
about 62% dead in the 711 months prior to May 1793. At insalubrious 
Fort Dauphin, the total losses of the Pas de Calais and Morbihan National 
Guards averaged about 75% after a year fighting the blacks and Spaniards, 
while at les Cayes disease claimed 'only' 36% of the Provence Regiment 
in 11 months, total losses amounting to 43%. (Men from the Mediterr- 
anean seaboard probably enjoyed a significant degree of immunity to 
both falciparum and vivax malaria). Also in the South the Berwick 
Regiment lost 51% in seven months and the Seine Inf4rieure National 
Guards 60% within only three months of their arrival. 
(75) 
Stationed 
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in the particularly unhealthy plain of les Cayes, the wettest part 
of Saint Domingue, the latter corps had arrived in October, the 
wettest month, and had to bivouac without tents on sodden ground. 
It was perhaps an exception. In the same area, disease carried off 
19% of the Aube Volunteers in just over 33j months. 
(76) 
Reckoning 
that between 3,000 and 3,500 French troops were still alive in August 
1793 it seems that the overall level of mortality in the French corps 
was not quite as devastating as that which the British were to exper- 
ience. 
Certainly, in Jamaica, where mortality was thought to be of un- 
precedented severity in the 1790's, death rates in the garrison never 
approached anything like those in British-occupied Saint Domingue. 
(77) 
Jamaica had actually fared worst during the American war, losing twice 
the number of troops in half the time, that is 3,500 in 3' years. 
Even then, however, in the dozen regiments involved the mean death 
rate for the first year after arrival was still under 30%. Further- 
more, overall morbidity never rose above a third, it seems. 
(78) 
Evidently, it was in the chaotic, makeshift world of military exped- 
itions, when troops were at their densest concentration, that the 
soldiers suffered most. The expedition to San Juan in 1781 lost 
77% of its 1,400 men. Between June and October 1762,40% of the 
British troops who had captured Havana died of disease, while of the 
12,000 British and Americans who laid siege to Cartagena in 1741 70% 
perished, including 77% of the British. 
(79) 
Perhaps the most tragic 
aspect of Britain's losses in Saint Domingue is that they were not quite, 
in fact, unique. 
(iii) Causes of Mortality. Anxious to combat the prejudices 
of previous historians, Ralph Korngold claimed not only that Britain 
lost 40,000 men in Saint Domingue but that more than half were killed 
in combat. 
(80) 
This was perhaps wishful thinking. While it is 
possible that battle casualties were on occasion covered up, 
(81)all 
the evidence suggests they were in fact a very small proportion of 
British losses. Up to November 1795, according to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Maitland, only 100 British soldiers had died in action - probably an 
under-estimate but not a gross one. 
(82) 
Most deaths occurred at 
Port au Prince and the Mole, where there was little fighting. When 
the fighting was severest, in 1797-98, the death rate was at its 
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lowest. On two occasions, nearly 50 British died when outposts 
were over-run(ß3) but otherwise the battle casualties reported were 
always remarkably low. At Saint Marc, the York Hussars lost 500 
men dead in 11 months, but only seven of them were killed in action. 
(84) 
There seems no need to discount such reports as products of racial 
prejudice. The British fought mainly on the defensive behind 
fortifications. When they did advance, the enemy usually withdrew 
and their musketry, even by 18th century standards, could be extremely 
inaccurate. 
(85) (There was no reason for it to be otherwise). All 
in all, it is difficult to believe that much more than 1,000 British 
troops were killed in combat or died of wounds, and the actual total 
was probably a lot less. 
The great majority unquestionably died of disease. Yet, beyond 
the general impression that most British deaths in Saint Domingue were 
due to yellow fever, it is not easy to assess the relative importance 
of the different factors involved. The epidemics that swept Port au 
Prince in 1794 and Port au Prince and the Mole in 1796 were fairly 
certainly yellow fever. It was the disease that attracted most 
contemporary attention, and regiments like the 66th Foot and the 29th 
Light Dragoons had suffered dramatic losses are known to have been 
its victims. Moreover, it was said to occur all year round. It 
is true that some of the worst losses, those of 1795 and particularly 
in the 96th Regiment, were attributed by McLean to 'ship fever' (i. e. 
typhus) that the troops brought with them from Ireland. 
(86) 
However, 
this diagnosis was not the product of his own observations. In view 
of the rarity of typhus in the West Indies and also of the contemporary 
tendency to associate the two fevers, it seems more likely that when 
the troops disembarked, the typhus then on board ship merged into an 
epidemic of yellow fever. 
However, yellow fever, an urban disease in the West Indies, was 
clearly not the sole scourge of the British troops. Even at Port au 
Prince, where it was 'strongly marked', the discerning Dr. Jackson 
thought that from April to December a variety of fevers were present. 
'Flux' and diarrhoea were common throughout the year, as at Saint Marc, 
doubtless because of the appalling sanitation in both towns and their 
use of wells for drinking water. 
(87) 
The Mole tended to be healthier, 
except in the autumn, when 'intermittents' (presumably malaria) were 
just as common as 'remittents'. There were no swamps in the area, 
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unlike at Port au Prince, and we probably see here the influence 
of the increased rainfall of these years. 
(88) 
'Fever' (excluding 
'intermittents') was responsible for only half the deaths in the 
Mole naval hospital, 'flux' and scurvy killing large numbers, 
(Table 3 (i) ). At Mirebalais, yellow fever in its most violent 
form existed alongside protracted 'double tertians', which seem to 
have killed many colonists. In other rural areas, such as the Cul 
de Sac and the swampy district of les Irois, malaria was not sur- 
prisingly prevalent, and this was also true of the lower mountain 
slopes. 
(89) 
Around les Irois, it sometimes assumed the pernicious 
form still called 'bilious remittent'. This was also found at Saint 
Marc and in both places killed many colonists. Jackson thought it 
a variety of yellow fever but his description and the slow, imperfect 
recovery of those who survived it are suggestive of falciparum mal- 
aria. 
(90) 
The terrible disease that decimated the York Hussars at 
Saint Marc, leaving them 'drowned in their own Blood', 
(91)may 
have 
been yellow fever but its rapid termination also suggests pernicious 
malaria. 
Malaria, therefore, may well have been as common among the 
British forces as yellow fever, especially as it can recur, whereas 
the latter leaves its victims either dead or immune. What is known 
of soldiers who survived two years in Saint Domingue, though they were 
of course a minority, suggests that they experienced at least two or 
three bouts of fever. 
(92) 
Even so, despite being confined to the 
ports, yellow fever doubtless killed more soldiers than did malaria. 
It is usually more fatal, (though some might dispute this); observers 
certainly thought it so at the time, and it had and has no cure, while 
malaria was treated with cinchona bark shipped out to the West Indies 
by the ton. The decreased mortality but continuing high morbidity of 
the spring and summer of 1797 probably reflect a shift in the relative 
incidence of malaria and yellow fever, as troops moved into the country- 
side on campaign. However, the overall mortality of the British troops 
points to case-fatalities much higher than those either disease exhibits 
nowadays, rarely being more than 10% and often much less. It seems 
likely, however, that the high death rates are at least partly explained 
by multiple infection. Some regiments, we know, arrived suffering from 
typhus and descriptions of yellow fever cases sometimes beginning with 
fits of shivering perhaps suggest the simultaneous action of both diseases. 
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Malaria, though, was a more probable alternative. 'Remittent' 
fevers sometimes were observed to develop into 'intermittent' fevers 
and the persistent problem of relapses among yellow fever convales- 
cents suggests additional infection, as normally convalescence is 
rapid. When Saint Marc was surrounded by an open ditch and Port 
au Prince general hospital was situated next to a marsh, simultaneous 
infection was a real risk. 
Contemporaries, however, tended to explain the British troops' 
vulnerability to fever in terms of three factors. These were: - 
a general level of debility, an excessive consumption of alcohol and 
inept medical treatment. They were wrong, of course, to think such 
factors made the soldiers more susceptible to fever, but they undoubt- 
edly affected a patient's chances of recovery or death. In the 
first place, these were not men in the best of health. Often re- 
cruited in prisons and workhouses, only the worst regiments were sent 
to Saint Domingue. Pallid, thin men from the new industrial towns, 
Dr. Jackson felt they radically lowered the standards of the British 
Army, as regards both discipline and fitness. Before disembarking 
in Saint Domingue, some had spent from three to six months crowded 
on board troopships. Many had passed mid-winter camped on the Irish 
coast, racked by dysentery and typhus. Half the Cork expedition had 
fallen sick before it set sail. 
(93) 
(It is worth reflecting that not 
a few of these troops must have contracted typhus, malaria and yellow 
fever all in the space of a year. ) On the other hand, these new 
regiments often remained fit for months after their arrival, while 
in the long run, the German and French peasants in the foreign corps 
do not seem to have proven any more hardy. Furthermore, it was 
precisely the healthiest, most impressive-looking regiments, such 
as the 82nd, which arrived after a trouble-free voyage from Gibraltar, 
that suffered some of the worst losses in Saint Domingue. The robust, 
hearty individual, in fact, was thought peculiarly prone to yellow 
fever. 
(94) 
Even so, as noted above, troops were progressively worn down 
by their life-style and conditions in Saint Domingue. Coming from 
a Europe slightly cooler than it is today, they had great difficulty 
coping with temperatures considered high even for the Caribbean. 
Unwashed, clad in flannel shirts and ill-fitting woollen uniforms 
that were permanently-soaked with sweat and prevented proper thermo- 
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regulation, soldiers became easily exhausted and subject to 'heat 
stress'. 
(95) 
Sleep was a luxury in under-manned p ý'y garrisons and 
soldiers often went to bed in wet clothes. What little nourishment 
they could derive from a diet entirely lacking for months on end in 
fresh meat and vegetables was often denied them because of persistent 
dysentery. The heat and the salt meat diet, the brackish or contaminated 
drinking water and, above all, the mental state of the troops, help 
explain what some observers considered to be the most debilitating aspect 
of the soldier's life - the great quantity of alcohol he consumed. 
Over-drinking can be seen as both a cause and effect of the high 
rate of mortality. Hector McLean has graphically evoked the claustro- 
phobic tension and general despondency that prevailed in the British 
garrisons, hemmed in by an unseen enemy and haunted by 'the daily 
spectacle of death'. 'Debauches of wine' they imagined, would 'banish 
not only their fears but their dangers'. 
(96) 
It is also relevant that, 
in the folk medicine of 18th century England, rum and other spirits were 
considered a remedy for fevers, and certainly in the Windward Isles we 
find troops treating alcohol as a prophylactic, afraid that 'a sober 
hour might give the Disease an Opportunity to attack'. 
(97) 
As death 
in yellow fever is usually the result of hepatic or renal failure, a 
patient's alcohol consumption is an important determinant of his chances 
(98) 
Although officers frequently drank several bottles a of survival. 
day, wine was not the chief danger. Claret at least contained 'the 
nutrient of the grape', McLean rightly remarked. 
(99) 
Much more lethal 
was the raw cane rum on which the troops spent their money. They 
smuggled it into their messes (and into the hospitals), they filled 
their canteens with it before campaigns and on occasion they bartered 
their rations for it. This is one reason why all contemporary writers 
stress the matter of regimental discipline, pointing out that the new, 
badly-officered corps generally suffered the worst losses. 
(100) 
(The 
other reason concerns enforced cleanliness both personal and general). 
The question of alcohol further overlaps with that of medical 
treatment, for to the horror of the French, hospital patients received 
a bottle of Madeira per day - 'le comble de la ddraison! ' - and wine or 
brandy was specifically prescribed in fever cases to raise a falling 
pulse. Until 1797, some patients even went on receiving their daily 
rum ration. Because of lax supervision in the general hospitals, 
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orderlies and convalescents were known to carouse together and this 
frequently led, the Conseil privy claimed, to relapses and death. 
(101) 
For several years, critics had condemned the unwieldy institution of 
the general hospital. 
(102) 
They bred disease, it was thought. The 
smaller, regimental hospitals were more economical, provided more 
personal care and could treat soldiers with less delay, yet they 
were under-used. In Saint Domingue, the main hospital buildings 
were usually large and well built, unlike in the British islands, 
but at Port au Prince men were still cramped 80 to a ward with one 
doctor between them. The Government made considerable efforts to 
send out a sufficient number of medical staff, and medical supplies 
generally were in abundance. However, orderlies fresh from Europe 
died as fast as their patients and, since 33% of European troops were 
regularly on the sick list, and also 12% of the black corps, the 
hospitals were persistently overcrowded and undermanned. Nursing, 
therefore, was entrusted to invalid soldiers and those considered 
the scum of the regiments. As the quality of nursing is vital in 
yellow fever cases - there is no other treatment as such 
(103) 
_ the 
situation must be accounted extremely deleterious. 
Since yellow fever has no specific remedy, it is ironic that 
the French and British clashed so violently as to the appropriate 
method of treatment. The army was being sacrificed, so the colon- 
ists claimed, to the ignorance of the British doctors. Some French 
physicians denounced them in the English press and formally complained 
to the Army Medical Board. Both sides claimed to have had more success 
than the other but it is significant that the troops themselves favoured 
French methods and lost confidence in their own doctors. 
(104) 
Indeed, 
Hector McLean had to agree it was absurd sending out to the West Indies 
doctors with no experience of tropical medicine. Somewhat misguidedly, 
he attacked the 'vanity' and 'impudence' of his French colleagues, who 
'equally oeconomic of medicines and the truth-committed their patients 
to a nurse and left the issue to nature', which was really the best 
course of action. However, he came to recognise the importance of 
nursing and agreed that patients needed a special diet in place of 
the salt meat they continued to receive in hospital. He also adopted 
from the French their copious use of tisanes and lemonade, important 
in combating dehydration caused by continual vomiting, and their habit 
of warm baths, to cleanse the skin of impurities'. 
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British methods by contrast were violent. In the language of 
the day, they were 'inflammatory', designed to excite the pulse and 
produce perspiration or salivation, as opposed to the 'anti-phlogistic 
regime' of the French. Great stress was laid on drugs, (mercury, 
camphor, laudanum, calomel), and 'cordials', (cinnamon water and 
cinchona bark infusions), as well as on wine. Purgatives, including 
the infamous James's powder, had pride of place. British remedies 
were not always bad. Where malaria was concerned, the French were 
of course wrong to reject the use of quinine but, as McLean realised, 
it had no effect in cases of yellow fever. Calomel, then one of the 
latest fads in West Indian medicine, has been recommended till recently 
in treating malaria but in yellow fever, where the stomach lining is 
attacked, aperients are positively harmful. 
105 
McLean came to appreciate 
the deleterious effects of medicines that irritated the stomach but, 
nonetheless, came up with a fiendish stimulant of his own - cayenne 
pepper wrapped in balls of dough! 
Yet, he was no quack. Adventurous and eclectic, both he and 
Jackson represent a new empiricist approach to medicine that heralded 
the advances of the 19th century. 
106 
One is impressed with his 
honesty and humility when grappling with forces that he confessed 
were beyond his comprehension. Neither man was afraid to say he had 
been wrong, and Jackson's acuteness of observation demands respect. 
it is unfortunate that their contributions to the treatment of yellow 
fever involved as many steps backwards as forwards. Both men became 
convinced that dousings with cold water were of the greatest benefit ... 
if employed early enough - the usual escape clause. The method was 
unorthodox but not original. Although explicitly borrowed from the 
Indians of Asia and North America, it had long been known in British 
folk and formal medicine. Cold sponge baths clearly brought patients 
relief but the scenes described of buckets of cold water being poured 
from great height on to feverish and unsuspecting victims partake of 
tragedy and farce. 
107 
The treatment must have added to the already 
great strains on the patient's heart. 
Perhaps more serious was the doctors' reaffirmation of the 
traditional 'cures' of blood letting and blistering. 
108 
Venesection 
had been going out of fashion in the British West Indies but had re- 
mained standard practice in Saint Domingue. McLean, however, adopted 
it with a vengeance, taking sometimes 16 ounces from his already anaemic 
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patients. It is therefore easy to understand why he had such 
difficulties in building up the strength of those who survived into 
convalescence. Blistering was meant to stop vomiting. Burst 
blisters, however, attracted swarms of flies. They then became 
deep ulcers full of maggots that tortured the patient with their 
burrowing. These could only be killed, McLean observed, with 
turpentine 'which almost throws the patient into fits'. Not 
surprisingly, neither doctor was able to claim much success for 
his work. Lieutenant Howard ascribed his survival of an attack 
of fever to a concoction his black nurse gave him. 
(109) 
Whether 
true or not, it is probable that the better results McLean achieved 
treating officers in private houses owed much to the nursing of the 
local female population. 
When the best medical minds of the day floundered in this 
fashion, it might seem that the mortality in Saint Domingue was 
completely unavoidable. Yet, some facts were known only too well: - 
that yellow fever only occurred in the towns; that malaria was found 
near swamps; that in the hills troops only suffered from leg sores 
and dysentery and that on the high ridges of the interior they stayed 
as healthy as in Europe. In Jamaica, the annual death rate in the 
mountain camps was around 2%; in the lowland camps it was 8.6%. 
(110) 
Commanders and engineers repeatedly refused to heed medical advice 
about the siting of camps and outposts. Jackson warned that, as 
long as new regiments were garrisoned in the ports, two thirds would 
die each year. He asked that the European garrison of Port au Prince 
be camped in a crescent in the mountains around the town, but in vain. 
Of course, strategic and medical considerations could not always be 
compatible. All commanders, including Commissioner Sonthonax, it 
is interesting to note, thought that white troops were needed to guard 
the ports, while the British simply did not trust the citizens of the 
capital to be left unguarded. 
(111) 
Nevertheless, advances were made. By 1797, more and more 
British troops were moving into mountain outposts. Mortality was 
reduced at the Mole by building new barracks in the hills above the 
port. The swamp at les Irois was partly filled in. Believing in- 
activity to be harmful, General Simcoe got troops out of their barracks 
on exercises and at Fort Bizoton he replaced British with colonials. 
When a new regiment arrived, it was sent to salubrious J6r4mie. Along 
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with improvements in hospital organisation and restrictions on the 
drinking of rum, these changes clearly had, as already seen, some 
impact. With more camps in the mountains and 'judicious arrange- 
ments', Jackson thought, many, perhaps five sixths, of the British 
dead could have been saved. 
(112) 
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CHAPTER XIV. THE FINAL YEAR 
The autumn of 1797 found the British Government more anxious than 
ever to extricate itself from Saint Domingue. The occupied zone had 
survived the spring offensive Dundas, observed, only because of 
two chance arrivals - that of a regiment from Jamaica at Port au 
Prince and of two frigates calling in at les Irois. The next attack 
might prove more serious. It was imperative that the continuing 
waste of men and money be reduced and also obvious that the colonists 
would not supply the amounts required. Ideally, Dundas was hoping 
to negotiate a total evacuation by special agreement with the 
Directory. Despite the coup d'etat of fructidor, he still thought 
at the end of October that the Republicans might accept back under 
French rule the inhabitants of the occupied zone without molestation, 
if Jamaica and Saint Domingue were made neutral. However, he accepted 
that this was unlikely and, while pursuing negotiations, he drew up 
instructions for a withdrawal to the Mole and the Grand' Anse. The 
colonists of the West were to be. offered £60,000 and naval support, 
should they decide to stay and defend themselves and thereby negotiate 
their own settlement. Those that wished to leave would receive free 
passage to Europe or North America, with the prospect for some of 
land grants in Trinidad. Civil government was to be dismantled by 
the New Year, and British, Foreign and Colonial forces were to be 
reduced to 4,000 in number. The only reason, it was stressed, for 
retaining the Mole and Jeremie was the protection of Jamaica, and 
this was deemed less important than in the past, as both Jamaica 
and the Navy were now stronger. If these two points could not be 
held without erecting new fortifications or risking considerable 
loss of life, they, too, were to be abandoned. The commander of 
the Grand' Anse, however, was to take orders from the Governor of 
Jamaica and could be commanded to stay, if the safety of Jamaica 
warranted it. 
i 
Early in November, Pitt and Dundas discussed these draft 
instructions at length and then passed them on to Portland and 
Grenville with the observation that 'every hour of delay is a source 
of uncalculable expense' 
2-a 
sentiment in which they all concurred. 
Yet, it took nearly two more months before the instructions were made 
- 349 - 
official, on January lst. 
3 
The difficulty may have been finding a 
commanding officer to carry them out. General Whyte, left in command 
since Simcoe's departure, was not favourable to ideas of evacuation 
and anyway entirely unsuitable. Maitland, who believed the Grand' 
Anse and the Mole could be held until the peace, was willing to return 
but first wanted Whyte to be recalled. 
4 
At first, it seems, a Major- 
General Hunter was chosen for the job, and then, in December, one 
Major-General Nesbitt with Maitland as his second in command. In 
the meantime, British merchants trading to the colony pressed for 
compensation in the event of a withdrawal, and the colonial emigres, 
deserting Malouet for de Charmilly, argued desperately in favour of 
a British offensive. 
5 
The news from Saint Domingue, as usual, was 
ambiguous, but it revealed significant signs of decay in the British 
position. In September, while yet another attack on Saint Marc 
was repulsed, enemy movements in the Cul de Sac started to become 
threatening. Blacks occupying the Crochus mountains north of the plain 
began harrying communications between Arcahaye, Mirebalais and 
Croix des Bouquets. Although a night attack by Depestre's corps 
completely cleared the mountains without difficulty, it was probably 
only the small band of Jean Pineau that they had for adversaries. 
Mirebalais became relatively secure, but 'the fact that raiders had 
penetrated close to the capital convinced Dundas that the West was 
indefensible. 
6 
Nesbitt, however, under the influence of the London 
emigres, doubted that the Mole and Jeremie could stand alone and, 
just like Simcoe before him, went out hoping to preserve the occupied 
zone intact. 
7 
Had he not died before reaching Saint Domingue, the general 
would have found his optimism misplaced. Toussaint and Rigaud 
mustered their forces during January and at the end of the month 
launched a concerted attack on all the posts of the occupied zone. 
The Mole and Saint Marc held firm and then counter-attacked, but 
Lascahobas in the Spanish zone was lost and with lightning speed 
Toussaint advanced from the Artibonite to seize on February 7th the 
passes south of Mirebalais. Grand Bois was evacuated and Whyte 
ordered all the troops in the Cul de Sac to fall back on Croix des 
Bouquets. Several attacks were beaten off in the mountains of 
Arcahaye but a group of some 2,000 Republicans broke through to besiege 
Boucassin fort. The Chasseurs de la Reine were rushed from Port au 
Prince and on February 17th they routed the attackers, killing some 
300 including their general. Mirebalais, however, surrounded by 
8,000 men, could not hold out and on the 25th its 300 black defenders 
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fought their way over the Crochus mountains losing only 20 dead. 
Meanwhile, Rigaud had taken two small posts on the Cayemittes front 
and then switched his attention to les Irois, beginning a regular 
siege. Laplume advanced from Leogane and with reinforcements from 
the mulatto Beauvais, took the brand new mountain citadel of Lacoupe 
(present day Petionville) after a bitter contest on February 15th. As 
in most of the battles of this campaign, almost all the troops on 
both sides were uniformed blacks. The other mountain posts east 
of the capital, Grenier and Neret, were precipitately abandoned a 
few days later. Just as in June 1794, General Whyte did almost 
nothing to support them and on March 1st the Fourmier post on top 
of Morne 1'0pital was surrounded. A brief lull ensued. 
8 
This was the situation when General Maitland arrived early in 
March, Although the Republicans were said to be at least 12,000 
strong, 'regularly Regimented, Armed and Clothed', Maitland doubted 
there had been any sudden increase in Republican strength and 
suggested Whyte had panicked. Nevertheless, while there was little 
sense of danger in the British garrisons, Maitland said the situation 
was worse than he expected and he immediately recommended to Dundas 
a voluntary and total evacuation that would save lives, money and 
honour. The lines of Port au Prince, he thought, could not sustain 
a serious attack, though Whyte contrarily disagreed. The Grand' 
Anse was now almost paying its way, but he doubted that Jeremie 
could hold out if Rigaud captured les Irois, which was now being 
bombarded from three sides. If the Grand' Anse fell, he stated 
controversially, reversing his previous opinion, it was dubious 
that the mole either could or should be held. 
9 
Even as he was writing, the British position was crumbling 
dramatically. In the second week of March, the cordon of Arcahaye, 
'the work of years', suddenly collapsed. Garrisoned by only 300 
men, the very expensive chain of mountain forts was abandoned by 
its Irish commander, who had blenched at the sight of 4,000 assai- 
lants. At the same time, after successfully relieving the Fourmier 
post, General Whyte decided to give up the Morne l'HÖpital. Keeping 
mountain garrisons supplied with water and ammunition was simply 
too dangerous. Desertion was now a major problem, not only, as 
before, among the European and mulatto troops, but also for the first 
time in the black corps, while in the plain of Arcahaye over 300 
slaves fled to the advancing army of Toussaint and Christophe. 
Even so, having descended from the mountains, the Republican soldiers, 
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despite their usual enormous sacrificesc could still make no headway 
against the forces of Lapointe and Depestre. Cavalry remained the 
decisive factor in the plain, On the 27th and 29th March, over 700 
of Christophe's 6,000 troops were killed, before his army was driven 
back into the mountains, and a few days later O'Gorman's horsemen 
claimed another 90 victims near Croix des Bouquets. However, 
several Arcahaye plantations were burnt and Fort Williamson at les 
Vazes was accidentally blown up. 
10 
By this time, relations between Whyte and Maitland had become 
so strained that the former withdrew to the Mole in a huff and 
resigned his command to the Scotsman. Nesbitt had not arrived and 
Maitland, who had been privy to his instructions, had refused to 
inform Whyte of their contents. With the costs of defence and 
casualties mountingo he now decided that if Nesbitt did not appear 
by mid-April he would evacuate the West. Rumours and denunciations 
flew thickly in the occupied zone. To try and calm the colonists' 
fears, Maitland blustered vaguely, but on April 23rd he approached 
Toussaint Louverture with an offer to withdraw. 
11 
If the colonists 
were guaranteed good treatment, he would hand over the West Province 
with its property intact, removing only the guns of the forts. 
Toussaint accepted. 
To preserve order, martial law was declared and at least one 
civilian, guilty of sedition, was executed by being strapped over 
the muzzle of a cannon and blown apart. To believe Maitland, however, 
confusion was kept to a minimum, Convoys were assembled off Saint 
Marc, Arcahaye and Port au Prince, and all who wished to leave were 
allowed free passage to either Jeremie and the Mole or Jamaica and 
the U. S. While some colonists scrambled to put together their pos- 
sessions and ship off their workforces, bargaining with ships' 
captains for extra freight space others, said Maitland, high-born 
Frenchmen, tore off their Croix de Saint Louis and liaised with their 
former slaves in the Republican army. 
12 
Since January members of the 
Conseil Prive had been employed on roving commissions, examining 
outstanding claims on the Government in the British zone. They and 
the magistrates of the Conseil Superieur were now paid off with six 
months' salary, though a reduced civil administration was later 
established in the Grand' Anse. While the general's attempts to 
investigate corruption at Saint Marc were ineffective and naive, 
13 
his efforts to summarily clear up all claims on the British Govern- 
ment with once and for all ex gratia payments also proved un- 
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realistic, though'to the Cabinet they seemed at the time commendably 
efficient. Wages of public employees had not all been paid up to 
date; compensation for recruited slaves was still outstanding, and 
no account was taken of damages owed by the Government. (It would 
take a special board set up in London another five years to deal 
with these and other claims for compensation. ) 
14 
Nevertheless, much 
was accomplished in a short space of time, and when 4,000 colonial 
troops were transferred to Jeremie and the Mole, desertions were 
surprisingly few. Saint Marc was evacuated on May 6th, Arcahaye the 
following day and Port au Prince on May 8th. 
Everything now depended on how the campaign went in the Grand' 
Anse, where Brigadier-General Spencer had been pinned down with 
some 400 European and 2,000 colonial troops for several months. He 
had made a couple of sorties from les Irois in mid-March and after 
receiving a thousand reinforcements captured one of Rigaud's camps 
in April but overall could make little impact on the Republican 
entrenchments and dared not risk an attack in the mountains for fear 
of ambushes. He therefore concentrated on holding his posts and 
keeping Rigaud's army out of the interior. Maitland was severely 
critical of his conduct and wondered why, when the enemy numbered 
only some 4-7,000, he had let Rigaud establish such a strong position. 
It was typical, he said, of the indolent and corrupt way the war 
had been managed that Spencer should 'stuff ... all his men into 
posts without leaving any moving force'. Between February 19th and 
April 28th, he had lost 166 colonials killed and 21 British and 
Europeans. Republican losses for half that period were put at over 
1,200 killed and wounded. Maitland, moving to Jdrdmie in May, 
wanted to strike an offensive 
blow, like Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart 
had done from the Mole and favoured a landing at les Anglais behind 
the Republican lines. The arrival of his squadron caused Rigaud, 
anticipating an attack, to abandon all his gains at both les Irois 
and les Cayemittes. However, Maitland was also greeted by freak 
rainstorms that made any offensive temporarily impossible and the 
colonial troops of the Grand' Anse he found unreliable, (which partly 
explained Spencer's past conduct). Yet, with about 
2,300 British 
troops and over 7,000 colonials he was in a strong position, and 
before going on the defensive in mid-June he made a bold attempt to 
take Tiburon, as if to show how military affairs might have been 
conducted. While a naval squadron cannonaded the 
fort of les Anglais, 
Dessources's Volunteers with considerable daring made their way 
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through the mountains of the Republican zone to cut the town off from 
the north. Taken by surprise, its defenders were said to have been 
fleeing, when it was discovered that cross-currents prevented troops 
being landed from the ships. Maitland waited three days for the 
15 
tide to turn, then gave up. 
He now wished to evacuate the Grand' Anse and, in conformity 
with Government instructions, he sought the permission of the Governor 
of Jamaica. Balcarres, however, said he had received no Government 
directions on the matter - an oversight by Dundas - and refused to 
take responsibility for a withdrawal that would greatly undermine, he 
said, Jamaica's security, though he agreed that the Grand' Anse did 
not seem tenable. Having acted till then entirely on his own 
initiative, Maitland was loath to upset the Jamaicans, especially 
as an evacuation would force on them hundreds of refugees, and he 
feared his enemies in the Cabinet16 He therefore awaited permission 
from Whitehall, stressing that Rigaud was now building roads up to 
the frontiers of the Grand' Anse for bringing up artillery. By mid- 
July, Toussaint was doing the same across the trackless arid terrain 
surrounding the Mole. Its five block-houses, Maitland pointed out, 
would never withstand a siege if heavy artillery were brought up. (Less 
than a year before, he had declared that the blacks were 'totally 
unfit (for) a regular siege'. ) 
17 
Although Jdremie and the Mole 
were important to the defence of Jamaica, the expense and difficulty 
of holding them would outweigh their utility. The humanity of 
Toussaint Louverture, he added, made the colonists less determined 
to resist, particularly as they knew that anyway when peace was 
signed Saint Domingue would be returned to France. This was 
especially true of the subordinate officers of the colonial corps, 
usually creoles, who were intending to remain in the colony. Till 
then, they had been buoyed up hopes of taking les Cayes, but they 
might lose heart when they realised this was impossible. Meanwhile 
the British garrison continued to be worn down, newcomers perishing 
of yellow fever, veterans being invalided home, 'perfectly useless'. 
Jeremie and the mole could not be held for an outlay of less than 
£500,000 p. a. and, as either bargaining counters or outposts of 
Jamaica, they were not worth that much. The defence of Jamaica 
should be concentrated on Jamaica itself, where at least all public 
expenditure reverted to Britain. 
18 
Lord Balcarres initially said he would take 3,000 white colonial 
troops from Saint Domingue, and Maitland seems to have, perhaps 
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deliberately, misunderstood him in thinking he meant black Chasseurs. 
At any rate, he stressed that they and their officers were not at 
all dangerous and would cause no trouble in Jamaica. This was 
another instance of Maitland reversing his opinions of the previous 
year but in general his appraisal of the situation in Saint Domingue 
remained accurate. General Hedouville, the new Agent sent out by 
the Directory, was merely a cypher, he observed, real power lay with 
Toussaint, Laplume and Rigaud. Despite their jealousy, Toussaint 
and Laplume might co-operate but Toussaint and Rigaud would never 
join forces. Although Rigaud was officially still proscribed by 
the Directory and Hedouville was empowered to deport him, it was 
with Toussaint, with his conciliatory attitude towards the whites 
and his desire to establish trade relations with the British, that 
Britain might most profitably co-operate. From May onwards, in 
fact, the two generals began an exchange of flour and fresh vegetables. 
As for Hedouville, Maitland rightly, surmised he would try and play 
Rigaud against Toussaint and so cause further bloodshed. 
19 
On July 27th, Maitland informed Balcarres he had almost decided 
to evacuate and asked for his and Admiral Hyde Parker's reactions. 
He could bring with him 4,000 colonial troops, he said, and if 
Balcarres wished to exclude Dominguan slaves he should write him a 
strong letter forbidding their shipment to Jamaica. (Lapointe's 
had just been deported from Kingston. ) The Mole, Maitland suggested, 
a sensitive topic in Jamaica, was actually of little importance to 
the Navy, as the French could not support a Caribbean squadron and, 
once besieged, it would cease to provide a haven for British ships. 
Balcarres did not agree. 'In the eyes of the world', and particularly 
in the eyes of Jamaica's slaves, its evacuation would seem a 
drastic step, and would increase Jamaica's refugee problem. As for 
the admission of black troops, (having realised his mistake), he said 
this was for the Assembly to decide but he agreed to take 
Dessources's corps and suggested the rest be kept at the Mole. On 
July 30th, Maitland received two letters that broke the deadlock. 
One was from Toussaint Louverture pressing for negotiations to start 
on a British withdrawal, (and Maitland knew that Toussaint and Rigaud 
had met the previous week). The other was from Dundas, which 
conveyed both Government approval of his actions and a copy of 
Nesbitt's instructions. He now apparently realised he had over- 
rated the importance the Government attached to Jerdmie and the 
Mole, and determined immediately to evacuate them. 
20 
Envoys were 
sent to Toussaint and Rigaud. 
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Balcarres and Hyde Parker were furious when informed of this 
fait accompli by brief and hurried notes and resented being out- 
manoeuvred by a young officer who had the ear of the Cabinet. In 
vain, they tried to persuade him to change his mind. Ironically, 
the Government, ever wavering in its Saint Domingue policy, was 
about to change its own mind. Because, it seems, of the activities 
of bands of runaways in Jamaica, they now decided that the Mole and 
Jeremie were worth the expenditure of half a million pounds and at 
the end of August sent out a new commander with orders to hold them. 
Reinforcements were to be despatched in the autumn. 
21 
Fortunately 
for all concerned, this about-face, which would have achieved nothing, 
took place too late to affect events in Saint Domingue. Negotiations 
were begun with representatives of Toussaint and Rigaud early in 
August. Exactly why, on the 10th, Maitland then invited Hddouville 
to send a representative is not clear; perhaps it was just a formality, 
perhaps he was putting pressure on Toussaint, who was not dealing 
quite so openly with the Agent as he pretended and who insisted that 
the Mole be surrendered only to his own representatives. 
22 
This, 
Maitland willingly conceded, happy to drive a wedge between Toussaint 
and the Republic; it was the best way to preserve the security of 
Jamaica. 
While Toussaint did not wish to prejudice his relations with 
the Directory, his and Maitland's interests were substantially the 
same. He had no designs on Jamaica and would later betray a 
Republican conspiracy in the island to Governor Balcarres. 
23 
Both 
he and the British Government looked forward to mutually profitable 
commercial relations and both had a common interest in keeping in 
Saint Domingue as many of the black Chasseurs and white colonists 
as possible. The Chasseurs were an embarrassing problem, mis- 
trusted by the Republicans and feared by the British planters. 
Dundas had assumed they would be left behind and reclaimed by their 
former masters. Most eventually were, including several thousand 
turned back from Jamaica. Bending the laws of the Republic, Toussaint 
and Rigaud granted broad amnesties to most non-emigres and the black 
general later arranged in secret for the return of evacuees from 
Jamaica under the guise of prisoners of war. Lastly, after the 
terms of evacuation were formalised, both leaders signed secret 
clauses guaranteeing future neutrality and arranging future trade 
relations. 
24 
Hostilities ceased on August 20th and the last troops 
sailed from the Mole at the beginning of October. 
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CHAPTER XV THE FINAL RECKONING 
(i) The Consequences of the Occupation for Britain. A source 
of great wealth for the French, Saint Domingue under British rule proved 
to be a heavy financial burden. In five years, it exported to Britain 
but one-third as much produce as Martinique and less than a twentieth 
of the quantity exported by the British West Indies (Appendix E (iv) ). 
The only commodity market it had any impact on was that of coffee in 
1794, when imports into Great Britain doubled and Saint Domingue was 
responsible for perhaps half the increase. Thereafter, however, its 
coffee exports to Britain dwindled, while those of Jamaica and Martinique 
surged forward and were joined by those of Demerara. In 1796, Saint 
Domingue accounted for merely 0-6% of Britain's raw cotton imports, 
while the British West Indies supplied 54 times as much sugar. As a 
market for British produce, Saint Domingue was similarly negligible. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the duty levied in Britain on trade 
with the colony came to little more than 
£150,000. The revenues 
raised in the occupied zone did not amount to much more - about 
£495,000. The two AgentsGeneral, on the other hand, paid out during 
the occupation some £5,765,000 and to this should be added the pay of 
the British rank and file which was probably around £500,000. 
(2) 
Perhaps one should add to this the cost of equipping and transporting 
the troops sent from Europe - say, 25,000 men at £30 per head: 
£750,000. Moreover, by 1805 another £100,000 had been spent by the 
St. Domingo Claims Bctrd set up in London to assist colonial refugees 
and settle outstanding debts. 
(3) 
At least £50,000 more was paid out 
between 1819 and 1822, when it was decided to settle the claims of 
colonists who had stayed in France during the occupation. 
(4) 
Through- 
out the 1830's, in fact, about 
£800 p. a. was still being paid out in 
pensions to a dozen colonists. 
(5) 
Nevertheless, whatever contingency 
expenses one includes under the costs of the occupation, the total 
figure undoubtedly fell far short of the £30,000,000 reported by Rainsford 
and of the £20,000,000 reported by Malenfant and Korngold. 
(6) 
The number of men killed, also, was considerably less than the 
figures usually given. Fewer than 13,000 British troops died in 
Saint Domingue, and probably not more than 20,000 men were lost to 
the army and navy, dead, discharged or deserted. 
(7) 
It seems 
impossible therefore, to justify Sir John Fortescue's famous statement 
that 'the secret of England's impotence for the first six years of the 
war may be said to lie in the two fatal words, Saint Domingo'. 
(8) 
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Losses in the West Indies, although appalling, were less than 
Fortescue thought and, of them, Saint Domingue accounted for but a 
small proportion. He himself concluded that British casualties in 
the West India campaigns totalled almost 100,000, half of them 
fatalities. His figures, however, contain several contradictions, and 
it appears likely that the magic number 100,000 is greatly inflated. 
The '18,600 dead' for 1794, 'official returns', clearly include men 
discharged and deserted; he had already written that the British dead 
that year, including the crews of the transport ships, numbered 
12,000, and this, too, may seem a little high since the Conquered 
Islands it is unlikely more than 8,000 British troops died and in 
Jamaica the death toll was 200. As most of his other figures are 
guesswork and his estimates for Saint Domingue are demonstrably 
cavalier, Fortescue's statistics certainly need revision. There is 
no doubt, at least, that far more men were lost in the Windwards than 
in Saint Domingue. 
(9) 
Secondly, the relative impact of these losses was less than 
might be imagined. In November 1794, by which time only 3,500 troops 
had been sent to Saint Domingue and about 10,000 to the whole of the 
West Indies, the British Army numbered 112,000 regulars 
(10) 
and 
the war in Europe had already been lost. Until the evacuation of 
April 1795, far more troops were sent to the Continent than to the 
Caribbean. For this and other reasons, it is difficult to agree with 
Fortescue that the West India campaigns were really 'the essence' 
of Pitt's military policy. 
(11) 
In July 1794, there were over 25,000 
British troops in northern Europe. Moreover, 6,000 of them were lost 
in just the first three months of 1795. 
(12) 
In the West Indies, at 
least men did not freeze to death. What is more, the European war 
was scarcely any cheaper than the war in the West Indies. In three 
years, the Duke of York's army cost £6,574,733 and accomplished nothing. 
(13) 
Even worse, nearly 11 million pounds were paid to the Prussians in 
1794 for troops that were never supplied. One should not forget the 
other subsidies - 1.62 millions to Austria alone 
(14) 
- and the 
different expeditions to Brittany and to Toulon. In these five years, 
military expenditure totalled almost 150 million pounds. 
(15) 
Pitt's 
war policy was a series of costly disasters. In no one respect was 
the occupation of Saint Domingue unique. 
Critics of the West India strategy must also remember that, while 
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the war in Europe was a complete failure, notable successes were 
achieved in the Windward Isles. What, though, can be said of the 
Saint Domingue venture? Was it a total waste? According to its 
proponents' "- Dundas, de Charmilly, Colonel Chalmers - the occupation 
bought five years of security for the island of Jamaica and so enabled 
it to enjoy a prosperous boom period. The argument carried weight. 
Jamaica was then importing between one and two million pounds' worth 
of British produce each year; it supplied most of Britain's sugar and 
coffee and its trade was worth close to a million pounds per annum in 
Customs revenue. However, two questions arise. Was Jamaica ever 
really in danger of invasion, or of active subversion, from Saint 
Domingue? and was its defence best served by occupying its neighbour? 
According to Hawkesbury, it was ' evident almost to demonstration that 
there was no medium between keeping those possessions at all events or 
losing Jamaica altogether', so great was the threat of a servile war. 
Governor Balcarres thought Jamaica might resist for several years the 
attacks, piracy and incendiary example of a neighbouring 'Kingdom of 
Banditti' but that its all-important commercial credit would be 
destroyed. 
(16) 
Although the Republicans certainly wanted the British to think that 
Jamaica was in danger of imminent invasion, it has never been established 
that there was any direct intervention in the island from Saint Domingue 
during the period of occupation. As early as October 1793, Sonthonax 
had proclaimed that the Blue Mountain Maroons were at his command but 
this was just bravado. His correspondence of 1796 clearly shows he 
had little idea of what was happening in Jamaica and a gauche attempt 
to gain information via a flag of truce was easily scotched by the 
Kingston authorities. Though several of his colleagues urged him to 
intervene, he was too hard-pressed to organise anything but the defence 
of Saint Domingue. 
(17) 
The following spring a letter by Sonthonax 
detailing invasion plans came into British hands. Having been dropped 
in the Cul de Sac, however, it was fairly obviously a red herring. 
(18) 
It is ironic that, when a plot really was hatched in Saint Domingue, 
by Commissioner Roume in 1799, it was to be betrayed to the British by 
Toussaint Louverture himself. 
(19) 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt 
that from about 1794 onwards the French minister in Philadelphia, the 
Government in Paris, Victor Hugues in Guadeloupe and Rigaud in the South 
collaborated in sending agents to Jamaica, who were usually English-speaking 
free coloureds. They liaised with prisoners of war and were said to have 
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made contact with some of the Maroons. 
(20) 
Yet, this activity produced 
few results and it is difficult to see that it would have proved any more 
harmful had the Britishnever occupied Saint Domingue. As for the threat 
of invasion, this was mainly a matter of naval superiority. Though the 
crossing between the two colonies was short, a large force could not be 
risked without adequate protection. In this respect, it was not the 
British forces in Saint Domingue but the failure of any large French 
squadron to reach the West Indies that saved Jamaica from invasion. 
(21) 
Moreover, to the navy's annoyance, warships were tied down protecting 
and supplying the outposts in Saint Domingue when they could have been 
patrolling the seas around Jamaica. British intervention, furthermore, 
by failing to quash the slave revolution and actually catalysing its 
development, undoubtedly worsened its impact on the minds of Jamaica's 
slaves. The occupation thus made more potent the dangers it was meant 
to suppress. 
The defensive justification for intervention, therefore, does not 
seem well-founded. Here one should note that the alternative strategy 
recommended by Admiral Hyde: -Parker in 1798 and endorsed by M. W. B. 
Sanderson, that of occupying just the main ports without getting 
involved in a large-scale campaign, 
(22) 
was pointless. The main ports 
could not have been occupied without a major campaign. Mortality 
would not have been reduced, since they were the foci of infection, 
and nor would enemy privateering have been much affected. Saint 
Domingue's coastline was'far too long and indented. Such a policy 
would not have been acceptable to the colonists and on balance would 
probably have been little less expensive. Jamaica would have been 
best defended, not by tying up troops and ships in Saint Domingue, but 
by concentrating them closer to home. 
If the occupation is to be justified, (moral considerations apart, 
of course, ) it is as an attempt to extend Britain's tropical empire. 
This, moreover, was the original rationale of intervention, rather than 
the defence of Jamaica. Was it really attempting the impossible? Some 
factors in the British defeat were constant and unavoidable - Saint 
Domingue's great size, the unhealthiness of its seaports, its difficult 
climate and terrain, the numerical superiority of the Republicans and 
insurgents. Few of these factors were immutable, however; the 
importance that they assumed derived from their interaction with other 
factors more easily controlled - the numerical weakness of the British 
forces, their reluctance to move outside the coastal towns, the alienation 
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of the mulattoes, certain tactical errors such as the failure to 
attack les Cayes, Jacmel or Port de Paix before occupying Port au 
Prince. In three successive autumns, one might add, Atlantic gales 
prevented reinforcements arriving in time for the healthy season. The 
later experience of Leclerc's expedition, which debarked in January, 
should make one cautious on the subject of mortality, but from the 
evidence presented in Chapter XrV, it seems that with the knowledge 
then available to British commanders the exceptionally high death 
rates of the white troops could have been substantially reduced. 
Moreover, as argued in Chapter IV, the mortality problem only became 
insuperable once slavery ceased to be supportable in the minds of most 
of the blacks. When the decision to intervene was taken, the slave 
regime was substantially intact in most parts of the colony, and the 
slave revolt came close to being extinguished. Until April 1794, 
Toussaint Louverture was still fighting on the side of the slave owners. 
Furthermore, it took many years of warfare to mould from the fieldhands 
and domestics of the Ancien Regime the disciplined battalions of veterans 
that were to defeat the forces of Napoleon. 
All hinged on delivering a heavy blow early in the war. Even the 
occupation's severest critic, Thomas Maitland, accepted that General Whyte 
could have been successful in June 1794 and thought, had circumstances 
been right, the 1796 campaign might have ended favourably. 
(23) 
The 
socio-political tensions within the Republican zone at that time made 
it extremely vulnerable. After 1503, after 1815, planters went on 
concocting hopeless schemes for the restoration of their power. It 
does not, however, seem pie in the sky to suggest that, if Grey's 
expedition had debarked in Saint Domingue instead of Martinique, the 
occupation would not have been for Great Britain such a costly mistake. 
As for the relative merits of the European and colonial strategies, one 
may suggest with some confidence that the European campaign suffered far 
less from the removal of troops to the Caribbean than did the West India 
campaign from the diversion of troops to the continent. 
There was of course an internal contradiction in Government policy, 
since the acquisition of Saint Domingue would have ruined the reviving 
economy of the British islands. Pitt suggested they might have to grow 
other crops. However, the Jamaican planters replied they were willing 
to share with their French counterparts their monopoly of the British 
market, providing in return they were permitted to trade with whom they 
pleased, and thereby obtain cheaper imports. This was a possible solution 
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profitable for all concerned. In Pitt's conversations with the 
Society of Merchants and Planters early in 1796,24 one can see, 
reading between the lines, it might have been adopted, had Saint 
Domingue been annexed, and the era of Free Trade thus brought forwards 
by 30 years or more. 
Few lessons were learned from the occupation of Saint Domingue. 
White attitudes to blacks do not seem to have changed appreciably; 
men such as Toussaint and Jean Kina were simply considered exceptionally 
cunning. Black troops, having proved 'safe', were now adopted on a 
permanent footing in the British Caribbean, so as to reduce the losses 
of white regiments. Greater care was henceforth taken with the siting 
and construction of barracks, but in the treatment of yellow fever the 
renewed emphasis on venesection was a great step backwards. The 
pioneer Hospital Corps was abandoned and not re-established for another 
20 years. 
No regimental banner bears the words 'St. Domingo'. No minister 
or general wished to preserve in his memoirs the history of the 
occupation. It was an episode best forgotten and which the 19th 
century had no need to remember. Some of the survivors lived on 
with vivid memories into the 1840's, but by mid-century not only Saint 
Domingue but all the British and French islands had become somnolent 
backwaters ignored by Europe. However, in a church in Salford, 
Lancashire, a faint echo still: remains' of those ; forgotten expeditions.. and of 
the horror with which contemporarie-. learned of th. ir fate. On a 
funerary monument commemorating the death of a Major Thomas Drinkwater 
can be read the following inscription: - 
'Thrice had his foot Domingo's island prest, 
Midst horrid wars and fierce barbarian wiles; 
Thrice had his blood repelled the yellow pest 
That stalks, gigantic, through the Western Isles! ' 
(25) 
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(ii) British Intervention and the Destruction of Saint Domingue. 
With the expulsion of theBritish forces in September 1798, slavery's 300 
year history in Saint Domingue came to an end. The attempt to shore up 
the crumbling edifice had failed. Although for five years the plantation 
economy was kept alive to an extent not hitherto appreciated, 
27 
the 
impact of the occupation on the course of Haitian history would appear to 
have been slight. And this may indeed have been so. However, a case can be 
made out for the British occupation having had a major influence on 
long-term developments, namely that it promoted that very destruction 
of the plantation regime that it was intended to prevent and which was 
the most profound change then taking place in the Caribbean. The argument 
is both factual and counter-factual. 
Firstly and simply, as regards physical damage, we have seen how the 
arrival of British forces led within months to the desolation of the plains 
of Leogane, the Artibonite and Cul de Sac, of Grand Goave and of the 
mountains of Port au Prince, till then largely intact. 
28 
In addition, 
the recruitment of over 7,000 black soldiers, apart from its effect on the 
minds of the remaining slaves, obviously represented at the simplest level 
a substantial weakening of the plantation regime. Later, as the British 
zone became a battlefield, the mountains of Mirebalais and Arcahaye came 
to share a similar fate. as the coastal plains. It might be said of course of 
the areas where production had previously ceased, that the rebellion and 
arson would anyway have occurred as soon as an attempt was made to force 
the slaves back into the fields. But at the same time, it may be that the 
nature of the British intervention, the extremely small numbers of troops 
at first involved, was a crucial factor here, and that a more powerful 
expedition would have met with quite different results. As for Arcahaye 
and the Grand' Anse, it was clearly the British presence that kept slavery 
functioning there as long as it did, but the question is, whether a 
peaceful transition to another type of (communal) labour regimewould have 
done less damage in the long run. 
One could argue that the slave revolt by February 1793 was already unst- 
oppable and that ultimately thik; meant the end of plantation labour. 
However, as we have noticed, it was the outbreak of war that dramatically 
broadened the scope of the then languishing revolt andrescued it from what 
could have been extinction. 
29 
The causal factor here, it is true, was 
not intervention itself but the threat of intervention and then invasion 
by the Spaniards. Whether or not the British intenddd to intervene, 
Sonthonax would have declared slavery abolished; (though\one may doubt if 
the Convention would done likewise). And the Spaniards, too, would have 
taken rebel blacks into their pay. Hence the appropriate counter-factual 
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scenario to the British occupation is the situation as it was developing 
in the early summer of 1793. One cannot tell, of course, how the Spaniards 
or Republicans would have fared without British interference, but certainly 
in the South and West one might have expected to see a transition to a 
forced labour regime defended by an army andgendarmerieof blacks and 
mulattoes, with the Civil Commissioners and free coloureds jockeying for 
power. The Spaniards, one presumes, would have occupied the whole Artib- 
onite plain, and possibly Arcahaye. Thereafter, much would have depended 
on thei relations with the powerful free coloured community of the West and 
on the calculations of Toussaint Louverture. While it is conceivable 
they might ahve been able to establish an enclave where the slave regime 
was preserved or restored in some form, they may well, if deserted by 
Toussaint, have been expelled even more quickly than actually happened. 
What is clear, however, is that the balnce of power between the free 
coloureds and blacks at this time was far more in the former's favour than 
it would ever be again. 
That the power of the blacks was increasing rapidly,, one cannot doubt, 
but the British occupation was to contribute to thistrend in two signif- 
icant ways. In the first place, it isolated the mulattoes of the West, 
(where numerically, proportionately and economically they were at their most 
powerful), and cut them off from thsoe of the South and North. In so doing, 
it brought to an end their ascendancy in Saint Marc, Port au Prince and, 
later, Mirebalais. Since the free coloureds were at their weakest in the 
North Provinceand yet remained such a powerful faction there until the 
crisis of 1796, then one might wonder if Villatte's bid for supreme power 
in March 
30 
would have achieved different results in a Republican zone 
that included Lapointe and Monthrun and where their forces and thsoe of 
Rigaud had freedom of movement. This line of argument seems the stronger 
if one notes that Britain's five-year attempt to preserve the slave regime 
meant that far more blacks had to leave their estates to become soldiers 
than would have been the case if the Spaniards alone had intervened. 
31 
Literally, it forced thousands more than just the guerriers of mid-1793 
to fight for their liberty, instead of receiving it on'a plate from 
Sonthonax and peacefully becoming cultivateurs. As for the psychological 
effects of participating in such a war of liberation, one can only guess, 
but in military terms the effects were obvious. In July 1793, most of the 
black rebels were armed with lances and machetes, and Toussaint (not yet 
1'Ouverture) was leading only a few hundred men. By 1798, he commanded a 
devoted army of veterans, numberingat leastl3/14,000, as against Rigaud's 
8,000.32 The British occupation carried forward and extended, therefore, 
- 364. _ 
the effects of the slave revolt, breaking down the mental and physical 
shackles of slavery and plantation habit, and enabling the ex-slaves to 
develop the military skills with which to defend their freedom. At the 
same time, it also made the free coloureds increasingly dependent on the 
martial skills of the blacks. The implications of this shift in the inter- 
nal balance of power as regards the future policy of Bonaparte and therefore 
the entire history of the country might well have been profound. 
Needless to say, this is simply speculation, an attempt to relate 
causally important social changes to an event of perhaps no singular 
significance or obvious consequences. Indeed, while most modern Haitians 
have apparently never heard of Great Britain, mention of l'occupation 
brittanique even to the average member of the elite tends to conjure up 
images of the 1640s and the pirates of lisle Tortue. Even so, tangible 
remains of this brief episode in the life of the peopldare still to be 
found dotted about the Haitian landscape. Fort George still looks down on 
Port au Prince, though under another name, and continues in use by the 
army. Substantial ruins still stand at the Mole1and in the hills above 
Saint Marc the walls of Forts Brisbane and Churchill have also survived. 
On the hillock at les Irois, only a few cannon, half buried, recall the 
existence of its mud fort, but further up the coast at Tiburon not all the 
masonry of de Sevrd's defences have yet disappeared, and scraps of rusted 
steel are scattered in the surrounding fields. Fort Williamson, blown up 
in 1798, is now an anonymous pile of rubble to the north of Arcahaye, 
though the massive stonework of Fort Bizoton is stillmuch in evidence 
and on the lonely Dominican frontier Fort Biassou, the haunt of bandits in 
the nineteenth century, survives as a reminder of the advanced positions 
of the British occupying forces. It is in the mountains of Arcahaye, 
however, that the most impressive ruins are tobe seen. There, at a height 
of over 4,000 feet, stand at least three very solid stone forts, overgrown 
with creepers and brushwood, their cannon pointing skywards, but still 
largely intact; and in the mornes all around them are the opulent ruins, 
equally lifeless, of the cafAeres they werebuilt to protect. 
But this is not quite all. There is a street game little girls play 
in Haiti, that appears to be known in most parts of the country, though 
some say it is particularly associated with the Grand' Anse.,. and others 
with Saint Marc. It consists of a danoe"variously performed but aocömpanied by 
a short refrain, whose opening words, rather curiously, are totally without 
meaning in creole. It seems they are the ghosts of English words, learned by 
the young girls of a previous generation who sought to attract the attention 
of a Brisbane or a Whitelocke - 
'Si si mi, dM commands. La v4 ron, d6 command6' 
as he rode by during 
'slavery's final days in Saint. Domingue. 
33 
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APPENDIX A. CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE RATES 
(i) Official Exchange Rates 
Always being scarce and continually exported from the 
region, specie circulated at a premium in the West Indies. There 
was no Dominguan currency per se and the livre tournois was officially 
fixed at 150% above par to attract coinage into the colony. Similarly, 
the pound sterling in Jamaica stood at 140. 
1 livre = 
24 livres tournois 
£1 sterling 
£1 sterling 
1 Spanish piastre 
or 'gourde' 
20 sols = 240 deniers 
= 36 'livres de Saint Domingue' 
£1/8/0 'Jamaican currency' 
24 livres tournois 
8 1.5 s. de Saint Domingue 
or 4 'gourdins' 
1 'portugaise' or 
half-joe (meia dobra) 
1 'Jamaican dollar' 
or piastre 
(ii) Actual Exchange Rates 
66 'livres de Saint Domingue' 
= 4/6d sterling = 6/3 3/5d 'currency' 
in the 1790's, the Spanish milled silver dollar, the 
commonest medium of exchange in both Saint Domingue and Jamaica, was 
generally rated at 6/8d 'Jamaican currency', or 4/8d or 4/9d sterling, 
sometimes more. In Europe, it was usually bought for 4/6d sterling 
and sometimes less. Similarly, guineas, theoretically worth 29/4d 
'currency', fetched 32/6d in September 1795. 
During the occupation, British currency was apparently 
undervalued by about 4% against the 'livre coloniale'. Usually, 
the 'pound Jamaican' was calculated at 24 1.15 s. instead of 25 1.14 s. 
and the pound sterling at 34 1.13 s. not 36 1. It seems that, for 
convenience, the 'gourde' was made equal to the 'Jamaican dollar', 
both being abstractions, merely the Jamaican and Dominguan exchange 
rates for the piastre. 
To provide small change, piastres were cut up into bits, 
also called ryals in Jamaica and escalins in Saint Domingue. In both 
colonies, they were valued wholesale at 11 to the piastre. 
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APPENDIX B. SOUTH AND WEST SAINT DOMINGUE ON THE EVE OF THE 
OCCUPATION AS SEEN BY AMERICAN MERCHANTS AND FRENCH COLONISTS 
1) J6r&ie: early June. 'an Insurrection was daily expected at J4r4mie 
which occasioned very considerable Alarm. ' (examination of J. B. Boccalin) 
2) Miragoäne: 26th August 1793. 'if there is no alteration in this govern- 
ment white men won't be able to stay in this part of the island much 
longer... (debts cannot be collected] for there is no laws. ' (Bigar to Lynham) 
3) Les Cayes: 30th August 1793. 'the Spanish Inquisition when in the 
zenith of power did not equal what is daily committed here, Molato sons 
have assassinated the unhappy authors of their existance. Men are here 
frequently massacred in cold blood and the prisons are filled with the 
most respectable and most virtuous Characters. Such is French Democratic 
Liberty. ' (Wright to Wright) 
4) Port au Prince: 11th September 1793. 'No American trusts his property 
on shore during the Night and the harbour is crouded with women and children 
praying to Masters of Vessels to take them off. ' (Mumford to Powers) 
5) Les Cayes: 16th/18th October 1793. 'We are in great fear of more trouble 
every day and no man dare speaks as all law is in the hands of the yellow 
and black faces... 
[everyone is freeing their slaves from fear of being killed 
... White men 
is worse than ever negroes was. ' (Haight to Haight and to Adams) 
6) Saint Marc: 4th November 1793. 'Nous sommes ici daps 1'etat le plus 
deplorable, toujours sur le qui vive... Je ne marche qu'avec un poignard... 
Jose vous annoncer l'incendie de Saint Marc. ' (anon. ) 
7) Saint Marc: November (letter of 12 f6vrier 1794). Sonthonax and Polverel 
'ne se donnaient meme pas la peine de dissimuler leur horrible projet; ils 
marquent du geste et de la voix au milieu des rues de Saint Marc les 
victimes qu'ils devaient immoler. ' (Preval to Preval) 
8) Port au Prince: 7th November 1793. 'les negres de la plaine de Cul de 
Sac ne travaillent. plus de tout, parce qu'ils savent bien que la liberte 
donnee par les Commissaires ne vaut rien, mais qu'ils en profiteront tant 
que les choses dureront comme elles sont et qu'ils ne se rangent I 'Vordre 
comme autrefois aussitöt que les choses se retabliront. Malgrez tout ce 
bouleversement, il ya encore dans les montagnes de la Voute et de la 
Riviere froide des habitations ou les negres travaillent comme auparavant 
et sur lesquelles les proprietaires'resident et sont parfaitement tranquils. 
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Depuis pras d'un mois, on n'assassine ni n'incendie plus dans la 
plaine. ' (anon. ) 
9) Port au Prince: . 13th February 1794. 
(Vos esclaves sontl 'fort 
tranquilles ... La recolte dans toute la dependance sera fort peu de chose; 
les jardains ayant depuis longtems et4s ne5gliges. Its sont encore presque 
partout empoisonnes; cependant depuis quelque tems les negres commencent 
ä travailler... la mauvaise foi de cette nation americaine nous a tous 
ruinnes... mais quand je compare notre position ä celle de tous les habitants 
de la partie du nord qui ont tout perdu g4n4ralement, je"vois que nous 
sommes encore moins malheureux; et qu'avec le tems nous parviendrons a 
reparer nos pertes, nous en avons tous grand besoin. Je ne vous parle 
pas de la situation politique de la colonie. Vous devez aujourd'hui la 
connoitre. ' (Thenet to Berard) 
Sources: J. A. V. A. C., papers of the 'Speedwell' (1), 'Jefferson' (2), 
'Fox' (3) , 'Nancy' (4 and 5), 
'Union' (6,7 and 9) ; WO 1/59,49 (8) . 
- 367 - 
APPENDIX C. TIM PROPOSITIONS OF FEBRUARY 25th 1723 
(i) The Original Propositions 
1) Les habitants de St. Domi. ngue ne pouvant recourir a leur souverain 
legitime pour les delivrer de la tirannie qui lea opprime invoque la 
protection de sa majest6 Britannique et lui pretent serment do fidelit6; la 
supliant do conserver en sequestre lour colonie, et de lea traitor comme Bons 
et fidels sujets jusqu'a la paix g&0rale epoque a laquelle ils seront" soumis 
d4finitivement aux conditions arretes entre ea ma jestd Britannique et le 
gouvernement do France relativement a la souverainet4 de St. Domingue. 
2) Jusqu'a ce que fordre et la tranquillit4 soient retabli dans la oolonie 
le representant de Sa Majest4 Britannique aura, tout pouvoir de Regler et 
ordonner provisoirement l'administration et de prendre toutes lea mesures de 
surete et de Police qu'il jugera convenables, 
3) Personne ne pourra eire recherch¬ pour Raison des troubles anterieurs 
except4 ceux qui seront juridiquement accuses d'avoir provoqu6s ou ex4ut4s 
des incendies et des assassinate. 
4) Tous lea proprietaires blancs et Gens de couleurs resteront arms et 
seront form's en compsgnies de milices; tous lee non proprietaires qui ne 
seront point engagds et sold4s dans des corps militaires seront desarme's. 
5) Les Gens de couleur proprietaires auront lee rnemes droits quo lea Blanes; 
lea non proprietaires de quelques castes qu'ils soient ne seront admix dann 
aucune assembl4e politique. 
6) Le R4gime civil et Politique sera le meine que celui des colonies anglaisea 
mais aucune assmebl4 ne pourra etre comroquee qu'apr(ýs le RAablissement de 
fordre dans tous lea gicartiers de la colonie. Jusqu'a cette epoque le 
representant de Sa Majest4 
Britannique eera assist4 daps tous lea details 
d'administra. tion et de Police par un comite de six personnes choisic panni 
lea proprietaires des trois paroisses de la colonie. 
7) Les dettes contrsctees par lea habitans jusqu'au premier janvier dernier 
ne pourront etre poursuivis pendant dix annees et ne porteront aucun interet 
a compter de 1'"epoque ou lee insurectinn et lee incendies ont devast6 la 
colonie; ladite epoque demeurant fixde au premier aout 1791. 
8) La saisie reelle des habitants ne pourra avoir lieu-que pour lee avances de 
fonds stipul4es pr- 
etablissement et Qsnelioration des manufac Ures. ITais 
lee lettre de changes et Billets a credit poýsterieurs aus desastres de la 
colonie produiront con-ne par le passe la contrainte par corps et la saisie 
des meubles et des revenues. 
9) Le repr4sentant de Sa Majestd Britiennique Pourra confirmer ou dectituer 
lee officiers de justice et 
nomrner provisoirement lee titulaires sur la 
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presentation du comite. 
10) Lea droits d'importations et d'exportations pour lea denrees et marchand- 
ises D'Europe seront Reglos sur le mgme pied que dane lea colonies anglaises. 
11) Les manufactures de sucre Blanes conserveront le droh d'eporter leur 
sucres terres. 
12) La Religion Catholique sera maintenue sans exclusion d'aucun autre culte 
evangelique. Les Pretres qui auront pretes serment a la R4publique seront 
Renvoies et remplaeds par ceux actuellement refugits en angleterre, 
13) Jusqu'a cc que lea quartiers qui sont devastes soient repares la navig- 
ation sera Libre avec lea etats unis: et lorsque le gouvernement anglais 
etablira le Regime prohibitif qui a lieu daps see autres possessions 11 
prendra des mesures pour guarantir l'approvisionement de premiere necescite 
en vivres bois et animaux et salaisons. 
13) (SIC) La gestion des biens des mineurs et des proprietaires absens sera 
soumise a une comptabilite exaete et a une responsabilite effective de la 
part des ge'rans et fond4s de Pouvoir. 
14) Les frais de justice seront Regles par des tarifs et lea formes de proced- 
ure civiles usites dans lea colonies anglaises et seront r4duites aux termer 
lea plus simples et lea moans dispendieux. 
15) Tous lea d. roits et privileges accordes aux canadiens et aux habitants de 
la Grenade, loix et usages conservees dans ces colonies a la demands des 
habitans, seront egalement guarantis et conserves aux habitans. 
16) La colonie acquittera sur lea impositions locales tour lea frais de 
garrison et d'administration mais ne supporters pas la depense des escadres 
destin4es a la proteger; lea droits percus en Europe sur l'importation de 
sea produits devant etre consideres comme la solde de cette protection. 
17) Le Representant de Sa Majeste Britiannique a St. Doming e reclamera 
aupres du gouvernement espagnol lea negres et les animaux vendus dans son 
territoire par lea N fires Revolts. 
(Margin ISotes) 
Note. Cette condition premiere satisfait a notre delicatesse et nos devoirs 
envers Louis XVII sans contrarier aucunes des vues que pent avoir is 
gouvernement anglais. 
Na. I1 importe fort au bon ordre et a la bonne police de la colonie que les 
articles 13 et 14 soient statu4s pendant ta plein et entier exercice de 
1'autorit6 royale com-ne articles de capitulation affin qutauc-Lne pr's 
ou des Bens de justice et des comptables auroient 
d'influence ne puisse les 
anrraller. 
Na. Il ya eu en la quere des brigandages commis par les espagnols et le 
gouverneur anglais obtiendra tout de suite un grand credit sur les habitans 
en se montrant dispos4 ä leur procurer justice. 
so : wo 1/58,533-8 
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(ii) The Capitulation 
(N. B. Various texts exist. As the use in CO 319/4 contains many errors clearly 
due to its English copyist, I have used the text in Prostin, Intervention 
3362-5, which derives from a copy of the one registered by the Conseil 
Superieur in August 1794. However, two important departures from the Brit- 
ish text need noting. In-article 5, devra choisir should read rourra choisir 
and in article 12, seul port d'importation should read seul Pont. Interest- 
ingly, the version in Placide-Justin, Histoire 264-7, otnits the prohibition 
on a colonial assembly meeting in wcrtime. It was apparently the text de 
Chaxmilly signed on behalf of the Grand' Anse planters on September 3rd, 1793. 
i) Les habitants de Saint Domingue ne pouvant recourir a leur 16gitime 
souver&in pour lea ddlivrer de la tyrannie qui lea opprime, invoquent la 
protection de Sa Majeste Britannique et lui pretent serment de fidelite, la 
suppliant de conserver leur colonic et de les traiter comme bons et fideles 
sujets jusqu'ä la paix gendrale, 
epoque ä laquelle Sa Majest6 Britannique,.. 
le Gouvernement de France et lea puissances alli4es d4cideront ddfinitivement 
entre elles de la souverainete de Saint Dcmingue. 
Accordd. 
2) Jusqu'ä ce quo fordre et la tranquillit6 soient retablis dens la colonic, 
le repr4sentant de Sa. Majeste Britannique aura tout pouvoir do r6gler et 
d'ordoanner toutes lea mesures de police et de sürete qu'ils jugera convenables. 
Accorde. 
3) Personae ne pourra etre recherche pour raison deWtroubles antLerieurs, 
exceptes eeux qui seront juridiquement accuses d'avoir provoqueAes incendies 
ou des assassinate. 
Accorde. 
4) Les hommes de couleur auront tous privileges dont jouit cette olasse 
d'habitants dans lee colonies anglaises. 
Accorde. 
5) Si, ä la conclusion de la guerre, la colonie Teste sous la dominati^n de 
la Grande-Bretagne et que fordre y soit retabli, alors lea loin relatives 
ä 
la propriety et a tous lea droits civils qui exietaient 
dann la dite colonic 
avant la Revolution de France, seront conservees. 
Neanmoins jusqu'ä la formation 
d'une assemble coloniale, Saliajeste Britannique aura 
le droit de statuer 
provisoirement ainsi que 
l'exigera le bien gen6ral et la tranquillite de la 
colonic,, mais aucune assembl4e ne pourra etre convoquee qu'apr6s 
le retablisse- 
ment de I'ordredans 
tous lea quart+icrs de la colonic. Jusqu'ä cette 6poque, le 
representant de Sa MMajest64 Britannique sera assists 
dann tous lee details 
d'administration et de police par un comite de 
6 personnes qu'il devra 
choisir pa=, i lea proprietaires des trois provinces 
de la colonic. 
Accords. 
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6) Attendu lea incendies, insurrections, revoltes des negres, vols et 
pillages qui ont devastg la colonie, le representant de Sa Majest4 Britann- 
ique, au moment oü ii prendra possession de la colonie, pour eatisfaire ä. 1a 
demands quten font lea habitants, sera autorise ä proclamer qu'il accorde, 
pour le paiement des dettes, un sursis de dix annees, qui commencera a courir 
du jour de la prise de possession, et la suspension des interets commenoera 
a courir depuis l! epoque du ler aoüt 1791 pour n'expirer qu'A la fin des dix 
Bites annees de sursie accordees pour le paiement des dettes, et cependant ne 
pourront titre comprises dans lesdits sursis lea dettes pour compte de tute 
et compte de gestion des biens des proprietaires absents, et aussi lee dettes 
pour tradition de fonds de proprietaires. 
Accoit1e. 
7) Les droits d'iniportation et d'exportation pour lea denr4es et marchandises 
d'Europe seront reglees sur le meme pied que daps lea colonies anglaises. 
Accords. En consequence le tarif sera rendu public et affiehe pour que per- 
sonne nten ignore. 
8) Les manufactures de Sucre blanc conserveront le droit Vexporter leurs 
sucres, tenus sujets aux reglements des droits qu'il sera necesaaire de faire 
ä cet egard. 
Accords. Les droits sur lea sucres blancs seront lea memes que ceux qui 
4taient perjus dans la colonie de Saint-Dominigue en 1789. 
9) La religion catholique sera maintenue sans acceptation dtaucun culte 
evang6lique. 
Accorde, ä condition quo lee pretres qui auront prete serrient de fidglite ä 
la Republique seront renvoyes et remplaces par ceux refugies dann lea etats' 
de Sa ? da jestd Britannique. 
10) Les impositions locales, destinies ä acquitter lea frass de garnison et 
diadministration de la colonie seront perýues sur le me"me pied qu'en 1789, 
sauf lea modifications et dMcharge$ qui seront accordees aux habitations 
incendieea, jusqutau moment oü leurs etablissements seront repares. ri sera 
tenu en oonsoquence compte par la colonie de toutes lea avances qui pourront 
etre faites par la Grande-Bretagne, pour suppleer au deficit des dites imp- 
ositions. Le dit deficit, ainsi que touter lea autres depenses publiques de la 
colbnie autres que celles relatives aux escadres des vaisseaux du Roi qui y 
seront employes seront defrayes par la colonie. 
Accordo. 
11) Le representant de Sa Majest6 Britannique a Saint Domi. ngue s'adressera 
au gouvernement espagnol pour la restitution des negres et des animaux vendus 
dans son territoire par lea negres revolter. 
Accords. 
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12) L'importa, tion des vivres, bestiaux, grains at bois de toute espAce des 
tats Unis de l'Amerique, sera permise ä Saint-Domingue sur des vaisseaux 
am6ricains. 
Accord4, pourvu qua lea b. timents mm4ricains n'aient qurun seul port d'izmport- 
ation; cette importation aura lieu tant gtr'elle paraitra necessaire pour 
l'approvisionnement at is r6tablissement de la colonie, ou jusqutä. ce qu'on 
ait prix des mesures pour la mettre ä cat 4gard. sur le meme pied qua lee 
colonies anglaises. I1 sera tenu un etat exact des vaisseaux, aver la descrip- 
tion de leer cargaison, lequel sera envoys tous lea trots moil aux Commiss- 
aires de la Trdsorerie de Sa 1'dajeste Britannique, ainai qutä urn des princip- 
aux Secretaires d'Etat. Sous aucun pr6texte, il ne sera permis aux Bits 
vaisseaux de prendre eia chargement aucune denr4e de la colonie, a 1texeeption 
de. la m6lasse, du rhtme at du tafia. 
Aucune partie des susdites propositions ne pourra etre considdräe comme une 
restriction au pouvoir qu'a le Pariement de la Grande Bretagne de regler 1s 
gouvernement politique de la colonies 
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APPENDIX D. 
(i) Conseil Prive 
'GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
11th June - 22nd Sept. 1794 
C. A. I. Hanus de Jumecourt 
P. F. Venault de Charmilly 
le Comte O'Gorman 
F. R. Ango 
J. B. Lespinasse 
J. M. Delarue 
E. J. Billard (added 2nd July) 
Rolland (secretary) 
11th June - late July 1795 
Belin de Villeneuve 
Vincendon-Dutour 
de L'aumont 
C. P. de Ronseray 
Jouette (secretary) 
28th Aug. 1795 onwards 
22nd Sept. 1794 - 26th Feb. 1795 
P. Belin de Villeneuve 
E. G. Vincendon-Dutour 
J. S. de L&aumont 
Billard 
L. Gueydon (added 25th Sept. ) 
F. Legras (added 21st Nov. ) 
H. Jouette (secretary) 
August 1795 (interim) 
Belin de Villeneuve 
Billard 
P. J. Laborie 
Duranton 
Belin de Villeneuve 
Laborie (until 26th October) 
le vicomte Dulau D'Allemans 
le chevalier Dubreuil de Villars 
J. B. J. Busson 
J. B. J. LomSnie de Marine (added 11th Nov. ) 
In July . 1797, 
Dulau D'Allemans and Belin de Villeneuve retired. 
On 8th August 1797, Billard and Hanus de Jum4court were reinstated. 
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(ii) Conseil Superieur 
Dumas, Berault Saint Maurice, de Ronseray, Bocquet de Frdven, 
de Conigliano, Valentin de Cullion pere, de la Chasse de Couedie, 
Gouin, Petit Deschampeaux, Chesneau de la Megriere, Bascher de la 
Boisjoly, Baron, Salvau de Jonquiere, Bourdon de la Milliere, 
Philippe de la Marniere. 
In July 1795, Jonquiere and Marniere were replaced by Laborie 
and Collet, and in September, Lambert and de Cotte replaced 
Dumas and Berault. 
In August 1797, Petit Deschampeaux died and Baron was dismissed. 
(iii) Administration des Biens des Absents 
Receiver-general: A. Malouet d'Alibert. 
Principal Administrators: L. M. de Ligaumont (Port au Prince); 
Duranton and, later, Reignier du Timat (Grand'Anse); Saint-Aigne 
(Saint Marc). 
Local Administrators: L. Vendryes (Port au Prince); 
Trinquart (Saint Marc); Brault Adam, then Cizos (Croix des 
Bouquets); Saint-Cyr Prevost (Mirebalais); Reignier du Timat, 
then P. Morin (Abricots) ; Oliver (Cayemittes) ; Richer (J4r&ie) ; 
Gasnier du Tesse (Mole) Valentin de Cullion (Arcahaye). 
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APPENDIX E. TRADE FIGURES 
(i) Exports from the Grand'Anse (livres weight) 
Brown Clayed "" 
Coffee Cocoa Cotton Sugar Sugar 
Year ending 
30th Sept. 1794 15,946,604 558,504 298,037 386,300 30,546 
Year ending 
30th Sept. 1795 16,979,165 681,851 317,411 484,787,2,310 
Source: WO 1/63,423. livre = 1.08 lbs. 
(ii) Exports from Saint Marc and Arcahaye, 5th July - 22nd August 
1794 (livres weight) __ 
Brown Clayed 
Coffee Indigo Cotton Sugar Sugar 
Saint Marc 
to Br. ports 348,440 201,862 611,441 
to Fo. ports 873,891 1,020 23,301 725,942 ""2,000 
Arcahaye 
to Br. ports 163,315 56,050 383,978 
to Fo. ports 49,477 5,500 237,779 
Source: Co 137/93 Williamson to Portland 13th September 1794. 
(iii) Exports from Port au Prince, 20th Feb. 1795 - 29th Feb. 1796 
(livres weight). Produce of Arcahaye, Mirebalais and Grands Bois. 
Brown Clayed 
Coffee Indigo Cotton Sugar Sugar 
8,660,416 6,072 609,300 9,846,439 12,032 
Source: WO 1/64,246 - 7. 
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APPENDIX F. BRITISH TROOPS SENT TO SAINT DOMINGUE. 
Number. Regiment Date of Arrival 
801 . 13th and 49th Foot with art- Mid-Sept. to late 
illery and engineers. Oct. 1793. 
370 20th Foot. 31st Jan. 1794. 
500 1st batallion Royals with Mid-Feb. - late 
artillery. April. 
1860 Batallion companies of 22nd, 19th May. 
23rd and 41st Foot. 
290 Flank companies of 22nd, 23rd, 8th June. 
35th and 41st Foot. 
40 Remainder of flank companies June - August. 
after convalescence in Jamaica. 
55 Detachments of 16th and 62nd c. 1st October. 
Foot. 
100 Miscellaneous recruits. Jan. - Dec. 
1505 81st and 96th Foot. 24th April 1795. 
148 Recruits for the Royals. April. 
110 Miscellaneous recruits. Jan. - July. 
125 Flank companies of 130th Foot. Late July. 
1161 82nd Foot and 3 companies of Early August. 
83rd Foot. 
513 Detachments of 130th and 83rd October. 
Foot, and 18th Light Dragoons. 
483 Miscellaneous recruits. Aug. - Dec. 
2200 66th and 69th Foot with February 1796. 
artillery. 
6700 17th, 32nd, 56th, 67th Foot, May - July. 
with detachments of 39th, 93rd 
and 99th. 13th, 14th, 17th and 
18th Light Dragoons with artill- 
ery, engineers and hospital corps. 
400 3rd Irish Regiment. Late August. 
910 Miscellaneous recruits. Jan. - Dec. 
- 377 - 
Number Regiment Date of Arrival 
336 Return of 3rd Irish Regiment. April 1797. 
400 40th Foot and other detachments. April. 
580 2nd Irish Regiment. Sept. - Dec. 
400 Miscellaneous recruits. Jan. - Dec. 
400 60th Foot. Early 1798. 
250 Miscellaneous recruits. Jan. - Sept. 1798. 
Most of these figures, which include officers, N. C. O. s and drummers 
as well as rank and file, are open to question. Regimental returns, 
district returns, estimates given in military correspondence and those 
in printed works are very often at variance, with errors difficult to 
identify. Most of the regimental monthly returns (WO 17) are in- 
coomplete; some are totally lacking. However, I have usually pre- 
ferred their evidence to that of other sources. I have also obtained 
useful material from JAJ IX 213, CO 245/1,157-9, the Royal Gazette, 
S. R. O., GD 193/3/5 and WO 1/60,15 and 265. 
The number of recruits is difficult to pin down. Whitehall 
recruiting statistics show hundreds raised in Britain for regiments 
then in Saint Domingue but it is not clear how many reached the 
colony. Regimental returns usually show occasional large additions 
of recruits along with fairly regular but numerically small enlist- 
ments, which may have been made in Saint Domingue itself, though more 
probably in Jamaica, where recruiting parties are sometimes mentioned. 
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GLOSSARY 
A. G. N. Archivo General de la Naci6n, Dominican 
Republic 
A. N. Archives Nationales, Paris 
A. N. O. M. Section d'Outre-Mer 
H. N. Bibliotheque Nationale, Manuscrits, Paris 
B. M., Add. Ms. British Museum, Additional Manuscript 
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H. P. L. r Boston Public Librazy, Massachusetts 
C. U. L. Cambridge University Library 
H. M. C. Historical Manuscripts Commission 
I. J. Institute of Jamaica, Kingston 
J. A. Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town 
J. A. V. A. C. Jamaica Archives, Vice-Admiralty Court 
Papers 
N. L. S. National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh 
P. P. Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons 
P. R. O. Public Records Office, London 
R. A. M. C. Royal Army Medical College Muniments 
S. R. O. Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh 
U. C. M. M. Universidad Cat6lica de Madre y Maestra, 
Dominican Republic 
W. I. C. L. West India Committee Library, London 
As all works cited are listed in the bibliography, only short titles 
of secondary works are given in the notes. Two oft-quoted and well-known 
books are cited only by their authors' names: - Moreau de Saint-Mdry, 
Description... de la partie fran9aise de lisle Saint Domingue and Garran- 
Coulon, Rapport sur les troubles de Saint Domingue. 
Reference to the Public Record Office is omitted in citations of P. R. O. 
Colonial Office, War Office and Foreign Office papers. 
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I 
NOTES 
INTRODUCTION 
1) Debien, Les Colons 29-57. 
2) Garran-Coulon 116. Officially, the average importation in 1785-90 was 
29,333 p. a. but illegal imports were g6ndralement reconnu to be au moins 
9/10,000 p. a., according to one contemporary: CO 245/10,6 and 122. However, 
see Geggus, Slaves part 2. A contemporary Spanish estimate put them at 3000 
p. a.: U. C. M. M., Colecci6n Inchäustegui, Documentos ÄGI-AGS 1750-99 II, 
(hereafter: 'U. C. M. M. typescripts'), 'Estado de lo que fud el commercio de 
dicha colonia antes de la revoluciön' - not at 25,000 p. a., as reported in 
Laurent, Archives 11. Fouchard, Libertg 218, puts legal imports for 1790 at 
an incredible 46,471. Some account should be taken of a small re-export trade 
to Santo Domingo. 
3) The 'Precis Historique des Annales de la Colonie Francoise de Saint 
Domingue depuis 1789 ä 1'annee... ', (hereafter: 'Precis Historique'), I2 
gives the 1789 population as 35,000 whites, 30,000 free coloureds, 480,000 
slaves. The Intendant estimated it at 35,440 whites, 26,666 free coloureds, 
509,642 slaves: Garran-Coulon I 15-18. Troops and seamen probably amounted 
to another 5000. 
4) ' Garran-CoulOn IV 18- 
5) Ott, Revolution 204-5. 
6) Ott relied incautiously on contemporary American newspaper reports and on 
fantasy works like Alexis, Black Liberator. Cf. Geggus, Volte-Face, for an 
example of how errors compounded by successive writers have clouded an 
already obscure issue. 
CFIAPTFR I 
i) Merivale, Lectures 66. 
2) Saintoyant, Ancien Regime II 352; Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 105-6. 
3) Laborie, Appendix 46; Maurel, Cahiers 26. 
4) Moreau de Saint-Mery 135; Wimpffen, Voyage 54; Frostin, Revoltes blanches 
366-7. 
5) Rotberg, Haiti 29,32; Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 81. 
6) Wimpffen, Voyage 202-8; Moreau de Saint-Mery II 907ff. 
7) Winipffen really only knew the Jacmel area. Moreau de Saint-Mery, though 
infinitely better informed, was most at home describing the North. 
8) Corvington, Port au Prince I 81ff. 
9) Moreau de Saint-Mery III 1384, II 987,1 358. 
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10) Rotberg, Haiti 31; Ponce, Vies and Moreau de Saint-Mery passim. 
11) Vaissiere, Saint Domingue 291-2; Cabon, Haiti I 253; Debien, Grand' cases 
passim. 
12) Malenfant, Colonies 169; Wimpffen, Voyage 117; Laborie, App_ endix 113; 
Brougham, Inquiry I 44-50; Vaissiere, Saint Domingue 299,329. 
13) Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 17-18,46,79; Vaissiere, Saint Domingue 
300-1. 
14) Especially against lawyers acting as plantation attornies who swindled 
absentee owners in collusion with their managers: Wimpffen, Voyage 327. 
15) Debien, Les Colons 44. 
16) Moreau de Saint-Mery I 18. Cf. Wimpffen, Vo age 107-118. Neighbours, he 
said, hardly knew one another. He also stressed local jealousies and disputes. 
17) Quoted in Vaissiere, Saint Domingue 327. 
18) Frostin, Histoire introduction, and Revoltes blanches 17,60-62. 
19) The plantation leases and inventories in A. N. O. M., Domaine, Saint 
Domingue, Administration anglaise, -15 vols., (hereafter: 'Absentee Invent- 
ories'), give a good idea of the extent to which intermarriage and inherit- 
ance had complicated land ownership in the plains of Cul de Sac and Arcahaye. 
Furthermore, these properties were watered by elaborate irrigation works, 
whose financing had demanded a certain degree of corporate organisation on 
the planters' part. See CO 245/6-8 passim. 
20) See above, n. 16; also, Vaissiere, Saint Domingue 323-4. Frostin, 
Histoire examines the 'moral decline' of 18th century Saint Domingue. 
21) Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 17-18, claims that whites were more often 
married than in Jamaica. However, the numbers cannot have been very impress- 
ive, as the sex ratio of the white population was nearly 230: 100. See above, 
n. 3, for sources. 
22) See Wimpffen, Voyage 167-9; Vaissiere, Saint Domingue 280; Debien, Un 
Colon 13,15. 
23) Debien, Etudes 1-137, Plantations et Esclaves 47, Les Colons 41-42. 
However, to a certain extent sugar and coffee planters bid for a different 
sort of slave: Geggus, Slaves part 2. 
24) Debien, Les Colons 42. 
25) Vaissiýre., Saint Domingue 1.15. Cf. Thesee and Debien, Colon niortais 
29, n. 17. 
26) Malenfant, Colonies 209. 
27) Debien, Etudes 136. 
28) Frostin, Uistoire I 433, II 687-714. 
29) Debien, Main d'oeuvre 260, Les Colons 42; Wimpffen, Voyage 59. 
30) Vaissi? re, Saint Domingue 338. 
31) CO 245/1,130-8, memoir by Cesar Dubuc Saint-Olympe. 
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32) Debien, Les Colons 36-37. 
33) Madariaga, Fall 118; Goveia, Leeward Islands 164-6,206-212,218-224; 
Brathwaite, Jamaica 135-150,167-175. 
34) Debien, Etudes 136. 
35) Precis Historique I 35; Paul(5us-Sannon, Histoire I 69. 
36) Debbasch, Marronage 39. 
37) 'Manager' is here used to translate g4ant, and 'overseer' to translate 
econome. Confusingly, in Jamaica and in many monographs 'overseer' denotes 
a manager. 
38) Carteaux, Soirees 39. 
39) Debien, Les Colons 40. Cf. Wimpffen, Voyage 63. 
40) Debien, Les Colons 30. 
41) Edwards, Survey 166; (unless otherwise stated, notes refer to the 1801 
edition). Edwards was a former president of the Assembly of Jamaica. 
42) Rotberg, Haiti 383-5. 
43) Thesee, Negotiants 134. 
44) One merchant house found that most of its 50 clients could apparently do 
little more than cover production costs: ibid. 208, (though clandestine sales 
were probably a factor here). Wimpffen was 'surprised at the trifling profits 
of the planters': Voyage 72-78. Yet, Leon, Marc hands 126 estimates a 15%-20% 
net profit for one Arcahaye sucrerie. Others made 10%, but 5%-8% was more 
normal; Debien, Plantations et Esclaves 169. 
45) Hill, Haiti 9. 
46) Th4see, Negotiants 76,220-1; Thes4e and Debien, Colon niortais 34. 
47) CO 245/1,130-8. 
48) Proceedings of the Assembly 7. 
49) Cf. the cahiers printed in Maurel, Cahiers 270-1,301-2,312-3. 
50) Laurent, Archives 5. 
51) Gaston-Martin, Esclavage 174-5. In 1788-9, le prix commun et le plus mod- 
4r64 of a newly-imported slave was 2100 livres coloniales: CO 245/10,6; 
Edwards, Surve 241. However, around April 1789, prices reached 2800 livres: 
Wimpffen, Voyage 71,76-78. That is, twice what English contraband traders 
charged. On the currency, see Appendix A. 
52) For contemporary estimates of its extent, see WO 1/59,517-8; CO 245/10, 
xiii-xiv, 1-18,119-122; Laurent, Archives 8-12. 
53) Fieldhouse, Empires 91. However, in 1790 the Spanish Empire was thrown 
open to foreign slaveships. 
54) Ragatz, Fall 16,126. 
55) Wimpffen, Voyage 324. A Spanish source says 6%, sometimes nothing, was 
charged: Laurent, Archives 7. Boissonade, Veille 309, says interest rates 
went up to 15%. Whatever, it was much less than what Virginia planters were 
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paying around 1770: see Miller, Origins xv. The subject is discussed further 
in ch. III. 
56) Boissonade, Veille 309 - perhaps a conservative estimate, given that the 
50 estates dealing with Romberg, Bapst et Cie. owed in 1791 nine million 
livres: Thesee, Negotiants 215-7. 
57) B4gouen-Domeaux, Foäche 25. 
58) Cited in Debien, Les Colons 40. 
59) Debien, Magistrats II 1. 
60) Frostin, Histoire II 632-6. 
61) Fieldhouse, Empires 40-41; Laborie, Appendix 63-73. 
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was the retention of and speculation with public funds by financial admin- 
istrators. This was standard practice in 18th century France: Bosher, 
Finances. 
64) Edwards, Survey 31; Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 18-22. Cf. Laborie, 
Appendix 7-14; Dalmas, Histoire I 19. 
65) Moreau de Saint-Mery I 18-19. 
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growth, rising prices and egalitarian ideas; the interaction of war and rev- 
olution; the government search from the 1760's onwards for new sources of 
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156; Shepard, St. Vincent 56-75; S. R. O., GD 51/1,512. 
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124) Vaissiere, Saint Domingue 217 and Moreau de Saint-Mery I 85 give 
conflicting views. Mixed marriage, pace Hall, Social Control 145-6, was not 
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- 386 - 
126) Gisler, Esclavage'97-98. 
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140) Debien, Etudes 119. It has been suggested that the greater creolization 
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on the sucreries, despite the greater creolization of their workforces: Geggus, 
slaves part 1. 
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see. UCMi typescripts, various letters August/October 1791; Debien, Los 
Colons 333; Garran-Coulon II 211-216; Saint Remy, Vie 18,28; Debbasch, 
Rarronage 195. Jean-Prancois and Diassou claimed to have been 'enveloppss II 
dams les rnalheurs de la colonie': Garran-Coulon II 308-312. The scr'po for 
guesswork in enorricus.: 
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61) Garran--Coulon 11 562. 
62) C , ä"te . ti: -, : Owr'>F's passim. 
63) 
c'o 
I 11j-U; M YPOI . ^r 34-35" 
64) Leyhu: rn, Peoy?. e 139-140; Fouchax3, '' . r; cýryY1 359-360. 
65) 1``F: trrux, -r^. udov 34-3v; Leyl urri, 10 1.37-9. 
66) Though it i:,, usual to speak of 50F0'30 rt eiu, Garr u --Coulon though-1; 
12-15,000 more ? 7ealistic, apparently referring to the end o. f August: U 
214.1.. 
334; An nST:. u, r-+ irk 17; Carteaux, Soir6ei 88-90, 67. ) Debien, Les Colons rul 
Garran-Coulon 17L 21, ',, 217-8. 
68) Gar°ran-Conlon II 266--8; McIntosh and Waber, C rresrondanoe 30,35. 
69) Garran-Coulon II 254-6r 335. 
70) Ibid. II 256; Garca--Coulon, Debs. ts 1267; Debien, Etudes 172; Lon, 
? M{arch 193. So-n. 4-5000 slaves from 
the plain were said to have taken 
refun in le Cap, while one contemporary estimate has 30,000 loyal blacko 
crowded into the toten: CO 137/89, Effingham to Dundas 7th September 1791. 
71) Pauleus-Sannon, Histoire 189. 
72)Gaston s; art3. nf F ,, l vaa-c- 128; Moreau de Saint4T ry 111 1395-6- 
73) See Debien, ý'la_xý `ation: ý et Esclavres 46. The Crand' Anne region contained 
many slaves of British provenance but was exceptionally stable, owing; to 
its locr black: white ratio. The numerical predominance of Africans amongst 
the slaves and the ethnic make-up of its African population - fear Gold 
Coast and Slave Coast negroes, numerous 'Congos' and Ibos - may also have 
been contributing factors: Gcggus, 1¬cves part 2; Precis Jiistorique I 
61. 
74) Geggus, Slaves part 5. Bryan Edwards'was surprised that a 'very 
considerable part of the insurgents' were creole: 
Survey 16. 
75) WO 1/58,1-11; Venault de Charmilly, Leitre 13-14; Pauleus--Sannon, 
Hi. stoire 188-89. 
76) Debbasch, -T`arronage I 95. The 200 inventories in A. N. O.? i., Absentee 
Inventories reveal several cases of comnýndeurs rewarded for maintaining 
order in difficult circumstances. 
77) Venault do Char illy, Lettre 13-14. This may have been because the 
Africans were concentrated on the coffee plantations, Where life was 
easier and which were furthest from the to: ans, or 
because they had greater 
difficulties conmunicating, owing to language barriers. 
78) T0 1/58,10-11; Garran-Coulon II 213, III 484-5; Carteaux, Soirees 
1-3; Debien, Etudes 172; Ott, Revolution (thesis) 65; I. J., is-36F, 
dossier 103. At Quartier ?? `drin, slaves fought off the rebels independently 
for several days: Dalmas, Iiistoire I 123-5. 
79) Debien, Etides 172. 
80) Precis ßistor-ique I 35; Pauleus-Sannon, His re 169. 
81) ucly typescripts, Garca to Lerena 18 de aeptiembre de 1791! and to 
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Bajamär_ 25 de septie'ibre de 1791, with enclosures; Raume, 16; 
Garran--Coulon ITT 389,482; Precis Hictorique I 70; Leon, :,; arc' ? nt'^ Ig;, 
Debien. EEuu. ,3 122-3. 
82; ) Garran-Coalon II 324-, 334,565. 
83) DebLacch, rP 174; Debien, 7, es F nl. as"ec 468-9. 
84) A. 17. , Dxxv 110/870-2 passirr; Ga rrar--Coulon II 74-176,509-514, III 300. 
85) GarranCoulon III 151; Placide-Justin, Fistoire 244. 
86) The army and navy were already dislocated by th& Revolution, and from 
October 1791 onwards the deepening rift b; 4tween Right and Left and the 
approachof war with Austria impeded efforts to intervene: James, Jacobins 
112. 
87) Cf. Garran--Coulon II 269. 
88) Ibid. II 281-7. 
89) By the decree of 24th September, which was the result of Pxarnavo's 
manoeuvrl. ne and the reactionary climate that set in in Paris in the summer 
of 1791. 
90) Dominated by Brissot and other members of the Amts des Noirs. 
91) Raune, R pnort 26ff.; Garran-Coulon III 81,99-101. 
92) Foubert, Volontmires passim. 
93) Co 245/10,22-23. 
94) Co 245/1,130-8; also the letters in Jabien, Ftvaes 120-4, which tend 
to exaggerate the dangers of the situation: of. below, ch. V 
95) Garran-Coulon II 484,509-514, ITI 99-100,299-301; Roune, Rapport 15, 
44; Precis Historique I 70. 
96) precis Eistorique I 141-2; Roume, Ra jUort 15; Leong }, arche. -nds 148-9. 
Cf. Geg_; us, Slaxes part 5 and A. N. 0.11. , Absentee Inventories for the 
relatively intact state of the Areahaye plantations. 
97) Roume, Ran rt 47-48; Laveaux, Compte-Rendu 11; Thesee, NEgotiants 
177-183- 
98) Garran-Coulon III 149; Debien, Etudes 120-4. 
99) Garran-Coulon II 482,487-500, III 71-77; CO 245/10,19-40; Leon, 
htarchands 146-7; Thesee, Nerotiantg 177-183; A. N. 0.11., Absentee Inventories, 
Grand' Anse plantations. 
100) Foubert, Volontaires 
101) UCz, rd typescripts, Garcia to Lerena 25 do diciembre de 1791 with 
enclosures; Garran-Coulon II 306-311,564-570,609; 
Ott, Revolution (thesis) 
59-60; Jean-Baptiste, Haiti 27- 
102) Garran-Coulon II 304. Rebels in the North and Went cold follow blacks 
to the Spaniards as slaves; Ibid. IV 46; A. N. Dxxv 39/392, letter no. 19; 
Monte y Tejada, His orLa IV 104-5,141,154-5. 
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ý. ý C: _ 103) See U""_.. _T 
t -pecr_ atS, Gar t. ` to Le x, ena 
ncovj. emhre . 
79 w-S 1 e, c! oýure 
104 floe n2,7 . 22r', -4C. 
'The 3C p ý"33 ca ed [b., s nd for 
£ij ed JPiFö! 1 C''i: rýOlilf a`xý! ý? '` an 
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July 17 92 
que. ion& ? ýý' th. a n up by a enll ;" , 5n Ope n or free COQ r: I7'Coi It 7_iß 
pr'i: itod. no. 3y 239-243- IiJwover, as early a 261!! Sept Tttite 
1791, a note dcmcnding thF ý: the whites evacuate the North was found in a 
rebel carp, though never c, -nt: T0 1/58,, 1-11. 
105) Rour: ýof f? a r rt 47-48. By March, the Dove nor of Senta Domingo thou ht 
the rebels would die rather than pie age themselves in their trusters' ha: )Os: 
to ,M. do ,. s, -ýauýr, 2. 33,14. y Dg. Yz. 1794, Garcia '' f 29 de mrýraý. =cý cue 179 
106) Caxracn-Coulon II 344-6. 
107) For evidence on either side, sen Garran-Coulcn I! 506, III 40f 116, 
173,264-9,293-5, and Il 362,422,453-4y III 38. Janeo's positive verdict, 
Jacobin4 121-2 is rather weakly based. 
108) Precis Isis vor3-que 175-76; Taeseef lee ti rats 179-180; Debion, ?o zr-l1eý, i 
34-35. 
109) Leon, ý'arc; ý rds 1/6; Farrel and Debien, Colors 340. 
110) CO 245/10,19-24. 
111) Roberts, Trench 198; G=ran-Coulon II 126-8,523-4, I11 99,255. 
112) See the population stetistic3 in Ducoeurjoiy, Manuel, Introduction ii; 
. 113) Garran-Coulon III 
317 s 356-7,385. For conditions iii' the South 1y y- the 
sun, mer, see Appendix B. 
114) Garran-Coulon III 140ff. 
115) Ibid. III 176-192,223-8. 
116) Ibid. III 2759 279,371" 
CHAPTER IIt s 
1) Frosting, Intervention 357 and Histoire I xxxx. 
2) Garrcn-Coulon IV 102-5- 
3) Jean-Baptiste, Haiti 23. This line of argument can be variously applied. 
she paucity of evidence of secessioniem before 1793 can be attribuLed not 
to the lack of support for it but to its scant feasibility; during 1793, 
one night say that the colonists were inhibited 
from showing their true 
sentiments by a justifiable scepticism as to Britain's ability to 
protect them, while after 1793, disillusion with 
foreign occupation could 
explain hostility to it. 
4) Frostin, T. niervention, iüetoire and P. 
evoltes Bianche3. Hin e? aphacis on 
separatist ambitions is shared in varying dQGrees 
by the majority of 
writers on the Revolution, but especially Rüsch, 2. (t%1oTpt -ors mid Jean- 
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Baptiste, Haiti. Cabon, Haiti III and Roberts, French, however, say the 
colonists acted essentially conservatively in the face of revolutionary 
ch. os. Frostin, Intervention 296 claims that Debien's Esprit Colon and 
Un Colon 'mettent en valeur la permanence de l'esprit autonomiste et 
anglophile chez la plupart des colons de Saint Donti. ngue'. This is clearly 
untrue. Debien's views are above all cautious. Cf. his review of Frostin's 
thesis. 
5) Frostin, Intervention 357- 
6) Ibid. 296,313- 
7) See chapters I and IT. 
8) Debien, Un Colon introduction and 135; Frostin, Intervention 296. 
9) 'Si la France nous abandonnerons... si nous avions le malhehr de changer 
de patrie... ii faudra bien souffrir ce que nous ne pouvons emp'Ocher. ' 
10) Debien, Un Colon 165. 
11) Maurel, Cahiers 63-64- 
12) See above, ch. II, 28-29. 
13) Thesee, Negotiants 130- 
3-4) Garran-Coulon II 181-2, IV 106-7. He also claimed that les plenteurs 
had official relations with Jamaica from the start of the Revolution: I 46. 
15) Ibid. IT 181-2. Even at this early date, the idea of a pan-Caribbean 
union was not without supporters. See Young, Travels 401. 
16) CO 137/88-100; J. A., 13/5/3/19-20; J. A., 13/5/14/1-2; J. A., 113/5/12/1 
and J. A., 13/5/13/1: which cover the years 1789-98. 
17) Edwards, Survey 56-57. Here he probably relied on the evidence of 
Cadusch: Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 10. 
18) Ex mousguei, for 15 years a man of affairs and sugar planter in 
Saint Domingue, he ras in his own words 'habitant de la partie de Sud, qui 
devait presque son etablissement auz Anglais et aux negotiants de la Jam- 
aique, connaissant 1'Angleterre par plusieurs voyages' 
(Lettre 2-3); in 
the words of another, ' celebre par le desir d'etre un personnage interessant 
dans le changement do domination ä Saint Domingue our lequel il avait fonde 
ses plus belles esperances de fortune, ''(Precis Historique 1122). The abusive 
and self-assertive tone of his Lettre very much suggests the parvenu. 
19) Lettre 4,52. 
20) Debien, Nouvelles 8- 
21) Venault de Charnilly, Lettre 3-4,52. Saint-Germain, a headstrong and 
slightly shady emissary of the Club Massiac, soon abandoned by them, seems 
to have envisaged as a measure of last desperation threatening to appeal 
to the English, and actually doing so, should the Amis des Noirs prove 
victorious. This, however, he saw as a sacrifice. See Debien, Les Colons 207-8. 
22) See Millet's comments in Garran-Coulon IV 108. Others might have noticed 
the British Government's past reluctance to take over settled colonies. Cf. 
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Parry and Sherlock, Histo 118-125. Very few wartime occupations had led 
to transfers of sovereignty. 
23) Frostin, in fact, implies that British annexation had more dovotoea-than 
did absolute independence: Histoire I ii; Rcvoltes blanches 14. Debien 
thinks that both movements were really the same: Esprit d'Ind6pendance`21. 
Frostin, in one place seems to agree: 'Colonie fran9aise, colonie anglaise, 
autonomic, independance, peu importait lea appartenances et lea formales. ' 
The essential desire, he explains, was for self-administration and freer 
trade: Eis Loire II 648. He thus seems to abandon much of the case made out 
in Intervention. However, contemporaries wore known to distinguish anglophiles 
from indduendants. See Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 3-4, and Sonthonax's 
words, printed above, p. 67. Clearly, not all separatists thought the English 
would follow the French example of 1778 and attach no strings to helping an 
enemy colony to secede. 
24) Garran-Coulon I 238 no 
25) Debien, Nouvelles 20. For the moderate temper of the Assembly's early 
sessions, see Garran-Coulon I 168. 
26) Debien, No ve lles 15-20. 
t 
27) Th4s4e, NeMtiants 208-9. 
28) Ibid. 101; Laborie, Appendix 42; Gaston-Martin, Esclavage 176, MYsettas, 
Honfleur 17-18, n. 23; Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 20-21. 
29) Thesee and Debien, Colon Niortais 36, n. 39; Thesee, Ne, atianta 209-210. 
30) Thes6e, Negotiants 101,132, 
31) Garran-'Coulon II 191; Debien, Nouvelles 27. 
32) E. g. Clausson, Precis; Carteaux, Soirees. 
33) Carteaux, So irees 127-8- 
34) Constitution 1-55. The author greatly admired English Liberties but 
treated England as l'ennemi naturel. However, his inclusion of Congress's 
Adress to the Inhabitants of Quebec of October 1774 raises doubts whether his 
patriotism was stronger than his revolutionism. 
35) Cormier, 1,14m! oire passim. 
36) Debien, Esprit'Col_en 47; Potion, Discours 41-42. 
37) Debien, Esprit Colon 47- 
38) Ibid. 
39) Garran-Coulon II 277-9, III 15- 
40) Ibid. II 110-2; Extraits des Registres... 17 iuillet 1721- 
41) FO 27/36, Cower to Grenville 13th and 20th May and 26th August 1791; 
Parrel and Debien, Colons 309. 
42) Parrel and Debien, Colons passiv. 
43) Extraits des Regt stres... 17 iuillet 1791; Extraits des Doliberations. 
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44) Garran-Coulon II 118,279; McIntosh and Weber, Correspondence 19,23. 
Bryan Edwards said it-would have produced civil war if imposed on Jamaica: 
Survey 87. Pace Fouchard, Liberte 123, he was never 'Consul anglaisI at le Cap. 
45) CO 137/89, Williamson to Grenville 5th August 1791. Williamson thought 
them ! men of the first consequence'. Th&ir names were Jean Boyer, Lun 
pecheurt according to Precis ßistorique I 51p but probably a merchant), 
Miroux and Marie (perhaps the Genevan-born merchant-planter Raymond Marie 
but more probably the watchmaker J. A. Marie). 
46) Garran-Coulon IV 111, II 188ff. 
47) Ibid. II 188-192; Debien, Nouvelles 27; Blanchelande, Memoire (supple- 
ment) 6. 
48) Leopardin and sometime president of the Saint Mara Assembly, he had been 
colonel of the troops raised to defend the deputies in July 1790. 
49) Garran-Coulon II 230-3,290ff.. Garran-Coulon's chronology is here in 
error. See A. N., Dv 46/433, Blanchelande to the Minister of Marine 16 
novembre 1791. 
50) Garran-Coulon, Debts I 38; Debien, Esprit d'Independance 23. 
51) The Governor would surely have mentioned it in his dispatches. See CO 
137/89, Effingham to Dundas 7th and 17th September 1791. Edwards, who 
introduced the two men, similarly says nothing of secret proposals: Survey 
4-5. The allegation in Castonnet-Desfosses, Revolution 88 and Jean-Baptiste, 
Haiti 137 that the envoy sent to Washington sought Saint Domingue's entry 
into the Union remains likewise unsubstantiated. 
52) Members of :: the ate ouest` f&6tion. Pierre-Jean Raboteau, an apparently 
French-born Petit negotiant, owned various properties in the townof Saint 
Marc. Either he or one of his cousins, Jean Isaac or Pierre Isaac, was 
probably the anonymous who supplied most of=tthe information for Edwards's 
Surve . Jacques -Fran joi a 
Berault Saint Maurice, a creole, was a minor jud- 
icial official, son of a rich southern sugar planter and president of'the 
Saint Marc Assembly in its extreme phase. 
53) Garran-Coulon IV 119; Lacroix, Memoires I 121. 
54) See WO 1/58,1-11; UCML typescripts, the reports in Garcia to Lerena 25 
de noviembre de 1791; CO 137/89, Effinghaza to Dundas 17th September 1791. 
55) Edwards, Survey 6-7; Garran-Coulon II 223- 
56) Edwards, Survey 6 gives September 26th; Garran-Coulon II 241 gives the 
21st and Precis Historique I 50 gives the 20th. However, see P. R. O., ADM 
51/20,100 and 228, logs of the 'Alert', 'Blonde' and 'Daphne'. 
57) Edwards, SurveY 9: 'very earnest wishes were avowed in all companies, 
without scruple or restraint, 
that the British admint. stration would send an 
armament... to receive 
(the colony's) volontary surrender. ' The Marquise de 
Rouvray, however, was complaining that not enough people wanted the British 
to intervene: McIntosh and Weber, Correspondance 31. 
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58) Dundas Papers I, pieces no-3 and no. 5. 
59) Its tenets include: - Saint Domingue and France are 'deux societes 
federees', each possessing 'le droit imprescriptible... de tendro irrEsis- 
tiblement a son bien etre'; Saint Domingue is the source of French greatness, 
its wealth being drained to pay for France's wars; philosophy that denies 
that blacks are property is immoral, since slavery saves them from cannibal- 
ism; a free colouredts rights derive solely and 'contractually' from the 
master who freed him, and even be cannot confer political equality as only 
la republiaue can accord la droit de cite; the National Assembly intends to 
abolish slavery; Saint Domingue has constamment cheri et respecte' the king 
but the yoke of the National Assembly must be thrown off. 
60) Dundas Papers I, Affleck to Pitt 25th September 1791. 
61) The Assembly's letter of thanks of 25th September is indeed suspiciously 
sychophantic (ibid. piece no. 2; also in FO 27/37) but then so is that of 
Civil Commissioners Roume and Mirbeck of 15th February 1790 (CO 137/90). The 
gratitude was genuine. 
62) CO 137/94: Williamson to Portland 16th January 1795. Garran-Coulon II 
227-8 claims that Cadusch's unpopularity had nothing to do with his secession- 
ist activity, however. 
63) CO 137/89, Williamson to Dundas 18th September 1791. Another envoy of the 
Assembly of the West expressed a personal desite for Independence to the 
Governor of Santo Domingo: UCMM typescripts Urizar to Ba. jamär 25 de soptiembre 
de 1791. 
64) Precis Historique 151; Garran-Coulon II 157; Maurell, Grimouard 32-35. 
65) Dundas Papers I, piece no, 4, dated 23rd November 1791. 
66) Garran-Coulon II 397-422,571. 
67) Ibid. II 351,397" Cf. Precis Historique I 114: tune cabale aussi folle 
dans sea conceptions que nulle dans ses moyens'. 
68) Ibid. II 355. 
69) Ibid. II 437, III 258-9,350. Edwards, Survey 4. Jamaican merchant 
houses like Alexandre Lindo , Donaldson and Thomson, James Grant Forbes, 
had probably long been trading illicitly in Saint Domin gue, selling slaves 
and buying cotton. Certainly, their connections were to become extensive in 
the next two years. See J. A. V. A. C., (1793), papers of the 'Peggy', 'La 
Marguerite' etc. Lindo supplied ammunition and provisions to the Assembly of 
the West and was a-frienii of de Charmilly and Berretz: CO 245/5,235; WO 
1/58,31-34. The South, moreover, had long contained a number of English and 
Irish residents. 
70) See Parrel and Debien, Colons passim. The Pacte de Familie was a Bour- 
bon treaty of mutual assistance dating from 1761. 
71) A doctor from la Rochelle, Cougniac `3ion had been 20 years in saint Dom- 
ingue , where he had made a wealthy creole marriage. 
As a corlmiss; over of 
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the second Colonial Assembly, he was sent to request aid from the king and 
National Assembly, 'indeed to seek for succour wherever he could obtain it... 
a very sensible intelligent man': CO 137/91, Williamson to Dundas! 6th /9th 
June 1793. He seems to have been introduced into counter-revolutionary 
circles by the marquis de la Rochejacquelein and in September was presented 
by the baron de Montalenbert to the Regent at Coblentz. La Rochejacquelein 
was a marechal de France, active in the Club Massiac; Montalembert, a 
colonel of Household troops. 
72) Garran-Coulon III 329. 
73) However, Cougniac-Mion and La Rochejacquelein knew the Jamaican planter 
Gilbert Franklyn and he kept Lord Hawkesbury, minister and fellow planter, 
informed of their movements. At the end of June, Francklyn suggested to 
Hawkesbury that he meet La Rochejacquelein. Owing to the latter's public 
position, as representative of the Princes, he recommended it be ! by accident,: 
B. M., Add. Ms. 38228,46-47,192. Coming from Coblentz in May, La Roche- 
jacquelein had told Lord Auckland,, ambassador to the Hague, that Spain had 
agreed to take Saint Domingue and hold it for the Regent, providing England 
did not object: H. M. C., Fortescue Pias. II 267. 
74) See A. l1., CBA 103,14-159 178-184. 
75) Frostin, Intervention 357- 
76) See below, notes 171,172 and 206. The correspondence in UC'VRt typescripts, 
and A. I. Eg. Ms. 1794,255-328 suggests that Spanish behaviour was at first 
more callous than actually malicious. Cf. Geggus, Volte-face. 
77) Debien, Les Colons 315ff. 
78) Parrel and Debien, Colons 340. 
79) In May 1792, the creole de Leyritz brothers, extreme royalists, reported 
that the colonists' discontent might result in an attempt at secession but 
in view of tun attachement non douteux pour la personne du roi', their 
support for the Counter-Revolution might be iron in return for a grant of 
autonomy: Parrel and Debien, Colons 318-325. For a more positive appraisal 
of Saint Domingue as a site for counter-revolution, see Cormier, 1tnoire 36. 
80) Garran-Coulon III 176-192. 
81) Ibid. III 258,283. 
82) Ninety percent of the electorate boycotted the elections to the. -Convent- 
ion. The legislative assemblies of the Directory were to contain at least 
200 royalists and as many indecisive moderates: Godechot, Revolution 159,185- 
83) B. N., Laveaux Corresp. It Pigne de Montignac to Laveaux le 12 decembre 
1793. Some naval officers had apparently planned to intercept the Commiss- 
ioners' fleet: WO 1/58, Francklyn to ? 23rd November 1792, 
84) A memoir, probably by Maloizet, enclosed in Dundas to Williamson 5th 
June 1793, CO 137/91, stresses the repercussions in the colonies of the 
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Prussian army's retreat. Its effects were particularly noticeable in 
Martinique, where the Governor remarked that the planters were Royalists, 
when they thought the king triumphant, Republicans, when the Republic seemed 
to be winning,. and Anglophiles, when they feared Republican revenge: 
A. N., C8A 103,11- 
85) See Galarneau, Opinion 105-143; Wallot, Canada 361-3. 
86) Garran-Coulon III 279,363,386. 
87) Dundas Papers II 21, memoir probably by Malouet. 
88) TO 1/58,17-23, minute dated Ist January 1793 possibly by Grenville, 
who knew Malouet personally. 
89) UMV typescripts, de Jumecourt to Arata 25 de diciembre de 1792. 
90) A. N., CSA 103,14-15; CO 137/91, Midas to Williamson 12th January 1793" 
He was accompanied by J. B. Digneron and the Comte de Beaunay, both sugar 
, 1, 
planters. 
91) A. N., C8Aio3,160-177. 
92) FO 27/41, report of meeting of 25th February; appendix II if. At least 
another 40 colonists in London signed the Proportions between March and mid- 
August: TO 1/58,91-93,115-191. Roughly, 30% owned property in the Cul de 
Sac alone, 301'- in the North and 15% in the South. The number of London 
signatories is put at 420 in M 1/58,525. The following comments apply to 
the final 13 Propositions agreed on with the British Government, not the 
original 17 discussed below in ch. 's V and VI. Five different preliminary 
drafts can be found in WO 1/58,475ff. The chronology of, and influences 
behind, their development are not entirely clear. Both Murray, West Indies 
50 and Lokke, Malouet 382 confuse preliminary and final drafts. 
93) The import of wheat would be allowed but American ships had to be 
single-deckers. 
94) Frostin, Intervention 312. 
95) 170 1/58,17-23,35-42,107. 
96) See above, note 88. 
97) A. N., C 103,178-184,160-3- 
98) See Hampson, Revolution 64. The completely divergent interpretations of 
Malouet's dealings with the British Government found in Frostin, Intervention 
and Griffiths, Mal_ out both seem extreme. Griffiths ignores hlalouet's aut- 
onomist leanings in January/February 1793 and makes the man too 'French', too 
centralist. He exaggerates the European orientation of his policy in 1796-97. 
Both he and Frostin fail to appreciate the influence on M'Ialouet's thinking 
of events in Saint: sJomingue and fluctuations in Royalist fortunes, 
99) F0 27/40,187-190,175-8. 
100) P. R. O., All 1/4157, proposals dated 15 fevrier 1793. Some, however, 
assumed this would take place: 170 1/59,155" 
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101) The words are de Curt's, who on December 5th told Hawkesbury that 
France would be defeated in one campaign but that the French monarchy 'Would 
never be re-established: FO 27/40,175-183. Even a non-colonist like Lally- 
Tollendal had before the king's trial become a British citizen, though 
remaining suiet de coeur duroi de France: ibid. 190. 
102) FO 27/41, de Fontanges cadet to Maloust, no date. 
103) Lefebvre, Revolution II 11-14; Hampson, Revolution 167-171- 
104) He nevertheless kept clear of the Princes till the summer, accepting 
that Saint Domingue's destiny was in British hands and wanting to avoid any 
embarrassment with Monsieur. By late May, however, he was trying to arrange 
that England recognise Marie Antoinette as Regent and receive as a war ind- 
emnity France's Indian colonies: PO 27/42, Malouet to Grenville 29 mars and 
31 mai 1793. 
105) Frostin, Intervention 318. Yet, from August onwards, Malouet advocated 
Anglo-Spanish co-operation. Frostin attributes the volte-face to personal 
ambition as . ii. - gained Malouet a place in the Princes' entourage. However, 
Malouet's own explanation carries great weight. He argued that, since the 
strategic situation had changed considerably in Sonthonax's favour-, (see 
below, ch. V), England could not succeed alone: WO 1/58,341-8; WO 1/59, 
45-48. He also knew in August, unlike in February, that the south of France 
was in revolt and that the Spaniards had already occupied much if Saint 
Domingue and were, -furthermore, threatening his Fort Dauphin plantation. He 
also seems to have thought they recognised Louis XVII: Dundas Papers II 1-4. 
106) wO 1/58, L! alouet to (? )King 12th Marchl793, which evinces real panic at 
France's declaration of war against Spain. It also shows him trying to extract 
conditions fron the British, apparently to satisfy royalist scruples. It ends 
by asserting his loyalty, despite the force of events, aux principesaui 
doivent me diriger 
107) fro 1/58,35-42,405-8,520. 
108) Frostin, Intervention 360 
109) Co 137/94, Williamson to Portland 13th January 1795- 
110) WO 1/58,101-2. Colonists in Prance generally kept quiet, but one 
observer thought it evident most wanted 'passer sous un gouvernement qui pout 
conserver aux uns leurs proprietes echapp'es aux flamines, aux autres fournir 
les moyens de retablir leurs biens dejä devastes: WO 1/58,107, undated 
letter by Michel, merchant-planter of Nantes. 
111) See Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 87 and above, note 92. 
112) E. g. Thomas Millet and Larchevesque-Thibaud. 
113) Garran-Coulon III 275,279,371. 
114) WO 1/58,35-42. Malouet, lfiemoires II 195-213 does not appear very 
reliable here. 
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115) Monte y Tejada, Historla IV 13-14. 
116) WO 1/58,31-34, letter by Berretz fill. 
117) TO 1/58,219-221, letter probably by de Beaunay, a creole planter and 
ea naval officer, on which the rest of this paragraph is based. 
118) Garran-Coulon IV 119-120, III 353. Both men were thought genuine demo- 
crats by Jamaicans who met them, though Garran-Coulon would hardly have 
agreed: 7. '0 1/58,207-210; CO 137/91 Williamson to Dundas 5th September 1793. 
119) Most colonists preferred to flee to the U. S. but . ended up in Jam- 
aica, as at this time 90% of American shipping in the area fell prey to 
British privateers: J. A. V. A. C., (1793), 'Fox' papers, Hall to Stewart 31st 
August 1793. 
120) CO 137/50, undated letter by Gilbert Prancklyn; CO 137/91, Williamson to 
Dundas 10th and 13th April, 20th June, 6th and 13th July 1793 (with inclosures); 
WO 1/58,199-221.1 
121) CO 245/1,160. Apparently through an officer in one of the Irish regiments 
at le Cap. 
122) Garran-Coulon III 353. Claude-Isaac, che'talier de Borel, sugar planter of 
Verrettes, militant racist and 1eopardin, in April he had tried to hold Port 
au Prince against the Commissioners' forces. Always a soldier of fortune, he 
had been captured in 1778 by Arabs in: o pt, when on a secret mission: Appel 
inter; 45 n. i. The Jamaican press announced, 'rd. Borel is a friend to 
independence or a annexation with England': Royal Gazette 1793, no. 11 p. 23. 
123) Garran-Coulon III 322-6. 
124) See ibid. III 287-9. How many thought like Admiral Cambia that 'la 
Commission Civile nest point la Convention Nationale'? See A. N., Dxxv 54/521, 
log of the 'Jupiter'. 
125) Sometime president of the Saint Marc Assembly, 1eopardin and pamphleteer, 
he was sent to France like Cougniac-Mion by the second Colonial Assmebly but 
appears to have been little inclined towards foreign intervention. 
126) Garran-Coulon III 366-482, esp. 446 and 461-2. Cougniac-Mion thought he 
could win over Galbaud 
(A. N., C8A 103,176) as apparently did de Beaunay but 
see Malouet's version: - Galbaud, 'ardent republicain mais tres brave homme et 
oroole proprietaire rallioit ä lui ce que restoit des honnetes gens... ce parti 
quoique anti-royalistes preteroit probablement encor 
ä une negociation': 
WO 1/58, Malouet to Dundas 15th August 1793. 
127) A. N., C8A 103,187-190. 
128) Frotin, Intervention 326-7,357. 
129) Charles-Joseph Loppinot de Beauport was, like 14ontalembert, a French- 
Canadian soldier long in le service du roi, though more closely acquainted 
with the colony. He owned a coffee plantation near Jeremie and in 1790 was 
commandant particulier of-Port au. Prinee. 
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130) See above, note 127; also, B. L , Add. GIs. 38228,192. 
131) See WO 1/58,377-383- 
132) See above, note 127- 
133) ucbu typescripts, Urizar to Acuna 27 de septiembre de 1793; Ardouin, 
Etudes II 108; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1257" 
134) B. N., Laveaux Corresp. I, Garcia y Moreno to Jean-Frangois 9/10 juillet 
1793- 
135) See CO 137/93,170-3; A. G. N., Archivos Real de Higuey, Leg. 22/48,51, 
52; also below, note 171. 
136) Frostin, Intervention 358; Dundas Papers II9 Malouet to Dundas 9th 
November 1793. 
137) 00 137/93,170-5- 
138) Uma typescripts, Vailiant'to Alcudia 3 de mayo de 1793. Vizien Des- 
ombrages had served 20 years in the colony and owned a plantation at lea 
Cayemittes. 
139) To borrow the phrase of Mile. Perrotin. 
140) There were 750 in Port au Prince alone: Garran-Coulon III 356. 
141) Ibid. IV 23-37. 
142) Ibid. IV 72,97" 
143) Ibid. IV 210-1. 
144) However, the campagnard. party in the French Windwards, where there was 
no slave revolt and much less of a race problem, also wanted an English 
occupation. Martinique's planters were 
in several respects more extreme than 
those of Saint Domingue - they openly seceded in September 1792, were the 
first to sign an agreement with the British Government and revolted again in 
theepring of 1793, anticipating British help. 
145) J4ýrdmie, Cap Dame Marie, Abricots, lea Cayemittes. 
146) Whites formed, an unusually large percentage of the population in this 
recently-settled area, insulated against outside influence by. poor roads, 
swamps and high mountains. 
See above, p. 36 and, on the slaves, cb. II n. 73. 
147) Francois Legras: 'one of the richest inhabitants of the colony!, he had 
been allowed to cross from Jamaica to Je'remie some time before and this is 
doubtless why Williamson was expecting overtures from April onwards, the very 
time commandant Desombrages left for Cuba: WO 1/58,409-412; CO 137/91, 
Williamson to Dundas 13th April, 20th June, 13th July 1793. Desombrages, too, 
soon ended up in Kingston. 
148) Precis Historique 1122. 
149) CO 137/91, Williamson to Rundas 8th September 1793 (secret). 
150) Garran-Coulon IV 152-172. 
151) CO 137/92,263-4- 
152) Ibid. 265-8. possibly, it was the Conseil de Paix et d'Union that caused 
he changes or the mayor, Savary. The approach to Spain was later said to 
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be simply a safeguard against Spanish vengeance: see below, note 197. 
153) Co 137/92, Williamson to Dundas 19th January 1794. 
154) CO 137/92,177-180; B. M., Add. Ms. 38229,128. 
155) J. A. V. A. C., (1793), 'Triomphante' papers, Dubourg and Bonvallet to Grant 
9th December 1793. The-previous meetings were chaired by Constant de Castelin 
with the notary Navailles as secretary. 
156) Ibid., piece no. 13. 
157) CO 137/92, Whitelocke to Williamson 18th December 1793" 
158) Jacmel, Bainet, Saltrou and Cayes de Jacmel. Three hundred whites from 
the latter district had also fled to Saltrou, from where they thou called 
for British protection: CO 137/92,241-4 and Whitelocke to Williamson 29th 
December 1793. 
159) CO 137/92, Williamsonn to Dundas 15th December 1793 and 15th January 1794; 
CO 137/91, Williamson to Dundas 19th October 1793- 
160) Four of them, Pellier, Menauteau, Rumadon and Branday, are referred to 
as bons ro_valistes;,: see below, n. 161. 
161) CO 137/91, Caries to Williamson 29th September 1793; CO 137/92, Grant to 
Williamson 4th January 1794. 
162) Mayor and National Guard Commandant since late 1791, his personal 
ascendancy was total. Educated in France, moins exalte' than the other free 
coloureds, he avoided reprisals against the whites. He is said to have been 
an officer in the Chasseurs du Comte d'Artois. 
163) Garran Coulon IV 177-180; CO 137/92,283-4. 
164) CO 137/92, Brisbane to Grant 27th December 1793- 
: L65) Ibid., address of 80 habitants of Tortuga; Milner to Grant 2nd January 
1794. 
166) James, Jacobins 135. 
167) CO 137/92, Williamson to Dundas 15th December 1793. 
168) See ibid., 263 and Brisbane to Grant 27th December 1793; CO 137/91, 
Dansey to Williamson 25th October 1793 and Conseil de Sürete to de Charmilly 
le 18 aout 1793- 
169) The British privateers were 'more savage to them than Blackbeard the 
pirate ever was': CO 137/50, Williamson to Nepean 19th October 1793. 
170) Jeremie and the Mole would soon have fallen, some thought: CO 245/5, 
report of le 11 ostobre 1794; CO. 137/92, Williamson to Dundas 25th November 
1793; Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 119-120. The people of Saint Marc said they 
could not resist much longer: CO 137/92,263; of. appendix B. Leogane was 
actually being besieged: WO 1/59,1-4- 
171) One proclamation announced to the French colony's 'Tropa de Capriciosos' 
that their crimes 'les hace indignos de vivir sobre la faz de la tierra, y 
acre hedores al mas vii tormento': A. N.; Dxxv 39/392, proclamation of 13 de 
Julio de 1793. 
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172) Where the planters were said to 'fear the Spaniards more than the 
brigands': CO 137/92, Whitelocke to Williamson 29th December 1793. 
173) See below, n. 183. Cf. the case of Morin at Saint"! are: B. N., Sonthonax 
Correspondence I, letter to Toussaint 3 vendemiaire V. 
174) Garran-Coulon IV 269-287- 
175) De Charmilly distributed over ¬2000 Secret Service money in the Grand' 
Anse: WO 1/61,523-6. Lapointe spent his own money: P. R. O., 30/8/349,376. 
176) Venault de Chakmilly, Lettre 102. 
177) P. M., Add. M. 38229,128. 
178) Edwards, Survey- 176-7; Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 128ff. 
179) Garran-Coulon IV 146-8; Cabon, Haiti III 203. 'When Caries reported to 
Williamson on 29th September that 'all' the garrison and 'most' of the town 
were willing to accept the Capitualtion (CO 137/91), he was evidently 
exaggerating or mistaken. Desertions from the Mole were to be common. 
180) See Co 137/92, Brisbane to grant 21st and 22nd December 1793, Grant to 
Williamson 19th and 24th December 1793, and pp. 195 7,279-281. 
181) J. A. V. A. C., (1793), 'Triomphante' papers, examinations of Esten and Grant. 
182) CO 137/92, Smith to Whitelocke 24th December 1793- 
183) Debien, Comptes, Profits II 39; Cabon, Haiti III 205. 
184) Debien, Esprit d'Independance 35; CO 245/5, report of 11 ostobre 1794. 
185) 'Des gene ä qui l'on a surement fait la lecon de Kingston prennent A 
'ääche de detruire ici toutes les nouvelles que M. B. et moi donnons: vous 
savez d'oü cela part. Mais ils soot peu dangereux... quelques bavards qui 
savent ä peine lire. ' See 
below, notes 199 and 201. 
186) Schoelcher, Vie 123. 
187) See CO 137/91, Williamson to Duudas 13th July 1793. 
188) See Co 245/10, passiv and CO 245/1,130-8. 
189) CO 137/92,264-5,277; collections of 400 and 300 signatures. 
190) Debien, Esprit d'Ind4pendänce-. 32ff. It is an impressionistic sampling. 
This is the denunciation's strength. A more comprehensive list might reveal 
all the occupants of public office at the time of surrender but tell us 
little. E. g. militia officers Who accepted to serve under the British were 
pardoned after the occupation even by the rigorous General Hedouville. The 
middle of the road man had no choice. 
191) CO 137/91, Williamson to Dundas 8th October 1793; CO 137/92,243-4. 
192) Prostin, Intervention 313. 
193) Laveaux'a sweeping condemnatior4f the mulattoes is excessive: Compte 
Rendu 16-17- He whitewashed equally guilty whites and was wrong about 
Savary and about Candy at Fort Dauphin, though the main culprit there was 
probably another mulatto, Albert: see Precis Historique 1 146. Nevertheless, 
it remains true that, with the exception of Ouanaminthe, the Mole and:. the 
Grand' Anse, occupied Saint Domingue was surrendered to its invaders by the 
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gene do couleur. 
194) CO 137/91, Williamson to pandas 19th October 1793. 
195) Garran-Coulon_IV 212-4. 
196) Ibid. IV 643; B. N., Laveaux Correep. I, Grandet to Laveaux 30 juillet 1794. 
197) J. A. V. A. C., (1793), 'Triomphante' papers, minutes of the Council of the 
Mole le 4 decembre 1793. rissous, apparently one"of its members, was married 
to a mulatress: Debien, Esprit d'Ind endý, 39, 
198) However, 28 refugee habitants from Port de Paix at Tortuga applied for 
British protection: CO 137/92, address dated 20th December 1793. 
199) CO 137/91, ' Berault to de Charmilly le 19 aout 1793. 
200) Schoelcher, Vie 72; WO 1/59,214-5. 
201) CO 137/91, Merceron to de Charmilly le 19 ao-ut 1793. Equally, it seems 
that the south coast mulattoes responded by killing Börauit'e father and one 
of his sisters and burning down their plantation: WO 1/61,580- 
202) In 1769, too, it had been, with Saint Louis, one of the least revolution- 
ary districts in the South: see Frostin, Histoire II 675-6. 
203) Pr6ois IIistorique I 122-3. 
204) Deneux later claimed that they also tried to contact the English in 
July, but this is not borne out by the evidence: e. g. his own statement, 
CO 137/92,38. Dillon's Regiment did send a deputation but apparently later. 
205) A. N., 08A 103,164-5- 
206) See Co 137/92, Brisbane to Grant 21st December 1793: 'the dread, the 
abhorrence, all. "ranka_of--people here have against the Spaniards is inconceivable. ' 
207) w0 1/581 377-383; UGM'`( typescripts, Arzobispe Fernando to Acuna 25 de 
septiembre de 1793; WO 1/58,409-426. p, mishap had forced them to return around 
10th August before setting out again. Numerous colonists from different parts 
of Saint Domingue answered Spain's call but within a month a hundred had 
(re)joined the English: CO 137/93,170-5. 
208) Coudniac-3: 1ion and Loppinot de Beauport were instructed to solicit aid 
from the Allied Powers, especially Spain: A. N., C8A 103,178. 
209) Grouvel, Cor2s 186. The vicomte de Saint Pont claimed, slbeit'in July 
1795, that Monsieur approved the Propositions, alias the 'petition from the 
royalists to the British ministry'. He insisted that no strings were attached 
to it: WO 1/61,525- 
210) CO 137/50, Williamson to Nepean 15th December 1793. 
211) CO 137/92, Grant to Williamson 4th December 1793. 
212) Laveaux, Comnte Rendu 53- 
213) Grouvel, Corp! 187. 
214) Louis Barthelemy de Faveranges, lieutenant de juhe in the senechauseee 
of J6r mie, sometime president of the second Colonial 
Assembly, owned a 
coffee plantation at Roseaux. The chevalier de Lacombe, ex-naval officer, 
was a sugar planter at les Cayemittes. Francois 
Maignie de Sailenave was a 
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rich creole with plantations at Cayemittes and jr. the North. 
215) Laurent-Eiarie and Jean-Suzanne de Leaumont were creole planters from 
lee Cayes and deputies to the second Colonial Assembly, Laurent-Marie being 
an ex-president. Hilaire Jouette was an unscrupulous and dishonest sugar 
planter from the West and second president of the Saint Marc Assembly. 
Claude-Frangois Valetin do Cullion, militant revolutionary, avow and owner 
of various properties in the South, had been a vice-president of the Saint 
Marc Assembly. 
216)C0 137/91, powers accorded to Legras, 23 juillet 1793. 
217) See above, note 201. 
218) CO 137/91, address dated 24 septembre 1793. 
219) WO 1/58,397-400. 
220) Co 137/92,195-7. 
221) Occupied by the Spaniards, Petite Riviere was out off from its natural 
outlet, SaintwMare. 
222)1See above, pp. 44-45. 
223) Co 137/92, Deneux to Williamson 1-novembre 1793. The following biog- 
raphical details that were enclosed in the letter presumably identify those 
behind it: - Lambert Marie Antoine Jean Deneux, b. Tours 1761, joined colonial 
artillery 1784, commandant of the Mole April 1792; Sulerend Caries, b. 
Carcassonne 1757, soldier since 1773, came to the Mole July 1790, ecrivain 
de la place; Francois Eugene Pecquerie, b. Paris 1751, page to Prince de 
Lamballe, artillery lieutenant 1778; Lascaris do Jauna, b. 'Martinique 1760, 
joined Saint Domingue militia 1778, adjutant do la place 1792; L6uis Duhoux 
de Montigny, b, Clermontois 1754, page to Prince de Conde 1766-73, served in 
Saint Domingue throughout the American War. 
224) See Etat detaille. However, Caries claimed to have lost his for'ltuno in 
the Revolution, and Duhoux's daughter was married to a plenter: CO 137/92, 
Caries to Shaw 14th November 1793; Debien, Esprit d'Indepandance 44. 
225) Co 245/10-and Geggus, Memoir passim; P. R. O., 30/8/125,187-9. Guillaume 
Frangois Mahe de Cormere was a high-ranking financial administrator in France. 
His brother Edouard was an official in Saint Domingue. He was the author of 
several tracts on the colony, on national finances and also in defence of 
another brother, the marquis de Favras, 
the conspirator. He owned property 
at le Cap but apparently never visited 
the colony. 
226) WO 1/58,661-674. Initially an outspoken autonomist, he had soon become, 
like most planters of la Croix des Bouquets, an opponent of the Saint Marc 
Assembly. 
227) See above, p. 46, note 66, and Co 137/93,170-5- 
228) Cf. above, pp-50-51 and note 101. 
229) WO 1/59,67. 
230) Edwards, Surve 22-23,172. 
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231) Venault de Charmilly, Lettre'87,103-4,106. 
232) Garran-Coulon I 118,111,519,446. 
233) Precis Historique I 26,173. 
234) Wimpffen, Voyage passim. 
235) I owe this information to M. B. Foubert, who has examined some 1200 
letters posted in this period. 
236) See above, note 201. 
237) Cited in Jean-Baptiste, Haiti 178. 
238) The phrase comes from Frostin, Histoire xxxx. 
239) Most of those on the lists of denunciation published by Debien were 
probably European-born 
(Esprit d'Ind6pendance 45) , like the signatories of 
the Propositions. As for de Charmilly, Saint Domingue's leading anglophile, 
he was brought up in England: WO 1/58, de Charmilly to ? 15th February 1793" 
He and Berault, Cadusch, Raboteau, their friend Lemoine, mayor of Jer6mie, 
all had a good command of English, as did Laborie, but this was probably not 
unusual. 
240) According to Edwards, the most genuinely pro-British area was Saint Marc, 
the Pompon blanc stronghold: Survey 169. The Grand' Anse, on the other hand, 
was to be a constant trial to the British. 
241) Here it must be stressed that in early 1793 Saint Domin ae was still 
very much a prize worth preserving. This explains the_colcnists': desperate 
sense of urgency in these months. Something of great value was still within 
their grasp but was fast slipping away: see ch. V. 
242) See below, ch. VI, note 49. 
243) CO 137/93, letter of 6th June 1794. Williamson agreed: 'a number' df 
planters were 'strong monarchists' who would revolt against the British even 
in peacetime, if the Monarchy was ever restored: WO 1/60,93-94. 
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35) See ibid.; Wilberforce, Life I 340-1; Anstey, Abolition 276, n. 96; 
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in the bibliography, although the National Union Catalof; ue gives that 
writer's name as Charles. James, Jacobins 132 wrongly gives his name as John. 
45) Edwards, Co_ 87-8i3. 
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128) Undated report (July 1794), SVO 1/59,213-4. Cf. ibid., 323-4. 
129) CO 137/92, Williamson to Dundas 14th and 20th January 1794. 
130) WO 1/59,348-352,372. 
131) w0 1/59,13-31,381-4,389-395,405-7; Lettre 162. 
132) CO 137/93, Williamson to Dundas 28th April 1794. However, an unusually 
candid sample of letters posted from Saint Marc in 
February 1794 reveals no 
complaints on this heading. One even observes 
that all free men were indebted 
to the mulattoes Bacquet and Charles Savary for opposing Sonthonax: J. A. V. A. C. 
1794, 'Union' papers. 
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133) Cabon, Haiti III 218-9. 
134) wo 1/59,559-563. 
135) X70 1/60,161. 
136) CO 137/89, Dundq. s to Williamson 5th June 1793. 
137) B. M., AdO. Ms. 12431/223-233; CO 137/91, Williamson to Dundas, 2nd 
December 1792. 
138) P. R. O., 30/8/137,17; CO 137/91, Edwards to Nepean, 15th May 1793; 
wo 1/60,371. 
139) CO 137/93, Dundas to 'Williamson 5th July 1794. 
140) CO 137/93, Portland to williamson 5th September 1794. 
141) Co 137/93,155. 
142) Precis Historique It 169. 
143) CO 245/5, passim. 
144) Precis Historique It 165. 
145) wo 1/59,597-8; wo 1/60,121-146. 
146) wo 1/60,215-265; B. N. 9 Laveaux Corresp. It Toussaint to Laveaux 4 
octobre 1794 and nrocýs-verbal of an assembly at Petite Riviera 30 septembre 
1794; T6tral, Expedition 335. However, it may be that Blancazenave, Christophe 
Hornet and their men really did defect temporarily but were soon won back by 
Toussaint. The tone of the Petite Riviere letter is certainly apologetic, and 
Laveaux, Compte Rendu 40 actually says Brisbane had bought the two commanders. 
Laveaux, it is true, always presented th4mu4attoes in the worst possible light, 
but then again, no mention of a plot is to be found in Toussaint's correspond- 
ence. 
147) Precis Historique It 171. 
148) CO 245/5, minutes of 17 octobre and 22 novembre; WO 1/60,, 261; 
Precis Historique It 171. - 
149) Cabon, Haiti III 160. 
150) Precis Historique It 159-160. 
151) CO 137/93,141fr.; WO 1/60,75-83. 
152) precis Historique It 169. A houngan is a voodoo priest. 
153) WO 1/59,435,559-563,632. 
154) Wo 1/60,97-99- 
155) Precis Historique I, 265. 
156) Ibid., 177. 
157) This paragraph is based on CO 137/94, Williamson to Portland , 14th Novem- 
ber 1794. 
158) Laveaux, Compte Rendu 41-42. 
159) See the letters printed in Cabon, Haiti III 294. 
160) B. N., LaveauX Corresp. It 152. 
161) Cabon, Haiti III 251,255; WO 1/59,311; B. N., Laveaux Corresp. I, 
Toussaint to Laveaux 19 juillet 1794, report by Chabot 29 septembre 1794. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
1) In September 1794, the Government stopped providing passages on credit 
for emigre colonists, and London merchants stopped granting loans on the 
strength of Saint Domingue property, though only temporarily: i70 1/59,545- 
554. 
2) Murray, West Indies 49. 
3) Despite the assertion in Murray, West Indies 51, the signing of the 
Capitulation did not 'compel' the Cabinet to reorganise the colonial gov- 
ernment. Saint Domin, ue's Capitulation allowed for the restoration of civil 
law only after the war was over. The Windward Islands' Propositions did 
envisage the immediate return of civil liberty but were not binding, as the 
colonies had to be taken by force, 
4) B. 11., Add. Ms. 38351,208; Geggus, Memoir 33- 
5) See below, ch. vi section (iii). 
6) B. M., Add. Ms. 38353,160. 
7) 170 1/59,599-602. 
8) The Portland Whigs joined Pitt's ministry in July 1794, forcing the over- 
burdened Dundas to shed some of his responsibilities. Although the colonies 
then came under the umbrella of the Home Secretary, Dungas, as Secretary for 
Wlarsretained a dominant influence in this sphere. He apparently did not want 
the job and accepted it anly at the King's insistence: B. M., Add. Ms. 40102, 
18-19. 
9) B. L , Add. TMis. 38351,202; Harlow, 
Founding TI 775- 
10) Copies of the Instructions exist in CO 245/3 and CO 319/4, and in 
abridged form, in Harlow and Madden, Documents 83-88. 
11) B. M., Add. Ms. 38353,140-1; 0 1/59,599; Keith, Documents 40-41. 
12) CO 318/11,129-138. 
13) See below, note 14. 
14) See 1,70 1/58,489 marginal note (in English), which adds that perhaps the 
1791 Canadian Constitution would be best for both Saint Domingue and Britain. 
15) See above, ch. III, pp. '50-5ý- 
16) B. M., Add. Ms. 38353,135" Many colonists indeed called for the status 
quo of 1789,1787 or 1784, 
but the Propositions clearly envisage a legis- 
lative assembly and even the conservative Mahe de Cormere would have accept- 
ed a small advisory body: Geggus, Memoir 33- 
17) MU=ay, niest Indies 55. 
18) Cabon, Haiti II 583; haborie, Anrendix 3-4. 
19) Instructions, art. 11; B. M., Add. Ms. 38353,140. 
20) CO 245/3 Portland to Williamson 7th November 1794 and passim. 
21) See Appendix C; CO 318/11,455, and above, notes 14 and 16. 
22) Cambridge History of the British Empire II 155-6; Manning, Government 342. 
23) CO 137/50, V'filliamson to Yonge 8 
th September 1793; The St. Domingo 
-I23- 
Review 47-51; whose author was probably John Rousselette: see below. 
24) J. A. V. A. C., 1793, Erle papers, Penman and Co. to Corbet 18th November, 
and Desroches to Branchu 22 novembre 1793. 
25) CO 137/94, Williamson to King 12th December 1794- 
26) Ibid.; CO 245/1,148; St. Domino Review 69-70. 
27) Ott, Revolution'(thesis) 104. 
28) Until le Borgne fell in September 1794, the Mole had exported some 
produce from the Spanish-occupied areas. 
29) (10 137/92, Bogle to Williamson 18th November 1793; CO 137/93, Smith to 
Williamson 22nd March 1794. 
30) CO 137/94, Williamson to Portland 20th December 1794. 
31) C0"137/93: Williamson to Dundas 25th Ilay 1794; WO 1/62,43; CO 137/91, 
Additional Instructions of September 3rd, 
32) WO 1/59,49-50; W0 1/60,671, etc, 
33) Barrister and President of the Chamber of Agriculture of le Cap in 1789, 
he was elected a deputy to the States-General and later was made President 
of the Superior Council of is Cap. A sullen man, said to have turned rev- 
olutionary out of spite for the Intendant, he was, nonetheless, by 1790 
calling for free trade and self-government for Saint Dominguez Precis fRist- 
orique 1197; Laurel, Vent 156. 
34) See above, ch. III n. V0 ; WO 1/59,651-2; CO 245/5,88-90. 
35) CO 137/92,315; CO 137/93, Williamson to Dundas lot August 1794. 
36) See CO 137/91 Dansey to Williamson 25th October 1793. In August 1795, 
Bogle wanted to continue importing the Americans' superior flour, while 
taking 50 of his needs from England: 'You know tine French are particularly 
nice in the article of Bread': WO 1/62,236. 
37) Unless otherwise stated, references to 'livres' and 'pounds' refer to 
'livres coloniales' and pounds sterling. 
38) There had been two poll taxes on plantation slaves. One financed the 
parish police forces and was administered by the Superior Council. The other 
was applied to the upkeep of the parish churches, roads and bridges and was 
controlled by the parish assemblies until 1787, when the Intendant angered 
the-colonists by consolidating the taxes and taking them over, though the 
Superior Council remained as watchdog. 
39) CO 245/5,82-89; i0 1/64,228,246-7 funds were advanced for Montalem- 
bert's activities by the British firm Dalton, Leriche and Beaumont. Richard 
Dalton, who had influential connections in the City, established himself at 
Port au Prince immediately after it fell: P. R. O., T 81/7 minutes of 20 
janvier 1796, etc. 
40) CO 137/93, Williamson to Dundas 1st August 1794; also cp. appendix E and 
P. R. O., A. O. 3/200, abstract 5, voucher 2. 
41) P. P. 9 1796-7 
XLIII 869; CO 137/50, Atkinson to NepeanT20th October 1793; 
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Wo 1/62,203. 
42) P. R. O., AO 3/200, final account. This does not include the pay of the 
British rank and file, who anyway represented no extra cost. 
43) WO 1/63,417; St. Domingo Review 19. 
44) Y10 1/59,629. Soldier, planter in the Cul de Sac since 1786, opponent of 
the S. Marc Assembly autonomists, promoter of the concordats with the free 
coloureds, he had briefly collaborated with Borel but had then been imprison- 
ed by him. Williamson saw him, through Cadusch's eyes, as 'always a violent 
party man and of all parties': CO 137/93, letter to Dundas 19th July 1794. 
The Precis Historique I 161 describes him as 'remuant par caractere... 
uniquement occupe des moyens de se rendre necessairet. 
45) See above, ch. V, section (iii). 
46) WO 1/59,587; 'O 1/63,417-8. 
47) See appendix D (i) and P. R. O., T 81/5 passim. 
48) 710 1/59,571-8; tiro 1/61,58. 
49) W0 1/63,55-57. The petitions are in Dundas Papers III 4-25 and ^ro 1/59, " 
413-420,461-482. They were signed by at most 600 colonists: WO 1/63,398. 
50) WO 1/59,587. 
51) See CO 245/5: 89-90; VM 1/60,487-497- 
52) WO 1/59,212,217; WO 1/61,60; WO 1/63,44. 
53) 170 1/60,93-94; above, ch. III n. *. 
54) Co 137/94, Williamson to Portland 14th November 1794, 
55) wo 1/63,497-509, memoire probably by Hawkesbury. 
56) Co 137/93,155. 
57) Precis Historique I 164; Apiendix D 
(ii). 
58) wo 1/61,6o-61,440,614; above, ch. III n. 5t. Dumas had used his eloquence 
to effect in the Revolution. Though conservatives depicted him as an extrem- 
ist, he had tried to moderate its course in 1791-2, when he had Oroduced a 
still-born constitution which weakened 
the Assembly and allowed the Governor 
to veto legislation: Garran-Coulon II*406-421; Roume, Rapport 
6-13; Blanche- 
lande, SupDl4ment 5. De Ronseray wqs regarded as a capable royalist. 
Substitut Procureur-General in 1789, he possessed through his wife, who hated 
Cadusch, substantial plantations in the South. 
59) w0 1/60,487-497" 
60) w0 1/61,60,526. 
61) 'Doyen des avocats', owner of several plantations, deputy to the States- 
General, he had in 1791 congratulated the Port au Prince regiment on 
murdering its colonel. 
62) WO 1/61,61-67,487-497; WO 1/59,628. 
63) See above, ch. VIr . 
64) wo 1/59,763-8- 
65) Co 137/93,146-9; pro 1/61,67-68. 
66) Ibid. The original decree wascarelessly drafted and needed extending in 4 
the 'Instructions pour les tribunaux' of 7th June 1794. One of the merchants 
involved was probably Edward Plunkett, an Irish-born naturalised Frenchman, 
who had lived at Islet some 16 years. Also established at Baltimore, he had 
relations at Kingston, where he had recently acquired British nationality, 
and at Havana. One of his brothers had been a general in Habsburg service: 
J. A. V. A. C., 1793, Ceres and Beaver papers, etc. 
67) This was also Dubuc Saint Olympe's plan: WO 1/58,661-674. 
68) CO 245/5 minutes of 4 novembre 1794. 
69) P. R. O., T 81/14 decree of 17 septembre 1795; CO 245/5,90. 
70) MO 1/59,571-589; 110 1/61,61. 
71) Co 245/5, minutes of juillet-septembre 1794. 
72) See appendix D (i). 
73) A French-born lawyer opposed to the free coloureds, he had built up a 
moderate fortune as a planter in the South.. 
74) P. R. O., T 81/6 passim; W0 1/61,23-26. 
75) Mercy-Argenteau told Lord Elgin that as regards talents and moral virtue 
he had been considered 'comme le chef de cette colonie' by both the old 
government and the inhabitants. Belin had left Baltimore for the Spanish zone 
in the spring, ready to renounce France if the Monarchy was not to be re- 
stored and to join whatever power offered protection. He arrived at the Mole 
in July, having fled the Fort Dauphin massacre. Dissatisfied with the 
Spaniards, he had probably already been in touch with Cadusch, a fellow 
northerner: WO 1/59,151-162,257-299,607-610; CO 137/93,170-5. 'N'ayant 
d'autre passion que celle de pouvoir compter pour quelquechose... se pretant 
egalement ä tous les parties' is the worst the acerbic Duboys could say of 
him: Precis Historique I 194. 
76) 170 1/61,33-34,63. Cf. ch. III n. 2. ,,. 
77) wo 1/61,33-76. 
78) Cf. the views of the financial administrator, '. Iahe de Cornere: Geg ts, 
?; ieoir - 33. Billard condemned the Grand' Anse's financial semi-autonomy 
but advised it be left unreformed until after the war. 
79) Co 245/5. 
80) Ibid., 99-101. 
81) Ibid., minutes of octobre-novembre 1794; Royal Gazette 1794, no. 50, p. 5. 
CHAPTER VII 
1) co 137/93, Wil? iamson to Rundas 20th July 1794; CO 137/50, Williamson to 
Nepean 15th December 1793, etc. The knighthood was intended to impress the 
colonists; he was to be invested at Port au Prince. It was not a golden hand- 
shake conferred after his recall, as has been claimed 
2) Franco, Documentos 77-78. Son of a Lieutenant-general of artillery, a 
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a soldier since the age of 12, he had been trained as an engineer/gunner and 
had served in the French West Indies in 1762. He was 58 years old: Dictionary 
of National Biography. - 
3) See the Journals of the Assembly, Royal Gazette, etc., particularly 
CO 137/95 Balcarres to Portland 11th May 1795. 
4) See CO 137/95, Balcarres to Portland 27th September 1795 with enclosures, 
but also Furness, War passim. 
5) SWO 1/60,157,206-7; w0 1/62,21-23. The Admiralty was extremely inefficient 
at this period but there is no evidence it contribute4to the delay; ß. 1S., Add. 
Ms. 40179,9-26. 
6) WO 1/61,709; Precis Historique I 179. 
7) Moreau de Saint fiery II 1079,1082; Venault de Charmilly, Lettre 163. 
8) Corvington, Port au Prince II 135-9" 
9) Precis Historique I 173; Royal Gazette 1794, no. 52,19; WO 1/60,341-6; 
Ito -1/63,103. 
10) w0 17/1986, returns of 26th October 1794; Edwards, Survey 203. 
il) St. Domingo Review 29; RO 1/62,157-160. 
12) CO 137/94, Williamson to King 16th June 1795. 
13) P. R. O., ADM 102/426 and 730; J. A., 1B/5/3/20, minutes of 29th September 1794. 
14) CO 137/95, Williamson to King 27th April 1795; Royal Gazette 1794, no. 's 
36-52; Defermon, Rapport 7; Cabon, Haiti III 295; 170 1/62,399; WO 6/6,291. 
15) WO 1/60,277-284; Fro 1/63,103. 
16) WO 1/62,5-10. 
17) WWO 1/62,71-73; rro 1/63,47-51. 
" 18) wo 1/63,103-4; B"N., Lav. Corresp. II, Toussaint to Laveaux 6 pluvioso 
III; CO 137/94, Williamson to Portland 5th March 1795. 
19) ßl0 1/63,103; B. N., Lav. Corresp. I, Toussaint to Pierre Michel and 
Laveaux 4 and 19 Primaire III, and the misdated proclamation in vol. II 328-9; 
Laveaux, Compte Rendu 45-51. 
20) B. N., Lav. Corresp. I, Toussaint to Laveaux 4 octobre 1794. 
21) B. N., Lav. Corresp. I 163, II 2,426. 
22) See below, n. 24. 
23) L veaux, Comnte Rendu is incorrect in saying Verrettes fell in December. 
The account of its capture in Gragnon-Lacoste, Toussaint 106-110, supaosedly 
based on Louverture family papers, and also used in Schoelcher, Vie, 110-1, 
either refers to events of one year later or is entirely bogus. Cf. W 1/65, 
21-22; B. N., Lav. Corresp. I 163, and below, n. 24- 
24) B. N., Lav. Corresp. II Toussaint's letters of 29 nivose, and 6,12 and 18 
pluviöse III; +0 1/61,157-99 
25) 170 1/61,709; Precis Historique I 178-9; St. Domingo Review 29. 
26) Tw0 1160,675-7- 
27) Precis Historique I 180ff. 
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28) 170 1/62,125-143; Laveaux, Compte Rendu 56-57. His correspondence is 
silent for several months. 
29) 7w0 1/61,157-160. 
30) See B. N., Lav. Corresp. II 65-123. 
31) B. N., Lav. Corresp. II, Toussaint to Laveaux 26 messldor and 3 thermidor III. 
32) 'L'hom~ie de genie en ferait un champ do gloire, ' had varittnn Moreau de 
Saint-1 ry (I1919). Though regarded as impregnable, it was, ironically, to 
change hands during the war more times than any other parish. 
33) CO 245/5, minutes for November. 
34) P. R. O., T 64/230/9, letter by Vendryes 15 octobre 1795; T 81/6 passim. 
35) wo 1/63,100. 
36) 170 1161,314,521; Precis Historique 1195" 
37) Precis Historique 1172-7. 
38) ß'1o 1/61,526,710. 
39) W0 1/61,23-26; WO 1/63,42-57. 
40) Precis Historique I 180-6. 
41) Dundas Papers II 22-23; Precis Historique I 185-6; P. R. O., T 81/14, first 
procl. -Lmition. 
42) St. Domingo' Review 8-9,26; 170 1/61,568,595" 
43) Precis Historique 1185-6. 
44) See below, ch. The text of this and the following decrees can be found 
In P. R. O., T 81/14 and 17, or in I. J., L, is. 36F, dossier 2. 
45) wo 1/63,411-422; CO 245/5, minutes for June ; 795- 
46) rro 1/61,420-7; WO 1/62,49. 
47) This included Malouet, who two years before had said that the arming of 
slaves meant the end of slavery; see 10 1/58,35ff.; 170 1/60,255; 7,0 1/61, 
161-2,455,821-6; Dundas"Papers II 30-31, but also 170 1/63,167. Briefly, at 
the height of the Maroon War, the Jamaicana thought a black corps would be 
needed in Jamaica but otherwise abhorred the idea: CO 137/88-100 passim. 
48) Precis Historique I 186. 
49) wo 1/60,97-99,152,290; WO 1/62,95-106; 149-152,351-2. 
50) WO 1/61,420-7; WO 1/62,13-19. 
51) WO 1/59,421-4,656; Dundas Papers II 32-34; Laborie, Appendix 96,114,129. 
52) 710 1/59,63,189,193-4. 
53) w0 1/61,91,135-144,177,213; Co 137/94, "Williamson to Portland 13th 
January 1795- 
54) 1,170 1/61,221ff. 
55) W0 1/61,439-441,637-643- 
56) CO 245/5, minutes of 15 j. n and 17 juillet 1795- 
57) B. M., Add. us. 38353,135. 
58) WW70 1/59,647-8; 170 1/61, E58-161,741-4; Precis Historique I 192. 
59) WO 1/61,521-2. 
60) Precis Historique I 186; WO 1/61,521,710. 
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61) WO 1/61,737-740. 
62) Pr6cis Historique I 193; 1170 1/61,731-4. 
63) coo 1/61,309-318; pro 1/63,363. 
64) wo 1/61,731-4; NO 1/63,411-422. 
65) WO 1/61,23-26,44; WO 1/63,42. 
66) WO 1/60,407ff.; To 1161,125-130,181-184,261-7; Lokke, Diploms. cy, 
passim. Williamson was ready by late 1794 to let the Spanish take the North, 
as he assumed Britain would gain it at the peace. Even Charmilly came to 
agree that Spanish co-operation was necessary but insisted it must be bought 
with subsidies not territory, whereas MMalouet accepted that the two powers 
would divide the colony: 00 1/61,199-202. 
67) F10 1/61,679-681; Royal Gazette 1794, no. 32,23, 
68) Spain had actually made peace with the Republic in July but this was not 
known in Port au Prince till September. 
69) WO 1/61,717; B. N., Lav. Corresp. II, Toussaint to Laveaux 19 thermidor 
and 28 fructidor (undoubtedly meant to be thermidor) III. This last letter 
has been responsible for Schoelcher Vie 145) and many others wrongly assuming 
that Toussaint retook Mirebalais in September. 
70) WO 1/61,599-600. 
71) W0 1/61,717-721; B. N., Lav. Corresp. I 128, II Guion to Toussint 29 
thermidor III, Toussaint to Laveaux 5 fructidor III. According to Toussaint, 
Dessources lost at least 300 out of over 600 men; according to Williamson, 91 
out of 485: WO 1/62,274. Regimental returns show only 74 dead but another source 
reports several hundred killed: WO 17/1987, September returns; WO 1/66,581. 
Assuming that Dessources' regiment was 'a famous corps of white Creoles', C. L. R. 
James calls this a 'victory of the black sansculottes over the old planters': 
Black Jacobins 159. Politically, this was true, but the bulk of troops on both 
sides were ex-slaves and, of the five Republican commanders in action, one was 
white and two were mulattoes. 
72) tiro 1/63,478,521; WO 1/62,349. , 
73) P. R. O., T 81/14, decree of 17 septembre 1795. 
74) wo 1/61,575-7,663-7; pro 1/64,1,53-54. 
75) Precis Historique I 198-9; WO 1/61,715., Two lawyers were gaoled merely for 
repeating planters' complaints that he was ruining the estates of the Cul. 'de Sac. 
76) P. R. O., T 81/14 and 7, decrees and minutes of September 1795. 
77) B. M., Add. dis. 38352,12; Precis Historique I 205,216,271,315-6, 
78) See Appendix D (i). Representing the South, were Busson, a meticulous lawyer, 
who though involved in the secession of la Grand' Arise had been seneschal of le 
Cap and owned numerous properties in the North, and de Villars, a Louisiana-born 
soldier who owned a south coast plantation and had been commandant of Leogane. 
Busson became the Council's man of affairs, as Billard had been. 
79) Cf. below, ch. 
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80. ) P. R. O. ,T 81/]: 4, various decrees December 1795. 
81) However, of all the emigre regiments therl recruiting in Europe, do Char- 
milly's was the most top-heavy and Montalembert's a close third, Double- 
officering was permitted for the West Indies but no cavalry regiment needed 
17 majors! See P. P. 1795-6 XLI 821. 
82) 170 1/60,319,325; 7,10 1/61,821-6. 
83) See Wright and Debien, Jamaigue 66, which wrongly assumes i't tb have been 
a black corps. As compensation, Roche jacquelein-was made colonel of the now 
Chasseurs de Cayemittes. 
84) Mongin and Faveranges retained the seneschalcies of Port au Prince and 
Jeremie. L. M. de Leaumont stayed as Principal Administrator of Absentee 
Property but with reduced powers. Borel, after commanding colonial troops at 
Saint Marc, had probably left early in 1795. Raboteau was a prisoner of the 
Republicans. De Charmilly had left the fold and was now in the political wild- 
erness, already out of favour with Asontalembert, ignored by the British gov- 
ernment and superseded by Malouet as Deputy. Around November, Dundas decided 
he could keep his colonelcy on condition he did not return to Saint Domingue: 
WO 1/63 passim. 
85) Wo 1/61,725-8. 
86) Cf. Precis Historique passim. 
87) E. g. CO 137/95, Dumas to Portland 24 septembre 1795. 
88) Precis fiistorique I 173-5,206-214,220-5,257,271. 
89) Ibid.. 178; Dundas Papers I, piece no. 5; Co 137/93, Cadusch to ? 14 Juno 
1794" 
9o) wo 1/61,339-340,524. 
91) See Dundas Papers II 22. 
92) See below, ch. %) 1 eq" VIS-° . 
93) Garran-Coulon IV 471-7,579-580- 
94) A. N., c8A 103,187-9; W0 1/65,707- 
95) Cp" W0 1/64,225-242 and Laborie, 'Appendix passim. 
96) wo 1/64,141-3; Precis Historique I 204. 
97) P. P. 1796-7 XLnI 869; WO 1/61,467-471- 
98) Trio 1/61,529-539; P. P. 1796-7 . III 868. 
99) Idas Papers II 30-31; Laborie, Apn endix 136; WO 1/61,595; 710 1/62,477. 
loo) Co 245/3, Portland to Williamson 10 December 1794. 
101) PTO 1/61,567-8,727-749; McIntosh and Weber, Corresnondance 161. 
102) P. P. 1796-7 XLIII 868. 
103) Cp. ibid., ?! 0 1/61,67 and Laboriv Appendix 29-30. 
104) wO 1/61,66; o 1/64,397; Precis Historique I 204. 
105) Wo 1/61,529-539; W0 1/64,129. 
106) P. R. O., AO 3/200, Bogle's final account. ¬227,282 in specie was shipped 
from Jamaica; the r6st was. met . largely by. bills of' exchange.. 
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